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This thesis examines whether economic rationalist policies, as implemented by
Labor, and as reconunended by rationalists in the 1983 to 1996 period, are the key to
achieving national competitive advantage, restructuring and employment growth. It
is argued that, while the policies made some progress in this regard, more could
have been achieved through the use of strategic industry policies. The key weakness
of the rationalist policies advocated in the period is argued to be that they were
based on an uncritical faith in market forces - almost alone - to produce economic
prosperity.
National competitive advantage is crucially dependent on the capacity to innovate.
Markets fail to produce competence in a range of activities crucial to competing on
the basis of innovation, such as research and development (R&D), technology
diffusion, work organisation, management, education and training, finance and
export marketing. This thesis argues that strategic industry policies can foster
national excellence in such capabilities, and so bring improvements in national
competitive advantage, restructuring and employment growtþ beyond that
achievable by markets alone.
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The period 1983 to1996 was a decisive turning point in Australia's economic history.
It was a period in which the Labor Party placed unprecedented faith in the capacity
of free markets to deliver economic prosperity. This faith underpinned a range of
economic policies implemented in the period, such as tariff cuts, free market reform
of Australia's economic infrastructure, small goverrunent policies, deregulation of
the financial system, wage restraint and deregulation of the labour market.
In this period, economic rationalism came to be widely accepted as the key to
international competitiveness by most of the key decision making groups in
Australian society, including the media, the Opposition Coalition parties, business,
the financial markets, the economic bureaucracy and key government advisers.
Rationalism achieved a remarkable power in the period, such that anyone seeking to
influence social or economic policy had to argue within the rationalist paradig-.'
When a particular form of knowledge pivotal to determining economic and social
outcomes comes to be widely accepted as'...divine wisdom...','cateftJl analysis
seems vital, especially given that globalisation has increased the speed at which
national economic performance can ascend or decline.3 If Australia has attached itself
to a flawed economic paradigm, the decline in living standards and employment
opportunities will be swift.
This thesis examines whether economic rationalist policies, as implemented by
Labor, and as recommended by rationalists in the period 1983 to 1996, are the key to
achieving national competitive advantage, restructuring and employment growth.
The policies of the Industry Commission (IC) are given prominence in the
discussion, as they are key advisors to the Federal Government on industry policy,
and their recommendations enjoy currency among the economic elite. IC
recommendations reflect 'textbook' rationalism, with free market solutions
invariably recommended.n Referring to IC views on key industry policies facilitates
analysis of hardline rationalist policies recommended by the IC, but not
implemented by Labor.
Of course, Labor was not always purely rationalist, and its implementation of some
active industry policies - such as thei 150 per cent R&D tax concession - illustrated
how well-designed industry programs can advance economic performance beyond
that achievable by markets alone. F{owever, rationalism was the key thrust of
1 Kennetlr Davidson, 'Defrocking the priests' in Donald Horne (ed.), The Trouble Witlt Econontic Rationalism,
Scribe Publications, Newham, Victoria, 1992, pp.58-62 at p.58.
2 Donald Florne, 'It's time for a think' in Donald Florne (ed.), op. cit., pp.2-12 atp.6.
' Ab" David & Ted Wheelwright, The Third Waoe: Australian and Asian Capitalism, Left Book Club Co-
operative, Newtown, New South Wales, 1989, p.154,155,'162,L63; and Stephen S. Cohen & John Zysnan,
Manufacturing Matters: Tlæ Myth of tlæ Post-Industrial Economy, Basic Books Inc., New York, USA, 1.987, p.xüi.
o P"t". Ewer, Winton Higgins & Annette Stevens, lfnions and the Future of Australian Manufncturing, Allen and
Unwin, Sydney, 1987, p.1.26. John Warhurst & jenny Stewart ch.7'Manufacturing industry policies' in Brian
W. Head & Allan Patience (eds), From Frøser to Høutke: Austrnlian Public Policy in the L980s, Longman
Cheshire, Melbourne, 1989, pp.1,59 -17 6 at p."161..
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Labor's economic policies, which justifies using this period to analyse the utility of
economic rationalism.
It should be noted from the outset that this thesis is centrally concerned with policy
in the abstract. It critiques the economic rationalist policies implemented or
recommended in the period and offers alternative economic policy directions. It does
not seek to engage the literature on how the ideas of the Chicago School came to
dominate the thinking of the economic bureavctacy, as discussed in books such as
Michael Pusey's Economic Rationalism in Cønberra.t Nor does it seek to deal with the
political process of establishing an economic agenda and having it maintained by
political parties and the bureaucracy.
K"y Concepts
Before discussing the arguments and structure of the thesis, the key concepts
examined - namely 'economic rationalism', 'industry policy' and 'restructuring' -
need to be defined and discussed. This is important because these terms do not have
universally accepted meanings.
For some,'economic rationalism' is synonymous with'neo-classical economics'.u The
primary focus of this thesis is not on progressive neoclassical economics, which has
long endorsed at least a minimal role for goverrunent to correct areas of market
failure.'
The k"y focus of this thesis is on 'economic rationalism' as discussed and
implemented by policy elites in the period 1983 to 1996. Modern Australian
rationalism is dominated by the assumptions that a market allocation of resources
maximises efficiency and growth, and that industry policy invariably reduces
growth. As rationalists admit, they place substantial faith in the market - almost
alone - to enhance economic welfare.u Bob Hawke said in the Curtin Lecture of 1983
that: 'Social Democrats have no reason to deny the capacity of markets to allocate
resources efficiently...'n Flawke's key adviser Ross Garnaut advocated '...extensive
Michael Pusey, Economic Røtionalism in Canberra: A Nation Building State Changes its Mind, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, England, 1991.
David Clark, 'Economic rationalism in Australia', The Austrøliøn Financial Reaieu¡,20 September 1995, p.32,33
atp.32.
Stuart Rees, Gordon Rodley & Frank Stilwell (eds), Beyond the Market: Alternatiz¡es to Economic Rationalisn,
Pluto Press, Leichhardt, New South Wales, 1993, p.9.
Rationalists who acknowledge this include: Ian R. Harper & Phillip j. Leslie, 'The case of financial
deregulation: "Economic rationalism on trial"' in Stephen King & Peter Lloyd (eds), Economic Rationnlism:
Dead End or Way Fonttard? , Allen and Unwirç St Leonards, New South Wales, 1993, pp.84-107 at p.88; and R.
Lattimore, B. Martiru A. Madge & J. Mills, Design Principles for Small Business Progrøms and Regulations,
Auslnfo, Canberra, -1998, p.48. Rationalist critics who view this as the key defining element of rationalism
include: Frank Stilwell, ch.2'Economic rationalism: Sound foundations for policy?' in Stuart Rees, Gordon
Rodley & Frank Stillwell (eds), op. cit., pp.27-37 at p.27; John Carroll, 'Economic rationalism and its
consequences' in John Carroll & Robert Manne (eds), Shutdoam: The Failure of Economic Rationalisw and Hoat to
Rescue Australia, Text Publishing Company, Melbourne, 1992, pp.7-26 at p.7; and Michael Pusey, Reclaiming
the Middle Ground...from Nrat Right Economic Rntionalism - A Paper Presented at The Uniaersity of Melbourne,
Mondøy/Tuesday, 15 €t 16 Februnry 1993 to a Conference on Economic Rationalism? Economic Policies for tlrc 1990s,
Unpublished, 1993, p.9.








use of markets in the allocation of resources,.."o and influential rationalist Tony Cole
argued that: 'A major role for goverrunent is to ensure that market signals get
through to individuals and firms."' At their most extreme, rationalists automatically
assume that the costs of government intervention will outweigh its benefits.'' Pusey
is only slightly overstating the position when he writes: ''Economic rationalism' is a
doctrine which says...that markets and money can ahuays, at least in principle,
deliver better outcomes than states and bureaucracies."'It is this key defining feature
of economic rationalism, namely its faith in free markets to deliver economic
prosperity, that is the key focus of this thesis.
'Industry policy' also has no universally accepted meaning. For much of Australia's
history, 'industry policy' was conceived as referring primarily to the free
ftadef protection debate. The Brigden Report o11929, which was taken to legitimise
continuing protection, was a classic of the free trade/protection notion of industry
policy, as its central question concerned whether Australia would be more
prosperous under protectionist or free trade policies.tn Even during the 1980s, a
significant proportion of Australia's total assistance regime was made up of tariffs
and quantitative import restrictions.tt Today, people advocating an active role for
government are still sometimes labelled 'protectionists', even where they explicitly
reject the use of tariffs and quotas as tools of industry development.
Others view 'industry policy' as referring to those policies that favour particular
sectors over others. In some instances, such authors state that while such 'sectoral'
policies are ill advised, some active industry policies, such as R&D assistance, rnay
be appropriate, where such assistance is available to firms throughout the economy.
The key flaw in this conception is that all government policies favour certain sectors
more than others. For example, tertiary education and R&D policies will favour
knowledge intensive sectors more than others, even where they are made available
to all sectors.
This thesis takes'industry policy' or'strategic industry policy' to refer to nII tl'¡e ways
that government influences industry, from macroeconomic policy to regulation and
to more commonly accepted 'industry policy' areas like R&D. This includes areas
like education, which have important social purposes, quite separate from advancing
the cause of industry. This broad definition of industry policy is important because
10 
Ross Garnaut, ch.2 'Trade and industrial policy after the Uruguay Round' in Michael Costa & Michael
Easson (eds), Australian Industry: What Policy?, Pluto Press in Association with the Lloyd Ross Forum of the
Labor Council of New South Wales, Leichhardt, New South Wales, 1991, pp.47-68 atp.62.
tt 
Tor'ry Cole, ch.4 'Australia and the world trade environment: The difficult road to competitiveness: What is
the government's role?' in Michael Costa & Michael Easson (eds), op. cit., pp.97-1'06 at p.103.
'' Fo. example, in Industry Commission, Impediments to Regional Industry Adjustment Draft Report: Volunrc 1:
Rcport, Industry Commission, Canberra, 1993, p.222, the IC argued that '...policies such as tax
concessions...lead to a misallocation of resources among economic activities, thereby reducing national
income...'
'3 Michael Pusey, Reclaiming the Middle Ground From Neut Right Economic RationøIism, op. clt., p.4.
14 
J.B. Brigden, D.B. Copland, E.C. Dyason, L.F. Giblin & C.H. Wickens, Australian Tariff: An Econonúc Ënquiry,
Melbourne University Press in association with MacMillan & Co. Ltd., Melbourne,1,929.
rs Robert Albon & Rod Falvey, ch.7 'Trade policy and microeconomic reform in Australian manufacturing' in
Peter Forsyth (ed.), Microeconomic Reþrm in Australia, Allen and Unwiry St Leonards, New South Wales,
1992, pp.745-163 at p.151.
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coherent industry policies can be implemented only where the totality of the effect of
all government policies on industry are considered. Each component of government
policy can then be directed towards an overall strategy for industry, rather than each
being directed toward different ends. Indeed, it appears that narrower conceptions
of industry policy may have produced negative results. For example, the tarfff
reduction policies of the 1991, Industry Statement served to exacerbate
unemployment in the short-to-medium term, at the same time as numerous other
policies, such as free market infrastructure reform and 'boom-bust' macroeconomic
policies, were also reducing employment. In an economic context of domestic and
international recession, such policies appeared to exacerbate the economic hardship
experienced in the period.
The term'restructuring' also has no universally accepted meaning. The word is often
used loosely, to refer to economic reform generally. In this thesis, 'restructuring' is
taken to refer to the process of structural change, whereby resources move out of
firms and sectors in decline and into firms and sectors experiencing growth. Thus,
the term encompasses changes in the composition of output and exports, both in the
economy as a whole, as well as within industries and sectors.
Restructuring is a central consideration in this thesis because Australia's commodity
dependent industry and export structures have been a key cause of the nation's
modest economic performance over the last three or four decades. World trade
growth has been relatively slow for mining and agriculture over this period, while
world trade in elaborately transformed manufactures (ETMs) and sophisticated
services has grown rapidly. Thus, increased national economic prosperity is, to a
significant extent, dependent on Australia's capacity to restructure the economy such
that more exports come from those sectors experiencing high world trade growth.
Given the importance of restructuring to Australia's economic future, the thesis
analyses the capacity of economic rationalism to restructure the Australian economy.
Rationalists make strong claims that free markets can produce efficient resource
allocation. If true, rationalist policies should result in changes to the composition of
Australia's trade and output such as to produce surging economic prosperity.'u
Structure and K"y Arguments
The structure and key arguments of this thesis are as follows:
In part or:re, Free Mørket Reforms, three key economic rationalist policies implemented
in the period are examined, namely tariff cuts (chapter one), free market reform of
Australia's economic infrastructure (chapter two), and small government policies
(chapter three). Chapter four then completes part one by examining the progress
made in the period in advancing international competitiveness, restructuring and
employment growth. The broad thrust of the argument is that rationalist policies did
Max Walsh, ch.2 'The demise of protectionism' in Chris Jones, Chris James & Andrew Norton (eds), A
Drtnce of Economic Rationalism, Allen and Unwin, St Leonards, New South Wales, 1993, pp.73-29 at p."19




appear to bring some net economic benefits. However, these benefits were associated
with significant dislocation. Furthermore, the benefits appeared to be moderate or
minor. The policies did not make a significant net contribution to employment
growth, produced only moderate restructuring and did not bring a major surge in
national competitiveness. Rationalist policies appeared more effective in facilitating
the 'release' of resources from firms and sectors in decline, than in fostering the
development and growth of new firms and emerging sectors. Mass unemployment
remained at the end of the period. More needed to be done to foster the 'growth
side' of restructuring.
In part two, Economic Røtionalism: The Kry to Nationnl Competitiue Adunn¡¡1g¿,
Restructuring nnd Employment Groruth7, the thesis examines why economic
rationalism may have produced only modest results.
In chapter five, a critique is made of the overall rationalist approach to economic
policymaking in the period. It is argued that the key flaw in the rationalist economic
framework was the view that free markets - virtually alone - can bring sound
economic outcomes. In the Hawke-Keating years, rationalists rarely engaged in an
active exploration of how industry policies could increase growth over a market
allocation of resources, and tended to simply assume that industry policies would
reduce economic welfare. This approach fails to acknowledge that the private sector
growth has always been crucially dependent on government investment and
government support structures. The rationalist framework therefore has the capacity
to limit economic prosperity by failing to foster those capabilities crucial to national
economic development, but subject to market failure.
The major limitation of this rationalist'no industry policy' approach is that it fails to
foster an innovation-driven economy. This is a serious weakness because - as
chapter six argues - the capacity to innovate is the most important determinant of
employment growth, restructuring and national competitive advantage. The term
'innovation' denotes the creation of new or substantially changed products and
processes. It encompasses a vast afiay of innovative activities needed to create new
products and improve efficiency, such as R&D, work re-organisation and
marketing.lT lnnovation is the key to national competitive advantage because success
on world markets now depends on being able to consistently create new, high
quality, sophisticated products that meet rapidly changing consumer demands.
Innovation is central to restructuring and employment growth because it drives
domestic and export sales growth, the development of new firms and the growth of
emerging market segments.
The key argument made in the remainder of the thesis - chapters seven to 1,4 - is that
rationalism can not produce an innovation-driven economy. Markets fail in those
capabilities crucial to achieving an innovation-driven economy, such as R&D,
technology diffusion and export marketing, yet rationalism rules out strategic
interventions to build up excellence in such capabilities. Strategic industry policies
can foster excellence in these capabilities and so help to create an innovation-driven
Barraclough and Co., Enterprise Improaement Through Innoaation: A Study for Auslndustry by Barrøclough and




economy. In this way, strategic industry policies can bring superior outcomes for
employment growth, restructuring and national competitiveness than market-based
policies alone.
In chapter seven, the structure and the arguments in chapters eight to L4 are
outlined. The chapteÍ commences by introducing the'innovation chain' concept, The
'innovation chain' refers to those capabilities that must be mastered if a nationrs
firms are to consistently achieve product and process innovation. Each main
capability is discussed in each of the remaining chapters as follows:
research and development (chapter eight);
technology diffusion (chapter nine);
work organisation (chapter 10);
management (chapter 11);
education and training (chapter 12);
finance (chapter L3); and
export marketing (chapter 14).
These capabilities can be viewed as forming an'innovation chain' because a firm or a
nation will not be able to consistently achieve product and process innovation if it
can not achieve excellence in every capability in the innovation chain. For example,
the full commercial potential of an innovative idea may not be tapped if managers
can not effectively oversee R&D projects or export drives, or if workers can not
effectively apply technology or implement innovative work processes.
Chapters eight to'1,4 generally have four sections. In the first section, the importance
of the particular capability considered in the chapter to achieving innovation, and in
turn, competitive advantage, restructuring and employment growth, is examined.
The central thesis that strategic industry policies are vital to creating an innovation-
driven economy is developed and evidenced by sections two to four in each chapter.
In section two, it is argued that the capability in question is subject to market failure
and that Australia's weaknesses in the area are preventing the nation from
competing through innovation. In section three, it is argued that rationalist policies
have not and will not produce excellence in the capability. In spite of market failure,
rationalists advocate little or no active industry policy to improve Australia's poor
performance in the area. Finally, in section four, overviews of some of the
government policies and programs that could improve performance in the capability
are provided. These fourth sections, while not intended to be comprehensive, are
important to demonstrating that strategic industry policies can help to create
competitive advantage for firms and the nation through innovation.
A key theme in this thesis is that economic rationalists, in their certainty that markets
- virtually alone - can produce economic prosperity, have 'choked off' economic
debate in those areas crucial to establishing a competitive, high employment growth







reasonable outcomes (albeit backed by a range of support structures provided by
government, including the maintenance of a system of law and public
administration, health, education, economic infrastructure, and scientific and
technological expertise.) The most difficult and decisive question is: 'In what areas
and how can government assist in improving economic performance?' While
rationalists focus rigorously on the weaknesses of industry policies and why they
should be eliminated or avoided, they rarely undertake an active, detailed and open-
minded exploration of how industry policies could improve national economic
welfare. The tendency for rationalists to simply assume that industry policy reduces
economic welfare is an approach to economics lacking in imagination, creativity and
intellectual rigour, particularly as large parts of the industrialised world engage in
active industry policies, many of which appear to advance economic prosperity. This
thesis seeks to make a contribution to re-opening Australia's economic debate.
Instead of a constant recitation of the 'no industry policy' prescription, it is hoped
journalists, economists, bureaucrats, political parties and tertiary economics lecturers
could refocus attention on the critical'what policy' question.
Of course, policies focused on innovation are not all that government can do to foster
international competitiveness. Firms throughout the economy would benefit from a
range of other policies to foster a sound business climate, including: reform of the tax
system so that it fosters productive business investment; further tarill reform;
implementation of competition and privatisation, where appropriate, in Australia's
infrastructure sectors; prudent macroeconomic policy; regulation reform; and
policies to encourage national savings.
Flowever, while other factors are important determinants of national
competitiveness, this thesis focuses on innovation because: it is the most important
factor in creating national competitive advantage; and, the failure of the rationalist
paradigm to foster the creation of an innovation-driven economy is the main factor
explaining its limited economic success.
Situating the Thesis
While the approach outlined in this thesis may have most in common with new
growth theory, the thesis does not seek to strongly align itself with any particular
theoretical perspective. Rather, the thesis has a strongly practical orientation. The
approach attempted in the thesis is to be guided by the empirical evidence in each
policy area, rather than recommend approaches pre-determined by rigid adherence
to one theoretical perspective. The result is that, in some areas, market-based policies
are advocated, while in others, strategic industry policies are viewed as important in
improving economic welfare. The primary focus of this thesis is on the application of
policy in practice, a matter that can be insufficiently addressed in discussion of
philosophy or economic theory.
The thesis seeks to find a niche less than fully explored within the Australian
critiques of economic rationalism implemented under Labor. The thesis analyses in
detail several key components of the economic rationalist policy agenda, critiques
the overall approach adopted by rationalism and outlines an alternative economic
policy agenda. While many of the books and articles of the period examined
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elements of the rationalist approach, few analysed its practical application in such a
range of areas, and, in particular, few attempted such a comprehensive critique of
the capacity of the rationalist paradigm to produce an innovation-driven economy.
Further, unlike many of the critiques of the period, this thesis has the advantage of
historical perspective.
Several of the critiques in the period touched on industry policy, but did not attempt
a sustained critique of rationalist economlcs. For example, The Trouble With Econonúc
Rntionølismtu made some sound criticisms, but most were outside the topic of
competitive advantage and employment creation. Additionally, the chapters lacked
detail, averaging only eight pages in length. Similarly, Mnrkets, Mornls nnd
Mønifestos" made a contribution, but only included one short chapter on industry
policy. Beyond the Markefo was also a compilation of chapters by different authors on
disparate topics.
Two books with much in common with this thesis were Shutdorun'' and Austrnlian
Industry: INhat Policy?," which covered many of the key issues of industry policy and
provided both solid criticism and economic alternatives. However, again, these
books were a compilation of chapters from different authors on different topics, and
the latter included contributions in support of rationalist economics. As Jenny
Stewart wrote of the critiques of rationalism in the period, more could have been
done to analyse the weaknesses of rationalist policies and to provide a credible
alternative."
Stewart's The Lie of the Leael Pløying Field'o effectively analysed many of the
weaknesses of the rationalist approach and outlined alternatives for a modern
industry policy. There are, however, several differences in emphasis between
Stewart's book and this thesis, such as the detail provided in this thesis on free
market infrastructure reforms and small government policy, as well as significant
differences in emphasis on alternative policy prescriptions. Most particularly,
whereas Stewart outlines suitable industry policy approaches in a broad range of
areas, admittedly including policies to encourage innovation, this thesis focuses
more narrowly, but in significant depth, on those industry policies that could help to
create an innovation-driven economy.
18 Florne, Donald (ed.), The Trouble With Economic Rationalism, Scribe Publications, Newham, Yictoria,'1992.
1e Peter Vintila, John Philtimore & Peter Newman (eds), Markets, Morals and Manifestos: Fighthack! and tltc
Politics of Economic Rationalism in the 1990s,Institute for Science and Technology Policy, Murdoch Ur-riversity,
Murdoch, Western Austr alia, 1992.
20 Stuart Rees, Gordon Rodley & Frank Stilwelt (eds), Beyond the Market: Alternatiues to Econonic Rationalism,
Pluto Press, Leichhardt, New South Wales, 1993.
" Johr, Carroll & Robert Manne (eds), Shutdoa¡n: The Føilure of Economic Rationalism and How to Rescue Austrølia,
Text Publishing Company, Melbourne, 1992.
22 Michael Costa and Michael Easson (eds), Australian Industry: What Policy?, Pluto Press in Association with
the Lloyd Ross Forum of the Labor Council of New South Wales, Leichhardt, New South Wales, 1991.
23 
Jenny Stewart, The Lie of the Leoel Playing Field: Industry Policy and Australia's Future, Text Publishing,
Melbourne, 1994, p.4.
24 
Jenny Stewart, The Lie of the Leoel Playing Field: Industry Policy and Australin's Future, Text Publishing,
Melbourne, 1994.
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This thesis also differs from many of the social science critiques of rationalism, which
have focused primarily on the negative social effects of rationalist policies. This
thesis attacks rationalism on its 'own tur(, namely economics, the area which
sustains its influence on government policy. Rationalist policies are likely to be
continued until Australia's elites are convinced that they are not the key to
maximising economic performance.
This thesis also starts from the premise that writers who only ever critique are doing
a valuable task, but are ultimately leaving their task only half done. Fostering
economic and social change requires that one not only deconstructs and critiques,
but also constructs an alternative approach for progress. As Daly writes:
The task is to expose economic rationalism for what it is - an approach to economic policy
which has shaky theoretical foundations and demonstrably dangerous consequences - and
to counter it with positive alternative economic strategies.2s
Australian economic rationalists, such as Costa, Duffy and Warby, have argued that
their critics are unworthy, while they fail to provide alternative economic policies
that can improve economic welfare beyond a market allocation of resources.tu While
this is untrue in terms of international literature," it is true that more Australian
alternatives could have been forthcoming. In part two, a range of policies that could
contribute to Australia achieving national competitive advantage through
innovation are outlined.
2s Maurie Daly, ch.5 'No economy is an island' in Stuart Rees, Gordon Rodley & Frank Stilwell (eds), op. cit.,
pp.72-90 atp.201..
26 Michael Costa & Mark Duffy, ch.L2'Labor and economic rationalism' in Chris james, Chris Jones & Andrew
Norton (eds), op. cit., pp.127-131 at p.130; and Michael Warby, ch.13 'Scapegoating and moral panic: Political
reality and public policy versus anti-rationalism' in Chris James, Chris Jones & Andrew Norton (eds), op.
cit., pp.132-1.42 at p.141.
27 For example, see Michael E. Porter, The Competitioe Adoantage of Nøtions, The Free Press, New York, USA,
1990.
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Part One: Free Market Reforms
Rationalists generally assume that if resources are allocated by the market, they are
allocated with optimum efficiency, leading to maximum economic and employment
growth. In part one, three of the key rationalist policies implemented in the period
are examined, namely tariff cuts (chapter one), free market infrastructure reform
(chapter two) and small government policies (chapter three). Of course, rationalist
policies were also implemented in other areas, most notably in deregulating the
financial sector, reducing wage levels and commencing the deregulation of the
labour market. Chapter four concludes part one by examining the progress made by
rationalist policies in restructuring the economy, propelling employment growth and
advancing national competitiveness. The argument advanced at its broadest is that
rationalist policies did bring net benefits in this regard, but the benefits were only
moderate, and were associated with considerable structural dislocation.
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Chapter One: Tariff Reform
Introduction
This thesis examines whether rationalist free market policies are effective in
generating employment, restructuring the economy and creating national
competitive advantage. This chapter tests the utility of free market policies as
applied in the 1988-1996 tariff program.
The belief in free markets underpins the rationalist enthusiasm for free trade.
Rationalists repeatedly claim that tariff cuts will reduce the allocation of resources
going to the least efficient industries, and increase the allocation of resources going
to the most efficient industries, thereby improving Australia's industry and export
structure, and producing an increase in gross domestic product (GDP) and
employment.'8 The assumption underlying this 'principle' is that any government
policy that alters resource allocation leads to an allocation of resources which
encourages inefficient industries and therefore sub-optimal economic and
employment growth. This assertion collapses to the extremely simple maxim: 'Let
resources be allocated by the market in order to attain optimal efficiency and
therefore optimal economic and employment growth.' 'Efficient' is directly and
automatically equated with 'allocation of resources by the market', arnazingly,
without adequate empirical substantiation.
In line with this simple logic, numerous rationalists, such as Ross Garnaut,
advocated the removal of all protection.'n Some rationalists argued the point with
much certainty, as typified by Anderson's belief in'...the logical conclusion of zero
tariffs..."o Similarly, Gregory and Pincus wrote:'The imposition of the tarifÍ reduces
welfare. It imposes a production and consumption cost on the community."'
The May L988 Economic Statement planned to reduce average effective assistance
from 19 to 13 per cent between May 1988 and the mid-1990s." The March 1991,
Statement involved reducing the general level of manufacturing assistance from 10
and 15 per cent in 1992 to 5 per cent by 1996." The average effective rate for
28 Industry Commission, Annual Report 1990-91, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 799'1,
p.227,228; Industry Assistance Commission,'The commission procedures: A paper prepared for the
committee to advise on policies for manufacturing' in Committee to Advise on Policies for Manufacturing
Industry, Policies for Dettelopment of Manufacturing Industry: A Green Pøper: Volume 3: Conmtissioned Studies,
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1975, pp.64-67 at p.64; and Kym Anderson & Ross
Garnau! Australian Protectionism: Extent, Causes and Effects, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1987, p."IO.
2e 
Free trade by 2000 is recommended in Ross Garnaut, Australia and the Northeast Asian Ascendancy: Report to
the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Governrnent Publishing Service,
Canberra, 1989, p.222.
30 Kym Anderson, 'International trade and Australian protectionism' in Stephen King & Peter Lloyd (eds),
Economic Rationalism: Dead End orWay Font¡ørd?, Allen and Unwin, St Leonards, New South Wales, 1993,
pp.1.08-"126 at p.1.21..
31 R.G. Gregory & J.J. Pincus, ch.6, 'Industry assistance' in L.R. Webb & R.H. Allan (eds), Industrial Econonics:
Australian Studies, George Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1982, p.113-1'62 at p.11'4.
32 
Ross Garnaut, Australia and the Northeast Asian Ascendancy, op. cit., p.209.
33 Industqy Commission, Annual Report 1990-91,, op. cit., p.69.
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manufacturing sectors, bar textiles, clothing and footwear (TCF) and passenger
motor vehicles (PMV), would fall from 13 to 3 per cent between 1987-88 and1996.'o
These changes mark a historic shift in policy. From 1930 and 1980, Australia's
manufacturing was the second most protected in the industrialised world,tt
protection had support from both major parties, the press, the Tariff Board and many
economiststu and it was thought to promote high wages, economic and employment
growth, and industrialisation." Thus, Australia moved from being a highly
protectionist nation Íor 70 years - which left the average effective rate of assistance
for manufacturing at 35 per cent in 1972-73 - to virtually a free trade nation, with an
average effective rate of assistance for manufacturing at around 6 per cent by 1996.t8
This chapter has three sections. The first section argues that Australia's tarifÍ policy
was outdated and counterproductive by 1960,let alone by the 1980s. Reform was
therefore justified. The second section highlights the benefits of tariff reform, arguing
that it is appears to have reduced costs, improved the composition of trade and
increased the focus on workplace performance. The third section analyses the
limitations and weaknesses of tariff reform, arguing that tariff cuts, while useful,
may have produced only mild benefits in terms of restructuring, growth and
international competitiveness.
L. Long-term High Protection Policies Impeded Restructuring, Growth
and Competitiveness
As numerous authors have argued, Australia's protectionist policy was initially a
useful strategy. It assisted the nation to industrialise, grow, employ and diversify its
industry base.'n While they debate the effect of tariffs on overall growth, even
rationalists like Anderson and Garnaut admit tariffs were central to the
industrialisation of Australia:
34 Industry Cornmission, Annual Report 1991-92, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 7992,
p.270.
3s Kym Anderson & Ross GarnauÇ op. cit., p.1.,43-45.
36 For analysis of this era, as well as the beginnings of the free trade resurgence among these groups, see: Leon
Glezer, Tariff Politics: Australian Policy Making: 1960-1980, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, Victoria,
1982; and John Warhurst, lobs or Dogma? The Industries Assistance Commission and Australiøn Politics,
University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, Queensland, 1982.
37 Kym Anderson & Ross Garnaut, op. cit., p.28.
38 Industry Commission , Annual Report 1.990-9L, op. cit., p.2.
3e Greg Crough & Ted Wheelwrigh! Australia: A Client State, Penguin Books, Ringwood, Victoria, 1982, p.86;
Ranãa[ G. Stewart, ch.6 'Industry policy' in Christine Jennett & Randal G. Stewart (eds), Haa*e and
AustrøIian Public Policy: Consensus and Restructuring,MacMillan, South Melbourne, Victoria, 1990, pp.105-136
at p.105; K. Sheridan & P. Chapman, ch.2 'Australia's economic achievement - Comparisons with Japan' in
fyãko Sheridan (ed), op. cit., pp.5-26 at p,2L,21P. Chapman and K. Sheridan, ch.3 'Foreign capital and the
Australian economy' in Kyoko Sheridan (ed.), op. cit., pp.27-50 at p.32,33; Paul Chapn'ran, ch.3 'Australian
industry - Surely not "no policy"' in Michael Costa & Michael Easson (eds), Australian Industry: Wut Policy?,
Pluto Press in Association with the Lloyd Ross Forum of the Labor Council of New South Wales, Leichhardt,
New South Wales, 1991, pp.69-96 atp.73,77,78; Peter Ewer, Winton Higgins & Annette Stevens, Unions and
the Future of Australinn Manufacturins, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1987, p.10; Michael Webber, 'Garnaut: The
implications of Northeast Asia for Australian industry', Austrølian lournal of International Afføirs, vol'44, no."I,
April 1990, pp.39-45 atp.39-40; John Warhurst & ]enny StewarÇ ch.7'Manufacturing industry policies', in
Brian W. Head & Allan Patience (eds), From Fraser to Hautke: Australian Public Policy in tlrc 1980s, Longtnan
Cheshire, Melbourne, 1'989, pp.159 -17 6 at p.159.
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Australia's protection policy certainly achieved one of its objectives, which was to boost
rnanufacturing production and employment...[The industry's share of GDP was 10 per cent
in 1900]. Between then and 1970 value-added grew at least 50 per cent faster in
manufacturing than in the rest of the economy, and, at least up to the 1940s, employment
growth in rnanufacturing was almost double that in other sectors... Thus by the 1960s
manufacturing accounted for almost 30 per cent of Australia's GDP and employment... At
the turn of the century, manufacturing was only half as important to Australia as to other
high-income countries. Flowever, by the 1960s Australia had virtually eliminated this
difference.ao
In a time before the global economy, tariffs provided a significant barrier to imports.
This encouraged foreign and local capital to invest in manufacturing to serve the
protected local market. Australia developed an industrial base that included iron,
steel, heavy engineering, shipbuilding, TCF, white goods and eventually, a car
industry.o'The need to diversify the economy had been made clear during the 1930s
depression, when Australia's vulnerability to world commodity prices resulted in a
particularly severe decline in GDP.4'Tariffs facilitated a new area of expansion after
the pastoral and mining industries had become mature markets.43
Tariff protection appeared to increase growth and employment initially, The key
policy mistake was the failure to refocus the strategy after an industrial base had
been achieved. Australia's industrial strategy could have usefully focused on shifting
production to more elaborate, value-added products, and to capitalising on the
world boom in manufacturing exports that was to ensue in the four decades from
1960. Australia's long-term protection policy appeared to be detrimental to growth,
restructuring and international competitiveness when Labor took power. The
general thrust of Labor's tariff reduction strategy was therefore warranted.
Protection weakened economic performance in a number of ways.
Tariffs were administered in such a way as to prevent structural change. Tariffs were
granted to a sector according to the'made to measure' rule, which involved granting
enough protection to enable the sector to maintain its market share, production and
employment levels.oo When a sector found that imported products were threatening
jobs and growth in their sector, they would lobby the Federal Government, who
would send a reference to the Tariff Board to review the sectors' protection. Where
large amounts of employment and investment were in jeopardy, it was general
practice of the Tariff Board to grant an increase in tariffs, to a point that would allow
the industry to remain reasonably profitable.ot Hence, the era has become known as
the'made-to-measu re' tariff era.
40 Kyrn Anderson & Ross Garnauf op. cit., p.12.
4t Randal G. Stewar! op. cit., p.105.
42 
Greg Crough & Ted Wheelwrigh! op. cit., p.88.
43 
Peter Ewer, Winton Higgins & Annette Stevens, op. cit., p.10.
44 Committee to Advise on Policies for Manufacturing Industry, Policies for Deuelopment of Manufacturing
lndustry: A Green Pøper: Volunre 1: Report to the Prime Minister by the Committee to Adaise on Policies for
Manufacturing Industry, Australian Government Publishing Serwice, Canberra, 1975, p.29,30.
4s 
Leon Glezer, op. cit., p.33; and Kym Anderson & Ross Garnau! op. cit., p.53,60.
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Structural change - where it involves constantly redistributing the nation's resources
to areas of competitive advantage and to areas experiencing strong growth in world
trade - helps to maximise growth and exports. Studies of numerous nations confirm
a relationship between structural change and economic growth.*ó 'Made to measure'
taríll policy had the effect of holding resources within a particular structure, rather
than allowing them to flow to areas of greater competitiveness, and thereby lowered
growth. Where the economy is near full employment, as it generally was between
1945 and 1973, declining sectors need to be allowed to contract, so that competitive
sectors can access the resources needed to grow. By preventing the expansion of
competitive sectors, the tariff era may have contributed to the decline in Australia's
per capita income from fourth in the world in 1960 to 16th in1987.o'
The 'made to measure' approach also had the effect of 'picking losers', as it provided
ever higher assistance to Australia's least competitive sectors, while more
competitive sectors received little or no assistance.ot This is the very reverse of sound
industry policy, which aims to foster structural change by creating competitive
advantage in strategic, growth industries.
Most particularly, 'made to measure' tariff policies may have impeded restructuring
towards sectors achieving high world trade growth, particularly from approximately
1960 onward. Australia's tarilf policies involved expending large amounts of scarce
resources'propping up' increasingly less competitive sectors, particularly low value-
added sectors. This was just at the time when newly industrialising nations in Asia
were establishing competitive advantage in such areas, and the industrialised
nations were responding by restructuring their manufacturing sectors toward higher
value-added products. Australia's tariff policy ensured it missed out on much of the
great expansion in high value-added manufacturing exports in the period from
1960.on
Australia was the only industrialised nation not to increase its manufactured exports
to GDP ratio (from L3.5 per cent of GDP) in the three decades to the mid-1980s.
Largely as a consequence, Australia's exports to GDP ratio fell from 23.21o L4.5 per
cent between1949-50 and 1984-85, at the time when other nations greatly expanded
their exports, chiefly through expanding their manufactured exports to GDP ratio.'o
Between 1960 and 1987, world trade grew 6 per cent per annum in real terms, but
Australia's failure to fully integrate its manufacturing industry in such growth meant
that its share of world trade fell from 1,.7 to 1,.1 per cent in the period."
46 Australian Industries Assistance Commission, Strucfural Change in Austrqlin, Australian Governrnent
Publishing Serwice, Canberra, 1,977, p.7,"14,1.5,30,31.
47 Report of the Committee for Review of Export Market Development Assistance, Australiøn Exports:
Performance Obstacles and Issues of Assistance: Report of the Committee for Reoiew of Export Markct Dettelopnrcnt
Assistønce, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1989, p.8.
48 
Jenny Stewart, The Lie of the Leuel Playing Field: Industry Policy and Australia's Future, Text Publishir-rg,
Melbourne, 1994, p.75.
4e This is essentially the argument made by Peter Ewer, Winton Higgins & Annette Stevens, op. cit., at p.38,39.
50 Winton Higgins, ch.7'Missing the boat: Labor and industry in the eighties' in Brian Galligan & Gwyneth
(eds), Business and Gotternment Under Labor,Longmann Cheshire, Melbourne, 1991, pp.102-117 atp.705.
sr Report of the Committee for Review of Export Market Development Assistance, op. cit., p.8-10.
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By attracting numerous entrants into manufacturing sectors, 'protection all round'
also produced a manufacturing industry made up of numerous fragmented, often
unrelated, small scale firms and sectors, each performing relatively poorly, with
none becoming world competitive." For example, in the car sector, the application of
tariffs, import licensing and local content provisions resulted in L4 companies
producing numerous models in Australia, all of which were being produced in
numbers far beneath that needed to be internationally competitive.tt Throughout
manufacturing, such fragmented sectoral structures were commonplace. It was
inevitable that such underscale firms would eventually be swamped by more
competitive overseas producers.to
Protectionism also fails because it does not address the keys to achieving competitive
advantage in manufacturing, such as establishing excellence in R&D or export
marketing. In effect, protection involves hiding from competitive weaknesses, while
doing nothing to resolve them. Indeed, by shielding producers from international
competition, protection allows and encourages firms to become complacent. After
decades of protection, much of Australia's manufacturing had uncompetitive
quality, design, productivity, management, work practices, R&D, marketing and
work organisation, as well as outdated technology and production techniques.tt To
be effective, industry policies must be aimed at producing structural adjustment and
competitiveness. Unfortunately, long-term protection facilitated industrial
retardation.
Tariffs also hampered competitiveness by increasing input costs.s6 This occurred
because, firstly, manufacturers, in effect, had to pay for the tariff on imported inputs
to their production, and secondly, because shielding local manufacturers from
international competition brought poor performance and higher cost products.
These negative effects of tariffs constrained export growth. In particular, by raising
input costs, tariffs subjected nearly all manufacturing exports to negative effective
assistance prior to 1977.t' Tariffs also constrained export growth in other ways. They
focused firms inward on the domestic market.tt Tariffs also promoted a
manufacturing structure dominated by multinational firms producing for the
52 Philip Yetton, jeremy Davis & Peter Swan, Going International: Export Myths ønd Strøtegic Realities: Report to
the Australian Manufacturing Council, Australian Graduate School of Management Ltd, Kensington, New
South Wales, 1992, p.69.
s3 Peter Ewer, Winton Higgins & Annette Stevens, op. cit., p.12.
s4 
Jenny Stewart, The Lie of the Leael Playing Field, op. c(t., p.76.
ss Pappas, Carter, Evans & Koop/Telesis, The Global ChøIlenge: Australian Mønufacturing in the 1990s: Final
Report of the Pappas, Carter, Euans ønd Koop/Telesis Study, Australian Manufacturing Council, Melbourne, 1990,
p.48; ACTU / TDC Mission to Western Europe, Australia Reconstructed: ACTU/TDC Mission to Western Europe:
A Report by the Mission Members to the ACTU ønd the TDÇ Australian Government Publishing Service,
Canberra, 1987, p.90,91; and Report of the Committee for Review of Export Market Development Assistance,
op. cit., p.31; and Winton Higgins, op. cit., p.104.
s6 Robert J. L. Hawke, Paul Keating, John Button & Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Building a
Conrpetitiue Australia: Statements by Prime Minister, Bob Hau¡ke, Treasurer, Pøul Keøting and Industry Minister,
lohn Button, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1991, pp.1."I-1.23 aL p.1'.5.
s7 Kym Anderson & Ross Garnaut, op, cit., p.62.
s8 Ralph Evans, ch.1 'The Global Challenge repoït and the clash of paradigms' in Michael Costa & Michael
Easson (eds), op. cit., pp|1.5-46 at p.36.
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domestic market only. Many Australian subsidiaries were prevented from
developing export markets by the policies of their foreign parents.se The
discouragement of exports was a key weakness of protectionist policies because
competing on export markets against the world's best spurs firms to improve their
performance.
While all tariff policies produce some negative (as well as some positive) outcomes,
Australian policy makers implemented protection policies poorly, thereby further
worsening economic outcomes.
A central tenet of any thoughtful industry policy is to seek to create an industry
structure capable of achieving exports, growth and international competitiveness.
State and Federal Governments took little or no interest in the pattern of industrial
development that emerged under tariffs.uo They sought to shift the development
focus from primary to secondary industry, but didn't seek to target sectors beyond
this. No attempt was made to consider inter-industry linkages, developments in
world demand for products, nor the relative competitiveness of various sectors.
Policymaking was ad hoc, amateur and sometimes contradictory. It was made
without reference to any overall strategy and without any vision of the industry
structure Australia needed to maximise growth, exports and international
competitiveness.u'
As the Crawford report noted, Australia's tariff structure by the 1970s was the result
of a series of historical accidents, not any overall planning.u' Many of the tariff rates
had simply remained in place from as far back as the rises imposed by the Scullin
Government in the 1930s depression.u' On top of the structure applying during the
Scullin era, tariffs were raised for any sector that could demonstrate that imports
were threatening jobs in their sector. The resulting lack of coherence was further
worsened by the fact that the States ran their own industrial development programs
without any reference to each other. This reinforced the development of an
inefficient, fragmented and dispersed industrial structure.6o
Further, Federal Governments never made protection conditional on manufacturers
improving their performance and export orientation.6s This was a wasted
opportunity because, in return for tariff assistance, the Federal Government could
have required firms to improve their performance and build expertise in vital
competencies such as R&D and export marketing.
5e ftid.,p.22.
60 
Leon Glezer, op. cit., p.26.
6l ACTU/TDC Mission to Western Europe, op. cit., p.89; and P. Chapman and K. Shericlan, ch.2 'Foreign
capital and the Australian economy' in Kyoko Sheridan (ed.), op. cit., pp'27-50 at p.40.
62 
John Crawford, Brian Inglis, R.J.L. Hawke & N.S. Currie, Study Group on StructurøI Adjustnrcnt: Report,
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1979, p.10.21'.
63 
John Warhurst & Jenny Stewar! op. cit., p.160.
64 Greg Crough & Ted Wheetwrigh! op. cit., p.103; and Peter Ewer, Winton Higgins & Annette Stevens, op.
cit., p.17.
6s Metal Trades Unions, Policy for Industry Deuelopment and More lobs, Metal Trades Unions, Metbourne, 1984,
p.54.
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Additionally, protectionism was combined with active encouragement of foreign
investment and little focus on developing indigenous firms. This approach resulted
in foreign multinationals owning much of the manufacturing industry, particularly
in tradeable and high technology areas. This had damaging long-term consequences.
In particular, it meant Australia did not develop competence in many of the
capabilities necessary for achieving competitive advantage on world markets.
Foreign multinationals tended to perform such functions in their home nation. For
example, little R&D took place in Australia. Firms simply imported technology. In
many cases, because the domestic market was protected, foreign firms made little
investment in up-to-date production equipment, training oÍ quality assurance
programs. Foreign owned firms tended not to export, often because they had already
achieved large global sales through exports from their home nation or through
multidomestic structures. High foreign investment in high technology fields meant
mechanisms for financing startup and growing concerns were not developed. A
significant venture and development capital market has not emerged.uu
In conclusion, these factors indicate that by 1960,Iet alone 1988, protectionist policies
were reducing Australia's capacity to grow, restructure and compete, and a tariff
reduction strategy was appropriate.
2. The Importance of Tariff Reform
Tariff cuts appear to have assisted restructuring. As noted above, 'made to measure'
tariffs impeded the flow of resources from those sectors in structural decline, such as
labour intensive manufactures, to sectors with greater potential for growth, such as
ETMs. TarifÍ cuts can facilitate the release of resources from inefficient firms and
sectors for use in more competitive firms and sectors, thereby facilitating
restructuring and growth.ut Thus, tarifÍ cuts are likely to bring a composition of
industry and exports more conducive to growth and employment than the structure
brought about by 60 years of protectionism.
Tariff cuts also narrow the difference between the levels of assistance available for
local production and for export production, thereby encouraging producers to
increasingly focus on exports, not just domestic sales.u*
Tariff cuts may also reduce input costs. The IC estimated that, in 1989-90, t};re
consumer tax equivalent for the manufacturing sector - a broad measure of the
additional amount consumers of final goods pay as a result of assistance to domestic
manufacturers - was fi7.6 billion.un Tariff cuts produce cheaper inputs where
importers pass on the lower tariff to consumers by lowering their prices. In turn,
domestic firms competing in such sectors may respond to this price competition by
increasing their efficiency and lowering their prices. These effects produces input
66 jenny Stewar t, The Lie of the Leuel Playing Field, op. cit., p.89-93'
67 Australian Industries Assistance Commission, op. cit., p.1,,2,16,17; and Michael Porter, Tlrc Contpetitiue
Aduantage of Nations, The Free Press, New York, USA, 1990, p.5,6.
68 
John Crawford, Brian Ingtis, R.J.L. Hawke, N.S. Currie, op. cit., p.10'10.
6e Industry Commission , Annual Report 1990-91, op. cit., p.227.
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cost reductions for those Australian firms that use these goods to create their
products. This improved cost competitiveness can result in increased sales.to
Tariff cuts - in conjunction with the float of the Auslralian dollar and the removal of
exchange controls - have also exposed the economy to greater international
competitiory thereby forcing many firms to become competitive in order to survive
against imports." In addition, increased import penetration, and subsequent loss of
market share for domestic producers, has forced firms to seek out export markets to
ensure their continued survival.t'
These impacts of tariff cutting may have produced faster restructuring, and higher
economic, employment and export growth, than would have been achieved by a
continuation of protectionism.tt ln particular, tariff cuts may have facilitated some
restructuring of manufacturing toward higher value-added segments. While tariff
cuts are likely to have a negative effect on overall manufacturing output, the greatest
output falls are concentrated in inefficient firms. Tariff cuts may have led to greater
specialisation in production in which Australia can be internationally competitive
and export-oriented.'o This is why both the Hughes ReportTs and Ross Garnaut,'u as
well as various rationalist models,tt indicate that tariff reductions will reduce
Australia's commodity reliance and increase manufacturing exports. Importantly,
these arguments are consistent with - while not proven by - Australia's economic
history. From 1988 onward, Australia achieved a useful increase in its exports to
GDP ratio, after 3 to 4 decades of tariff protection had coincided with no growth in
the exports to GDP ratio. In particular, ETM exports have achieved rapid growth.
(These trends are analysed in chapter four).
3. Weaknesses and Limitations of Rationalist Tariff Reform
The Limitations of Tariff Reform
The key limitation of tariff cutting is that it has only a moderate or minor impact on
Australia's capacity to compete, restructure and create employment. These goals are
dependent primarily on being able to create innovative, sophisticated, high quality
products. Such product innovation is dependant on achieving excellence in a range
70 This is strongly stressed in free trade theory, as described in R.G. Gregory & J.J. Pincus, op. cit., pp.113-162,
atp.116,117.
7t Industry Commission, Annual Report L990-91, op. cit., p.5.
72 McKinsey and Company & the Australian Manufacturing Council Secretariat, Emerging Exporters: Australia's
High Vølue-Added Manufacturing Exporters: Final Report of the Study by McKinsey €t Company and tlrc Australian
Manuføcturing Council Seuetariøt to the Australian Manufacturing Council, Australian Manufacturing Council,
Melbourne, 1993,p.37.
73 Philip Yetton, jeremy Davis & Peter Swan, op. cit., p.51.
74 
White Paper on Mønufacturing Industry, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1977, p.17,22;
John Crawford, Brian Inglis, R.J.L. Hawke & N.S. Currie, op. cit., p.10.1; Philip Yetton, Jeremy Davis & Peter
Swan, op. cit., p.48,64,69.
75 Report of the Committee for Review of Export Market Development Assistance, op. cit., p.30.
76 
Ross Garnaut, ch.2'Trade and industry policy after the Uruguay Round' in Michael Costa & Michael Easson
(eds), op. cit., pp.47-68 at p.67 ,68.
77 Philip Yetton, Jeremy Davis & Peter Swan, op. cit., p.53,55.
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of capabilities such as R&D, an indigenous capacity to create and deploy advanced
technology, education and training, finance, marketing and exporting. Because tariff
cutting produces little or no impact on these capabilities, it makes only a modest
contribution to restructuring and national competitiveness.'u
Free traders have long admitted that tariffs have little effect on the overall level of
employment.'n For example, ORANI model estimates, published in the IC's 1988-89
Annual Report, found that tariff reform would increase employment by a mere 0.1
per cent.'o Tariff cuts also have a minimal impact on economic growth. The ORANI
model estimated that the 199'1. taúÍi program would only increase GDP by $1.5
billion in 1988-89 prices."
Furthermore, while tariÍf cuts appear to produce a mild net stimulus to
restructuring, particularly by inducing greater specialisation in those areas in
manufacturing in which we can be most competitive, some of their effects are not
optimal. Tariff cuts are likely to have been of most benefit to agriculture and mining
because they reduced the costs of manufacturing inputs and substantially reduced
the intersectoral structure of assistance that had long favoured manufactures over
mining and agriculture. In the mid 1970s, the average effective rate of assistance for
the manufacturing industry was approximately 27 per cent. In comparison, the
average effective rate of assistance to agriculture was approximately five per cent,t'
while the effective rate of assistance for mining had long been negative.83 Thus, free
trade policies encourage resources to flow from the manufacturing to the commodity
industries overall.to Services also benefit little because, while some may benefit from
lower manufacturing input prices, much of the sector is not exposed to international
78 This view is put in Pappas, Carter, Evans & Koop/Telesis, op. cit., p.51; Jane Marceau, ch.12 'Industry
policy' in Peter Vintila, John Phillimore & Peter Newman, (eds), Markets, Mornls and Manifestos: Fightbøckl and
tlrc Politics of Economic Rationalism in the L990s, Institute for Science and Technology Policy, Murdoch
University, Murdoch, Western Australia, 1992, pp,139-148 at p.139; and Humphrey McQueery 'Tariffs are no
panacea' , The Weekend AustrøIian,13-14 June 1,992, p.24. jenny Stewart, The Lie of the Leoel Playing Field, op.
cit., p.27'1. wrote: 'Both traditional (protection-based) industry policy and subsequent efforts to move away
from protection were not well designed to effect the two principal objectives: restructuring industries which
had lost their competitiveness, and optimising the opportunities for new businesses to get started and grow.'
7e 
R.G. Gregory & f.J. Pincus, op. cit., p.742.
80 Industry Commission, Annual Report 1,989-90, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1990,
p.33. Similarly, Philip Yetton, Jeremy Davis & Peter Swan, op. cit., p.55 details results using the ORANI-
MINE model, which predicted that assistance reductions would only increase real GDP by 0.6 per cent and
employment by 0.3 per cent.
81 Industry Commission, Annual Report L990-9 , Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1991,
p-69.
82 
James Scholfield Balderstone & the Department of Primary Industry, Agricultural Policy: Issues and Options for
the 1980s: Working Group Report to the Minister for Primary Industry, Australian Government Publishing
Service, Canberra, 1982, p.37,38.
83 Michael Taylor, The Regional Impact of Changing Leaels of Protection in Australian Industries, Office of Local
Government n.p., 7992, p.3.
84 For example, this is the view expressed in: Ralph Evans, ch.1 'The Global Challen-se report and the clash of
paradigms', op. cit., p.22,23.
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competition.8s Furthermore, services tied to manufacturing may be adversely
affected as manufacturing output declines.tu
The fact that tariff cuts may primarily benefit commodities, while useful, is not ideal,
because such industries are in long run decline and Australia's over-reliance on such
industries has underscored our declining economic performance in recent decades.
Meanwhile, tariff cuts may produce only mild benefits and some detriment for
manufacturing and services, which are the fastest growing areas of world trade and
the key to future employment growth.
Further, while tariff cuts may have made a contribution to the strong export growth
achieved in the period, it seems likely that other factors, such as a lower dollar,
government schemes and the activities of firms, caused the majority of the growth.
Export assistance provided by government appears to have made a strong
contribution to facilitating the export growth achieved in the period. For example,
the LEK Partnership study found that more than 70 per cent of emerging service
exporters used at least one goverrunent assistance scheme and more than 9 out of L0
users of government schemes found them useful.tt An LEK survey found the
following:
Use of Government Programs by Service Exporters







Export Market Development Grants
Other Austrade Assistance
150% R&D Tax Concession
National lndustry Extension Service
Australian lnternational Development Assistance
Bureau
lncome Tax Relief Facility
Grants for lndustrial R&D
Export Access
EFIC - Credit lnsurance
EFIC - Finance
Development lmport Finance Facility
lnvestment Promotion Program
lnternational Trade Enhancement Scheme
Australian Best Practice
Source: LEK Partnership, Intelligent Exports...and the Silent Reaolution in Seroices, Australian Trade Commission,
Sydney, 1994, p.78.
8s Michael Deeley, ch.17'Manufacturing in the 1.990s' in Michael Costa & Michael Easson (eds), op. cit., pp.333-
346 atp.334.
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89, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1990, p.33 found that tariff reform of
manufacturing and agriculture assistance would increase mining output by 11.5 per cent, agriculture by 1.3
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Perhaps more significantly, a significant proportion of the export growth achieved in
the period can be accounted for from exports fostered by government sectoral
schemes, such as: export facilitation in the PMV and TCF sectors; plans for the steel
and heavy engineering sectors; accelerated depreciation for ship building; assistance
for the medical and scientific equipment sectors; the partnership for development
program for the information technology sector; the factor F program for
pharmaceuticals; and the offsets program for the aerospace sector. The concentration
of export growth in these sectors indicates that government programs were
important in facilitating export growth.88 Exports fostered by such schemes are noted
in the table below.





Computers & office machines, parts etc




Motor vehicle parts, etc
Ships, boats and floating structures
lron/steel, primary and semi-finished
Computers
Flat-rolled iron/steel, not coated
Flat-rolled iron/steel, coated
Civil engineering equipment
Medicinal and pharmaceutical products
lron and steel bars, rods etc.














































Source: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Composition of Trade Australin L995-96, Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade, Canberra, 1996, p.24,25.
Many service exports were also encouraged by government assistance. Tourism,
strongly supported by government, accounts for 60 per cent of service exports, while
education, which is run primarily by government, contributes more than 10 per cent
of service exports.un
Tariff cuts also failed to resolve a fundamental problem of Australia's manufacturing
industry, namely its lack o1 large, indigenous, strategic exporting firms. Stewart
argued that many firms were unable to export because their loss of market share to
imports left insufficient demand to allow firms to reap economies of scale and gain
the sales revenue necessary for launching an export drive. Among those firms that
have produced exports, the vast majority have only achieved small scale export sales
in niche markets.no
88 Michael Easson'sunbeams, cucumbers and industry policy' in Michael Costa & Michael Easson (eds), op
cit., pp.123-150 at p.129 -131,.
8e LEK Partnership, op. cit., 15.
eo jenny Stewar t, The Lie of the Leoel Playing Field, op. cit., p.76.
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Finally, tariÍf cuts appear to have, at best, no net effect on the trade balance, and at
worst, a mild negative effect. Tariff cuts foster a larger tradeable sector. It is certainly
welfare enhancing to import products that Australia is ill suited to producing, while
exporting products we are well suited to producing. Flowever, a key aim of
Australia's restructuring strategy must also be to increase net exports, so as to wind
back the current account constraint on growth. Tariff cuts may increase the trade
deficit, at least for the medium-term, as imports rise quickly as tariffs are cut, but the
free market restructuring process taking longer to bring export growth. The ORANI-
MINE model estimates that, even in the long run, taúff cuts increase the trade deficit
by 0.2 per cent.n'
The limited benefits produced by tariff cuts do not demonstrate that tariff cutting
should not occur. They do, however. show that they should only form one
component of a much broader industry policy agenda. Unfortunately, as will be
argued and evidenced in remaining chapters, it appears the whole rationalist policy
agenda has only a mild impact in fostering restructuring, employment growth and
national competitiveness.
The Benefits of Tariff Reform: Less than Rationalists Predicted?
There aÍe a number of reasons to suspect that the benefits of tariff reductions may be
less than rationalists predict.
Taúff theory suggests that the full extent of the tariff cut will be passed on in
reduced prices because it is based on a perfectly competitive market structure, in
which there is no market power to vary price without losing revenue. ORANI
assumes output prices are determined in accordance with a competitive market
paradigm.n' Thus, if the full extent of the reduced tariff on imports is not passed on
in lower prices, improvements in restructuring and output will be lower than
rationalists predict. This indeed seems to be the case for several reasons.
In most markets, products are not homogenous and competition is not based solely
on price. For ETMs and highly sophisticated services, competitive advantage is
determined primarily by non-price factors such as quality and innovation. In such
markets, prices are determined by what a sufficient number of customers are
prepared to pay, not on what the product cost to produce. Indeed, where firms
establish a clear competitive advantage over rivals based on such factors, they can
charge premium prices. For these products, lowering tariffs will not reduce prices
because retailers who charge a lower or higher price will experience a fall in
revenue.n'
An example of how prices have adjusted in innovation-driven sectors is provided by
car sector. The IC noted in their 1990 Car Report that, since the commencement of the
e1 Philip Yetton, Jeremy Davis & Peter Swan, op. cit., p.55.
e2 Industry Commission, TIrc Automotizte Industry: Report No.S, Australian Government Publishing Service,
Canberra, 1990, p.7 9,81.,146,223-227 .
e3 
John M. Legge, A Submission to the Senøte Enquiry into the Effcacy of Tariff Protection, Unpublished, 7992,
p.10,11.
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1984program, the average price of passenger vehicles increased by more than 14 per
cent in real terms.no Holden noted that, between December L985 and December 1989,
despite major lariff cuts, locally produced car prices increased, on average, by 1.0.2
per cent in real terms, while imported car prices increased, on average, by 1.6.6 per
cent in real terms.n'
Import prices may also not fall where tariff cuts result in the elimination of local
production. In such instances, multinationals in an oligopolistic market could have
the market power to charge prices above the competitive market rate.nu The presence
of local competition can ensure greater price competition than would occur if
importers had the market to themselves.n'In a submission to the IC Inquiry on PMV
tariffs, the Motor Traders Association cited statistics demonstrating that, in product
segments where there were local manufacturers, prices tend to be close to the
average world market price, whereas in product segments without local production,
a major price increase is levied.nt This effect could occur in some sectors, although in
general, it appears likely that global competition would produce sufficient
competition, at least after a period of time, to create significant downward pressure
on prices.
Prices may also not fall by the amount predicted for a range of other reasons. Some
consumers may not shift their demand to lower priced imports because they may
have loyalty to the Australian product, they might fail to detect any price change, or
there may be supply constraints on the imported product. Further, domestic
manufacturers can only reduce prices in response to greater import price
competition to the extent they control their own costs. For many manufacturers,
most of their costs are beyond their control, being determined by factors such as
taxes and the price of production inputs.nn Finally, taxes formerly paid by foreign
companies through tafiff payments will need to be made up through increased taxes
elsewhere as tariffs are reduced, thereby placing upward pressure on prices. The
1991 Statement noted that by 1993-94, tariff cuts would reduce government revenue
by $579 million.'on
Thus, to the extent that these effects prevent the full amount of the reduced tariff to
be passed on in lower prices, rationalists have overestimated the amount of
restructuring and output increase achieved through tariff cuts. In particular, the
restructuring induced by changes in price signals achieved through tariff reform
may be minimal. The mild price effects induced by tariff cuts act in an environment
e4 Industry Commission,The Automotiae Industry, op. cit., p.28,
es 
General Motors Holden's Automotive, Second Submission by General Motors Holden's Autonrctiue to tlrc Industry
Contmission Inquiry into the Automotiae lndustry: Response to the Draft Report, Unpublished , p.35,36.
e6 
Independent Pørliamentary Inquiry lnto Tarffi ønd Industry Derselopment: Final Report, Unpublished ,1993, p.26.
e7 
General Motors Holden's Automotive, op. cit., p.38,39.
e8 Motor Trades Association of Australia, Submission by the Motor Trades Association of AustrøIia to the Industry
Commission Inquiry Into the Automotioe Industry, Unpublished,1990, p.10,22-25.
ee Toyota Motor Corporation, Subnission to the Industry Commission lnquiry into the Automotiae Industry,
Unpublished, 1990, p.2,3.
t00 Robert j. L. Hawke, Paul Keating, John Button & Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Building a
Contpetitioe AustrøIiø: Statements by Prime Minister, Bob Hautke, Treasurer, PauI Keating ønd Industry Minister,
lohn Button, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1991', p'4.2'
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in which a large number of other factors are causing the prices of a range of goods to
increase or decrease in varying degrees. For example, relative prices are constantly
being influenced by government policies, the relative price competitiveness of
various industries, fluctuations in exchange rates and technological change. This
means that the price signals caused by tarifÍ cuts may be largely subsumed by other
price effects, meaning tarifl cuts may have only a weak effect in promoting
restructuring.
Rationalists assume that resources 'released' from tarill dependent sectors will be
redeployed in more efficient sectors, leading to rising economic welfare. \¡Vhile this
may often happen - at least after a period of dislocation and adjustment - there are a
number of instances in which this free trade resource allocation mechanism might
break down.
Capital from one firm, for example a clothing plant, may not be reallocated within
another sector of the Australian economy, but instead be allocated in the same sector
in the same business overseas. This is occurring in two key ways. Firstly, Australian
owned firms are closing down local production that formerly served the local market
and provided exports to foreign markets. Instead, production is being relocated
offshore and then imported back to Australia andf or distributed in foreign nations.
The NSW Chamber of Manufactures March 1993 survey found that approximately 5
to 15 per cent of manufacturers had moved offshore or were considering moving
offshore, with12.6 per cent of these because of tariff cuts. In highly tariff dependent
sectors, the movement offshore was more considerable. For example, in the clothing
and footwear sector, the percentage of firms operating offshore increased from L3 to
21. per cent between 1991 and 1993, while a further 17 per cent were considering
moving offshore at that time.'ot
A second manifestation of this process is that foreign owned multinationals are
moving production from Australia to other subsidiaries overseas, a Íact especially
concerning given the high proportion of foreign multinational corporations in
Australia's manufacfuring industry.to'Such firms have large domestic investments in
marketing, brand names and distribution, as well as manufacturing, and therefore
don't redeploy released resources into other sectors within Australia, but
manufacture overseas and then import the product back to the domestic market. For
example, when Nissan closed their car plant in Australia in response to falling tariffs,
the capital was not re-invested in a more efficient sector in Australia. Of course, the
capital was re-invested in another Nissan car plant overseas.to'
Interestingly, the IC's ORANI model takes no account of such displacement because
it has no sector for overseas capital! All resources released are unrealistically
assumed to be redeployed in sectors regarded as the most efficient, such as mining
tot Stut" Bank of New South Wales & Chamber of Manufactures of New South Wales, Surttey of Manufacturing
Conditions and Future Prospects in N.S.W.: March Quarter L993, State Bank of New South Wales & Chamber of
Manufactures of New South Wales, Sydney, 1993, p.19-22.
to2 South Australian Manufacturing Advisory Council, South Australian Industry in the 1990s: A Proposnl for
Action: Submission to the Commonutealth Gooernment,Unpublished, 1992, p"l'S.
tot pu,rl Chapman, ch.3 'Australian industry - Surely not "no policy"' in Michael Costa & Michael Easson (eds),
op. cit., pp.69-96 atp.73.
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and tourism.ro4 Hence, ORANI may overestimate the economic benefits likely to
ensue from the tariff cuts.
FIowever, it should be noted that in many such instances, it is low value-added, cost
sensitive production that is being moved offshore to lower cost locations. This is
often a positive development for Australia, despite the transitional unemployment it
creates, because it is the only way some Australian firms can survive. It at least
enables profits to be repatriated to AustraLia, while the people displaced can
hopefully be redeployed in sectors in which Australia can be competitive.
The free trade resource allocation mechanism can also break down for other reasons.
Tariff cuts can result in resources being left idle, where they make production no
longer viable and the resources have no application elsewhere in the economy. This
can occur where capital andf or labour is specific to an enterprise, industry andf or
region. As Tony Cole, at the time IC Chairman, explained, a plant designed
specifically Íor the motor vehicle industry may not have suitable alternative uses. In
such instances, the plant may simply be abandoned, rather than utilised for
alternative production.tot Such output and employment losses are not considered by
the ORANI model, which assumes all resources 'released' by tariff cuts are
redeployed elsewhere in the economy.
Rationalists may have also overestimated the benefits oÍ tariÍf cuts because the
international 'playing field' is not level. Rationalists, such as Garnaut and the IC,
advocate completing the transition to free trade, regardless of the trade and industry
policies of nations overseas.t06 Past goverrunent reports and numerous academics,
industry representatives, journalists and unionists have criticised the unilateral
lowering of tariffs in an environment where other nations have substantial tariffs
and other industry incentives to attract investment.tot The inevitable outcome is
argued to be a loss of investment, growth and employment to other nations, as well
as an increasing deficit on the current account.
In a global economy, removing so called 'distortions' in Australia may not bring
optimal resource allocation. To the extent the economy is global rather than national,
too Bill Weekes, 'Import controls and the costs of free trade' in John Carroll & Robert Manne (eds), Shutdozon:
The Failure of Economic RationøIism and Hout to Rescue Australia, Text Publishing Company, Melbourne, 1992,
pp.172-'183 atp.179.
tot G"rl"rul Motors Holden's Automotive, op. cit., p.26
tou Ros Garnau! ch.2 'Trade and industry policy after the Uruguay Round', op. cit., p.64, 65; and Industry
Commission Annunl Report 1990-91, op. cit., p.4.
tot 
¡oh.r Crawford, Brian Inglis, R.J.L. Hawke & N.S. Currie, op. cit., p.6.20,9.18,9.19; Peter Ewer, Winton
Higgins & Annette Stevens, op. cit., p.34;lanLowe, Submission to the Pørliamentary Inquiry Into Tørffi and
Industry Deuelopment, Unpublished, 7992, p.4; Winton Higgins, op. cit., p.11,2; Francis G. Castles, 'The ten
commandments of comparative industry policy analysis', Australian Quarterly, vol,62, no.4, Summer 1990,
pp.337-345 at p.339; Joe Camilleri, Peter Christoff Boris Frankel, Rob Watts & John Wisernan, The
Melbourne Economics Group, New Economic Directions for AustrøIia, Centre for Australian Social Policy
Analysis, Coburg, Victoria, 1989, p.57; Allan Handberg,'Strategy lacks focus on growth', The AustrøIiøn, 5
l;4ay 7994, p.25; South Australian Manufacturing Advisory Council, Issues in Industry Policy and Prospects for
South AustrøIin: Submission to the Independent Parliamentary Inquiry Into Tarffi and lndustry Deaelopment by the
South Australian Mønufacturing Adaisory Council, Unpublished, 1992, p.3; Australian Council of Trade
Unions, ACTU Submission Re Economic Statement, Unpublished, 1992, Appendix 1: 'Charter for Jobs Policy:
ACTU Congress September 1991,',p.1,; and Metal Trades Unions, op. cit., p.1.83,184.
26
'distortions' will need to be removed world-wide if tariff cuts are to promote
Australia's most competitive industries. This is because - while tariff cuts in Australia
should, in theory, encourage the growth of our most efficient sectors - in practice, the
growth of such sectors may be constrained by tarifÍs and more effective forms of
assistance provided to such sectors in overseas nations. Such assistance can
encourage investors to produce in nations overseas, rather than in Australia.
This argument appears grounded in reality. Australia cut its protection in an
international environment of 'new protectionism', the emergence of major trading
blocs in Asia, North America and Europe, and latent trade wars.tot While the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has cut tarilfs, the incidence of non-tariff
measures (NTMs) doubled throughout the 1970's and 1980's and affects up to half of
world trade.'oe This protectionism has impeded the growth and exports of many of
Australia's most competitive firms. A McKinsey survey found that 31 per cent of
firms suffered restricted access to Asian markets due to tariffs and other measures.
Many found that once exports reached a certain level, it was made clear by Asian
Governments that further growth would require the establishment of local
production facilities. Local content provisions help enforce this policy."o An LEK
Partnership survey found that 26 per cent of service exporters said trade barriers
were one of the major issues constraining the growth of their exports.ttt
The broader industry policy regimes of governments can also play a role in
determining investment decisions by Australian and overseas firms. Block argued
that Australia lost many investment opportunities and jobs to Asia because of their
Governments more comprehensive industry policy regimes.tt' These regimes also
led to some Australian firms relocating their production offshore. The NSW
Chamber of Manufactures survey found that the assistance regimes provided by
overseas Governments were the key reason for moving offshore for 58.3 per cent of
those firms which moved offshore between 199'1, and1993."'
What should be the government response in this situation? Re-establishing a high
tarifÍ regime would appear counter-productive for the reasons outlined above.
Ffowever, this debate does suggest that active industry policy of some kind may be
needed to achieve strong export growth and competitive advantage in an
international environment in which the most dominant high export firms around the
world have achieved their position with the aid of strong government backing.
The Weaknesses of Rationalist Tariff Reform
A key weakness oÍ tariff reform is that it appears to produce significant structural
displacement, particularly where implemented in recession. As the tax on imports is
to8 
Michael Taylor, op. cit., p.1.
10e Australian Chamber of Manufactures, Bendigo, Submission to the Independent Inquiry Into Tarffi and Industry
Deaelopment, Unpublished, 1,992, p.2.
t to M.Kirrr"y and Company & the Australian Manufacturing Council Secretariat, op. cit., p.33,54.
' 
t t LEK Partnership, op. cit., p.98.
t t' 
Ruy Block, 'The ultimate cargo cult', Australian Business, vol.11, no.19,6 March 1991, pp.40-42 at p.4L.
t tt 
Stut" Bank of New South Wales & Chamber of Manufactures of New South Wales, op. cit., p.22.
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reduced, importers become more price competitive against Australian
manufacturers and increase their market share at the expense of Australian
producers. Some Australian producers contract, others are destroyed and others
decide to relocate their production offshore where wage, tax and regulation burdens
are lower. In all three cases, Australian jobs are lost.
While free trade advocates in the past had always admitted that tariff cuts did bring
dislocation (but that resources would be deployed in more efficient firms, producing
rising economic welfare), numerous rationalist writers in the period argued that
tarifÍ cuts had little or no gross negative impact on employment, even during the
recession.tto A more credible, yet still questionable claim was made by the IC, which
argued that tariff cuts increased net employment, even during the recession.t" Then
IC Chairman Bill Scales even called for an acceleration of the tariff program during
the trough of the recession.ttu
Economics textbooks, driven by a comparative static methodology, often do not
address the dynamic process of adjustment and its associated decline in jobs, firms
and plants."'Similarly, the projections of the IC's ORANI model refer only to the
long-term and'...do not, therefore, purport to encapsulate the costs of adjustment to
lower fariffs...',rtt such as an initial loss of employment, output and government
revenue. These projections assume that resources displaced have been redeployed in
sectors which give the greatest return on investment, meaning protection cuts are
always shown to increase employment.ttn Of course, the results of such models are
the simple outcome of the assumptions 'keyed in' and provide no evidence or
reasoning that the benefits claimed to ensue will actually arise."o
t to D", Moore, ch.1 'Condemning the cure: The recession and economic rationalism' in Chris Jones, Chris James
& Andrew Norton (eds), A Defence of Economic Rationalism, Allen and Unwin, St Leonards, New South Wales,
1993, pp.3-1,2 at p.3,6; Max Walsh, ch.2 'The demise of protectionism' in Chris Jones, Chris James & Andrew
Norton (eds), op. cit., pp.13-20 at p.15; Stephen Shepherd, 'Manufacturing', pp.88-92 in ch.8 'Economic
rationalism and Australian business' in Chris James, Chris Jones and Andrew Norton (eds), op. cit., pp.78-92
at p.89; Ralph Evans, 'Mining' pp.79-83 in ch.8 'Economic rationalism and Australian business' in Chris
Jones, Chris James & Andrew Norton (eds), op. cit., pp.78-92 at p.82,83; Ross Garnaut - Comments on
'Export or die' - Lateline - Aired on ABC-TV, 10.30-11.05pm,21 Aprll 1994; Rictrrard Blandy, 'Economic
rationalism and prosperity' in Stephen King & Peter Lloyd (eds), op. cit., pp.28-36 at p.29; Michael Warby,
ch.13 'Scapegoating and moral panic: Political reality and public policy versus anti-rationalisrn' in Chris
Jones, Chris James & Andrew Norton (eds), op. cit., pp.132-1,42 at p.134; and Kym Anderson 'International
trade and Australian protectionism', op. cit., p.108.
1rs Industr), Commission , Annual Report 1991-92, op. cit., p.3,4,83.
t tu 
Tonl Dusevic, 'Accelerate tariff cuts: Scales', The Weekend Australinn,26-27 September 1992, p.4.
ttt Philip Yetton, Jeremy Davis & Peter Swan, op. cit., p.70.
t t8 
Ir-rdrrstry Commission , Tlrc Automotiue Industry, op. cit., p.L44.
t tn Bill Weekes, op. cit., pp.172-183 at p.179.
t'o Fo. example, Industry Commission, The Automotiae Industry, op. cit., p.144 notes that the ORANI moclel
assumes that any assistance reduces growth because '...assistance to one industry will invariably impose
more than offsetting costs on other economic activities in the economy so that overall community welfare is
reduced. Similarly, Access Economics, The Origins of High Unemployment: A Report for tlte Offce of EPAC by
Access Economlcs in Economic Planning Advisory Council, Origins of the 1.990-91 Recession in Austrnlia: Ttoo
Pøpers Prepøred for the Office of EPAC - Background Pøper No.l8, Australian Government Publishing Service,
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unemployment in the AEM model.'
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While comprehensive analysis will not be attempted here, there is evidence that the
1988 to 1996 tariff program did bring significant structural dislocation. Before
commencing, it is acknowledged that the recession had many causes. Three main
causes appeared to be: a world recession; the boom and bust cycle brought on by
financial deregulation; and the fact that monetary policy was too loose for too long in
the mid-1980s and then excessively tight for too long at the end of the decade. It is
also acknowledged that it is not possible to accurately calculate the exact numbers of
people displaced due to tarilf cuts because there are so many other factors affecting
employment in the economy, such as globalisation, technological change, changes in
competitiveness of other nations, and government policies. It appears particularly
likely that factors other than tariff cuts were responsible for the great bulk of the
dislocation suffered in the period. FIowever, the evidence below, combined with
reasoning, suggests that the significant tariÍf cuts of the period may have brought
significant dislocation.
Tariff cuts appear to have had an adverse impact on employment in manufacturing.
The rate of dislocation has been the most rapid in the periods of fastest protection
cuts. The 25 per cent tariff cut in 1973 appeared to contribute to the dislocation
experienced in the period 1973-74 to 1975-76. Manufacturing employment fell from
1.,338,400 in1973-74 to 1,,245,200 in1974-75 and 1,,200,400 in1975-76."' By June 1975,
manufacturing employment had fallen 146,000 below its trend level, which was 63
per cent of all the employment reduction below trend levels."' While this
employment contraction had many effects, including a wages boom, a world
recession, rising taxation and a sharp appreciation in the dollar, the magnitude of the
employment decline and its concentration in manufacturing suggests that the large
tarifÍ cut may have caused some of the dislocation,
Manufacturing employment has suffered during the Labor Government's tariff
reform program, which reduced the average effective rate of assistance to
manufacturing, bar TCF and PMV, from 13 to three per cent between 1987-88 to
1996."3 Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) quarterly, seasonally adjusted figures
show that manufacturing employment peaked at 1.,221,400 in May 1989, before
steadily declining to L,082,000 in August1991, then remaining low until a trough of
1,061,500 in August 1993. At November 1995, manufacturing employment remained
at 1.,113,200 or more than 100,000 below the May 1989 peak. In that same period,
total employment increased by nearly 610,000.'"0 Such manufacturing employment
levels also compare to the 1,338,400 employed in manufacturing in 7973-74,'"'
r21 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Yeør Book Australia 1977-78, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra,'1.978,
p.430.
t" R.A. Price, 'The effect of the Government's economic policies on industry, 1973-1975', Tlrc Australian
Quarterly, vol.48, no.2, June 1976, pp.8L-94, atp.90.
t'3 Industry Commission, Annual Report 1,991-92, op. cit., p.270.
124 Ausrralian Bureau of Statistics, Labour Force Australia L978-95, Cat. no.6204.0, p.345-348.
12s Australian Bureau of Statistics, Year Book 1975-76, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Canberra, 1976, p.727.
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meaning that manufacturing employment has fallen by approximately 225,000 since
then, whilst the total labour force has almost doubled."u
Two studies in the early 1990s, based on survey responses by manufacturing firms
themselves, concluded that structural, not cyclical, factors were responsible for the
great majority of employment lost in the period."' Structural employment
dislocation in manufacturing is also evidenced by the very high rate of long-term
unemployed in manufacturing compared with the average industry. The percentage
of long-term unemployment among unemployed workers whose last full time job
was in manufacturing was 25.5 per cent in 1990, while the corresponding figures in
services was commonly a third of this figure.t"
Much of the dislocation in the period was concentrated in tarifÍ dependent
manufacturing sectors, particularly the TCF and PMV sectors. The table below shows
that in general, the greater the assistance reductions experienced by a sector, the
greater the employment dislocation. Between November 1989 and November 1993,
clothing and footwear lost a net 9,300 jobs and transport equipment lost 40,900. The
next three highest protected sectors lost a combined net total of 56,600 jobs. By
contrast, the remaining sectors, with moderate or low protection, suffered little or no
employment losses.
126 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Løbour Force Austrnlia L978-95, op. cit., p.348; and Australian Bureau of
Statistics, Year Book 1975-76, op. cit., p.727.
t" Bur"uu of Industry Economics, lobs Growth and Decline: Recent Employntent Changes in Snnll ønd Large
Business: Occasional Paper 21,, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1994' p.x,3l-
36,41,,42,44,45. At pp.34,35, the BIE note that a1992 study by Mclntosh entitled The Productittity Dritre,had
made similar findings.
t". P,N. junankar and Cezary A. Kapuscinski, 'The incidence of long term unemployment in Australia',
Australian Bulletin of Løbour, vol.17, no.4, Decembet 199L, pp.325-352 atp'339.
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Non-metallic mineral products
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Source: Michael Taylor, The Regional Impact of Changing Leoels of Protection in Australian Industries, Office of Local
Governmenf n.p., 1992, p.3; Australian Bureau of Statistics, Labour Force Australiø Nottember 1987, Cat. no. 6203.0,
p.33; Australian Bureau of Statistics, Labour Force AustraliaNooember 1'989, Cat. no. 6203.0, p.27; Australian Bureau
of Statistics, Labour Force Australia Noaember 1.991, CaL no. 6203.0, p.27; and Australian Bureau of Statistics, Løbour
Force AustraliaNouember L993,Cat. no. 6203.0, p.39. Note that the 11./93 figure for clothing and footwear is for
'knitting, clothing and footwear'.
Analysis to 1996 would have been useful to capture the employment impact over a
longer time period. Unfortunately, the Australia and New Zealand Industry
Classification system was changed in 1993, meaning that published figures for the
industry sectors above were no longer provided by the Australian Bureau of
Statistics. FIowever, there is evidence that structural dislocation has persisted. For
example, quarterly employment figures show that textiles, clothing, footwear and
leather (TCFL) employment fell from a peak of 128,400 in August 1989 to 100,000 in
February 1991. and a low of 9L,500 in February 1993. After a mild recovery/ TCFL
employment was just 98,400 in November 1995.12e
Two factors should be borne in mind when assessing such dislocation. On the one
hand, Labor's sectoral plans cushioned the impact of the displacement, helping the
most affected sectors to restructure and become export-oriented. Rationalist reform
alone may have produced significantly more dislocation. On the other hand, it is
likely that much of the displacement was inevitable, particularly in the low value-
added part of the TCF sector, due to competition from low tax,low wage nations.tto
That tariff cuts may have caused significant structural displacement is also
evidenced by the labour market performance of the States. At the commencement of
the 1988 tariff program, the industry profiles of Australian States could be divided
into two distinct categories. In South Australia, Victoria and Tasmantia, a significant
r2e Australian Bureau of Statistics, Lnbour Force Australia 1.978-95, Cat. no.6204.0, p.345-348.
tto Bill Weekes, op. cit., p.182.
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percentage of production is comprised of inward looking, tariff dependent
manufacturing. The percentage of manufactures in Gross State Product (GSP) at
factor cost in 1987-88 in Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania was 20.2 per cent,
18.3 per cent and 17.0 per cent respectively. By comparison, Queensland and
Western Australia had only L3.5 per cent and 1L.2 per cent of their GSP at factor cost
in manufactures in 1987-88 respectively, and much of this was in sectors receiving
little tariff protection. The industry structure of New South Wales lies somewhere
between the 'rust belt' and 'free trade' categories. Its manufacturing industry, which
comprised 17 per cent of GDP at factor cost in 1987-88,"' is of significant size, but
only pockets of the industry are highly tariff dependent.
The table below shows that among the 'rust belt' States, significant dislocation
occurred in manufacturing employment during the period of tariff cuts and
recession, which drove total employment down considerably in those States. As
shown above, much of the dislocation was concentrated in the most tariff dependent
sectors. Total employment had still not made significant recovery near the end of
1995, compared with its pre-recession peak. By contrast, the 'free trade' States
suffered only brief and minor dislocatiory and achieved considerable employment
growth in the period.
Manufacturing and Total Employment by State (in thousands, original figures)
























































































































Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Labour Force Australia 1978-95, Cat. no.6204.0, p.345-348,383-388.
The following table shows employment among the States in seasonally adjusted
terms. The table shows that in each of the 'rust belt' States, the employment
contraction was deep, the recovery was slow, and employment was not significantly
greater than its pre-recession peak at February 1996. By contrast, in the 'free trade'
States, the employment contraction was small and brief, and employment at
February 1996 was well above its pre-recession peak.
ttt Th"r" figures are calculated from the data provided in Australian Bureau of Statistics, AustrøIian Nationnl
Accounts: State Accounts 1995-96, Cat. no.5220.0, p.29-40.
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Dislocation By State: Employment (in thousands, seasonally adjusted figures)
































































































Source: The figures for 1988 to 1,995 are from Australian Bureau of Statistics, Løbour Force Australia 197 8-95, Cat.
no.6204.0, p.23,24,1.25,126,134,735,-1.43,144,152,153,1,61,1,62,170,"171,. The figures for February 1996 are from
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Labour Force Australia February 1996, Cat. no.6203.0, p.12,16-18.
In the following table, each of the cells contains three numbers, which are, from top
to bottom, the unemployment rate, the labour force participation rate and the
percentage of working age population employed. The table shows that, in each of the
'rust belt' States, the unemployment rate peaked well above the national average,
and, at that time, the States had a much smaller percentage of their working age
population employed than the national average. From then on, these States have
fared moderately or significantly worse than the national average by these measures
of -labour market performance. Six years after the recession, these States were yet to
significantly recover from the employment shock. By contrast, the free trade States
fared better by these measures, except for Queensland's unemployment rate in the
late 1980s.
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Dislocation By State: Unemployment, Labour Force Participation Rate and
Percentage of Working Age Population Employed (seasonally adf usted figures)








































































































































































































































Source: The figures for 1988 to 1995 are from Australian Bureau of Statistics, Labour Force Australia 1978-95, CaL
no.6204.0, p.23,24,1,25,1,26,134,135,1,43,144,152,153,161.,'1.62,170,171. The figures for February 1996 are fro¡t
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Løbour Force AustrøIia February 1996, Cat. no.6203.0, p.1.2,1.6-1,8. Notes: 'Percentage
of Working Age Population Employed' is determined by subtracting the unemployment rate from the labour
force participation rate. Western Australia's unemployment rate also troughed at 5.5 per cent in May 1989 and
November 1989 but with lower labour force participation rates than in April 1989. Australia's unemployment rate
also troughed at December 1989 but with a lower labour force participation rate.
In summary, the figures show that, primarily due to manufacturing dislocation
suffered in the early 1990s, the 'rust belt' States suffered significant short-term
dislocation. These States had not significantly recovered when the Keating
Government was defeated in1996. \¡Vhile numerous factors contributed to the labour
market performance of these States in the period, a range of facts suggest that tariff
cuts made a òolid contribution to the displacement they experienced. This evidence
includes that: tarifÍ dependent sectors experienced the greatest dislocation;
manufacturing dislocation was prominent in the 'rust-belt' States; and the labour
market performances of all the 'rust-belt' States was significantly inferior to that
achieved by the'free trade' States.
Numerous tariff dependent regions also suffered very large increases in
unemployment and had recovered little by 1996. Following are a few examples of
tariÍf related dislocation in a few regional areas in Victoria and New South Wales.
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Unemployment Trends in Regional Cities with a High Proportion of Tariff
Dependent Production
Region June Qua¡'ter










































































































































































12.0 7 .9 10.5 10.4 8.9 14.s 14.7 15.0 9.5 8.9
Source: The figures for the June quarter 1987 to the june quarter 1989 are from Department of Ernployment,
Eclucation, Training and Youth Affairs, SmnII Area Labour Markets March Quarter 1993, Australian Governrnent
Publishing Service, Canberra, 1993, p.55,58,62-64,66. The figures for the june quarter 1990 to the June quarter
1.995 are from Department of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs, Small Area Labour Markets
December Quarter 1995, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1995, p.21,25,30,36-39. The figures
for the June quarter 1996 are from Department of Employment, Education and Training, Sntall Area Lahour
Markets September and December Quarters L996, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, "1996,
p."17,19,25-28.
It is difficult to obtain reliable data on employment in regional areas.r32 However,
there is anecdotal evidence that the unemployment figures noted above were caused
in part by dislocation in tariÍf dependent sectors."'
tt' Mrr.h of the ABS data provides figures for large aggregated regions such as 'north-eastern region', without
providing detail for smaller towns. The Department of Employment, Education and Training and its
successors provide Small Area Labour Mørkets. Figures provided refer to the city, such as the city of
Newcastle, rather than the city and its surrounds. The figures for the broader area are not consistent over
time because DEET regularly change the make up of the towns under each major area. In DEET terminology,
the figures are for the Statistical Local Area, rather than for the Local Labour Market.
ttt E.rid".r." of tariff dependence in these regions and/or evidence of dislocation in tariff dependent sectors
within these regions can be found as follows: For Newcastle, see: Taskforce on Regional Development,
Deueloping AustrøIiø: A Regional Perspectitte: A Report to the Federal Goaernment by tlrc Taskforce on Regionnl
Deuelopment, The Taskforce on Regional Development, Canberra, 1993, p.23. For Wollongong, see: Michael
Taylor, op. cit., p.21.. For Geelong, see Michael Taylor, op. cit., p.21; Office of Employmenf Department of
Employment and Training Victoria, Restructuring of the Pøssenger Motor Vehicle ønd Textiles Clothing and
Footutear Industries in Victoria: An Ooen¡ieut of the Impact on Employees, Departrnent of Employment aucl
Training, Melbourne, 1991, p.23,3'1.,32,35,60; Industry Commission, Intpediments to Regional Industry
Adjustment Draft Report: Volume 2: Appendices, Industry Commission, Canbera, 1,993, p.C27; Brotherhood of
St. Laurence Submission to the Industry Commission Inquiry Into Tarffi and Industry Deztelopment, Unpublisl-red,
1992, p.2. For Arara! see: Office of EmploymenÇ Department of Employment and Training Victoria, op. cit.,
p.24; Cify of AraraÇ [Their notes forl Meeting betuteen City of Ararat, Arørat Regional Deaelopment Board, Packard
CTA Pty Ltd and Senator the Hon. lohn Button, Minister for Industry, Technology and Commerce, 10 June 1992,
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Similar localised dislocation can be found in the other two 'rust-belt' States. For
example, South Australia's industrial 'iron triangle' has suffered larifl related
displacement."o Between the ]une quarter 1990 and the June quarter 1994,
unemployment in the city of Port Pirie rose from 8.3 per cent to 16.8 per cent,
unemployment in the city of Port Augusta rose from 7.0 to \3.7 per cent, and
unemployment in the city of Whyalla rose from 7.8 per cent to 13.8 per cent.'" Itt
Tasmania's most tariff dependant region, Mersey-Lyell, which hadL6.4 per cent of its
1991, ernployment in manufactures,ttu unemployment rose from 9.1 per cent in April
1992'3' rc'-1,6|1, per cent in October 1993."8
A number of regional cities and towns also suffered displacement due to reductions
in protection for agricultural products. For example, Queensland towns such as
MacKay, Innisfail, and Bundaberg suffered dislocation as sugar protection was
reduced and all experienced very high unemployment in the period."n In Mildura,
Victoria, reduced protection and dumping of Brazilian orange juice concentrate led
to significant dislocation'oo and helped increase the unemployment rate from 8.3 per
cent in the june quarter L990 to L8.5 per cent in the June quarter 1993.'o'In Renmark,
South Australia, where horticulture and its processing dominates production,
Unpublished, 1992; and Ararat Regional Development Board, Submission to the Parliamentary Inquiry lnto
TartffsandlndustryDeuelopment, Unpublished,1993,p.1,-3. ForShepparton/ see: MichaelTaylor, op. cit., p.20;
and Parliamentary Inquiry Into Tnrffi and Industry Deaelopment: Fifth Interim Report, Unpublished, 1993,
p.10,11. For Moe and Morwell, see: Michael Taylor, op. cit., p.21,. For Stawell, see: Office of Employmenl
Department of Employment and Training Victoria, op. cit., p.179; and Parliamentary Inquiry Into Tariffs and
Industry Deoelopment: Fifth Interim Report, op. cit., p.5,6. For Maryborough, see: Office of Ernployment,
Department of Employment and Training Victoria, op. cit., p.35,60,174,179; Letter by Robert G Orr,
Econornic Development Officer, City of Maryborough, 3 November 1992 to Peter Marshall, City Manager,
outlining his oral submission to the Parliamentary Inquiry Into Tariffs and Industry Development at Ararat
on 29 October 1992; City of Maryborough per Peter R Marshall, Submission to the Parliantentary Inquiry Into
Tarffi and lndustry Deaelopntent, Unpublished , 1992, p.1.,2; Maryborough & District Development Comn-rittee,
Submission of Maryborough €t District Deoelopment Contmittee to Industry Conmùssion Inquiry: lnrpedinrcnts to
RegionøI Industry Adjustment, Unpublished, 1993, p.1,3-5; and Parliamentary lnquiry Into Tarffi and Industry
Dertelopment: Fifth Interim Report, op. cit., p.6. For Ballarat, see: Michael Taylor, op. cit., p.20; ar-rd Office of
Employment, Department of Employment and Training Victoria, op. cit., p.35,60,174,177. For Warrnarnbool,
see: Michael Taylor, op. cit., p.2O; Office of Employment Department of Ernployment and Training Victoria,
op. cit., p.35,60,174,180; City of Warrnambool, Submission to the Industry Commission Inquiry lnto Tarffi and
Industry Detrelopment, Unpublished,1993, p.11,; and Parliamentary lnquiry Into Tørffi and lndustry Deuelopnrcnt
Fifth Interim Report, op. cit., p.2. For Bendigo, see: Michael Taylor, op. cit., p.20; and Office of Employrnent,
Department of Employment and Training Victoria, op. cit., p.60,"174,178.
tto IndustÐ, Commission, Impediments to Regional Industry Adjustnrcnt Draft Report: Volunte 2: Appcndices, op. cit.,
p.B6.
t3t Depa.t^ent of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs, Small Area Løbour Markcts Australia
December Quarter 1995, op. cit., p.45.
t36 Ir,drrstry Cornmission, Impediments to Regional Industry Adjustment Draft Report: Volume 2: Appendices, op. cit.,
p.87.
137 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Tasmanian Statistical Indicators lune 1993, Cat. no.1303.6, p.5.
138 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Tasmanian Støtistical Indicøtors lanunry 1994, Cat. no.1303.6, p.5.
t3e Department of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs, Small Area Labour Markets Australia
Decentber Quarter 1995, op. cit., p.10-12.
'oo Parliantentary Inquiry Into Tørffi and Industry Deaelopment: Fifth Interim Report, op. cit., p.7; Independent
Parliamentary Inquiry Into Tarffi and Industry Deaelopment, op. cit., p.15,46: and john Carroll, 'Econotnic
rationalism and its consequences' in ]ohn Carroll and Robert Manne (eds), op. cit., pp.7-26 atp.17.
rar Department of Employrnent, Education and Training, SmaII Area Labour Markets Australiø December Quørter
1995, op. cit., p.39.
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significant tarlrff related displacement has transpired,'o' helping to increase the
Renmark municipality's unemployment rate from 13.3 per cent in the June quarter
1990 to19.7 per cent in the June quarter 1992.'0"
Thus, in those regions in which one or more tariÍf dependant sectors is significant in
production, the 1988 to 2000 tarìff program may be causing tariff related
displacement. Many of the towns noted above still had very high unemployment
rates when the Labor Government left power, suggesting a significant structural
component in the unemployment. Structural dislocation can be proportionately
more disruptive in regional centres and country towns. Their often narrow industry
bases mean that there are often few alternative opportunities for those displaced,
and negative multipliers are substantial where a destroyed sector had taken up a
large proportion of the region's output.too Nation-wide, the result appears to be
many pockets of very long-term, structural unemployment, in situations of low
labour mobility and few alternative employment opportunities.
This dislocation has some negative effects on restructuring and employment growth.
People who lose their jobs may not be able to employ their skills in other similar
firms, as their sector may be in structural decline. Unless they re-train for other
sectors, such people may experience long-term unemployment. Where people face
long periods in poverty and unemployment, the individual, social and economic
costs can be large. There is a significant link between long-term unemployment and
physical and psychological decline, family breakdown, crime and suicide. Peopie
faced with harsh economic and social conditions can not easily become the'proactive
facilitators'of a restructured Australian economy, at least in the short to medium-
term. This dislocation exacerbates the hysteresis in Australia's unemployment by
adding to the pool of structural unemployment that remains largely untouched
during cyclical upturn. The social reality of structural unemployment shows that the
rationalist assumption that 'resources released from inefficient sectors will be
redeployed into efficient sectors, leading to increases in economic and employment
growth' is problematic. It appears that tariff cuts are more effective in destroying
inefficient industries, than helping to build new industries.
Further - while some of the dislocation in manufacturing, where it involves the
inevitable decline of firms, may constitute necessary resfrucfuring - some may also
impede restructuring. Australia's manufacturing industry is already small by
international standards and is deficient in the capital goods sectors. TariÍf cuts, by
eliminating firms and, with them, their technology, equipment, markets, skills,
technical know-how and established links within the global division of labour, may
be decimating some of the firms upon which restructuring to higher value-added
to' Ri.r".la.rd Development Corporation, [Submission to the Industry Contmission Inquiry lntol lnrycdintents to
Regional Industry Adjustment: Rit¡erland of South Australia, Unpublished ,1993, p.1,,2,4-6.
143 Department of Employmen! Education, Training and Youth Affairs, Small Area Labour Markets Australia:
December Quørter 1995, op. cit., p.43.
1aa Australian Chamber of Manufactures, Bendigo, 'Policy for Balanced Manufacturing Developrnent' in
Australian Chamber of Manufactures, Bendigo, Submission to the Independent Inquiry Into Tarffi ønd lndustry
Deuelopment, Unpublished ,1992, p.1,. [The second page 1]
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production depends.'ot Further, the closure of major manufacturing firms can
decimate highly competitive small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), upon
which restructuring is also crucially dependant.
These economic costs are compounded by the loss of tax revenue where people
become unemployed, and by the need to increase outlays on unemployment
benefits, labour market programs and a range of community services needed by
displaced workers.
Rationalist models may produce an emphasis on dislocation because they assume
that resources are fully employed. In this situation, the movement of resources
requires that they be released from inefficient firms.'ou This focus on dislocation is
misplaced because Australia has experienced mass unemployment for decades. This
means there are already numerous 'resources' available to be deployed in growth
sectors, without any immediate need for resources to be released from declining
sectors. In this situation, the key to restructuring is the positive redeployment of
resources in sectors that can bring fast growth, not further dislocation. Of course,
over decades, our least viable firms, such as some in low value-added manufactures,
will need to be left to decline and be replaced by high value-added manufactures
and services. However, there appears little case for rapid, immediate destruction.
Perhaps not surprisingly, rationalists tend to advocate excessively rapid elimination
of tariffs. The structural displacement suffered in the period could have been far
worse had the Liberal Party, the IC,tot Ross Garnauttot or the Paul Keating of
November 1989'on decided the matter, as they all supported completely free trade by
2000. Worse still, imagine the displacement had Treasury had their way in the 1988
Statement, antd had tariffs completely abolished within five years."o
Rapid tariff cutting can lead to the destruction of competitive firms and reduced
economic and employment growth. The Treasury prescription, or free trade by 2000,
in conjunction with no active industry policy, could have resulted in the obliteration
of the PMV and TCF industries and a major decline in economic and employment
growth. This view is expressed in the IMP model of the National Institute for
Economic and Industry Research (NIEIR), which estimated that Garnaut's
recommendation for free trade by 2000 would reduce manufacturing outputby 4.75
per cent, GDP by 1,.6 per cent and employment by one per cent.ttt
Most particularly, long run employment and growth may be higher where tariff cuts
are delayed in recession, in which structural displacement already increases
tot Mu.gu."t Beardow,'Why we can't run on raw materials', Australiøn Business, vol.11, no.19,6 March 1991,
pp.44-45 atp.45.
tou G."g Crough & Ted Wheelwright, op. cit., p.89.
tot Ros Garnaut, ch.2'Trade and industry policy after the Uruguay Round', op. cit., p.63.
tou Ros Garnaut, Australia and the Northeast Asian Ascendancy, op. cit., p.222.
ton Gl"r,r, Milne, 'Tariff about-face no protection for Paul', The Australian, 27 March 1992, p.11 reported that in
November 1989, in response to the release of the Garnaut report, Keating endorsed the recommendation that
all protection be removed by 2000.
rs0 Randall G. Stewart, op. cit., p.113.
t"' Indrprrdrnt Parliamentary Inquiry Into Tarffi and Industry Deuelopment, op. cit., p.55.
38
dramatically,tt" then continued when the economy is recovering. Manufacturers can
generally control only around 30 to 40 per cent of their costs.ttt They therefore have
little capacity to deal with sharp declines in demand combined with rapidly rising
exposure to international competition.ttt Excessively speedy exposure , to
international competition would simply result in dislocation, while the recessed
climate means minimal medium-term job growth in other sectors. The result is a
negative effect on growth and employment, at in the short and medium-term."t
Pausing tariff reductions in recessions may assist more firms to survive and save jobs
numbering in the tens of thousands. Such firms can continue to contribute to
production, employment and restructuring. Some of the economic and social costs
associated with structural dislocation can also be avoided. The benefits of tariff
reforms can be achieved by progressing to a low protection economy in the years
when the economy in growing modestly or strongly. Using this approach, significant
extra displacement can be avoided, while the benefits of moving to lower tariffs can
still be achieved, if ayear or two later.
This was the reason goverrunent reports recommended tariffs not be cut during
periods of low or negative growth in the years after the Whitlam 25 per cent across-
the-board tariff cut in 1973."u TariÍf cutting in the L990 to 1992 period seemed ill-
advised given that firms already had to cope with the recession, not to mention very
high interest rates, high inflation and an inefficient microeconomy. In these
circumstances, many efficient firms, including some exporters, were already being
destroyed. Imposing tarifÍ cuts on firms during recession simply worsens the
structural dislocation.ttt This was why, during the recession, the Australian Council
of Trade Unions (ACTU), the majority of the Federal Cabinet, including John Button,
and the South Australian and Victorian Governments all called for atarifÍ pause."u
rs2 Ir,drrrtÐ, Commission, Annual Report 1.991.-92, op. cit., p.49,83 shows that their index of structural change
rose substantially in the recessions of7974-75 and 1982-83.
ts3 Cha-ber of Commerce and Industry South Australia lnc., [Submission to tlæ] Independent Parliamentary
Inquiry Into Tarffi and Industry Deaelopment, Unpublished,1992, p.2 notes that some manufacturing firrns in
the tradeable sector control only around 30 per cent of their costs. Anand Kulkarni, ch.19 'Networking ancl
industry development' in Michael Costa & Michael Easson (eds), op. cit., pp.357-372 at p.359-360 note that
manufacturers directly account for less than 40 per cent of their costs, less than any other industry.
lsa Michael Deeley, 'Government must do its bit', Australian Business, vol.11, no.19,6 March 1991, pp.46-47 at
p.46.
ttt 
loh.t Carroll, op. cit., pp.7-26, at p.15.; and Bill Weekes, op. cit., p.183.
rs6 Committee to Advise on Policies for Manufacturing Industry, Policies for Dettelopntent of Manufacturing
lndustry: A Green Paper: Volume 1.: Report to the Prime Minister by the Committee to Adt¡ise on Policies for
Manufacturing Industry, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1975, p.177 ,178; Wúte Papcr on
Manufacturing Industry, op. cit., p.22,36; and lohn Crawford, Brian Inglis, R.J.L. Hawke & N.S. Currie, op. cit.,
p.10.5, 10.13,10.14.
rs7 South Australian Manufacturing Advisory Council, South AustrøIinn Industry in tlæ 1990s: A Proposal for
Action: Submission to the Commonu¡ealth Goaernment,Unpublished, 1992, p.20.
ttt Lu.lru Tingle, 'PM, Ministers considered stopping tariff cuts', The Australian, 20 October 7992, p.1,2 shows
that Button and most of the Cabinet wanted a tariff pause or slowdowry but Keating refused; 'ACTU backs
tough company tax rules in $1bn. jobs plan', The Australian, 16 luly 1992, p.1,2 shows the ACTU were
lobbying the Federal Government Íor a Larlff pause; Laura Tingle,'Labor divided on tariffs', The Australian,
'17 July 7992, p.1 shows that the Victorian and SA Labor Governments and the Federal Parliamentary Left
sought a tariff pause during the recession; and Glenn Milne, 'Protection rackets' , The Weekend Australian, 19-
20 September 1992, p.21 shows that key parts of the Labor Unity faction at Federal level also sought a tariff
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It is also important to be measured about what tariÍf pauses can achieve. Senator
Spindler concluded from his tariff inquiry that 200,000 people would have retained
their jobs if a12 month pause and active industry policies had been adopted during
the recession,"n and that a further 250,000 jobs were likely to be lost in the 1992 to
1996 period.'uo This would appear to be a significant overestimate of the capacity of
tariff pauses to save jobs and an underestimate of the capacity oÍ tafiff cuts to create
jobs. The dislocation suffered in the period had several more significant causes than
tarifÍ cuts. However, pausing tariff cuts in recessions may save jobs numbering in the
tens of thousands.
Finally, as Labor arguably demonstrated, economic welfare can be improved by
combining tariff reductions with sectoral plans in the most affected sectors, to enable
such sectors to restructure, rather than simply be obliterated. For example, the Car
Plan successfully restructured the car industry. When Labor came to power, the
industry had too many producers making too many, high cost, uncompetitive
models, on a scale too small to be competitive.tut The industry had poor productivity
and quality, an inward focus, and was heavily reliant on high tariffs.'6'The 1985
Button Plan sought to restructure the industry to a maximum of three producers and
six models by 1992. Tariff cuts and penalties for low volume production provided
the'stick', while export facilitation and other assistance provided the 'carrot'.163
The Car Plan worked. It forced companies to focus on high value-added production
and their competitive strengths.'uo There are now three producers, namely Ford,
Mitsubishi and the GMH /Toyota joint venture, and all are concentrating primarily
on high volumes of one model, with exports a key focus. Productivity, cost, quality,
competitiveness and efficiency have improved markedly. The companies are
becoming strongly integrated in their global parents' international division of labour.
Transport equipment exports increased from fi474 million in 1985-86'o' to fi2,490
million tn1995-96.'uu These exports were propelled by the export facilitation scheme,
as Mitsubishi,'6' Toyola, Ford, Nissan and even the IC have argued.'ut In turn, such
pause, but Keating and his advisors refused. 'The sweetest victory of all' - The final episode of Labor in Pouter
- Aired on ABC-TV 9.30-10.30, 5 July 1993 included John Button saying he was against the March 1991
Statement because he thought it moved too fast and included Bill Kelty saying he regretted not '...going in
harder...' against the 1991 Statement because of the negative effects of tariff reductions in the context of
economic recession.
ttn 
Sid Spindler, 'Tariff report released in Parliament' - MediaRelense 93/241,26Way 1993.
tuo 
Johrl Kerin, 'Cash bid to ease tariff pain' , The Adoertiser,20 October 7992, p.10.
tut 
Bob Manning, ch.7'A manufacturing view'in Roy Green & Rodin Genoff (eds), Making the FutureWork:
Crisis and Change in the South Australian Economy, Allen and Unwin, St Leonards, New South Wales, 1993,
p.173 -134 at p.121.,122.
tu' Offir" of Employment, Department of Employment and Training Victoria, op. cit., p.4.
163 Industq, Commission , The Automotitte Industry, op. cit., p.12.
tuo Michael Lynch, 'How the car plan took the right road', The Australian Financial Reaieut, 10 February 1994,
p.14.
16s Australian Bureau of Statistics, Balance of Payments Australial.gSS-8g,Cat. no.5303.0,p.17.
t66 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Balønce of Payments Australia: September Quarter L996, Cat. no.5203.0, p.17.
167 Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd.., Submission to the Parliamentary Inquiry Into Tarffi and Industry Detteloptncnt,
Unpublished, 1992, p.2.
tuu Rorl Flammerton, 'Hands off car plan, says Nissan', The AustraliaL'r, 10 September 1992, p.13; Industry
Cornmission, The Au tomotiu e In dustry, op. cit., p.30 -32,66,67 .
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exporting provides the necessary economies of scale for firms to achieve cost
competitiveness.tun
A rationalist approach, by contrast, may have decimated the industry. The IC 1990
report argued for rapid removal of all assistance for the car sector,l7o stated that
export facilitation was harming efficiency in resource allocation, and rejected any
constructive industry strategy for the car sector, without any detailed consideration
of whether it could foster growth."' Similarly, the Hewson Liberal Opposition
proposed zero tariffs by 2000. Ford,t" Flolden,ttt Toyotat'o and even IC Chairman
Scales"t and Nissan (despite having switched to imports!)"u claimed that the Liberal
program would lead to the complete shutdown of the entire motor vehicle industry.
Without a car industry, Australia would lose the remaining 90,000 jobs in the
transport equipment industry"' and well over 200,000 more in industries reliant on
the car sector.ttt The trade balance would also deteriorate by more than $5 billion."o
Such a scenario would have been all the more likely had the Liberal Party been able
to implement their policy to remove the $12,000 tariff on Japanese second hand
cars.tto Such cars were allowed freely into New Zealand and, between l-986 and1991,
cut the new car share of the market from 94to 49 per cent."t
tun Ar,g.r, MacKenzie, 'Export or die - that's the car plan' , Australian Business, vol.11, no.21,,20 March 1991,, p.24;
N. B. Iddles, Automotiae Manufacturing Industry Post-L992: Gearing Up for Change: Speech to The Society of
Automotiae Engineers (Australasia), Wednesday May 1st, 1.991., Unpublished, 1991, p.2O; and Industry
Commission, The Automotioe Industry, op. cit., p.105.
170 Toyota Motor Corporation, op. cit., p.4. Industry Commission, The Automotirre Industry, op. cit., p.136 notes
that this was the minority position in the final report.
, 
tt t Industry Commissio n, The Automotiae Industry, op. cit., p.a4,69.
"' Luuru Tingle, '60,000 jobs could go under Libs: Ford', The Weekend Austrnlian,lg-20 September 7992, p.1,6
notes that Ford sent their employees a memo entitled 'Employee information: Car industry policies' stating
that under zero tariffs they believed the whole car industry would shutdown.
ttt Gl".rrr Milne, Laura Tingle and Tim Duncary 'Toyota boss backs PM' , Ttæ Austrrilian, 24 Septembe r 1992,
p.1,,2 at p.1 note that Holden strongly criticised Dr Hewson's policies.
"o ibid.., p.1 notes that Toyota Japan's President, Dr. Shoichiro Toyoda, stated that Toyota's $730m. investment
to establish a new plant at Altona was predicated on the Governments policies persisting into the 21st
century and,'Zero 2000'- Lateline, ABC TV - Aired 10.30 to 11.05pm, 5 May'1,992 has Toyota Australia head
Bob Johnson stating that there would be no car industry under zero tariffs.
"t 'Z.ro 20OO', op. cit., included Bill Scales stating that at zero tariffs, the industry would completely shutclown.
ttu 
Ron Hammerton, 'Hands off car plan, says Nissan', The Australian, 10 Septernber 1992, p.13 notes that Nissan
supported the Governmenfs car plan over that of the Coalition, despite having switched to imports because
they believed that stability was vital to the industry.
177 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Løbour Force AustrøIía Nouember 1993, op. cit., p.39.
ttt Thi, estimate is based on the view of Tony Bushell, Director of Supply, Mitsubishi Australia, that'...for every
job created in vehicle assembly or [the] component manufacturing sector, 2.7 jobs will be added elsewhere.'
as reported by Bob Jennings, 'Car companies set to accelerate SA economy' , The Adztertiser,l-O Febrrary 1994,
p.13 and ignores the view of GMH that 6 jobs were created in SA for every job in its SA operation as
reported by Lindsay Olney, 'Labor revs up its push on car tariffs' , The Aduertiser, 3 Septernber 1992, p.L9.
ttn Rodi.r Genoff, Industry Policy ønd Sectoral Plans l-Iniler Labor - A l)niaersity of Adeløide Research Seminar Paper, 3
August 1.992, Unpublished, 1992, p.20.
tuo L"no." Taylor & Tim Duncan, 'Hewson gives way on used cars', The Australian,25 September 1992, p.1,2 at
p.1.
ttt ¡u-", E. Buck, Submission to the Pørliamentary Enquiry into Tariffs ønd Industry Deuelopnrent, Vehicle Builders
Employ ee s' F e de r ation of Aus tr alia, Unpublished, 1992, p.5.
4'1.
Other manufacturing sectors would have also faced significant dislocation because:
lirstIy, the car sector produces capability in processes crucial to the development of
the manufacturing industry, such as design, engineering, electrical and electronics
expertise, R&D, skill development and best practice work organisation;tt' and
secondly, car making takes major parts of the output of a range of vital sectors
including machine tools."t GMH claim that for every job created in its South
Australian operation, 6 others are created in the broader economy.tto Every job in car
producing firms creates 3 more in the component sector.ttt Thus, the loss of the car
sector, which had 70,000 employees, may have led to the loss of several hundred
thousand jobs in the Australian economy. Finally, the loss of the car sector would
have produced significant regional dislocation in cities such as Geelong and
Adelaide.
Thus, the combination of sensibly phased tariff cuts and sectoral policy preserved the
significant benefits of the car industry and appeared to produce higher economy-
wide growth, employment and restructuring than would have been achieved by a
hardline rationalist approach. A more phased tariÍf cutting approach, in conjunction
with industry policies such as export facilitation, has also been, to varying degrees,
successful in restructuring a range of industries such as steel, heavy engineering and
TCF.
Conclusion
A key benefit of tariÍf reform has been to end Australia's unfathomable fixation with
the tariff as the key instrument for industry development. Australia's high tarifÍ
policies failed. By 'propping up' inefficient industries whenever their employment
was threatened, tariffs impeded structural change, growth and exports. In particular,
protection may have contributed to Australia's failure to restructure its
manufacturing sector from low value-added production to ETMs in the decades after
1960 and to capitalise on the significant growth in world exports during the period.
Tariffs also increased input costs for producers throughout the economy and allowed
producers to become complacent and inefficient.
In the past, tariffs may have been useful in assisting a developing nation to
industrialise, but the strategy needed to be targeted on particular sectors, and tariffs
must be phased down once an industrial base has formed. F{owever, with modern
transport and communications, even this limited use of the tariff is becoming less
tt'F"de.al Chamber of Automotive Industries, Submission to the Industry Commission Draft Rcport on tlrc
Automotioe Industry, Unpublished, 1990, p.21,,22.
ttt Puppur, Carter, Evar-rs & Koop/Telesis, op. cit., p.179 notes that the car industry takes n-rajor parts of tl.re
output non-ferrous die castings (40 per cent), ferrous foundries (1,2 per cent), fasteners (23 per cent), plastic
mouldings (10 per cent), tool and die (67 per cent), machine tools (60 per cent), glass (6 per cent), industrial
paint (10 per cent) and steel (8 per cent). Engineering Employers Association South Australia, Subnússion to
the Independent Parliamentary Enquiry into Tariffs and lndustry Deztelopment, Unpublished , 1992, p.14 noted that
there are 42 manufacturing codes required to make a vehicle.
tto Lirldruy olney, op. cit., p.19.
ttt Thi, was the finding of Manufacturing Advisory Council, Post 1992 - Assistance for the Autontotitte Industrll as
noted in Paul Noack, Vehicle Builders Employees Federation (SA Branch), Submission to tlrc Parliantentary
Enquiry Into Tariffs and Industry Detrelopment, Unpublished ,7992, p.1,6.
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effective. Tariff protection does little to address the causes of competitive advantage
and indeed, can often delay much needed adjustment. More than ever, tariffs are
irrelevant to achieving competitiveness, restructuring and employment growth, and
the end of the widespread use and abuse of tariffs should be celebrated.
Tariff reductions have produced economic benefits. Exposure to international
competition forced firms to increase competitiveness in order to survive. Tariff cuts
also appear to have contributed to restructuring by: reducing input costs; removing
most of the assistance bias against exports; and stopping the practice of 'propping
up' declining sectors, thereby encouraging those sectors to become productive and
survive, or decline and give up their resources for use in more efficient sectors. This
process would seem likely to allow structural change in Australia to more effectively
follow world trade growth trends.
Flowever, tarilf cutting appears to produce only modest economic benefits. Perhaps
most crucially, tarifÍ cuts do little to create competence in those capabilities - such as
R&D and skills formation - that are the keys creating an innovation-driven economy.
In a world where competitive advantage and restructuring is dependent on the
capacity to produce innovative, high quality, high value-added products and
services, tarfif reform is of only marginal utility.
It is also widely admitted that tariff reductions have little net impact on employment
creation, a disappointing result given the structural dislocation they cause. Further,
while taÅfÍ cuts may have fostered exports, they have not helped to create large
strategic exporters. Finally, tariff cuts appear to have, at best, no net effect on the
trade balance, and at worst, a moderate negative effect.
The limited benefits produced by tariff cuts do not show that tariff cutting should
not occur. They do however indicate that they should only form one small
component of a much broader industry policy agenda. Unfortunately, it appears that
the whole rationalist agenda does little to foster restructuring, competitiveness and
employment growth.
The benefits of taúff cutting may have also been overstated. Input cost reductions
promised appear likely to be smaller than predicted, and are less important in
achieving restrucfuring now that competitive success increasingly relies on
innovation, quality and value adding, rather than price. TariÍf cuts, combined with
minimal active industry policy, may also fail to encourage Australia's most
competitive sectors to expand, as Australian and foreign companies may be
encouraged to invest offshore by more attractive government assistance regimes.
Finally, the rationalist approach to tariff reform appears to be flawed. It may have
been a mistake to cut tariffs in the middle of the worst recession in 60 years, amidst a
high interest rate, high inflation environment. Rationalist prescriptions for even
more rapid tariff cuts, with no restructuring assistance for affected sectors, may have
produced very significant dislocation. Some of this dislocation would have harmed
restructuring,by creating huge pools of long-term structurally unemployed people,
unable to quickly be redeployed in efficient industries, and by destroying parts of
the manufacturing base necessary for restructuring to ETMs. Creating significant
dislocation in order to achieve a low tariff regime quickly would appear likely to
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produce worse outcomes for restructuring than a more phased approach, combined
with restructuring assistance for the most affected sectors. This approach can still
bring all the benefits of a low tariÍf environment, just a few years later.
On balance, sensibly phased tariff reductions during periods of economic growth
appear to be economically beneficial, particularly where they are accompanied by
effective, temporary sectoral plans to assist affected sectors to adjust. This approach
appears to produce moderate net beneficial effects for restructuring, employment
growth and national competitiveness, although these benefits come at a cost of
signif icant strucfu ral dislocation.
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Chapter Two: Free Market Infrastructure Reform
Introduction
This chapter assesses the impact of rationalist free market reform of Australia's
infrastructure sectors on employment growth, restructuring and national
competitiveness. The five key tenets of free market infrastructure reform are pricing
reform, corporatisation, increased competition, privatisation and deregulation. All
five were strongly advocated by rationalist academics, the IC and the Labor
Government in the period.tuu
All five tenets are means to achieving a market allocation of resources.tt
Rationalists recommend pricing policies that remove any assistance given to the
provision of infrastructure services."8 For example, the IC recommend that all
government business enterprises (GBEs) '...earn at least a 'hurdle rate' of return on
new investment comparable to that in the private sector."tn Consistent with free
market views, the IC claim that any return below market rates would mean
'...resources would be inappropriately directed to public utilities'.'eo Such policies
had substantial effects in enforcing free market resource allocation because
significant assistance had been provided to industry through subsidised
infrastructure provision. tn t
Rationalists also endorse corporatisatior.,'n' which involves removing any
infrastructure assistance through policies to: vest management in commercial
boards; establish objectives that relate to commercial performance only; remove all
community service obligation (CSO) provision; leave social provision solely to direct
budgetary allocations; apply rigorous performance monitoring; make all GBEs liable
for all taxes and charges; require rates of return equivalent to what the private sector
tuu Th" Industry Cornmission's policy on infrastructure provision is set out in ch.2 'Infrastructure reform: A
gateway to a better future' in lndustry Commission, AnnuaL lleport 1990-91, op. cit., p.9-17. Simon
Domberger, ch.8 'The role of public enterprises in microeconomic reform' in Peter Forsyth (ed.),
Microeconontic Reþrm in Australia, Allen and Unwin, St Leonards, New South Wales, 1992, pp.1,64-176 at
p.164, 168-170 describes the Federal Government's rationalist microeconomic reform agenda as seeking to
reduce inefficiency '...by the restoration of market forces where appropriate, the removal of barriers to entry
in sectors that would benefit from greater competition...', deregulation, privatisation and corporatisation.
Working Nation: Policies and Programs, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1994, p.22 noted
that the Government would seek to increasing the efficiency of infrastructure provision '...through
deregulation, corporatisation, privatisation and improved public sector management.'
ttt Alu., Wood, 'Less change, more reform', The Weekend Australiøn,22-23 }y'ray 1993, p.18.
tuu Fo, example, Henry Ergas, 'Privatisation and market forces: Their role in infrastructure provision' in
Stephen King & Peter Lloyd (eds), op. cìt., pp.1,47-"165 at p.148-151,,1,61,-1,62 endorses charging prices that
reflect costs to prevent the 'excessive investment' that occurs where infrastructure provision is subsiclised, as
well as the removal of all cross-subsidies and the closure of infrastructure provision that doesn't rnake a
rnarket return.




tn' S"" Sirnon Domberger, op. cit., p.769,170; and Frederick G. Hilmer, Mark Rayner & Geoffery Taperell,
National Competition Policy: Report by the Independent Committee of lnquiry, Australian Government Publishing
Service, Canberra, 1993, p.300,301..
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would seek to achieve; require dividend payments to government similar to that
achieved by the private sector; remove any borrowing advantages received by GBEs;
and make all corporatised authorities subject to the Corporations law and the Trade
Practices Act.tn'
IC policies also recommend the structural separation of activities performed in
markets dominated or monopolised by GBEs and the introduction of competition
and privatisation where appropriate.tno Competition helps to ensure a market
allocation of resources because any substantial subsidisation by GBEs in the context
of a competitive market would mean bankruptcy.tnt At the IC wrote: 'Competition
provides direct incentives for...efficient pricing practices..."nu
Deregulation overlaps with, and reinforces, corporatisation policy, through the
removal of CSOs and the establishment of exclusively commercial objectives.tn'
Deregulation can also facilitate competition, for example, by removing regulations
that restrict market entry.te8
Finally, rationalists are strong advocates of privatisation, again, in order to eliminate
any government subsidy and establish a market allocation of resources.tnn The
rationalist view that free markets bring efficient resource allocation underpins the IC
claim that: '[g]ains to the community from public asset sales come primarily from
efficiency improvements, not from maximising...the sale price'.'oo
The IC have recommended implementation of the market reform agenda in
numerous infrastructure sectors including rail,'o' electricity and gas,'o' ports,'ot and
watefoo and Commonwealth and State Governments have implemented, or agreed
to implement, much of the agenda.
te3 IndustÐ, Commissiory Energy Generation and Distribution: Volume 1: Sunrmary nnd Recommendations: Report
No.11, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1991, p.3-6 includes all this under the heading
'A corporatisation model for public utilities'. This agenda is also outlined in: Industry Commission, Annuol
Report 1991-92, op. cit., p.110-115; and Industry Commission, Annual Report 1990-91, op. cit., p.'1.2.
teo Industry Commission, Annual Report 1990-91, op. cit., p.8; and Industry Commission, Annunl Report 1991-92,
op. cit., p.19,102.
tnt ibid,, p.108,109; Industry Commission, Annual Report L990-91., op. cit., p.13 also endorses'free entry' into
infrastructure provision markets.
1e6 Industry Commission, Annuøl Report 1990-g , op. cit., p.108.
tnt Srl.h policies are recommended by Industry Commission, AnnuøI Report 1990-91., op. cit., p.1,2,
tnt Sirllon Domberger, op. cit., p.L69.
tee Industry Commission, Annual Report L990-9L, op, cit., p.15-17; and Industry Commission, Annual Report
1991-92, op. cit., p.1L5,1L6.
'oo Industry Commission, Annual Report L990-9 , op. cit., p.15.
'0t Industry Commission, Rail Transport Volume 1.: Report: Report No.13, Australian Government Publishing
Service, Canberra, 1991,, p.xvi,,xix,xx,xxi,xxiii.
202 IndustrJ, Commission, Energy Generation andDistribution: Volume 1: Summary andRecommendations, op. cit.,
p.1.,5,12,15 -"17,20,23,25-27 .
'03 IndustÐ, Commission, Port Authority Seraices and Actiuities: Report N0.31, Australian Government Publishing
Service, Canberra, 1993, p.xvi,xvii,xx,xxi,xxiii,"131-134,145,177,17 8.
20o Ir,dustÐ, Commission, Wøter Resources and Water Waste Disposal: Report No.26, Australian Government
Publishing Service, Canberra, 1992, p.2,3,6,10-13,85,86.
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The Hilmer Report was commissioned in order to speed the implementation of the
market infrastructure reform program.'os The report recommended the'break up' of
public monopolies through the separation of natural monopoly and potentially
competitive activities, and the separation of potentially competitive activities into a
number of smaller, independent business units, some or all generally to be private.
As Hilmer notes, establishing competitive markets will remove the ability to provide
subsidised infrastructure services.'ou
Furthermore, the Hilmer Report recommended that competitive neutrality be
established within one year of the introduction of competition.2o' To achieve
competitive neutrality, the report recommended privatisation as '...the most
appropriate response in most circumstances','ot with corporatisation the next option,
followed by either removal of the specific advantages of the GBE in question or
market pricing.'on As the Hilmer report states, the logic underpinning the
introduction of competition in markets involving public monopolies and their
subsidised infrastructure provision is to avoid the '...misallocation of resources and
inefficiency which adversely affects community welfare (associated with such
policies)."t0 Again we are back to the simple policy prescription: 'Let resources be
allocated by the market.'
The Hilmer Report catalysed the implementation of the market infrastructure reform
agenda by setting a tight timetable for implementation and establishing the National
Competition Council to guide governments seeking to implement the agenda."' The
Premiers and the Prime Minister agreed in principle to open up GBEs to an
environment of open competition within two years at the February 1994 COAG
meeting,"' as well as agreeing to jointly develop national competition legislation to
allow the structural separation of public monopolies including gas, electricity and
the railways."'
Rationalist academics such as Ergas,"o as well as rationalist government advisory
bodies, claimed that the market agenda would produce large growth and
employment gains. A market allocation of resources would bring optimal allocative
efficiency, while the introduction of competition would create pressure for improved
productive efficiency, better quality and price reductions, leading to increases in
20s Frederick G. Hilmer, Mark Rayner & Geoffery Taperell, op. cit., p.xviii,xix outlines the terms of reference.








"' Bru". Montgornery, 'COAG agrees on Hilmer reforms', The Weekend Australian,26-27 February '1994, p.4.
"t' Luuru Tingte, 'PM, States in deal to carve up monopoli es' , The Weekend Australian, 26-27 February '1994, p."l;
andWorking Nation: Policies ønd Programs, op, cit., p.38,39.
"to H"nry Ergas, op. cit., p.156-158.
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national output and exports."t The IC, in their 1988-89 Annual Report, used the
ORANI model to estimate that implementation of their market microeconomic
reform agenda would, in the long run, increase GDP by 6.5 per cent and create 53,000
additional jobs."u
Of course, the IC's ORANI results are the simple outcome of the free market
assumptions keyed in. Put simply, the process involves programming a model to
assume that free market reforms are positive for growth and employment, then
running simulations in which ORANI shows that free market reforms are beneficial
for growth and employment. For example, Quiggan has noted that privatisation,
corporatisation and cuts to public sector employment always are assumed to result
in economic gain, regardless of - and in some cases in spite of - the empirical
evidence of a particular situation.2" The IC themselves admit that their ORANI
simulations provide no foundation for market policies and that'...it is not possible to
model the effects of many of the recoûrnendations, such as corporatisation and
increased competition, in a model such as ORANI."tt
ORANI also fails to include many of the costs of market reform in its calculations.
For example, the impact of cost pricing in forcing some infrastructure service prices
to rise, as would occur in sectors such as rail, electricity, postal services, gas, water
and heavy vehicles, was not modelled."n Further, no consideration was given to the
situation in which major cost reductions would not be passed on to consumers and
producers in fu11."0 The lack of credibility of these rationalist econometric studies is
also evidenced by the enormous difference in the results they produce. For example,
whereas the IC predict a 6.5 per cent GDP increase, an EPAC study predicted a 15
per cent GDP increase from the free market microeconomic reform prograrn.'"t
Thus, to determine the impact of free market infrastructure reform on employment,
restructuring and national competitiveness, analysis needs to take place on the basis
of reasoning, combined with evidence drawn from what has actually happened in
infrastructure sectors. This approach is attempted below.
"t B.rr"u., of Industry Economics, International Perþrmønce Indicators: Oaeraieut: Resenrch Report 53, Australian
Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1994, p.7; and Industry Commission, Annual Report 1989-90, op.
cit., p.31.
216 IndustÐ, Commission, Annuøl Report 1989-90, op. cit., p.27,28.
"t' ¡oh-l Quiggan, 'The Industry Commission approach to public sector reform', Euatt Papers, vol.1, no.1,1993,
pp.63-99, p.71,72,84.
"8 Industry Commission, Energy Generation ønd Distribution Volume 2: Report: Report No.11, Australian
Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1991, p.42.
"tn ibid, p.42.
"o Bur.uu of Industry Economics, International Perþrmance lndicators, op. cit., p.78.
"t Ri.hurd Filmer & Dan Dao, Economic Effects of Microeconomic Reþrm: Economic Planning Adoisory Council
Bøckground Paper No.38, Australian Government Publishing Serwice, Canberra, 1994, p.41.
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Strengths of Free Market Infrastructure Reform
Labor Tackle Microeconomic Reform
Since 1950, the Labor Governments of 1983 to 1996 were the first to focus in a
detailed, systematic way on the microeconomy. By opening up the Australian
economy through tariff cuts and financial deregulation - themselves microeconomic
reforms - Labor created pressure for a stronger focus on increasing competitiveness
throughout the economy, including in infrastructure provision."' While much
argument continues about which policies are most appropriate to improving
Australia's microeconomy, it is true that a more efficient, competitive microeconomy
will improve the supply-side of the economy and thereby bring faster economic and
employment growth, with lower inflation. This long overdue focus on the
microeconomy must therefore be applauded.
Performance Improvements by Government Trading Enterprises (GTEs)
The rationalist policy framewórk appears to have substantially improved the
performance of infrastructure providers. The figures provided below are from two
sources. The first source is Goaernment Trading Enterprises Performønce Indicøtors 1987-
88 to 1992-93, which covers 56 of the major GTEs in Australia. This study charts the
progress of six Commonwealth GTEs involved in energy, transport and
communications and the major State authorities involved in electricity, gas, water,
urban transport, railway and port industries. Together, they account for around two-
thirds of total GTE employment."' The second source is Gouernment Trading
Enterprises Performønce Indicators 1990-91 to 1994-95, which covers 68 GTEs that
together account for approximately 75 per cent of total GTE employment.
Unfortunately, statisticians have been unable to provide a consistent time series
between reports."o For this reason, two sets of data will be provided each time that
statistics are provided below. \¡Vhile this is not ideal, a broad picture of general
magnitude of the success of the reforms can be adequately captured.
Overall, GTEs achieved an average real price reduction of around 17 per cent
between 1.987 -88 and 1994-95.
"" This was argued by John Button as quoted in Paul Kelly , The End of Certainty : The Story of the 19 80s, Allen
and Unwin, St Leonards, New South Wales, "1992, p.388.
"t St"".ing Cornmittee on National Performance Monitoring of Government Trading Enterprises, Gouernment
Trading Enterprises Perþrmance Indicators 1987-88 to L992-93,lndustry Commissiory Canberra, 1994, p.1.
"o St"e.i.rg Comn'rittee on National Performance Monitoring of Government Trading Enterprises, Gooernnrcnt
Trading Enterprises Perþrmance Indicators 1990-9L t0 1,994-95,Industry Commission, Canberra, 1996, p.üi,iv.
49












87t88 88/89 89/90 90/91 91192 92193
IIIII
Sou¡ce: Steering Committee on National Performance Monitoring of Government Trading Enterprises,
Gooernment Trading Enterprises Perþrmance Indicators 1.987-88 to L992-93, Industry Commission, Canberra,'1994,
p.4.
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Source: Steering Committee on National Performance Monitoring of Government Trading Enterprises,
Goaernment Trading Enterprises Perþrmance Indicators 1990-9L to 1,994-95,Industry Commission, Canberra, 1996,
p.6.
The graphs below indicate that between 1987-88 and 1994-95,labour productivity in
GTE's has more than doubled on average.
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Source: Steering Comrnittee on National Performance Monitoring of Government Trading Enterprises,
Gouernment Trading Enterprises Perþrmønce Indicators 1987-88 to 1,992-93, op. cit., p.3.
























Source: Steering Committee on National Performance Monitoring of Government Trading Enterprises,
Goaernment Trading Enterprises Perþrmance Indicøtors 1,990-91 to L994-95, op. cit., p.10.
Real debt levels among GTEs also fell considerably in the period.
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Source: Steering Committee on National Performance Monitoring of Governrnent Trading Enterprises,
Gotternment Trading Enterprises Perþrmance Indicators 1,987-88 to L992-93, op. cit., p.3.
How Rationalist Policies Bring Performance Improvements
Competition is important to achieving competitiveness. Michael Porter's The
Competitizte Afutantnge of Nntions found that domestic rivalry is a key determinant of
industry and national competitive advantage. In competitive markets, firms work
hard to gain a competitive edge by creating new products and technology,
improving quality and producing cost reductions.22t More specifically, Porter
argued: 'Deregulation of competition and privatization of state monopolies are
usually spurs to national competitive advantage. They will stimulate rivalry and
have ripple effects on linked industries...[provided there is] active domestic
rivalty.'""u
Historically, many of Australia's infrastructure setvices have been provided by
public monopolies. The productivity performance of such sectors has often been
poor, due to the absence of any competitive threat and the lack of incentive for
efficiency, given that increased costs could simply be passed on to the consumer or
the taxpayer. Many have performed vastly below world best practice in price and
quality, thereby hindering the competitiveness of firms reliant on such provision."'
For example, a \994EPAC report found that, even after the considerable efficiencies
achieved in infrastructure sectors, potential productivity gains, defined as the gap
between world best practice and the average Australian standard, adjusted for
differences in scale, were as follows:
"s Michael Porter, op. cit., p.117-124discusses the importance of domestic rivalry.
"u Mi"hael Porter, op. c1t., p.664.
'"' Productivity Commis sion, Stocktake of Progress on Miuoeconomic Reþrm, Australian Government Publishing
Service, Canberra, 1996, p.73-75; and Bureau of Industry Economics International Performance Indicators
Overview (Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, ß9\, p.76.
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Source: Richard Filmer & Dan Dao, Economic Effects of Miuoeconomic Reform: Economic Plønning Adttisory Council
Background Pøpcr No.38, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1994, p.15,28.
Competition policies improve performance because, whereas the public monopolist
could make consumers pay for inefficiencies by running up debt or charging higher
prices, each firm in a competitive market sffucture must provide low cost, high
quatity services to survive against competitors.22s
International evidence shows that introducing competition into infrastructure sectors
that were previously public monopolies or duopolies has brought improved
performance. Infrastructure performance in nations in which competition has been
introduced, such as in lapan, the United States, the United Kingdom and New
Zealand, has vastly outstripped infrastructure performance in nations in which most
infrastructure sectors have remained public monopolies."n
Introducing competition has also improved infrastructure performance in Australia.
A BIE study showed that the level of competition was a key determinant of
performance. For example, Australia's road freight sector has the greatest degree of
competition of all infrastructure sectors and achieves a performance closest to
international best practice, while rail is subject to the least competition and is the
worst performer of all Australia's infrastructure sectors."o
The establishment of competition also improved performance in the airline sector.
Under the Two Airline Policy, there was little incentive to lower fares and improve
services, and great incentive for tacit collusion to increase profits. As real
international fares fell considerably in the period from the 1960s, real domestic fares
fell only marginally. Allowing the entry of new competitors, and specifically the
shortlived entry of Compass, improved services."t Compass offered greatly
discounted air services and caused Ansett and Australian Airlines to reduce staff by
L0 per cent, increase efficiency and offer better services at lower prices."' Average
fares fell 25 per cent between September 1990 and September 1993. Nearly 18.6
million passengers were carried in 1992-93, which was 23 per cent higher than the
record before the introduction of new competition. The Bureau of Transport and
228 Frederick G. Hilmer, Mark Rayner & Geoffery Taperell, op. cit., p.xxxiii.
"o H"nry Ergas, op. cit., p.158.
"o Brrr"u., of Industry Economics, IntemationøI Perþrmance Indicøtors: Oaeraiant, op. cit., p.76.
"t Lurry Dwyer & Peter Forsyth, ch.11 'The reform of air transport and its impact on tourism' in Peter Forsyth
(ed.), op. cit., pp.222-242 at p.225,226.


















Communications Economics estimated the reform increased economic welfare by
$100 million."'
The introduction of competition has also been a success in telecommunications. As in
many OECD nations, Australia's public telecommunications monopoly had provided
services at costs far above world best practice. Innovation had also lagged
considerably behind technical opportunity."o The establishment of competition from
Optus improved telecommunications performance, as did the need to prepare for
full competition from rnid-1997. Telstra responded by cutting prices, improving
efficiency, boosting product and service innovation and increasing their rate of
return substantially."t Telecom/Telstra's average number of full-time equivalent
employees fell from around 87,000 in 1987-88"u to around 68,000 in1994-95. Between
1990-91. and1994-95, labour productivity more than doubled, real prices fell by more
than the statutory requirement of 5.5 per cent per annum, and real payments to
government increased 6L per cent."t A range of measures also show that efficiency
increased and service quality improved."t Open competition from JuIy 1997 has
further strengthened the industry, with new players providing a range of high
quality, cost effective products and services. Similarly, the introduction of
competition in Japan, the US and the UK in the 1980s produced lower costs, as well
as increased exports, as carriers sought to offset the loss of local market share."n
In the electricity generation sector, the 'break up' of State monopolies and the
establishment of a national grid and a national market, is beginning to produce a
more vibrant market. Competition is sparking efficiency improvements and price
reductions, as firms upgrade in order to survive and prosper. Those able to generate
electricity most efficiently will survive and grow, while poor producers will contract.
Already, between 1990-91, and1994-95, real business prices fell by nearly 15 per cent,
despite real payments to goverrunent rising from around $700 million to around
$1650 million (in 1989-90 dollars), while labour productivity rose more than 80 per
cent."o The establishment of a competitive national market in gas generation, also
still early in its evolution, can be also be expected to produce major efficiency
improvements and cost reductions.
Corporatisation has improved the commercial focus and efficiency of public
providers through policies that: vest management in commercial boards; establish
'33 Ri.hurd Fihner & Dan Dao, op. cit., p.2.
"to H"n y Ergas, op. cit., p.152-153.
"t Ro.lr,"y Maddock, ch.12'Microeconomic Reform of Telecommunications: The Long March frorn Duopoly to
Duopoly', pp.243-259 in Peter Forsyth (ed.), op. cit.,pp.243-259 atp.258.
"u St"".i.rg Cornmittee on National Performance Monitoring of Government Trading Enterprises, Goaernntent
Trading Ente:rises Perþrmance Indicators 1987-88 to L992-93, op. cit., p.411.
"t St"".irrg Committee on National Performance Monitoring of Government Trading Enterprises, Gouernment
Trading Enterprises Perþrmance Indicøtors 1990-91. to 1994-95, op. cit., p.411.
"t Ste".irlg Committee on National Performance Monitoring of Government Trading Enterprises, Gouernment
Trading Enterprises Perþrmance Indicators 1'987-88 to 1992-93, op. cit., p.410,41"1.
'3e Paul Twomey, ch.20'Telecommunications: A vision for the fufure' in Michael Costa & Michael Easson (eds),
op. cit., pp.373-400 atp.387.
'oo St"e.ir'rg Committee on National Performance Monitoring of Government Trading Enterprises, Gouernntent
Trading Ente:rises Perþrmance Indicators 1'990-91 to 1994-95, op. cit., p.30,31,33'
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objectives that relate to commercial performance only; establish market pricing and
the requirement of a market rate of return; and apply rigorous performance
monitoring. Corporatisation also helped to reduce GTE debt from $44 billion to $32
billion between 1987-88 and 1992-93"0' And market pricing should produce further
debt reduction. Further, between 1987-88 and 1994-95, real dividends paid or
provided for rose from around $600 million to around $2.3 billion, while the policy
to require tax equivalent payments was yielding almost $4 billion by 1994-95.'o'
Proceeding with investment only where it can achieve market returns should
produce improved allocation of investments in infrastructure. Australia's current
infrastructure is Iargely the result of numerous isolated, ad hoc decisions, most of
which were made without reference to any overall national strategy, and with
insufficient focus on commercial realities. The resulting assistance structure left
Australia with a situation in which its least efficient sector, railways, were drawing
on $4 billion in public savings annually'o' and irrigation received $424 million
through cost under-recovery,'oo while road transport, the biggest transport sector
and the sector most important to manufacturing, got approximately nothing.'o'
Moving to market pricing and cost recovery will improve economic outcomes over
such an irrational infrastructure assistance regime. By matching prices to the costs
entailed in providing infrastructure services, market signals will help to ensure
services are provided more efficiently. For example, services that are currently
provided inefficiently, and require considerable subsidisation, will have to charge
much higher prices, improve efficiency or close down. As this occurs, demand will
switch to more efficient infrastructure providers. Less resources will be required to
provide a given infrastructure service. For example, rather than transporting small
amounts of produce through less than container load rail freight services, which
have a cost recovery rate of around 24 per cent, market pricing will ensure that such
activity occurs through road transport, which can do the same job more cheaply and
efficiently.'ou Requiring a market return on public infrastructure investments will
help to ensure that uneconomic projects are not undertaken. Given that Australia has
undertaken numerous uneconomic projects in the past, this is an important step
forward in infrastructure policy.
Privatisation can also improve the performance of infrastructure providers - where
implemented in appropriate circumstances - for a range of reasons. Firstly, private
owners invest their own money and therefore seek maximum quality, efficiency and
cost competitiveness in order to avoid bankruptcy and maximise profit. By contrast,
there is less discipline for competitive performance in public enterprises because
there are no owners seeking to maximise profit. This can mean inefficiency, poor
2at Steering Committee on National Performance Monitoring of Government Trading Enterprises, Gouernnrcnt
Trading Enterprises Perþrmance Indicators 1987-88 to L992-93, op. cit., p.3.
'o' ibid.., p.2; and.steering Committee on National Perforrnance Monitoring of Government Trading Enterprises,
Got¡ernment Trading Enterprises Perþrmance Indicators 1990-91 to 1994-95, op. cit., p.91.
'03 IndustÐ, Commission , RøiI Transport Volume 1 Report, op. cit., p.xiv.
2oa I.rdustry Commission , RøiI Trønsport Volume 1: Report, op. cit., p.257,258,
'ot B.r."ur.r of Industry Economics, International Perþrmønce Indicators: Ooen¡ieu¡, op. cit., p.11,,53,56,57.
'06 Industryr Commission , RøiI Transport Volume L: Report, op. cit., p.xviii.
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service/ high debt and high prices because all this can simply be paid for by the
taxpayer or the consumer.'ot Secondly, privatisation prevents politicians doing
uneconomic favours for particular regions or sectors through provision of below cost
services from public infrastrucfure providers.'ot Finally, public managers often have
a range of political and social objectives they must aim to achieve, whereas private
sector managers are implored by their owners to maximise economic performance
onIy.'on
Economy-Wide Benefits of Infrastructure Performance Improvements
The overall result of infrastructure reform has been reduced costs, improved quality
of service, and more efficient provision of infrastructure services. Infrastructure cost
improvements can make a significant improvement to the cost competitiveness of
Australian firms because the contribution of the costs of infrastructure service inputs
to those in final output varies from 10 to nearly 25 per cent across industries."o Such
price reductions should increase the growth and international competitiveness of
firms.
By reducing costs in significant areas of the economy, infrastructure reform has
made a contribution to achieving the low inflation rates achieved in Australia
throughout the 1990s. Low inflation is likely to make some contribution to
stimulating investment and increasing national competitiveness."t
It is also likely that the reform process will lead to net gains in employment. It is true
that there has and will be significant, medium-term gross cuts in employment as
infrastructure sectors reduce staff, and regions and sectors reliant on subsidised
services experience reduced services and increased prices. Flowever, overall
improvements in price and quality achieved by infrastructure services can be
expected to increase the competitiveness and growth of firms reliant on such service,
leading to a net gain in employment. This is particularly the case because: increasing
the efficiency of infrastructure provision will allow a greater amount of services to be
provided economically; elimination of inefficient services, such as some rail lines,
may lead to increased demand for other services, such as road transport; and
adjustment costs, although considerable, will be one-off, while the long-term gains
will prevail in perpetuity.'"'
Furthermore, improved infrastructure services has assisted - and will continue to
assist - restructuring by assisting the growth of those firms and sectors vital to
national affluence. For example: cheaper, better aviation services are of great
importance to Australia's large, competitive and high exporting tourist sector;"'
'o' Chri" Strong, 'Key Owner Needs and the Electricity Industry', pp.63-67 in ch.7 'Privatisation' in Chris Jones,
Chris James & Andrew Norton (eds), op. cit., pp.62-77 atp.64.
'o* Ch.i, Strong, op. cit., p.64.
'on si-orl Dornberger, op. cit., p.1,66.
"o Brrr"uu of Industry Economics, Internøtional Performance Indicators: Oaeroiew, op. cit., p.7-"I1.
"r Richurd Filmer & Dan Dao, op. cit., p.34.
252,,., -lotd., p./.
"' Lurry Dwyer & Peter Forsyth, op. cit., p.224,225,231.-234,236-240.
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ETMs will benefit from high quality, low cost telecommunications services and
cheaper electricity, gas and transport; and exporters will benefit significantly, given
their particular reliance on infrastructure services.
Finally, government savings achieved through rationalist cost recovery policies
create greater scope for beneficial economic policymaking. Government savings can
be directed to reducing government debt, reducing taxation of productive business
investment, andf or increasing spending on policy initiatives designed to increase
competitiveness.
Limitations of Free Market Infrastructure Reform
The key limitation of infrastructure reform lies in its failure to significantly propel
economic and employment growth and improve national competitiveness. Even
strident rationalists admit that infrastructure reform will have a minimal impact on
reducing unemployment. For example, the IC 1989-90 Annual Report found that
reform of the transport sectors, post and telecommunications, electricity supply,
water services and contracting out more services provided by government would
increase aggregate employment by only 0.6 per cent.2'o Similarl), Dao and Filmer
admit that'...the overall or net effects of reforms on total employment has been
found to be minor..."tt Meanwhile, Gregory concluded that '...it is not clear the
underlying growth rate of the economy will change that much."'u Free market
infrastructure reform also does little to remove the external constraint to
employment growth because it generally helps imports as much as exports.
An important limitation of rationalist infrastructure reform is that - like tarifÍ cutting
- it is focused largely on reducing costs, when the key to national competitive
advantage is the capacity to produce an innovation-driven economy. While
infrastructure reform is worth pursuing for the benefits it does provide, it, like the
other components of the rationalist agenda, does not focus significantly on these
keys to national competitive advantage, restructuring and employment growth.
Weaknesses of Free Market Infrastructure Reform
The Role of Government in Infrastructure Provision
There are a number of reasons to suspect that the rationalist approach to
infrastructure policy could lead to under-investment in infrastructure, meaning that
the private sector has inadequate infrastructure support to maximise growth and
competitiveness. Firstly, rationalists are focused on reducing government
involvement in the economy and reducing goverrunent outlays. Rationalists in
Australia have sacrificed spending on industry and infrastructure to achieve their
more coveted goal - the reduction in the size of government - which they believe is
critical to the achievement of growth and competitiveness. Too little consideration is
2to Industq, Commission , AnnuøI Report 1.98g-g0, op. cit., p.33.
2ss Richard Filmer & Dan Dao, op. cit., p.2.
"u R.G. Gregory, ch.15'An overview of microeconomic reform' in Peter Forsyth (ed.), op. cit., p.31,2.
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given to whether there is sufficient government investment to maximise growth.
Perhaps this is why the White Paper argued that'...there was considerable capacity
for regions to invest in infrastructure from their own resources..."" This approach
seeks to limit the Federal Government's responsibility for investing in public
infrastructure.
Secondly, rationalist policies may lead to an under-investment in infrastructure
because of their view that public investment should not occur unless market returns
are very likely to be gained from direct users. Labor's Employment White Paper
stated that '...infrastructure projects should only proceed if they are proved to be
economically viable."tt Given the highly conservative rationalist approach to
government investment, combined with the difficulty of predicting returns on
infrastructure investment, such a policy could lead to insufficient public
infrastructure investment to maximise growth and facilitate restructuring and
competitiveness.
Rationalists also fail to consider that infrastructure investments create revenues in
ways other than payment by direct, identifiable users. They can also assist to reduce
the need for outlays. This can occur in a number of ways: Firstly, infrastructure
investments can produce important externalities. For example, higher quality roads
can help to reduce the $5 billion spent annually on 'mopping up' after road
accidents,"n and can also bring improved transport of goods. Secondly,
infrastructure investment can assist in raising private investment levels. The
availability of infrastructure is an important determinant of growth. No firm will be
attracted to a nation or a regional area with poor roads and little access to
telecommunications, electricit!, gâs, water, rail or port facilities. International and
domestic firms can be induced to invest through the availability of quality, low cost
infrastructure services. Waiting for private sector demand to rise to high levels
before making infrastructure investments may not be the best way to maximise
growth. Finally, the employment generated by sensible infrastructure investment
can facilitate lower expenditure on welfare benefits, and on dealing with the many
ills associated with unemployment, such as declining health, and a greater
propensity for crime. Infrastructure investment can produce net employment growth
in two ways. Firstly, it creates direct employment. Studies indicate that an additional
$1 bitlion (in 1990 prices) in investment in infrastructure would create 25,000 jobs.'uo
Secondly, investments in economic projects can produce net employment by
supporting an increase in private sector activity that outweighs the reduction in
welfare caused by the costs of the investment.
Australia has neglected public infrastructure investment during the rationalist era.
As shown on the tables below, between 1983-84 and 1995-96, gross fixed capital
2s7 
Working Nation: Policies ønd Programs, op. cit., p.170.
"" ibid.., p.L62.
"n Cur.,r, Task Force, 'Growth Plus' EquøIs the Employment Challenge: A Positiae Agenda for Change - Subnission to
the Prime Minister's Expert Committee on the Future of Employment and Unemployntent,Unpublished, 1993, p.36.
2óo Australian Council of Trade Unions, A Progrøm Tou¡ards FulI Employment: The ACTII.'s Program for Sustainable
Employment and lobs Groatth for the 1990s and Beyond, Australian Council of Trade Unions, Melbourne, 1993,
p.31.
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formation by public enterprises fell from 19.9 per cent to 11.0 per cent of total gross
fixed capital formation, or from 4.5 to 2.2 per cent of GDP (I). Over the same period,
total public gross fixed capital formation fell from 31.9 to 20.0 per cent of total gross
fixed capital formation, or from 7.2 to 4.0 per cent of GDP (I).'6' Given that the level
of investment is a key determinant of economic growttç it may be that the dramatic
reduction in government investment in economic infrastructure is impeding the
capacity of the economy to grow.
Gross Fixed Capital Expenditure (GFCE)
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Source: Figures for 1984-85 to 1995-96 are from Australian Bureau of Statistics, AustrøIiøn National Accounts:
National Income, Expenditure and Product 1995-96, Cat. no.5204.0, p.60. Figures for 1983-84 from Australian Bureau
of Statistics, Austrølian National Accounts: National Income, Expenditure and Product 1993-94, Cat. no.5204.0, p.60.
'ut The figures for 1984-85 to'1,995-96 are from Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian National Accounts:
Nationøl Income, Expenditure and Product 1995-96, Cat. no.5204.0, p.15,60. The figures for 1983-84 are from
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australiøn National Accounts: NøtionøI Income, Expenditure and Product L993-94,
Cat. no.5204.0, p.15,60.
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Source: Figures for 1984-85 to 1995-96 from Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian National Accounts: National
Income, Expenditure and Product 1,995-96, Cat. no.5204.0, p.15,60. Figures for 1983-84 from Australian Bureau of
Statistics, Australian National Accounts: National Income, Expenditure and Product 1993-94, Cat. no.5204.0, p.15,60.
This is the primary weakness of rationalist infrastructure reform. Rationalists are
focused on establishing a market allocation of resources, when the key policy
requirement is to overcome the massive failure by the market to produce the
infrastructure necessary to maximising growth and competitiveness. A policy
prescription to establish a market allocation of resources is of minimal utility when
the activity is primarily undertaken by government. Even at 1994, governments
owned approximately 90 per cent of all infrastructure assets and infrastructure
accounted for one third of Australia's capital stock and a quarter of Australia's new
investment.'u' Rationalists are largely silent on the key infrastructure policy question,
namely: What mix and level of government spending in infrastructure can maximise
national economic growth and competitiveness? Governments can make massive (or
small) investments in infrastructure and charge the public market prices and achieve
market rates of return. The level, type and quality of public investment in
infrastructure, by determining the quality, availability and cost competitiveness of
infrastructure services to industry, is an important cause of the level of growth and
competitiveness of the Australian economy.
Rationalist policymakers have given little consideration to this question and their
policy framework provides little guidance on goverrunent infrastructure investment.
Again we are back to a key weakness of rationalist policy making in virtually every
area of the economy. Because rationalists generally fail to acknowledge market
failures - and are almost entirely focused on removing government involvement in
the economy and establishing a market allocation of resources - they fail to consider
ways in which goverrunent can increase growth and competitiveness. An economic
theory that seeks to deny the importance of the state to economic development can
provide little guidance on the level and type of government investment needed to
maximise growth and competitiveness.
'u' Bur.uuof Industry Economics, International Perþrmance Indicators: Oz¡eraieut, op. cit., p.7-11.
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This is a crucial flaw in the rationalist approach because the modern history of
Western economies shows that the market has failed to provide sufficient road, raII,
port, electricity, gas, water, education, health and telecommunications services to
maximise growth. The government has had to play the key role in the provision of
such infrastructure, particularly when nations are industrialising.'u'
Sheridan and Chapman have argued that public investment in infrastructure played
a crucial role in the development of Australia by encouraging increased domestic
and foreign investment in Australia, thereby raising the level of economic growth.
For the first half of the century, Australia's public sector generally accounted for at
least 50 per cent of capital formation. Interestingly, many infrastructure investments
were subsidised, in full knowledge that they could not be financially justified on the
basis of the existing size and pattern of private sector activity. Instead, they were
made on the basis that they would generate increased private sector usage, which
would create greater demand and thereby bring financial viability. This 'nation
building' approach arguably increased the rate of national development and
economic growth.'oo
The importance of infrastructure investment remains in modern times. New growth
theory suggests that public infrastructure investment can increase growth,
restructuring and competitiveness because: it can increase the return on private
investments, thereby triggering further investment over the medium-term; it can
lead to clusters of firms with a common interest in production, technology and
markets (for example, infrastructure investment could spark clusters of resource
based value adding firms in regional areas); and it can increase the productivity of
private investments. Greater infrastructure investment could also assist in reducing
the transitional employment losses that flow from free market reforms. Rather than
simply retrenching well over one hundred thousand employees from infrastructure
sectors, the government could have redeployed many of the workers in vital
infrastructure projects.
A range of studies have found that public infrastructure investment can increase
economic growth. For example, Easterly and Rebelo, in a study published in 1993,
using data for 1,19 nations, concluded that general government investment is
positively correlated with economic growtþ with a co-efficient of about 0.4, and
positively correlated with private investment, with a co-efficient near one.'ut Munnel
(1990) covered 48 states in the United States over the period 1970 to 1986 and found
that those states that invested more in infrastructure tended to have greater output,
private investment and employment growth. The study found that the public
investment often came before the increase in economic activity, thereby suggesting
causation. Barro (1989) carried out cross-country analysis of post-war growth in 72
countries and found that successful nations tended to have high public investment as
'o' St"rr"r-, S. Cohen & |ohn Zysman, op. cit., p.222.
'uo K. Sheridan & P. Chapman, ch.2 'Australia's economic achievement - Comparisons with Japan' in Kyoko
Sheridan (ed.), op. cit., pp.5-26 atp.1.6,1.8,20.
26s William Easterly & Sergio Rebelo, 'Fiscal policy and economic growth: An empirical investigation',lournal of
Monetary Economics, vol.32, 1993, pp.4L7 -458 aL p.430-432.
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a percentage of GDP.'uu Michael Porterrs study found: 'Upgrading a nation's industry
depends on a modern and improving infrastructure. This is particularly true in
advanced transportation, Iogistics, and telecommunications, all integral to
introducing modern technologies and to competing in international markets.'"o'
Lester Thurow has even argued that: 'In many cases to spread and accelerate
economic development, infrastructure (transportation, communications,
electrification) has to be built ahead of the market..."u*
Similar findings have been made in the Australian context. Otto and Voss, using data
from 1967-68 to 1989-90, found that public investment is positively correlated with
private sector growth, with a co-efficient of around 0.4.'un Alesina, Gruen and Jones
noted that a disproportionate share of the Labor Government's cuts to public
spending in the period 1983-84 to 1988-89 had been borne by public investment and,
after reviewing the literature demonstrating the importance of public investment to
economic growth,"o concluded that'[c]utting public investment spending may have
[had] serious adverse effects on labour productivity and long-term economic
growth.'"'
The availability of high quality, low cost road, raiI, air, port, shipping and
telecommunications infrastructure services is also an important determinant of the
capacity to export."" The LEK Partnership study of emerging service exporters
analysed the common features of nations with a strong export performance and
found that the infrastructure services were a critical input. LEK surveys of
Australian service exporters also revealed that they believed transport and
telecommunications were important determinants of success. Accordingly, they
recommended increased investment in infrastructure and broadened application of
infrastructure development bonds."'
Perhaps the Federal Government should consider adopting the ideas of John
Maynard Keynes, who suggested that government establish a capital budget,
separate to the current spending budget, with capital investment ranging between
7.5 and 20 per cent of national income. Keynes argued that such services would be
fully paid for, so that the capital budget would be balanced over time. He believed
'uu The latter two studies were outlined in Industry Commission, Impediments to Regional Industry Adjustnrcnt
Draft Report: Volume L: Report, op. cit., p.168,170,172. The citation details for these studies are: A. H. Munnell
'How does public infrastructure affect regional economic performance?' in A. H. Munnell (ecl.), Is Thcre a
Shortfall in Public Capital Inaestment? Reserae Bank of Boston Conference Series No.34, Reserve Bank of Bostorr,
Boston, Massachusetts, USA, 1990; and R. j. Barro, A Cross-Country Study of Groutth, Satring and Gottcrnnrcnt:
Nøtional Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No.2855, National Bureau of Economic Research,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA, 1989.
'6t Mi.hu"l Porter, op. cit., p.637.
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Lester Thurow, The Future of CapitøIism: Hout Todøy' s Economic Forces WiII Shape Tomorrout' s World, Allen ancl
Unwin, St Leonards, New South Wales, 1,997, p.289.
'u' Gl"nn Otto & Graham M. Voss, 'Public capital and private sector productivity', TIrc Economic Record, vol.7o,
no.209, pp."127-132 at p.130.
270 Alberto Alesina, David W. R. Gruen & Matthew T. Jones, 'Fiscal adjustment, the real exchange rate and
Australia,s external irnbalance,, The Australian Economic Reaieut,3rd euarter 1991., pp.3g_51, atp.40_42.
271 ibid., p.bo.
272 Report of the Committee for Review of Export Market Development Assistance, op. cit., p.32,91.
"" LBKPartnership, op. cit., p.50,94,95,97,107 .
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such efficient public investment could correct the tendency for the free market to
produce high structural unemployment and major cyclical swings in economic
activity.2Ta
As the Kelty report recommended, Australia needs strategic modernisation and
development of its infrastrucfure base through increased private and public
investment and user charges."t Caution is certainly required to ensure that only
projects that will increase economic welfare go ahead. There is little doubt that many
ill-considered projects in the past have served to reduce Australia's economic
prosperity. However, rationalist policy makers have spent more than a decade
underspending on infrastructure. This has left a situation in which many badly
needed, growth enhancing projects should now be undertaken. This provides a
major opportunity for Australia to provide employment, assist restructuring and
improve national competitiveness through increased investment in infrastructure,
Towards the end of the Labor Government's reigo opportunities for growth
enhancing investment were available in every infrastructure sector. For example, the
Allen Consulting Group found that additional investments in key parts of existing
road infrastructure would produce high economic returns by increasing the
productivity of domestic and export productiort."'u A number of reports identified
specific projects likely to be welfare enhancing,"'such as the linking of the national
highway system to all major ports, building dual carriageway roads on key parts of
Australian roads to improve safety and transport efficiency; and upgrading arterial
roads from the centres of Australia's major cities to connect with major highways."*
The Taskforce on Regional Development referred to a study by Dr Vince Fitzgerald,
which estimated that every $1 billion sensibly invested in arterial roads could bring
an $810 million increase in GDP within a decade, while every $1 billion sensibly
invested in freeways could bring afi620 million increase in GDP within a decade."n
In all other infrastructure sectors, part of the reason for infrastructure performance
being substantially below international best practice is inferior capital productivity.
Investment in world best technology and equipment can play a role in redressing
this capital productivity weakness."n
In the electricity sector, the speedy completion of a national transmission grid and
structural separation of state monopolies to produce a competitive national
generation market would increase productivity. In gas, pipelines have been built to
"o J. A.Kregel, ch.3 'Budget deficits, stabilisation policy and liquidity preference: Keynes's post-war policy
proposals' in Fausto Vicarelli (ed.), Keynes's Releaance Today,MacMillan, London, Great Britain, 1985, pp.28-
50 atp.30,32,33,38. This idea was also suggested in Taskforce on Regional Development, Detteloping Australia:
Volume 1, op. cit., p.5.
"s Tuskforce on Regional Development, Deoeloping Australia Volume L, op. cit., p.5,6.
"u Bur.uu of Industry Economics, Internøtional Perþrmance Indicators: Ooeruieto, op. cit., p.60.
"' Bur"uu of Industry Economics, International Perþrmance Indicators: Ouentieut, op. cit., p.60,61. Australian
Council of Trade Unions, A Program Toutards FuII Employment, op. cit., p.35,36.; and Taskforce on Regional
Developrnent, Deueloping Australia: Volume 1, op. cit., p.6,27.
"8 Taskforce on Regional Development, Deaeloping Australia: Volume 1, op. cit., p.6,27.
"'n ibid.., p.26.The citation details of the study were not provided.
"o Brrr"u,, of Inctustry Economics, International Perþrmance Indicøtors: Ouert¡ieut, op. cit., p.76,77.
63
transport the gas from the source to capital cities, but many regional areas do not
have access to the gas distribution network. Given the importance of resource based
value adding, careful consideration of strategic investments in this sector should
occur. And of course, as with electricity, the breakdown of state monopolies and the
establishment of a national gas market would lead to increased investment, greater
productivity and lower costs."t
Investment to create high quality airports would support the fast growing tourist
sector. Quickly building a third airport for Sydney and the rapid development of
Brisbane airport would have improved economic welfare in this way.'""
Unfortunately, the Labor Government was primarily focused on privatising its 23
airports, leaving the possibility that many of Australia's 18 loss making airports will
close or charge higher prices.
Investment in telecommunications may be particularly important for a number of
reasons. Firstly, telecommunications is perhaps the most critical infrastructure sector
because its a widely used, generic input, important to the competitiveness of
virtually all firms in the economy."' As Chalmers Johnson wrote:
In all of its many forms, including office automation, instanianeous transrnission of data,
and the diagnosis of malfunctions in human and man-made data systems,
telecommunications are probably the greatest single source of gains in productivity at work
today.'8o
Secondly, there is also strong potential for major export growth in
telecommunications itself. World exports of telecommunications services are
growing very quickly and forecasts of demand for telecommunications services are
very high for at least two generations.'8t Global economic and export growth in
telecommunications can be expected to continue because its growth is underwritten
by rapidly spawning new products and services, such as cordless phones, pay TV,
fibre optic cables, modems and the Internet. Australia's exports of
telecommunications equipment are significant and growing strongly, reaching$TTT
million in1995-96. with a five year average annual growth rate of 20 per cent.'uu The
potential for telecommunications exports to Asia to grow is substantial because the
Asian telecommunications market is expected to grow rapidly in the next 20 years.
Australia's regional position, the increasingly Eurasian mix of its population, and the
depth and sophistication of its home services market relative to its Asian neighbours,
mean that quality telecommunications could underwrite a services export boom to
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"o Chulrnu.s Johnson, ch.5'MITI, MPT and the Telecom wars: How Japan makes policy for high technology' in
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Why lapan Works, Ballinger Publishing Company, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA, 1989, pp.177-240 at
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"t ibid., p.18s.
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Affairs and Trade, Canberra, 1996, p.24.
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Asia."' Australia's telecommunications sector can also be expected to achieve strong
export growth because it is reasonably competitive. The LEK study found that nearly
80 per cent of service exporters stated that telecommunications is a positive part of
their business environment.'*t
A different approach may be needed to encourage telecommunications because a
largely private, competitive market is emerging. Given the prevalence of emerging
products in telecommunications and its capacity for export growth, government
support could focus on encouraging R&D, technology uptake, skills development
and export marketing amongst indigenous firms in the sector.
Considerable investment is also needed to protect and rehabilitate the natural
environment. For example, in the Murray-Darling Basin, there are major problems
with water quantity and quality, and water management practices. If unchecked,
waterway pollution could threaten the future of key sectors, and, in turn, certain
metropolitan areas, as well as numerous regions such as Victoria's Goulburn Valley
and South Australia's Murray Bridge. Major investment is needed to restore health
to Australia's key water system.'8e Numerous other investments in our natural
environment, such as in land rehabilitation through Landcare Programs, are also
badly needed.'no
Even in rail, the most subsidised and inefficient infrastructure sector, there are
considerable opportunities for profitable investment. Ensuring all economic rail lines
have good linkages with ports can benefit exporters. Very fast train projects between
certain capital cities, such as a Sydney-Canberra-Melbourne service, could achieve
market returns and provide efficient passenger services to the great benefit of
Australia's tourist sector.'nt Long-standing proposals by the private sector have only
been prevented by a lack of tax concessions.'n' It is also possible that rail links
between capital cities and Darwin may be useful in facilitating exports to Asia.
Thus, the fact that so much economic public investment remained yet to be
completed at the end of the Labor Government's reign, shows that in the rationalist
era, too little infrastructure investment occurred to maximise growth, restructuring
and competitiveness. That the Kelty report could - in 1994 - argue that Australia's
ports should be connected to road and rail links,'nt shows how much welfare
enhancing investment remains to be completed.
This situation provides a major opportunity for Australia to provide employment,
drive restructuring and improve national competitiveness through infrastructure
"' PuulTwomey, op. cit., pp.373-400 atp.379.
"t LEK Partnership, op. cit., p.89.
"n Taskforce on Regional Development, Deueloping Australia: Volume 1., op. cit., p.47-57.
'no ibid., p.1r.,s1.
'nt Ruil Industry Council, RøiI into the 21.st Century: A RaiI lndustrv Council Discussion Paper, Australian
Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1,990, p.350 suggests this reform; and Taskforce on Regional
Development Developing Australia, Deaeloping Australia: Volume 1, op. cit., p.7,28 also suggests the
establishment of very fast train connections between Melbourne, Sydney, Canberra and Brisbane by 2000.
"n" ¡..:r'ry Stewart, The Lie of the Leuel Playing Field, op. cit., p.222.
'nt Taskforce on Regional Development, Deaeloping Australia: Volume 1, op. cit., p.7.
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investment. Such infrastructure investment could occur in full compliance with the
rationalist prescription to charge market prices and get a market return on
investments.
The vital role of government in identifying opportunities for profitable infrastructure
investment may have been neglected because rationalists: are focused on market
reforms, not public investment; and are opposed to national planning of
infrastructure investment. Rationalists appear to support the devolution of
investment decisions to numerous, largely private firms within each sector, without
any co-ordination with other firms in the sector, nor with the activities of related
sectors. For example, the IC report on port authorities recommended: 'Investment
decisions should be the responsibility of individual port authorities acting in a fully
commercial manner. There should be no national control or planning of
investment."no
As infrastructure services are primarily provided by government, it is government
that must identify key priorities for investment. Theoretically, goverrunent could
make a range of investments in infrastrucfure and get a market return through
mechanisms such as tolls or user charges. The key is to focus investments in areas
that will bring the greatest returns. An activist government approach can not only
enhance private sector activity generally, but can also foster restructuring by
focusing investment on infrastructure sectors, such as transport and
telecommunications, where the services encourage exporting, and exports of ETMs
and high value-added services in particular.
National planning is also needed to ensure the co-ordination of infrastructure
investments across three tiers of government, in numerous government departments
and in numerous sectors. Initiatives in one sector, for example roads, affect the
demand for services, and the necessity for investment in other sectors, such as rail
and air transport. Active government planning can ensure that the most efficient
methods are used to achieve particular needs. Unfortunately, throughout the
twentieth century, State Governments have often undertaken infrastructure
investments without co-ordination with their counterparts in other states. It was this
approach that led to three different railway gauges and the organisation of electricity
supply on a State by State basis.'n'
There is still insufficient co-ordination between State Governments, let alone
between Federal, State and Local Governments, and across the range of government
departments.'nu There is a need for a national body to be established to provide for
national co-ordination of research, planning and investment by Federal, State and
Local Governments. Without national planning and research in all areas of
infrastructure provision, there is a danger that public infrastructure investment will
be unco-ordinated and inefficient, as well as insufficient to maximise the growth of
the private sector.
2eo Indust y Commission , Port Autlnrity Seruices and Actiuities, op. cit., p|19L.
'nt Si*on Domberger, op. cit., p.167,168.
'nu Industry Commission, Impediments to Regional Industry Adjustment Drøft Report: Volunrc L: Report, op. cit.,
p.183-185.
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Activist government policies could also usefully encourage the trend towards
private sector provision of infrastructure. Private projects are sometimes better
managed and more efficiently completed than many public projects.'n'To encourage
private investment, the Federal Government could: review the rules governing
Infrastructure Bonds and Pooled Development Funds to establish whether they can
become a worthwhile mechanism for encouraging private sector investment in
infrastructure; and review its tax treatment of infrastructure investments more
generally, which compares unfavourably with many OECD nations. Australia's tax
treatment of infrastructure investments has played a role in delaying or preventing
some infrastructure projects - such as the very fast train project - from proceeding.'e8
Structural Unemployment
A key weakness of the free market infrastructure reform agenda is that - while it
may produce net employment gains - it also produces significant gross employment
dislocation, much of which involves structural, long-term unemployment. It is, of
course, acknowledged that much of the dislocation is a by-product of the process of
achieving greater efficiency and lower costs. Flowever, the structural dislocation
caused remains a major disadvantage of free market infrastructure policies.
Free market infrastructure reform produces significant dislocation for a number of
reasons.
Elimination of subsidies will produce dislocation. For subsidised services, market
pricing requires that, other things being equal, prices have to be raised to cover costs
and a market return on capital, or the service has to be terminated. The result is that
some workers providing subsidised services will be sacked, as services are
terminated or reduced, or as demand falls in response to price rises.
Competitive neutrality policies exacerbate these pressures because, under such
policies, GBEs are losing: their immunity from various taxes and charges;
government guarantees on their debts; immunity from various regulatory
requirements; concessional interest rates on loans; effective immunity from
bankruptcy; exemption from the TPA; and exemption from having to pay dividends
to government (in the large majority of cases).'nn This is producing higher costs for
GBEs, which is, in turn, creating pressures for higher prices andf or the termination
of subsidised services, leading to further employment losses.
The magnitude of this dislocation has been significant because, as Ruthven estimated
in \994, the return on investment in GBEs was only two-thirds of the private sector
performance.'oo In some instances, the dislocation has been particularly pronounced.
For example, as the IC 1991, rail report noted, the sector is moving to market pricing
tn' H"n y Ergas, op. cit., p.L47-165 at p.160.
'2eE 
V. W. Fitzgerald , Reþrm of Australia's Tax System: Integrating the Agenda - A Paper presented at the National Tax
Reþrm Summit: Correcting the Balance at the National Press CIub in Canberra, 3-5 October 1996, Unpublished,
1996, p.17,1.2.
2ee Frederick G. Hilmer, Mark Rayner & Geoffery Taperell, op. cit., p.296.
too Phil Ruthven, 'White paper draws a costly blank on jobs' , The Australiøn Financial Reuieu¡,5 }y'ray 1994, p.A6.
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from a position in which it covered only around 60 per cent of its costs'o' and drew
on public sector savings by $a billion or more each year.to' Market policies have
meant that many services have been terminated, while others have survived with
higher prices, but lower demand. Some sectors have and will be particularly affected,
such as less-than-carJoad(LCl) freight, which had only covered approximately 24
per cent of its costs.to'
Subsidies provided via under-recovery of irrigation costs amounted to a massive
fi424 rnlllion in 1989-90. Over $50 billion in capital is utilised to provide water
sewerage and drainage services, much of which the IC has described as '[e]xcessive
investment."oo Market pricing from this position would require, other things being
equal, average price rises of between 50 and 470 per cent in various regions.to' Of
course, in reality, market pricing will lead to the closure of much of Australia's
irrigation infrastructure. As the IC admitted: 'The inability to cover all costs in water
charges (because it would render the use of water unprofitable) casts doubt on the
viability of the States irrigation systems."ou Dislocation is particularly likely because
public irrigation schemes are ageing and require much new investment, but the
funds needed to provide for replacement costs and other necessary investment does
not exist.tot
Dislocation has also been significant in electricity because it has been moving to
market pricing from a situation in which, at1989-90, cost recovery by State electricity
authorities was 78 per cent in Queensland, S4 per cent in Victoria and SA, 80 per cent
in NSW, and'1.02 per cent in WA.'o' Similarly, gas authorities have not traditionally
covered depreciation costs, nor a rate of return, and have provided a number of
CSOs, such as uniform pricing and pensioner rebates,ton as well as subsidies to the
rural sector. Public gas utilities have also been exempt from goverrunent taxes and
charges and from the TPA.31o Overall, dislocation has and will be significant because
the great majority of infrastructure sectors have had to move to market pricing from
a position of significant subsidy.
301 
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in Peter Forsyth (ed.), op. clt., pp.179-203 at p.185.
302 Ir,dustÐ, Comrnission, RaiI Transport Volume 1-: Report, op. cit., p.xiv.
tot Thi, figure is from the Railway Industry Council Report oÍ 1990 and is provided in Industry Commission,
RaiI Transport Volume 1: Report, op. cit., p.1.4.
304 Ir,dustry Commission, Wøter Resources andWøterWøste Disposø\, op. cit., p.2.
tot Fo. example, Industry Commission , Water Resources and Water Waste Disposal, op. cit., p.41.,42 notes that the
NSW Department of Water Resources (1990) estimated that market pricing would involve 50 per cent
increases in prices for irrigation, the MIA Council of Horticulfural Associations estimated that a 5 per cent
return on capital would require a 250 per cent increase in irrigation prices and the Queensland Government
estimated that a 4 per cent real rate of return would require a 470 per cent increase in irrigation water prices.
306 IndustÐr Commissiory Wnter Resources andWater Wøste Disposal, op. cit., p.322,323.
tot ibid,, p.6,7,203.
308 Industry Commission, Energy Generøtion and Distribution Volume 2: Report, op. cit., p.42,171,173.
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Introducing competition is also producing employment dislocation as public
monopolies lose market share to competitors. For example, State public monopolies
in electricity and gas have undergone, or may soon face, structural separation,
privatisation and exposure to a national market. While this will improve efficiency as
efficient producers expand, there will be significant localised employment
dislocation for inefficient generators and distributors that had relied on their state
monopoly to remain in business. In telecommunications, the move to a duopoly, and
then open competition from July 1997, has and will produce employment
dislocation, as Telstra progressively loses market share to competitors. While Telstra
is faring well at present and will have the advantage of operating in a sector
experiencing rapid product innovation and sales growth, pessimistic estimates
suggest that Telstra's employment could fall from it's late 1980's peak of 90,000 to
30,000.ttt The establishment of competition in other sectors will also produce
dislocation in the same way.
Privatisation will also produce dislocation, where employees in public enterprises
are replaced by private sector firms. This has occurred, and may continue to occur,
through privatisation in sectors such as electricity r gàs, water, rail, aviation and
ports, Such dislocation has and will be increased through contracting out. For
example, the IC have recommended that public port authorities divest 'non-core
activities', such as terminal operation and stevedoring, towage, pilotage, vessel
repair, construction of wharves, cargo handling and storage.t" This approach has
brought dislocation. For example, it assisted the NSW Maritime Services Board to
reduce its staff from 3,000 to 1,300 in the three years to 199'1,-92.313
Market reform will also produce dislocation by encouraging efficiency drives. The
introduction of competition will create job losses by sparking efficiency drives
among former public monopolies seeking survival against competition. Privatisation
will create further job losses through efficiency drives as private firms seek profit
maximisation. There is much scope for increased efficiency and associated job losses
in many sectors. For example, a 1994 BIE study noted that Australia's best
performing electricity utility had labour productivity almost four times below world
best practice.tto In rail, a Travers Morgan study concluded that changes to work
organisation and reductions in over-manning could bring labour cost savings of 34-
38 per cent.3's National Rail, established in 1993,"u quickly established plans to cut
operating costs by 45 per cent and at least triple labour and capital productivity by
1995-96.3u In telecommunications, a 1992 BIE report found that the sector's labour
productivity was only 34 per cent of world best practice, concluding that there was
scope for a 40 per cent labour productivity increase.ttt Telstra have undergone a
t t t Lu,rru Tingle, 'Micro reform, macro misery: The jobs that are gone forever' , The Weekend Australian, 1,5-"16
June 1.991., p.25,26 at p.25.
t12 Ir-,dustJr Commission, Port Authority Sercices ønd Actit¡ities, op. cit., p.xvi,17-18.
t tt ibid., p.26-28,745-146,1s0,181.
tto Br,."u,., of Industry Economics, International Perþrmance lndicators: Ozteruieu, op. cit., p.29.
ttt ibid., p.168,1T8.
316 Working Nøtion: Policies and Programs, op. cit., p.25.
ttt Brrr"u., of Industry Economics, lnternøtional Perþrmance Indicators: Oueruieut, op. cit. p.41.
ttu ibid., p.44.
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major efficiency drive in response to the decision to allow open competition from
July 1997. Considerable scope for efficiency improvements and job losses also exists
in sectors such as port services/ gas and water.
These factors, particularly policies to remove subsidies, have brought significant
employment losses in some infrastructure sectors. As noted above, complete figures
on the total employment losses are not available. The Steering Committee on
National Performance Monitoring provide full-time equivalent figures for GTEs, but
exclude some firms and do not provide a consistent sample over time. Meanwhile,
the ABS provide figures for certain infrastructure sectors, but they do not provide
separate figures for public and private providers. However, the use of various
sources can produce a rough guide on the magnitude of employment dislocation.
In the rail sector, rail authorities state that employment fell from 110,000 in 1981 to
103,000 in 1986 and to 79,000 in L990."n ABS figures, although they appear to exclude
some employees included in rail authority estimates of total rail employment,
indicate that, between November 1984 and November 1995, rail transport
employment fell from 85,900 to 45,500.t'o In telecommunications, employment in
Telecom/Telstra fell from 97,000 in1986'"'to around 68,000 in1994-95 (in full-time
equivalent employee terms)t" and a further efficiency drive has ensued since then. In
electricity and gas supply, employment fell from 97,800 to 55,200 between November
1984 and November 1995. In water supply, sewerage and drainage services,
employment has fallen from 45,000 to 28,200 between November 7984 and
November 1995.t" Employment in Australia Post, in full-time equivalent terms, fell
to just over 37,000 in1994-95, from the previous peak of just over 40,000 in1990-91."^
Between June 1988 and March'1.993, the number of workers employed by port
authorities was reduced from 7,400 to 4,200 and waterfront employment fell from
around 9,000 to 5,000.t's In aviation, Qantas, the Federal Airports Corporation (FAC),
the Civil Aviation Authority, Ansett and Australian Airlines have undergone major
staff cuts. The numbers employed in air transport fell 13,000 in the four years to
November 1993.t'u Loss making regional airports are also under threat as market
policies are being implemented, while international airline deregulation would bring
further major dislocation for Qantas. Shipping reform began in earnest in1984"' and
31e Industr), Commission, RaiI Transport Volume 2: Appendices: Report No.13, Australian Government Publishing
Serwice, Canberra, 1997, p.87.
320 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Labour Force Australia 1.978-1.995, Cat. No.6204 .0, p.343,348.
32t Robert Albon, 'Privatising telecommunications: The next step', pp.73-77 in ch.7'Privatisation', pp.62-77 in
Chris Jones, Chris James & Andrew Norton (eds), op. cit., p.76.
t" Stee.ing Committee on National Performance Monitoring of Government Trading Enterprises, Gotternnrcnt
Trøding Enterprises Perþrmance Indicntors 1990-91. to 1.994-95, op. cit., p.139.
323 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Labour Force Australia 1978-1995, op. cit., p.343,348.
t'o St""rirrg Committee on National Performance Monitoring of Government Trading Enterprises, Gotternnent
Trading Enterprises Perþrmance Indicators 1987-88 to L992-93, op. cit., p.401; and Steering Committee on
National Performance Monitoring of Government Trading Enterprises, Gouernment Trading Entcrprises
Perþrmnnce Indicøtors 1,1 90-9L to 1994-95, op. cit., p.132.
32s Industr), Commission , Port Authority Seroices and Actittities, op. cit., p.147,219.
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Australian Bureau of Statistics, Labour Force AustraliaNoz¡ember 1993, op. clt., p.37.
t" Industr), Commission , Annuøl Report 1.991-92, op. cit., p.192,193.
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brought significant efficiency gains."' Water transport employment has fallen from
15,900 in November 1984 to 1-0,L00 in November L995."n
The figures in the table below from the Steering Committee on National Performance
Monitoring of Government Trading Enterprises provide some indication of the total
employment losses from GTEs in the period. Bearing in mind the limitations on the
data mentioned, the figures show that GTE full-time equivalent employment has
fallen by around 110,000, or around a third, between 1987-88 and1994-95. This is an
underestimate of the total jobs lost because the figures provided are full time
equivalent positions. Further, the 1994 report only included around two-thirds of
total GTE employment,tto while the1996 report only covered aroundTS per cent of
total GTE employment."'
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Given that reforms to introduce competition and privatisation are far from complete
and that many sectors remain a long way from world best efficiency, significant
further job losses are inevitable. For example, further restructuring will occur in
electricity and gas, as firms thrive or decline in the national market, while open
competition in telecommunications could produce substantial job losses in Telstra.
Significant further reform also awaits the port services, rail and water sectors.
Sectors reliant on subsidised infrastructure provision have also faced dislocation as
services are removed and/or prices are increased to bring a market return on
investment. For example, sectors dependant on irrigation experience dislocation
where market policies produce price increases andf or the termination of services. A
1993IC report noted that irrigated areas are highly productive, representing only 5
per cent of the land under crop and pasture, but producing around 25 per cent of
Australia's agricultural production. Nearly $f bi[ion more is spent watering
livestock pastures, much of which is used to feed dairy cattle.tt' Thus, removal of
subsidies has the potential to cause significant dislocation in affected sectors.
Finally, in the regions, many of which have also been effected by tarifÍ cuts, removal
of general government services and the decline of agriculture, market infrastructure
policies are reducing employment via increased prices andf or service closures in
rail, air services, telecommunications, postal services, electricity r gas and water
(especially irrigation). Regional areas are being particularly affected because public
monopolies in many sectors have traditionally used profits from urban services, and
sometimes taxation, to continue unprofitable infrastructure provision for many
regional and rural areas.
Regional dislocation is occurring in two kuy ways. Firstly, some regional
infrastructure providers are reducing or terminating operations. For example, the
State Electricity Commission of Victoria reduced its employment from 36,000 to
3t2 Industry Commission, Wøter Resources andWaterWnste Disposal, op. cit., p.17,193,194.
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21,000 between May 1988 and May 1993. This involved an employment decline of
around 4,500 in the La Trobe Valley, which produces 90 per cent of Victoria's
electricity output, and is highly dependent on such production."' Secondly, price
rises and the termination of infrastructure services creates dislocation in regional
enterprises reliant on such services. As numerous regional submissions to the IC
report on Regional lndustry Adjustment,"o the EPAC'Medium Term Review"t'and
the Taskforce on Regional Developmentttu stressed, market reform will further
disadvantage regional enterprises on their key weakness, namely their distance from
the major markets that buy their products and provide inputs to their production.
For example, market pricing is producing regional dislocation because
Commonwealth and State Governments had long subsidised rural water supplies in
the name of regional development.ttt As such, in all States, significant localised
agricultural production has been dependent on heavily subsidised irrigation. Market
pricing requires large price rises and termination of some irrigation services, which
will impact significantly on affected sectors."'The Murray-Darling Basin area, which
accounts for most of Australia's irrigated production,33e will be particularly affected.
It accounts for 30-40 per cent of Australia's primary resource-based production.too As
even the IC have admitted: '...many communities and industries owe their existence
to abundant and cheap supplies of water for irrigation. In the Lower Darling Basin,
in particular, whole communities rely upon water supplied in liberal quantities, with
high reliability and a subsidised price."o'Numerous regions within the Basin will be
affected, such as: Victoria's Goulburn Valley, in which half the agricultural land is
under irrigatiorç including dairy produce and various fruit sectors;to' South
Australia's Lower Murray region, which is dependent on water to ensure the
continuing viability of its local food production industryi the Riverland Sunraysia
region, which includes Renmark, Berri, Wentworth and Mildura, where agricultural
and horticultural production, especially citrus, dominates production and is heavily
dependant on irrigation;to3 and numerous areas in the New South Wales section of
the Murray-Darling Basin, such as the Murrumbidgee Irrigation Area.'*'
Market reform in the heavily subsidised rail sector is also producing significant
regional dislocation, as rail lines are terminated and dependent sectors such as
tourism are adversely affected. The Rail Industry Council's 1990 report estimated
333 I.,d.,strJ, Commission, lntpediments to Regional Industry Adjustment Draft Report: Volume 2: Appendices, op. cit.,
p.B.5,C41.,C42.
330 Inclustry Commission, Impediments to RegionøI lndustry Adjustment Drøft Report: Volume 1: Report, op. cit.,
p.176,177.
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that moving to a 'commercial railway' scenario would result in a fall in the non-
urban rail workforce from 70,000 to 25,349 in the 1986-87 to 2000-2001 period. All
non-urban passenger services and all less-than-container-load services were
expected to close under this commercial scenario.to'
Regional dislocation will also occur elsewhere. For example, regional dislocation
among gas employees and sectors reliant on gas will ensue because governments
have traditionally subsidised regional gas infrastructure as a means of promoting
regional development.tou The future of some of Australia's 74 regional ports is also
uncertain because, as the IC's L993 report on ports noted, most ports were still
achieving negative returns, despite considerable improvement.to'Loss of such ports
or price rises would result in employment losses for port employees and for
employees in regional businesses reliant upon such port services. The decision to
privatise all 23 FAC airportstot will also bring regional dislocation because the
system had relied on using the major profits made by Melbourne, Brisbane and
Sydney, and the mild profits made by Adelaide and Perth, to cross-subsidise the
other 18 airports, all of which run at a loss. Privatisation may therefore lead to
dislocation, as some regional airports close, and regional firms reliant on such
airports, such as those in the tourism sector, contract or terminate.ton In postal
services, the IC have recommended that the Federal Government should establish
competition to Australia Post, and establish a review on its possible privatisation,
once competitive networks have been established.tto This would produce regional
dislocation, as there is little chance a private firm would continue to cross-subsidise
the numerous loss-making regional post offices.tt'
A'domino effect' of collapsing services and economic decline can be triggered by the
removal of government services and infrastructure. This occurs through negative
multiplier effects, as well as by firms and individuals leaving regional areas as
services are withdrawn. In turn, the decline can cause bankruptcies, as financial
institutions call in loans backed by assets, the value of which has declined. Lower
asset prices can also impede business growth by reducing the capacity of businesses
to access finance.tt'Queensland University demographer Dr Martin Bell believes the
key reason for the withdrawal of population from the regional and rural areas is the
tot Ruil Industry Council, op. cit., p.31.,33-37,40.
346 Australian Gas Light Company, Submission to the Industry Commission Inquiry'lmpediments to Regionnl
Industry Adjustment' , Unpublished , 1993, p.3.
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tt' Murybo.ough & District Development Committee, Submission of Møryborough €t District Deuelopment
Comntittee to Industry Commission Inquiry: Impediments to Regional Industry Adjustment, Unpublished,"1993, p.6.
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rationalist policy of removing Commonwealth and State Government services,tt'
which the IC also admits has had an effect."o
As with tariÍf cuts, rationalists have been relatively indifferent to this regional pain.
For example, several submissions to the IC Regional Adjustment Report stated that
deregulation of intrastate aviation might lead to the removal of their local air service
and thereby impede the development and adjustment of their regions."'In response,
the IC stated: '[T]he regional implications of intrastate aviation deregulation do not
constitute an argument against further removal of government intervention."tu
Reports by the IC, the BIE and EPAC all note that major regional dislocation will
occur as a result of market infrastructure reform, but none provide any detailed
analysis of these major costs, let alone a comparison of such costs compared to the
benefits of market reform. Indeed, each report simply notes the regional implications
and then advocates rapid implementation of market reform.ttt
The key employment concern of the market reform program is that, because it
involves major shifts of investment and employment between firms, industries and
regions,ttt it is prone to leaving localised pools of long-term structurally unemployed
people in various regions and sectors. For example, many of the 4,500 workers who
lost their electricity sector jobs in the La Trobe Valley (noted above) may have had
difficulty finding alternative employment because their jobs are probably gone
forever. Unless these workers can retrain to create skills suitable in other sectors,
they may face long-term unemployment. Market infrastructure reform will create
localised pools of long-term, structurally unemployed people via: the impact of the
110,000 plus job losses in infrastructure sectors; the concentration of such losses in
particular regions, which are often experiencing slow or negative employment
growth; and the impact of the removal of such infrastructure on reliant sectors.
Studies have confirmed that infrastructure job cuts are particularly likely to create
structural, long-term unemployment. For example, a Bureau of Transport and
Communications Economics study of the rail sector conducted between January 1987
ttt 
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and June L988 found that, of those workers accepting a redundancy package, 44 per
cent remained unemployed and two-thirds of these for at least 13 months.t'n
In some instances, dislocation is being suffered by those least able to find alternative
employment. For example, in the port sector, those being displaced are primarily
unskilled or semi-skilled workers, as the composition of jobs in the sector shifts
increasingly towards higher skilled employees.tuo Similarly, in the rail sector, the
1990 Rail Industry Council report found that low skilled employees were
experiencing the majority of the employment dislocation, as the rapidity of the
rationalisation process has made many rail workers skills redundant. The 1990 Rail
Industry Council report found only 15 per cent of the rail workforce had undergone
training and acquired skills that are transferable to other industries. There is also a
large proportion of workers from non-English speaking backgrounds in the rail
workforce, reaching as high as 40 per cent in some rail systems. Further, many of
those displaced are in weak regional labour markets, such as Whyalla and Griffith.
The majority of these rail workers will not find alternative employment within a
year.tut
Thus, in summary, free market infrastructure reform produces significant, long-term,
structural unemployment as: market pricing and competitive neutrality policies
necessitate price rises or service closures in subsidised or otherwise favoured sectors;
competition causes some public providers to lose market share; privatisation and
contracting out create downsizing in the GBEs they replace; and competition and
privatisation spark efficiency drives. Further dislocation is caused: among sectors
that were reliant on subsidised infrastructure provision; and among regions, where
regional services are forced to terminate and where regional firms reliant on
subsidised infrastructure services contract as the services are terminated or prices are
raised to produce a market return.
Managing Competition and Privatisation
Rationalists may also lack the strategic industry policy framework needed to
implement competition and privatisation in the most effective way. With respect to
introducing competition in former public monopoly areas, rationalists can produce
sub-optimal outcomes due to their excessive faith in market forces and excessive
disregard for the capacity of government. For example, rationalists often seek speedy
implementation of open competition in formerly protected markets, without
adequate consideration of the impact on existing investment and employment in the
sector, nor for the structure of firms that would result in the sector. By contrast, a
more sensible approach would be to make domestic operators efficient, build up
domestic rivalry and only then apply open competition. This approach assists in
maintaining Australian infrastructure service providers and existing investment and
jobs, while encouraging a competitive market structure over the longer term.
3se IndustÐr Commission , RaiI Transport Volume 1 Report, op. cit., p.182.
tuo This shift in industry skill requirements is noted in Industry Commission, Port Authority Seruices and
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This was illustrated in the telecommunications policy debates. While Treasury and
some members of the Labor Government wanted a speedy transition to open
competition, the 'Beazley option' of first moving to duopoly and then open
competition in 1997 prevailed. The latter option allowed Telstra to improve its
efficiency and competitiveness in preparation for such competition. As a result, a
market structure involving strong domestic competitors, as well as international
competition, has been made possible. An immediate move to open competition may
have left an inefficient Telstra open to obliteration, led to the loss of much existing
employment and production, and paved the way for a market dominated solely by
foreign competitors.
Introducing competition into markets traditionally supplied by public monopolies
also requires a strategic approach. Simply removing regulatory restrictions on
competition and privatising monopolies may bring adverse results, as private firms
with monopoly power can charge above market prices and deliver essential services
inefficiently without the discipline of competition. Structural reforms are needed to
dismantle excessive market power and make the market contestable. Natural
monopoly elements, such as rail tracks, need to be separated from potentially
competitive activities, such as rail services, with the latter being structurally
separated into several competing independent firms. Strategic judgements must be
made about which parts should be privatised, whether Australian ownership is
important, and which parts are 'natural monopolies' and should remain public, or
alternatively, made private, with price cap legislation.t6' Ensuring markets remain
competitive after structural separation is also important. The government must use
the powers of the Trade Practices Act to: ensure competitors do not collude to fix
prices or engage in other anti-competitive activity;tut and prevent the re-merging of
the broken up enterprises, where the merger would be likely to result in a substantial
lessening of competition.36o In summary, introducing competition requires a strategic
approach, not the simple market policies of deregulation and privatisation.
Rationalists may also be too inclined to advocate privatisation because of their blind
faith in market forces and their under-estimation of the utility of government action.
For example, Strong writes:
Inevitably, ... government enterprise can never be as efficient or service-oriented as private
enterprises... [T]he behaviour changes engendered by private ownership as opposed to
ownership by politicians, will inevitably lead to more competition, better customer service
and better resource allocation of labour and capital within th" ".ono-y...t6t
As with competition, privatisation requires a strategic industry policy framework
because it involves the central question rationalists fail to address, namely the
appropriate mix between public and private sector provision in the economy. Each
decision requires considerable research and strategic thought about the best mix
3o2 Frederick G. Hilmer, Mark Rayner & Geoffery Taperell, op. cit., p.215,217,219.
tut ibid., p.B7,1JO.
tuo Allur, Fels & Jill Walker, 'Competition policy and economic rationalism' in Stephen King & Peter Lloyd (eds),
op. cit., pp.169-"191. at p.179,189.
tut Ch.i, Strong, op. cit., p.64,65.
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between government and private sector involvement, not an automatic assumption
that market forces should prevail.
The privatisation of Telstra is a good example. Kept public, it would provide more
than $2 billion to government annually, is 100 per cent Australian owned, is
achieving considerable export growth, has undergone major efficiency
improvements, provides crucial technology to virtually all firms, and could be used
to keep foreign firms 'honest' in the environment of open competition. Privatisation
would mean significant loss of Australian ownership, loss of government revenue
and possibly reduced exports if a foreign multinational gained a controlling share
and was already exporting to the region from other nations. Alternatively, it may
well be that, in an environment of open competition, a privatised Telstra would
become substantially more efficient, create even more exports and offer cheaper
prices and better service. The decision on Telstra is not clear-cut, and needs to be
approached with an open mind and a strategic policy framework, not an ideological,
pre-determined view that privatisation is always optimal for the economy.
Each privatisation requires a range of strategic choices. As Michael Porter's study
found: '...[D]eregulation and privatization will not succeed without active domestic
riunlry!'uu Thus, where firms operate in a competitive national market, the former
public monopoly can simply be privatised. If however, privatisation would give the
firm too much market power, it is vital that the monopoly is broken up into several
competing businesses before privatisation. Governments have a strong incentive to
sell public monopolies without structural separation to maximise the sale price. In
some instances where there has been insufficient competition, privatisations have
given excessive market power to private firms, allowing them to charge monopoly
prices and provide sub-standard service. Structural reforms must take place before
privatisation to avoid such negative economic outcomes.tu'
Strategic choices also need to be made about whether each firm should be privatised
after the structural separation of a public monopoly. It may be useful to keep one
competitor in each sector in public ownership in order to keep the focus on long run
strategic infrastructure development. Private investors may under-invest in search of
short-term profitability, rather than focusing on nation building. This may be why
transport, communications and energy are largely in public hands in OECD
nations.tut
Rationalists may also be too willing to privatise natural monopolies. For example,
Australia's airports are being privatised. As almost all the airports are natural
monopolies, private firms will have considerable market power to charge high
prices, once the five year price cap legislation expires. Further, because only seven of
t}re 23 airports make a profit, the 18 loss-making airports will have to charge higher
prices or cease operations, with negative implications for regions and sectors reliant
on such provision. Thus, privatisation of airports without ongoing price cap
legislation and in the absence of competition, may worsen national economic
tuu Mi.huul Porter, op. cit., p.664.
3ó7 Frederick G. Hilmer, Mark Rayner & Geoffery Taperell, op. cit., p.226-228,234.
tuu Sirno., Domberger, op. cit., p|166.
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performance. These are the reasons why the FAC argued that the airports needed to
be run as a national network.36e SimiIarly, many port authority activities are natural
monopoly or duopoly activities. In these areas, market forces will not generate price
competition,3to yet the IC recommend widespread privatisationttt and it is
proceeding in many areas.
Conclusion
Rationalist infrastructure reform appears to have improved the functioning of
infrastructure sectors. Most particularly, introducing competition in sectors formerly
dominated by poorly performing government monopolies, such as in electricity, gas
and telecommunications, has brought significant efficiency improvements and cost
reductions. Corporatisation policies such as market pricing have led to a significant
reduction in GTE debt. Such policies are an important priority given that, at 1987-88,
real GTE debt stood at fi44 billion."' If managed effectively, there is also scope for
gains through privatisation, where it occurs in the context of highly competitive
markets. In these circumstances, the profit motive engendered by private ownership
could be expected to make some contribution to improved economic performance
from infrastructure providers. Overall, rationalist reforms have produced lower
average prices, sharply rising productivity and lower GTE debt.
These infrastructure performance improvements are likely to have produced
economy-wide gains. Given that infrastructure costs are an important part of the
input costs in many industries, the significant cost reductions achieved will have
improved the cost competitiveness of firms throughout the economy. To the extent
that cost reductions increase competitiveness and sales, such cost reductions have
aided growth, exports and restructuring.
The key limitations of rationalist infrastructure reform are that: it may make only a
small contribution to net employment growth; and it does little to foster an
innovation-driven economy, which is the key to national competitive advantage.
Rationalist infrastructure policy also has several key weaknesses. In particular,
rationalists are focused on establishing a market allocation of resources, when the
key policy requirement is to overcome the massive failure by the market to produce
the infrastructure necessary to maximise economic performance. A policy
prescription to establish a market allocation of resources is of minimal utility when
the activity is primarily undertaken by government. The prescription that
governments seek a market rate of return on their infrastructure investment fails to
answer the central infrastructure policy question, namely: What mix and level of
government spending in infrastructure can maximise national economic growth and
competitiveness? The level, type and quality of public investment in infrastructure,
tun Ch.i, Falvey, 'All FAC airports to be sold', The Australian, 5 May 1995, p.17.
3to Flo-u.d Dick, ch.10 'Progress and frustration: Restructuring of coastal shipping and ports' in Peter Forsyth
(ed.), op. cit., pp.204-22"1 at p.211,277.
371 Indrrstr), Commission, Port Authority Seraices and Actiaities, op. cit., p.182,184.
3t' St""rirlg Committee on National Performance Monitoring of Government Trading Enterprises, Gouernment
Trading Enterprises Perþrmance Indicators 1987-88 to 1.992-93, op. cit., p.3.
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by determining the quality, availability and cost competitiveness of infrastructure
services to industry, is an important cause of the level of growth and
competitiveness of the Australian economy. These policy issues must be primarily
determined by government.
Rationalist ideology may have contributed to the rapid fall in government
investment in the period because rationalists: are focused on market policies, not
addressing market failure; have little faith in the utility of government action;
recommend that public infrastructure investment only occur where it is very likely
to make a market return; are against national planning of infrastructure investments;
and place greater priority on cutting government spending than on ensuring that
sufficient public investment is undertaken. Public infrastructure investment has
plummeted during the rationalist era, raising the possibility that it has been
insufficient to maximise the growth of the national economy.
There is strong evidence that increasing investment in infrastructure could foster
growth, restructuring and national competitiveness. The history of industrial nations
shows that there is significant market failure in the provision of infrastructure.
Significant government investment is needed to provide adequate infrastructure to
support the private sector and the economy as a whole. A large number of
economically beneficial infrastructure projects were yet to be completed when Labor
lost power. This provides a major opportunity for Australia to increase its public
infrastructure investment and thereby provide employment, assist growth and
restructuring, and improve national competitiveness. Government infrastructure
policy can also assist restructuring by ensuring that infrastructure investments
encourage exports, and exports of ETMs and sophisticated services in particular.
Another key weakness of rationalist infrastructure reform is that it appears to have
produced very significant structural unemployment via: implementation of market
pricing and investment in a situation where every infrastructure sector,bar perhaps
(non-heavy vehicle) road transport do not cover their costs; corporatisation, which
will exacerbate the pressures for price increases via the removal of various
advantages enjoyed by public enterprises, including the requirement to pay all taxes
and charges; and privatisation and competition policies, which produce employment
losses by sparking efficiency drives. Major employment losses will also occur in
sectors and regions that have relied on subsidised infrastructure provision, as
infrastructure services are removed andf or prices increased to bring a market return
on investment.
In short, rationalist infrastructure reform has been worthwhile for the benefits it has
produced. F{owever, the rationalist approach also has weaknesses, particularly the
fact that it has involved too little public infrastructure investment to maximise
growth and restructuring. Australia will have to look beyond rationalist
infrastructure reform to achieve a significant improvement in national competitive
advantage, restructuring and employment growth.
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Chapter Three: Small Government Policy
Introduction
This thesis critiques the rationalist assumption that if resources are allocated by the
market, they are allocated with optimum efficiency, leading to rapid restructuring
and employment growtþ and surging national competitiveness. This chapter tests
these views, as applied in the form of the small government policies pursued by the
Labor Government.
Labor's Small Government Policies
Rationalists believe in reducing government expenditure to an absolute minimum in
order to maximise the role of markets in allocating resources, and to reduce tax on
companies so as to encourage investment. This belief underpinned the
unprecedented reduction in Commonwealth outlays under the Labor Government,
which fell from 30.2 per cent of GDP to 24.1. pet cent of GDP between 1984-85 and
1989-90. As shown below, Commonwealth and total government outlays also
declined in a structural sense over the 1983-84 to 1995-96 period, notwithstanding
the brief cyclical rise during the recession and its aftermath. These cuts helped to
facilitate a reduction in company tax from 60 to 33 per cent, before it was increased
to 35 per cent.










































































Source: The figures for the period 1983-84 to 1989-90 are from Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Economic
Indicators March 1.993, Cat. no.1350.0, p.33. The figures for 1990-1991. to 1995-96 are from Australian Bureau of
Statistics, Australian Economic Indicøtors lnnuary L998, Cat' no.1350.0, p'10.
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The table above also shows that while there was also a decline in Commonwealth
revenue over the period, there was no major structural change in total government
revenue. Flowever, the period is a good one in which to test small government
policies, because, as shown on the table below, Australia had the third smallest total
government sector in the OECD. Between 1983 and 1995; the average size oÍ
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government in Australia was 36 per cent of GDP, compared with 48 per cent of GDP
among small OECD nations.3t3
The Size Of Government in OECD Nations
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Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Economic Outlook lune 1996,
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, 1996, p.A31,. Notes: This table measures total
government current outlays plus net capital outlays as a percentage of nominal GDP. OECD average only
includes those nations in this table.
Small Government Policies and Economic Outcomes
The following tables seek to determine whether, in the 1983 to 1995 period, there was
a correlation between the size oÍ goverrunent and, in turn: real GDP growth; real
employment growtþ unemployment rates; and percentage of the working age
population employed. In each section, there is a table providing the raw figures for
the period, as well as two graphs, the first illustrating a straight regression, and the
second showing the moving average.
tt' O.gunirution for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Economic Outlook lune 1996, Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Developmen! Paris, 1996, p.é'31..
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Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Economic Outlook lune 1996, op. cit.,
p.A'4,1'31.
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Economic Outlook lune 1,996, op. cit.,
p.A.24,1.31.


















































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Economic Outlook lune 1996, op. cit.,
p.A22,A24,A31. Note: The percentage of working age population employed is derived from subtracting the




























y = -0.1 329x + 67 .733
R2 = 0.0109
l+Êi
30.0 35.0 40.0 45.0 50.0
Size of Government
55.0 60.0




























30.0 35.0 40.0 50.0 55.0 060
The major findings suggested by these tables are that:
There is a correlation between the size of government and economic
outcomes, but the correlation is modest.
There was some everìness in average economic outcomes for those nations
in which government accounted for 45-47 per cent of GDP or less. For
nations in which governments take up more than this in GDP, average
economic outcomes were lower, but this trend was modest, rather than
striking.
Some nations with large government sectors had relatively sound
economic outcomes, while some of the nations with smaller government




Other factors may be much more decisive in determining economic
outcomes than simply the size of government.
o
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Flowever, the findings are not inconsistent with the view that there are certain
limitations on the size of government. Firstly, studies have indicated that
government consumption expenditure may reduce economic performance.tto
Secondly, the findings for the 1983 to 1995 period indicate that, where the
government sector becomes very large, economic performance can suffer. Finally,
history indicates that rapid increases in taxation can reduce private sector and total
growth.
Flowever, overall, the findings cast doubt on conventional rationalist economic
wisdom in Australia. The OECD figures indicate that government averaged 36 per
cent of GDP in Australia in the 1983 to 1995 period, compared with an average for
small OECD nations oÍ 48 per cent. Given that there was no significant correlation
between the size of government and economic performance for nations in which
government contributed 45-47 per cent of GDP or less, the findings indicate that the
rationalist argument that Australia should reduce the size of its government sector
may be ill considered. The findings indicate that other factors may be more
important in determining economic performance.
How can this be so? Rationalists often highlight the argument that the government
must be as small as possible, so that only minimal taxes need to be imposed on
companies, leading to high profits, investment and growth. This logic appears to
have considerable validity. Globalisation also means that nations need to have
competitive business tax regimes if they are to attract global investment. However,
there must be an explanation for the findings noted above. It may be that the small
government policy prescription becomes a weakness if taken too far. There would
certainly be a point at which there would be insufficient taxes to finance the
economic infrastructure needed to maximise the growth of the private sector and the
economy as a whole. It may be that a balance needs to be established between
minimising goverrunent spending and taxation on the one hand, and undertaking
sufficient public investment to maximise the growth of the private sector and the
overall economy on the other. As Vince Fitzgerald has argued:
A very high tax jurisdiction will drive economic activity away to more favourable
commercial environments, but an extremely low tax jurisdiction is not likely to offer a
particularly competitive environment either. It is likely to be one in which the services and
infraslucture that are important to business are under-provided... Obviously, a balance
needs to be struck...37s
Government investment aimed at supporting private sector expansion may be an
important part of creating national affluence. Battin and Smythe have argued that
the key policy change of the modern (rationalist) era has not been from protection to
free trade, but from high levels of government investment during the three
Keynesian decades following World War Two, to low levels of public investment in
the last 25 years. They argue that the level of public investment was a key reason
374 William Easterly & Sergio Rebelo, op. cit., p.423; andPalle Anderson & David Gruen, op. cit., p.12,1'3
375 V. W. Fitzgerald Reform, Australiø's Tax System: Integrating the Agendn, op' cit., p.1.
89
why full employment prevailed throughout the immediate post-war decades, but the
modern era has been dogged by continuous mass unemployment."u
As noted in chapter two, a range of studies have demonstrated a significant positive
correlation between public investment and positive economic outcomes such as
economic growth and growth in private investment.t" For example, a study by
Easterly and Rebelo found that, while public consumption expenditure appears to
have a negative effect on growth, public investment has a positive effect."t Anderson
and Gruen noted a range of modern articles showing that public investment
increases economic welfare and concluded: '...[R]educing public investment merely
as a means of cutting the goverrunent borrowing requirement is not an optimal long
run policy."t' As Lester Thurow has argued: '...the real issue is not public versus
private spending. The real issue is investment (public and private) versus
consumption (public and private)."t.
These findings have implications for rationalists in the modern era who persist with
cuts to economically beneficial public investments and prevent the emergence of the
economic and industry strategy needed to maximise economic outcomes. Examples
include cuts to public infrastructure spending and the failure to quickly create a
world class vocational education and training system. A key rationalist weakness is
that the desire for small government subordinates all other considerations, meaning
that spending crucial to maximising the output of the private sector and the
economy as a whole is cut, or not undertaken. Indeed, small government policies
suffer from the fact that, as government expenditures and taxation are cut,
effectively releasing further funds to be allocated by the private sector, much of this
money will be spent on consumptiory rather than investment. By contrast,
government could invest all such money at the margin of government spending.
More Dislocation
As with tarifÍ cuts and free market infrastructure reform, small goverrunent policies
brought considerable gross employment cuts. As the table below illustrates, public
sector employment at the Commonwealth, State and total public sector level fell
during the period, both in relative and absolute terms. Between February 1984 and
February 1996, public sector employment fell by 88,100, with 67,900 of this reduction
coming from the Commonwealth. Had public sector employment maintained its
February 1984 share of total employment, it would have been 563,500 higher at
February 1996, all other things being equal.
376 Tim Battin & Paul Smythe, From War Economy to Deregulation: Australian Keynesianism in tlrc Long Rutt,
Unpublished, 1998, p.7-15.
377 Studies demonstrating that public investment can improve economic outcomes include: David A. Aschauer,
'Is public expenditure productive?', lournal of Monetary Economics, vol.23, no.2, pp.777-200; and Willian
Easterly & Sergio Rebelo, op. cit., pp.417-458.
378 Wiltiam Easterly & Sergio Rebelo, op. cit., p.423,430-434.
"n Pull" Anderson & David Gruen, op. cit., p.13.
380 Lester Thuro w , Heød to Head: Coming Econonic Battles Among lapan, Europe, and Anærica, Morrow, New York,
U9A,1992, p.269.
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Public and Private Employment (in thousands, seasonally adfusted) February 1984
to February 7996
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Source: These percentages are derived from figures provided in Australian Bureau of Statistics, Wage nnd SøIary
Ëarners Australia March Quarter 1997, Cat. no.6248.0, p.9-72.
These public employment reductions have caused disproportionate employment
losses in regional and rural areas, as compared with city areas, as the IC admitted in
their Regional Adjustment Report."' The Murray Bridge Council submission to the
Kelty Report stated: 'More than anything else, the withdrawal of government and
381 Industry Commission , Impediments to Regional Industry Adjustment Draft Report: Volume 1: Report, op. cit., op.
cit., p.1.87.
91
semi-government employees from regional Australia is impacting on the viability of
towns and cities outside the metropolitan area.'"'
Conclusion
Rationalists often advocate significant reductions in the size of government,
believing strongly in the capacity of free-markets to deliver prosperity. The analysis
above showed that there was not a strong correlation between the size of
goverrunent and economic outcomes. It may be that a more balanced approach is
required than the rationalist small government approach, which may produce
insufficient public investment to maximise the growth of the private sector and the
economy as a whole.
Of course, the finding that public investment can increase economic growth, while
important, does not provide significant guidance on what specific public
investments will increase economic growth. Australia's economic development is
crucially dependent on economists and policymakers identifying those areas in
which markets fail and government investment is required. Unfortunately, as part
two will demonstrate, this is the very exploration that economic rationalists - in their
certainty that free markets can produce rising economic prosperity - have stopped
undertaking.
This thesis suggests two broad directions for government investment. In chapter
two, the evidence and a range of studies suggested that strategic investment in
economic infrastructure has an important role to play in fostering national economic
development. In part two, market failures in areas crucial to establishing an
innovation-driven economy are identified and suggestions are made for public
investment in areas vital to creating competitive advantage through innovation, such
as R&D, technology diffusion, education and training, management and export
marketing. Given the increasing emergence of a knowledge-based economy, these
latter investments may be the most crucial in driving national economic
development.
This may be a more appropriate balance than the rationalist small government
approach. On the one hand, Australia's position as a nation with a relatively small
government by OECD standards could be maintained, thereby fostering growth
through the dynamism of the private sector, and by attracting global capital.
Flowever, government investment directed to creating an innovation-driven
economy could be increased by 2-4 per cent of GDP, paid for by cuts to politically
motivated industry programs, elimination of spurious tax concessions, and perhaps
a small increase in taxation, if necessary. Such an approach - by building the capacity
of firms to compete on international markets through innovation - might produce
greater employment growtþ restructuring and competitiveness than the rationalist
small government approach. It might also offset the major downside of so many
rationalist policies, namely the significant amount of structural dislocation they
cause.
382 Taskforce on Regional Development, Deoeloping Australia: A Regional Perspectitte: Volumc 1: Report, op. cit.,
p.67.
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Chapter Four: Restructuring and Employment Growth
Under Rationalism
Introduction
Rationalists claim that a key benefit to ensue from their policies is efficient resource
allocation, which means their policies should lead to speedy restructuring of the
Australian economy. The main task in this chapter is to examine the restructuring
and employment growth outcomes achieved in the period. These facts provide
evidence against which the analysis in chapters one to three can be further assessed.
The 1983 to 1996 period is a good era to test whether rationalist policies are useful in
bringing desirable structural change because much of the rationalist agenda was
implemented in this time. The policies of the period included not just tariff cuts,
infrastructure reform and small government policies, but also significant financial
deregulation, wage restraint and partial deregulation of the labour market, and
minimal active industry policy. The economic environment also provided significant
scope for market reforms to work effectively. Apart from the 1990-91 recession, much
of the period involved a strongly growing economy and a high profit share.
The effectiveness of rationalist restructuring in the period will be measured in the
following ways:
1.. Changes in the Composition of Exports
2. Exports
3. The Trade Account, the Current Account and the Net Foreign Debt
4. National Savings
5. Economic Growth
6. Employment and Unemployment
Of course, this approach does not bring conclusive evidence on the utility of
rationalist policies. The causes of the economic outcomes in the period were many.
Flowever, rationalism was the dominant framework of the period, so analysing the
economic progress achieved appears useful. The final part of the chapter will draw
conclusions on the dislocation caused by rationalist policies and their implications for
restructuring and employment growth.
L. Changes in the Composition of Trade
Trends inWorld Trade
Determining the desirable directions for the restructuring of Australia's composition
of exports can usefully be informed by trends in world trade. In recent decades,
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world trade growth has been strong in manufactures, but weak in agriculture and
mining. Industrialised nations have generally restructured their export composition
to match these trends, as shown on the tables below.
North America: Composition of Merchandise Exports 1963 to1994



















Source: World Trade Organisation, International Trade: Trends ønd Statistics 1995, rll/orld Trade Organisation,
Geneva, 1995, p.30. Note: Numbers may not add up to 100 due to unspecified products.
Western Europe: Composition of Merchandise Exports196S to1994




Source: World Trade Organisation, International Trade: Trends and Statistics 1995, op. cit., p.31. Note: Numbers
may not add up to 100 due to unspecified products.



































Source: World Trade Organisation, International Trade: Trends and Statistics 1995, op. cit., p.31. Note: Nurnbers
may not add up to 100 due to unspecified products.
Around the world, these trends have been marked in the last fifteen years, as shown
below.
Composition of World Merchandise Exports 1980 to 7994




Source: World Trade Organisation,InternationøI Trøde: Trends and Støtistics 1995, op. cit., p.25,77. Note: Numbers
may not add up to 100 due to unspecified products.
Manufactured exports now dominate world trade. Services comprise a significant
and growing share of world trade, while mining and agriculture are a small and
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Source: World Trade Organisation, Annunl Report 1996, vol.1, World Trade Organisation, Geneva, 1996, p.'1,4.
Australia's Trade Dilemma
These trends in world trade produced significant challenges for the Australian
economy in recent decades because Australia has traditionally had a commodity
dependent export base.
In particular, the long run decline of agriculture on world markets has been a
decisive factor in Australia's relative economic decline. Historically, agriculture was
vital because of its contribution to national exports. From 1920 to 1950, agriculture
trended at75 percent of export earnings.383 In that era, Australia's agriculture exports
were conducive to national economic prosperity because agriculture was well
rewarded on world markets. Flowever, the terms of trade for agriculture have been
in long run decline, falling from 245 index points in1949-50, to an average of around
100 in the 1970s, and then further to around 73by 1986-87.380 Australia's over-reliance
on agriculture has been the key factor in the long run decline in Australia's overall
terms of trade, which Íell43 percent in the 30 years from L960.'8u
On the other hand, manufacturing and services, which have been handsomely
rewarded on world markets in recent decades, have traditionally provided only a
minority of Australian exports. In addition, the manufacturing exports that Australia
did produce, were largely comprised of simply transformed manufactures (STMs).tuu
Competitiveness in STMs is often strongly dependent on cost factors. For this reason,
much of the production and export of STMs has shifted to developing nations in the
last few decades, particularly in Asia, where producers enjoy cost advantages
through low wages, minimal environmental standards, low taxes and tax
incentives."t As a consequence, many industrialised nations - which could no longer
compete in such segments due to their high wage and tax rates - restructured their
manufacturing industry towards higher value-added market segments over the last
few decades.'uu
383 
Kym Anderson & Ross Garnaul op. cit., p.22.
384 Geoffery Lawrence, Capitalism and the Countryside: The Rural Crisis in Australiø, Pluto Press, Sydney,7987,
p.28.
38s Bill Mansfield, ch.9'Trade unions and the challenge of change', in Michael Costa & Michael Easson (eds), op.
cit., pp.1.87-206 at p;19L.
386 Peter Ewer, Winton Higgins & Annette Stevens, op. cit., p.37,38.
387 United Trades and Labour Council of South Australia, Submission to the Pørliømentøry Inquiry lnto Tarffi and
I n du s try D eu elop ment, Unpublished, 1992, p.8.












These trends suggest that Australia should have reduced its commodity reliance and
begun to restructure its export base towards high value-added manufactures and
services from the L960s, as many other industrial nations did in the period.
This restructuring is also imperative if Australia wishes to create more employment.
Australia's commodity industries provide few jobs, and their role as employers is
declining. Employment in agriculture as a percentage of total employment fell from
26 percent in 1930-31 , to'1.4 percent by 1950-51, and to eight per cent in1970-71,.'u' The
decline of agriculture's share of total employment continued in the Hawke-Keating
years. Between 1982-83 and1995-96, employment in agriculture, fishing and forestry
fell from 6.6 per cent to 5.L per cent of total employment. Mining also provides few
jobs. Between 1982-83 and 1995-96, employment in mining fell from 1.5 to 1.0 per
cent of total employment."o
By contrast, services and ETMs are vital to employment growth. Between 1982-83
and 1995-96, when total employed persons grew by 1,.90 million, employment in
services grew by more than two million, from 4,653,200 to 6,681.,200, or from 73.5 to
80.5 per cent of total employment."' ETMs are also vital to employment creation in
high wage nations because STM firms, although more labour intensive, struggle to
compete against low tax, low wage, developing nations. Among G7 countries in the
1973 to 1993 period, employment growth in high technology, high R&D intensity
manufacturing sectors was faster than the manufacturing average, while
employment growth in low technology, low R&D intensity sectors was lower than
the manufacturing average."t
ETM production also plays a role in propelling services, the key industry providing
direct employment."'ETMs propel services because they are important in creating
national affluence, which in turn, brings spending on a range of services. ETMs also
propel the growth of high wage business services, which are vital inputs in ETM
production.'no Exports of services and ETMs are also important to employment
creation because they constitute Australia's best chance to achieve significant export
growtþ which is vital to enabling the economy to grow rapidly, without running
unsustainably large current account deficits.
Thus, for several decades, the challenge for Australia has been to develop a solid core
of innovative, fast growing, high exporting ETM and high value-added service firms.
38e Australian Industries Assistance Commission, op. cit., p.4.
3e0 Australian Bureau of Statistics, AustrøIian Economic Indicators December 1.991., Cat. no.1350.0, p.91.; and
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Economic Indicøtors lune 1.997, Cat. no.1350.0, p.67 . These figures are
yearly averages,
3e1 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Economic Indicators December 1991., Cat. no.1350.0, p.91; and
AustralianBureauof Statistics, AustrøIianEconomiclndicatorslunel99T, Cat.no.1350.0,p.67.Thesefiguresare
yearly averages.
3e' Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Developrnent, Technology and Industrial Perfornnnce : Technology
Difusion, Productittity, Employment and SkiIIs, International Competitioeness, Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Developmen! Paris, 1996, p.83.
'n' Puppur, Carter, Evans & Koop/Telesis , op. cit., p.22.
"o Stephet't S. Cohen & John Zysman, op. cit., p.xäi,3,4,6,20,21'.
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Restructuring Australia's composition of exports in this way is crucial to producing
sustainable economic, export and employment growth.
Australia's Composition of Exports:1950 to L983
The purpose of this section is to provide a comparison against which the Keating-
Hawke years can be measured. The following shows that, in the three decades prior
to the Labor Government, Australia largely failed to capitalise on the growth of
world manufactured exports, and continued to be very reliant on commodities. It is
this export structure that underpinned Australia's declining living standards, relative
to many other economies.
While world trade shifted significantly towards manufactures, and the percentage of
manufactures in Australia's total imports rose from just over 50 per cent in the 1950s
and early 1960s to over 75 per cent from the late 1960s onward,"' Australian exports
of manufactures as a percentage of total merchandise exports increased from 11 per
cent in the five years ending 1964-65, to 23 per cent in the 5 years to 1984-85.
Australia's share of world trade in manufactures fell from 0.7 per cent over the
period from 1971.-1975 to 0.4 per cent in the 1981-1985 era."u
Australia continued its very heavy dependence on exports of unprocessed primary
commodities over the period. Agriculfure and mining exports comprised 89 per cent
of merchandise exports in the 5 years to 1964-65 and 77 per cent of merchandise
exports in the 5 years to 1984-85. \¡Vhile agriculture exports fell from 75 to 36 per cent
of total exports over the period, mineral and fuel exports rose from 14 to 41. per
cent.'nt
Composition of Merchandise Exports L960 to 1984-85 (average percentage for the
five years ending)



















Source: Peter Ewer, Winton Higgins & Annette Stevens, Unions and the Future of Australiøn Manufacturing, Allen
and Unwiry Sydney, 1987, p.37 compiled the table using various issues of Australian Bureau of Statistics, Oz¡erseas
Trade (Foreign Trade).
Thus, during this period, agriculture and manufacfuring underwent some of the
necessary re-alignment to the structure of world trade realities. However, progress
was slow and only a small proportion of the necessary restructuring was achieved.
Restructuring Under the Hawke and Keating Governments
As shown below, the restructuring of Australia's export base quickened under the
Hawke and Keating Governments, particularly after the mid-to-late L980s.
3es Kym Anderson & Ross Garnau! op. cit., p,23.
3e6 
Peter Ewer, Winton Higgins & Annette Stevens, op. cit., p.30,31'.
tn' ibid., p.30,J1..
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Australia's reliance on corrunodities declined. Between 1982-83 and 1995-96, rural
and mining exports fell from 71,.1, per cent to 55.9 per cent of Australia's total exports.
Manufacturing, which was in disarray when the Labor Government came to power,
consolidated its position in the early-to-mid L980s, aided by government plans in
steel, TCF, PMV and heavy engineering.'n' Thery between 1988-89 and 1995-96, the
manufacturing share of total exports rose from 11.1 per cent to 187 per cent. Also
promising was the growth in services exports, which grew from 17.7 per cent to 23.4
per cent of total exports between 1982-83 and1995-96.
Composition of Exports 1982-83 to7995-96 ($m. and percentage of total exports)










































































































91-92 15,603 27,596 10,394 14,584
































19,045 29,702 15,989 20,247 1,710 86,693
(21.e7) (34.26) (18.44) (23.35) (1 .e7) (100.00)
21,300 33,592 18,374 22,964 2,040 98,270
(21.67) (34.18) 18.69) (23.37) (2.08) (1oo.oo)
Source: The figures for 7987-88 to7995-96 are from Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Economic Indicators
lune 1997, Cat. no.1350.0, p.14,15. The figures for 1982-83 to 1986-87 are from Australian Bureau of Statistics,
Australian Economíc Indicators lanuaryftebruøry 1993, Cat. no.1350.0, p.18,24,25.
Most importantly, as shown below, the growth in manufactured exports was entirely
made up of growth in ETM exports. Between 1988-89 and1995-96, ETM exports grew
from 13.2 to 23.4 per cent of merchandise exports, while simply transformed
manufactures declined from 1'l,.2to 10.3 per cent of merchandise exports.
3e8 
Pappas, Carter,Evans & Koop/Telesis, op. cit., p.3.
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Percentage of Manufactures in Total Merchandise Exports 1988-89 to1995-96

































Source: The figures for 1991.-92 to 1995-96 are from Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Conrposition of Trøde
Australia 1995-96, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, 1996, p.19. The figures for 1988-89 to
1990-91, are from Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Composition of Trade Australia 1992-93, Deparhnent of
Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, 1993, p.20.
Between 1988-89 arrd 1995-96, ETM exports grew by an average of 15.6 per cent
annually, compared with 8.2 per cent average annual growth among all exports.
Growth in Exports of Manufactures L988'89 to 1995-96 (percentage change on the
previous year)














































Source: The figures for '1,99'1,-92 to 1995-96 are from Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Composition of Trade
Australia 1995-96, op. cit., p.20. The figures for 1988-89 to 1990-91 are from Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade, Composition of Trade Australiø L992-93, op. cit., p.21,.
The table below shows that, while there was only one ETM exporter in Australia's
top 20 exports in 1995-96. many are growing very quickly, if from a low base. This
suggests that significant restructuring towards ETM exports has begun.
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Australia's Top ETM Export Sectors in L995-96






















Computers and office machines, parts etc
Aircraft and associated equipment, nes
Telecommunications equipment
Medicaments
lnternal combustion piston engines
Passenger motor cars
Other industry-specific machinery
Motor vehicle parts, etc
Ships, boats and floating structures
Computers
Electricity distributing equipment (SITC 778)
Electrical equipment for circuits
Photographic & cinematographic supplies
Measuring and checking equipment
Civil engineering equipment
Heating and cooling equipment
Medicinal and pharmaceutical products
Mechanical handling equipment
Electricity distributing equipment (SITC 773)












































Source: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Composition of Trade Austrøliø 1995-96, op. cit., p.2'1,,24,25.
Note: 'nes' denotes not elsewhere specified.
The 1993 McKinsey report confirmed that the rise in ETM exports from the late 1980s
represented a structural shift. The study estimated that there were around 700
emerging ETM exporters in the SME category. The report noted two types of
emerging exporters. Some 20-25 per cent of the 700 emerging firms were 'born
global', meaning they began viewing the world as their marketplace. These firms,
exported, on average, T6 per cent of their output, contributed $1.7 billion in exports
and expected to be exporting $3-6 billion by 1998. The other type of emerging ETM
exporter was the'domestic based firrn', which comprised 75-80 per cent of emerging
exporters, many of which had only recently begun exporting after a period of
significant employment decline and major productivity increases. Indeed, 'domestic
based firms' had began exporting after an average of 27 years of domestic activity.
The report claims that these firms have changed their attitudes in the last 10 years
from viewing exports opportunistically, selling only the occasional surpluses created
during periodic domestic downturns, to viewing exports strategically, as a core part
of their business. Such firms were exporting an average of 20 per cent of total sales
and are seeking to increase this 30 to 40 per cent. Overall, the report claimed there
had been a structural shift towards an export culture, with firms expecting to, on
average, almost double their exports in the 1993-1997 period. Only five per cent of
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the emerging exporters planned to reduce their ETM exports when the recession
ended.'t
An Export Structure for High Growth and National Affluence?
The figures above show that after several decades of minimal positive structural
change, Australia's export to GDP ratio, proportion of ETM, manufacturing and
service exports have increased and its dependence on commodities is diminishing.
Thus, there is some truth in Graham Richardson's conclusion: 'The change to a broad
based economy rather than one totally reliant on commodities will take a long, long
time. Given that we began three or four decades too late, Hawke and Keating have
made a brave start.'ooo
Flowever, much of Australia's restructuring task remains yet to be completed. With
the decline in prices paid for unprocessed commodities on world markets relative to
ETMs and sophisticated services, Australia's export structure will continue to
restrain its economic performance. While manufacturing and service exports together
comprise more than 80 per cent of world trade,'o' they make up only 42 per cent of
Australian exports in1995-96.00'\¡Vhile mining and rural products declined to only 18
per cent of world trade,ao3 Australia's over-reliance on commodities remained
marked. ln 1995-96, 56 per cent of Australia's exports were made up of rural and
mining products.oon Agriculture and mining sectors comprised 19 of Australia's top 20
merchandise exporters in 1995-96, while only one of Australia's top 20 merchandise
export sectors were ETMs.oot The restructuring of the Australian export base has
barely begun.
Unfortunately, the failure to have even a quarter of exports made up of ETMs in a
world trade environment dominated by ETMs meant that Australia ran a huge trade
deficit in manufactures in the period. Whereas most developed nations achieve
significant surpluses in ETMs or at least substantially cover their ETM imports with
ETM exports, Australia runs massive trade deficits in ETMs.aou As shown below, in
1995-96, ETMs made up 75.5 per cent of Australia's merchandise imports, while
manufactures made up 86.4 per cent of merchandise imports. The corresponding
figures for ETM and manufacturing exports were 23.4 per cent and 33.7 per cent.oo'
Australia's trade deficit in ETMs rose from fi28.7 billion or 8.0 per cent of GDP (I) in
1988-89 to a massive $40.5 billion or 9.35 per cent of GDP (I) in 1995-96, while its
3ee McKinsey and Company & the Australian Manufacturing Council Secretariat, op. cit.,
p.2,3,6,7,9,1.0,13,"t4,37,69.
400 Graham Richardson, Whateoer It Takes,Bantarr., Sydney, 1994, p.358.
401 World Trade Organisation, Annual Report L996,vo1.1, World Trade Organisation, Geneva, L996, p|1.4.
402 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Economic Indicators lune 1997, Cat. no.1350.0, p.15.
403 World Trade Organisation, Annual Report 1996, op. cit., p.14.
404 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Economic Indicators lune 1997, Cat. no.1350.0, p.15.
4os ibid.,p.24.
406 This structural weakness in Australian manufacturing was detailed in Pappas, Carter, Evans &
Koop/ Telesis, op. cit., p.5,28-30,129 -131,.
407 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Composition of Trade Australia 1gg2-g3, op. cit., p.19,20.
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deficit in manufactures rose from fi29.8 billion or 8.3 per cent of GDP (I) to 941..2
billion or 9.51 per cent of GDP (I) over the same period.nos
Percentage of Manufactures in Total Merchandise Imports 1988-89 to1995-96

































Source: The figures for 1199'1,-92to 1995-96 are from Department of Foreign Affairs ancl Trade, Conrposition of Trade
Australia L995-96, op. cit., p.19. The figures for 1988-89 to 1990-91, are frorn Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade, Composition of Trade Australia 1992-93, op. cit., p.20.
Australia's weakness in ETMs is a key reason for its declining share of world trade,
growth and employment. ETMs comprise more than three quarters of Australia's top
20 import sectors. Many of Australia's top imports are ETMs that are critical inputs to
a great deal of production and/or are central elements of a first world consumption
pattern. Such goods include: passenger motor cars and motor vehicle parts ($5.4
billion), goods and special purpose vehicles ($1.9 billion), computers and office
machines and parts ($5.7 billion), telecommunications equipment ($2.6 billion),
aircraÍt and associated equipment ($2.1 billion) and a range of other essential inputs
to manufacturing totalling well over $5 billion.'o'The widespread use of these goods
ensures that, without a major ETM export base to pay for them, a significant external
constraint on growth remains.
Australia's manufacturing industry remains far from restructured in many respects.
The McKinsey report noted that 90 per cent of Australia's manufacturing companies
were not exporting to any significant extent.nto Australia also has no large strategic
ETM exporters. By contrast, in many industrial nations, strategic exporters - defined
as those with more than $500 million in annual exports - contribute a significant
proportion or a majority of total ETM exports."'
Australia's multinational enterprises (MNEs) are often multidomestics, not strategic
exporters. Australia's tradeable sector is dominated by foreign multinationals,
whereas Australian MNEs are concentrated in less tradeable sectors, where
technology and transport costs favour overseas production.o'' The key problem of
408 
These figures are calculated from the original figures for imports of goods, exports of goods and GDP (I)
provided in Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Economic Indicators lune 1.997, Cat. no.1350.0, p.3,14.
oot ibid., p.30.
410 McKinsey and Company & the Australian Manufacturing Council Secretariat, op. cit., p.iv.
4rr 
Pappas, Carter, Evans & Koop/Telesis, op. cit., op. cit., p.L29-137 found that Australia's strategic exporters,
defined as those with more than $US500 million in annual exports, accounted for only 14 per cent of
Australia's complex factor exports, compared to 32 per cent in the United Kingdom, 47 per cent in the United
States, 76 per cent in Japan, 66 per cent in Korea and 50 per cent in Canada.o'' Philip Yetton, Jeremy Davis & Peter Swan, op. cit., p.1-2,4,17,18,34,35.
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this predominance of multidomestics is that their invisible export earnings produce
only as much export revenue as one to three strategic, multinational export firms
could achieve. The Going Internøtionøl rcpoft concluded that, unless manufacturing
can alter the pattern to a much higher percentage of strategic exporters, the industry
will be of little assistance in reducing Australia's current account constraint on
growth.ot' Further, strong clusters of firms in related industries have not developed,
nor are there many examples of strong domestic rivalry among major competing
domestic firms within sectors.ato
Australia's manufacturing industry lacks a major domestic advanced manufacturing
technology (AMT) sector. A vibrant AMT sector is crucial to creating an innovation-
driven economy and a thriving ETM sector.nts The numerous foreign multinational
companies in Australia's manufacturing industry have tended to rely on technology
produced by their parent company, which limits the scope for innovation. Much of
this technology has not been ideally suited to Australian conditions and has often
been outdated and inefficient.n'u
Australia has also been unable to create major pockets of resource-based value-
adding, despite its highly competitive resource base. Even though Australia's leading
companies are resource-based, the great majority of the resources are exported in
their raw form and receive low prices.o" The Global Challenge report estimated that
widespread value-adding could add well over $30 billion to exports.o'8
Australia could also be achieving a much greater level of high value-added services
exports. While services comprised a useful 23 per cent of Australia's services exports
in 1995-96,0t' many first world nations are exporting a much greater proportion of
service exports in total exports.o'o More significantly, the LEK Partnership study
noted that only 1,.2 per cent of Australian service companies are involved in export at
all and one sector, namely tourism, comprises 60 per cent of exports.o" Further, much
of the service sector continues to be marked by poor quality, low productivity, and
widespread customer dissatisfaction. There is also little emphasis on investment in
new market opportunities and value-adding.n"
Thus, much restructuring remains to be achieved. Australia remains far too reliant on
commodities, with too few exports coming from ETMs and sophisticated services.
Australia's export and industry structure can not sustain growth in the economy of
four per cent or more, as this leads to unsustainable increases in the current account
413 
ibicl., p.2,38,39.
ntn Puppur, Carter, Evans & Koop/Telesis , op. cit., p.5,6.
4rs Rodin Genof f , Industry Policy and Sectoral Plans Llnder Labor, op. cit., p.47,42.
416 
Greg Crough & Ted Wheelwrigh! op. cit., p.103,104.
n" Philip Yetton, Jeremy Davis & Peter Swan, op. cit., p.65,66; and Pappas, Carter, Evans & Koop/Telesis, op.
cit., p.28,104.
ott Puppur, Carter, Evans & Koop/Telesis, op. cit., p.9,10,105,107.
ale Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Economic Indicators lune 1997, Cat. no.1350.0, p.15.
o'o Th"r" are OECD figures noted in Pappas, Carter, Evans & Koop/Telesis, op. cit., p.20.
421 LEK Partnership, op. cit., p.15.
o" Rog". A. Layton, ch.1L 'services are importanl in Michael Costa & Michael Easson (eds), op. cit., pp.279-228
atp.227.
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deficit. Australia's export and industry structure thus prevent the substantial
removal of mass unemployment.
2. Exports
Export Performance: L950 to L984
This section outlines the historical performance against which the export record of
the Labor Governments can be measured. As the table below shows, the
industrialised world capitalised on the rapid growth in world trade in the post-war
decades. The most successful small nations dramatically increased their exports, with
many doubling their exports to GDP ratio. By contrast, Australia's share of national
product traded actually fell.n"
Share of National Product Traded 1950-1984

















































































Source: Kym Anderson & Ross Garnaut, Australian Protectionism: Extent, Causes and Effects, Allen and Unwin,
Sydney, 1,987, p.1,5.
Export Performance Under Labor
The table below shows that after several decades of export stagnation, Australia's
export to GDP (I) rose from 14.8 per cent to 20.L per cent between 1982-83 and
1995-96.
423 
Comprehensive analysis of post-war export growth in industrial nations is provided in Report of the
Committee for Review of Export Market Development Assistance, op. cit., pp.5-1,6. The report notes that
Australia was the only industrialised nation that didn't increase its exports to GDP ratio from 1.960 to 1989. It
remained steady at around 13.5 per cent. Australia's share of world exports fell from 1,.7 to 1.1, per cent
between 1960 and 7987. Similar analysis is also provided in: Ian Lowe, Submission to the Parliamentary Inquiry
Into Tørffi and Industry Deoelopment, Unpublished, 1992, p.2; and Ralph Evans, ch.1 'The Global Clmllenge
report and the clash of paradigms', op. cit., p.17-19.
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Australia's Exports to GDP (I) 1982-83 to7995-96






























Source: The figures for the period 1987-88 to 1995-96 are from Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Economic
Indicators lune 1997, Cat. no.1350.0, p.21. The figures for the period 1982-83 Io L986-87 are from Australian Bureau
of Statistics, Australian Economic Indicators lønuary/February 1993, Cat. no1350.0, p.31.
The table below shows that Australiars export growth averaged 7.0 per cent annually
in the 1983 to 1995 period, which was 0.9 percentage points higher annually than the
OECD average.
Australia's Growth in Real Exports of Goods and Services by OECD Standards
1983-7995


































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Economic Outlook lune 1996, op. cit.,
p.41.2.
Flowever, Australia's restructuring toward an export economy has also barely
begun. World Competitiaeness Yenrbook 1996 showed that Australia had the 39th
lowest exports to GDP ratio of the 46 nations included in the study. While nations
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with large domestic markets like the United States and |apan can achieve national
affluence while relying rather heavily on their domestic markets, nations with small
domestic markets like Australia must turn to the international market to create
national affluence. The table below shows that many of the successful smaller nations
have double the percentage of exports to GDP achieved by Australia and a
significant group have far more.
Exports to GDP Ratio L994


















































































































































Source: lMD,World Competitiueness Yearbook 7996,tMD, Lausanne, Switzerland, 1996, p.386.
3. The Trade Balance, the Current Account and the Net Overseas Debt
There was a major structural increase in the current account deficit during the period
of the Hawke and Keating Governments. The current account deficit, which had
averaged 1..73 per cent of GDP (I) in the 1970-7'1, to!979-80 period,o'n averaged 4.4 per
cent of GDP (I) in the 1983-84 to 1995-96 period.
424 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Economic Indicators lønuary/February 1.993, Cat. no.1350.0, p.31.
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There was also a massive build up of foreign debt. The net foreign debt rose from
fi23.4 billion or 13.6 per cent of GDP (I) in 1982-83n" to $187.5 billion or 38.4 per cent
of GDP (I) in 1995-96.0'u
Finally, the structural balance on goods and services appears to remain in deficit,
with the improvement in the 1990s appearing to largely reflect the recession and then
the period of sluggish growth.
Various Measures of Restructuring 7982-83-7995-96 (percentage of GDP (income))
Year Balance on
Goods & Services
















Source: The figures for the net overseas debt and the current account for the period 1987-88 to 1995-96 are from
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Economic Indicators lune 1997, Cat. no.1350.0, p.21,,22. The current
account figures for the period 1982-83 to 1986-87 are from Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Econonic
Indicators lanuøry/February 1.993, Cat. no.1350.0, p.31. The net foreign debt figures for the period 1982-83 to L986-
87 ale calculated from the original figures for GDP (I) and net foreign debt provided in Australian Bureau of
Statistics, Australian Economic Indicators lanuaryftebruary 1993, Cat. no.1350.0, p.12,29. The balance on good and
services figures are calculated from original GDP (I) and the trade balance figures provided in Australian Bureau
of Statistics, Australian Economic Indicators lune 1997, Cat. no.1350.0, p.7,12; and Australian Bureau of Statistics,
Australiøn Econonic Indicøtors lanuary/February 1993, Cat. no.1350.0, p.1,2,1,6.
While the restructuring performance according to these measures is poor, the results
appear to exaggerate the weakness of Australia's restrucfuring performance in the
period. It is true that the adverse behaviour of market players in responding to
financial deregulation may have contributed significantly to the foreign debt.
Ffowever, much of the decline in these three measures of restructuring may stem
from the failure of governments and industrialists to restructure the economy in the
decades after L950. Given that the Hawke and Keating Governments presided over
significant restructuring of Australia's export base, it would be unfair to over-
emphasise the decline in Australia's economic performance according to these
measures. Indeed, some or much of the increase in the current account deficit may
have been economically beneficial. It may largely reflect the financing of the private
investment necessary to begin the restructuring of the Australian economy.
42s ibid., p.29.













































Australia's national savings rate fell from a structural level of approximately 25 per
cent of GDP in the three decades to the mid-1970s, to around 20 per cent in the 1980s,
and L8 per cent in the 1990s.0" The table below shows that Australia's gross national
savings worsened in the period of the Hawke and Keating Governments, from 19.8
per cent in 1983 and a peak oÍ 223 per cent in 1988 to '1.6.9 per cent in 1995.
Australia's gross national savings also fell further below the OECD average in the
period. Australia's lack of national savings means that it must finance some of its
investment by drawing on the savings of other nations, which is reflected in its high
current account deficit.
Australia's Gross National Savings as a Percentage of Gross GDP Compared With
Other OECD Nations 1983-L995























































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD Economic Outlook lune L997,
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, 1997, p.30.




The table below shows that Australia's real GDP growth averaged 3.3 per cent
annually between 1983 and 1995, which was faster than any other OECD nation in
the period bar Ireland, and above the OECD average of 2.7 per cent. \Alhile it is
important to acknowledge such growth as impressive, it is also important to note
that it is only solid in absolute terms, low by Asian standards and insufficient to
overcome the mass unemployment experienced in Australia since the mid-1970s. It is
also assisted by Australia's immigration program, which brings in a high number of
migrants by international standards.
Australia's Real GDP Growth 1983-1995 by OECD Standards























































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Economic Outlook lune 1996, op. cit.,
p.44. Note: Figures for the Czech Republic not included as figures for the full period not provided, ruling out a
calculation of their growth for 1983 to 1995.
6. Employment and Unemployment
Australia's employment growth under Labor was impressive. In yearly averages,
almost two million jobs were created between 1982-83 and 1995-96. Australia also
achieved the second highest employment growth in the OECD between 1983 and
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1995, averaging 1,.9 per cent growth per annum, compared to the OECD average of
L.L per cent per annum. These impressive results should be qualified by two facts.
Firstly, nearly half the jobs created were part-time jobs. Secondly, employment
growth has slowed rapidly since 1989-90.In yearly averages figures, full-time jobs
were less than 70,000 higher in 1995-96 than they were in 1989-90, while total jobs
were less than 500,000 higher in1995-96 than in 1989-90'












































































































Source: The figures for 1988-89 to 1995-96 are from Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Economic lndicøtors
lune 1997, Cat. no.1350.0, p.62. The figures from 1983-84 to 1987-88 are from Australian Bureau of Statistics,
Australian Economic Indicators lanuary/Februøry 1993, Cat. no,1350.0, p.90. Note: The figures are original figures
and all numbers are thousands.
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Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Economic Outlook lune 1996, op. cit.,
p.4.23. Notes: The OECD average excludes Mexico prior to 1988. The Czech Republic and Mexico were not
included, as figures for the full period were not provided, ruling out a calculation of their employn'rent growth
for 1983 to1995.
Labor's unemployment record was less notable. While unemployment in yearly
averages fell from 9.6 per cent in 1983-84 to 6.2 per cent in 1989-90 , and, in seasonally
adjusted terms, fell to a low of 5.9 per cent in November and December 1989,
unemployment rose dramatically in the recession, peaking at11.4 per cent or 980,000
unemployed people in November 1992.n'u When the Labor Government were
defeated in March 1996, the unemployment rate was 8.5 per cent.42e
Australia's unemployment rate is also high by OECD standards as shown below. In
1983, Australia's rate was 1.6 per cent above the OECD average. In1995, the last full
calender year of the Labor Government, it remained 0.9 per cent above the OECD
average and Australia ranked L5th oÍ 25 OECD nations in unemployment rate
performance.
428 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australiøn Economic Indicators January/Februøry 1.993, Cat. no.1350.0, p.90.
Monthly figures are seasonally adjusted.
a2e Australian Bureau of Statistics, Labour Force Australia Nooember 1.996, Cat. no.6203.0, p.11.
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Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OECD Economic Outlook lune 1996, op. cit.,
p.A24. Note: OECD average and small nations average excludes Mexico prior to 1988. The figures for the Czech
Republic were provided only for 1993 to 1995, but were included because they give some indication of their
unemployment rate over the medium-term.
Structural Dislocation and Hysteresis
The Dislocation
A key weakness of rationalist restructuring policies is their tendency to produce
substantial structural employment dislocation. This section argues that, contrary to
rationalist views, the adjustment process is highly problematic. The dislocation
caused is likely to involve much long-term structural unemployment, which in turn,
creates negative social and economic consequences.
The evidence in the first three chapters indicates that free market reform of tariffs,
infrastructure and general goverrunent - while they may have produced some net
employment growth - may have also caused gross employment dislocation in the
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order of several hundred thousand people over the 1983 to 1996 períod. Tariff cuts
were one of the causes of the decline in manufacturing employment, which fell from
a peak of '1..221.4 million in May 1989 to 1,,061,.5 million in August 1993, before
recovering to 1,113.2 million in November 1995, more than 100,000 below the May
1989 peak.o'o The most tariff dependent sectors, particularly TCF and PMV, suffered
significant declines in employment. Free market infrastructure reform was a key
reason why more than 110,000 people lost their employment in infrastructure firms.
Many more jobs have been lost in sectors reliant on subsidised infrastructure
provision, as services were removed and prices increased to bring a market return on
investment. In turn, negative economic multipliers reduce production in other
sectors. Small government policies meant that between February 1984 and February
1996, public sector employment fell by 88,100. Had public sector employment
maintained its February 1984 share of total employment, it would have been 563,500
higher at February 1996, all other things being equal."'
Easy Adjustment?
Rationalists have tended to believe that resources displaced can be redeployed in
more efficient sectors with relative ease, leading to a rapid increase in economic
welfare. Part of the explanation for this optimistic view of the adjustment process
may be that free trade theory is built on a comparative static model, which involves
comparing one point on the production possibility curve with another, after all
resources displaced have been redeployed.n" This practice is followed by the IC in
their ORANI simulations, which provide projections for the long run, after
adjustment is complete, and indeed, after resources have been redeployed in more
efficient sectors.o'3
In reality, adjustment is much more difficult. Much of the dislocation is likely to be
long-term and structural because its incidence is so uneven across industries, regions,
sectors, states and occupations. Free market dislocation often causes long-term
structural unemployment because it leaves a major oversupply of labour in the
particular area of dislocation in question - for example, TCF - in an environment in
which the demand for that type of labour is very unlikely to rise. For example, the
closure of firms in the 'TCF towns' of Victoria left a major oversupply of TCF
workers, who, in the absence of other TCF growth, may have been left structurally
unemployed.
The dislocation for industries and sectors was noted above. Among States, tariff cuts
had a disproportionately severe impact on Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania,
which were also heavily affected by cuts in public sector employment. Furthermore/
it appears that reform has permanently removed some of the numbers employed in
some occupations, with the least skilled jobs being most particularly affected. Among
regional areas, free market policies decimated employment in four policy areas,
430 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Lnbour Force AustrøIiø 1978-95, Cat. no.6204.0, p.345-348.
431 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Wage and Salary Earners AustrøIia March Quarter 1997, Cat. no.6248.0, p.9-11.
nt' N. R. Norman, ch.19'The labour market: An industrial economics approach' in L. R. Webb & R. H. Allen
(eds), Industrial Economics: Australian Studies, George Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1982, pp.3l8-333 at P.324.
433 Bill Weekes, op. cit., p.179.
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namely rationalisation of infrastructure services, tariff cuts, the contraction of the
general government sector and the reluctance of governments to implement active
industry policies to attract industry to the regions.
Thus, free market reforms are leaving numerous pools of structurally long-term
unemployed people in particular sectors, industries, States, regional areas, and
occupations. Government ministers such as John Button have acknowledged this
structural employment dislocation.o'n Ralph Willis said:
[Unemployment] is not just a problem of macroeconomic policies. What I think is not being
picked up is the extent to which unemployment is coming out of structural change -
microeconomic reform. Most of the microeconomic reform puts people out of jobs in the
short term. We all know it's to the national benefit in the long-term, but the imrnediate
impact is usually a decrease in employment. Now once you've got structural change
occurring on a whole host of fronts, which we have, then the unemployment effects of that
are not insubstantial.a3s
Rationalist Peter Walsh admitted:
[W]e do not get a smooth transfer of resources out of...[an uncompetitive] industry or the
new inveshnent required in some other industry that is more competitive internationally. It
may not happen for a long time. It may not happen ever... [I]t does seem to me that
Treasury in particular failed to recognise how rheumatic the Australian economy was, or if
you like, how much friction there was impeding the transfer of resorrrces.o'u
Even the IC have acknowledged a large level of structural unemployment:
Even during full employment some people will be out of work when they change jobs or
there may be mismatches between the location of job seekers and the jobs on offer. As a
consequence there will be some unemployment - often termed the full employment rate of
unemplor¡ment.
Norris (1989) reports that the full employment rate of unemployment was less than 2 per
cent in the post-war years up until 1970. There is agreement it has increased to around 7 per
, 437
cent.
Paul Keating himself agreed that over half the late 199211 per cent unemployment
figure involved structural unemployment.43s
The table below outlines the major rise in the number of unemployed and long-term
unemployed people in the period, as well as the rise in the average duration of
unemployment to more than a year. The figures suggest that the period involved
massive structural dislocation, with inadequate redeployment of displaced labour.
nto 
JohlrKerin,'Recessionnottheonlycauseofjoblosses:Button',TheAduertiser,L2May1992,p.7.
43s Laura Tingle, 'Micro reform, macro misery: The jobs that are gone forever', The Weekend Australian, 'l'5-1,6
Jlane 1991., p.25,26 at p.25.
436 Peter Walsh, 'Economic rationalism: Economic policies for the nineties' in Stephen King & Peter Lloyd (eds),
op. cit., pp.282-290 atp.288.
037 Industry Commission,Impediments to Regional Industry Adjustment Draft Report: Volume L: Report, op. cit.,
p.106.
438 Paul Keating - Interwiewed on Meet the Press - Aired on Channel 10,1.0.50-11.20am on 25 October 1992.
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Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Labour Force AustrøIia 1978-95, Cat. no.6204.0, p.22-24,427-429,433-435.
Note: Figures are seasonally adjusted.
The ABS further confirmed the extent of long-term economic exclusion through a
longitudinal survey of 875,000 job seekers aged 15 to 59 at May 1995. Of the job
seekers, 23 per cent had not found work at the conclusion of the study in September
1997, while a further 1.6 per cent had found less than six months work. O.ly 25 per
cent had found work for more thanl2months during the period. Meanwhile, only 52
per cent of the job seekers were in employment at the end of the period.o'n
I fhy is Adjustment so Difficult?
Numerous social, psychological and economic factors combine to make it very
difficult for people who become structurally unemployed to find work again.
Rationalists may not recognise these factors because tertiary economics training often
ignores the social factors that influence economic behaviour.
The large pool of long-term, structurally unemployed people in Australia face social
conditions so inhumane that eventually their existence comes to be largely
determined by the material, psychological and social effects of unemployment. The
vast majority of the long-term unemployed live in poverty.ono Housing security often
becomes threatened, and the greater the duration of unemployment, the greater the
reduction in housing standard from home-buying to renting houses to renting flats to
renting a bed-sitting room to caravans. At the worst end of the spectrum,
unemployment related poverty can lead to homelessness, with people living out of
rubbish bins, sleeping in parks and alley ways, and breaking into homes.on' The
43e Australian Bureau of Statistics, Austrølians' Employment and l.Jnemployment Patterns 1'994-1997, Cat. no.6286.0,
p.5.
ooo 
loun Vipard, Bruce Bradbury & Diane Encel, Social Welfare Research Centre, 'Unemployment and poverty:
measures of association' , Australian Bulletin of Labour, vol.13, no.3, fune 1987, pp.179-192 atp.1'80,183,188-190.
441 
Graeme Brewer, Out of Work, Out of Sight: Study of the Impøct of Unemployment on ø Group of Australian People,
The Brotherhood of St Laurence, Fitzroy, Victoria, 1980, p.35,36,39,41'-44.
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Australian Institute of Health and Welfare report, Austrnlia's Welføre 1995, estimated
that there were at least 61,000 homeless people in Australia.nn'
At this time of fairly extreme material deprivation, unemployed people must also
cope with the stigma associated with unemployment. Many people are suspicious
about the motivation of unemployed people to find work and resent their receipt of
benefits, even though they leave people short of the poverty line.oo' Even family and
friends sometimes treat unemployed people with suspicion about their motivation
and adequacy, which sometimes leads to them ceasing contact.ooo Numerous studies
suggest that this stigma is a major cause of some of unemployment's most damaging
social and psychological consequences.onu One of the unemployed in Brewer's study
remarked:
At one stage I wanted to commit suicide. I couldn't handle it - people pressuring me, calling
me a bludger,... When you're unemployed you've got a stamp and you just can't get rid of
it. It's like a disease that grows all over your body until you just die... You think suicide is
your only hop".oou
The psychological effect of prolonged unemployment is generally devastating and
normally involves major changes to a persons identity.on'Studies show that the key
cause of psychological deterioration was poverty and that, as economic resources
wore thin, people go through four stages from 'unbroken' to 'resigned' to 'in despair'
to 'apathetic'.ont
In some cases, prolonged unemployment can leave people psychologically
dysfunctional. For example, studies show that increased unemployment leads to
sharp increases in mental hospital admission ratesont and other studies have shown
that the experience of prolonged unemployment can help to cause psychiatric
disorders.oto
The loss of one's work role can be devastating because people's identity, public
image, status and life-style are often closely tied to work roles.n" Joblessness also
entails removal from a previously stable system of job related friendships,
relationships and patterns of behaviour. Unemployed people must cope with
442 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Australiø's Welfare L995: Seruices and Assistarce, Australian
Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1.995, p.50.
443 
Graeme Brewer, op. cit., p.88; and Peter Kelvin & Joanna E. Jarrett, op. cit., p.95,118.
444 
Graeme Brewer, op. cit., p.7L.
44s 
Peter Kelvin & Joanna E. Jarrett, op. cit., p.11'8-1'24.
446 




oo* P"t". Kelvin & Joanna E. Jarrett, op. cit., p.18-22 detail a range of studies showing that prolonged
unemployment produces psychological decline through such stages.
on' K"ith Windshuttle, lJnemployment: A Social and Political Analysis of the Economic Crisis in AustrøIia, rev. edn,
Penguin Books, Ringwood, Victoria, 1980, p.95; and N. Whiteside, 'Social consequences of unemployment:
The question of health', Bulletin of Labour Mørket Research, no.16, 1985, p'10.
4s0 Daryl Dixon, op. cit., p.17; and Linda L. Viney, ch.9 'The psychological and social effects of unernployment'
in Robert Castle & John Morgan (eds), Austrnlian Studies: Unemployment in the Eighties, Longman Cheshire,
Melbourne, 1,984, pp.134-'1.44 ar p.134,L42.
4st 
Graeme Brewer, op. cit., p.48,49; and Keith Windshuttle, op. cit., p.113.
116
isolation and the loss of their functional role within society. Iob loss can be
particularly difficult for those strongly socialised to taking a'breadwinner' role, who
feel they've failed.nu'
Another major factor in explaining the psychological effects of prolonged
unemployment is the decline in social and communal activity.os3 lJnemployed people
tend to withdraw from their friendships because of the stigma associated with
unemployment, financial embarrassment due to not being able to afford social
activity,nto insecurity and loss of confidence,ntu loss of job related friendships,otu the
sheer, progressively exhausting effort needed to keep going at all, and the
unemployed individual's frequent debilitating dislike of themselves.ntt
Thus, the difficult social world of unemployment often leads to major psychological
deterioration, with commonly felt feelings including fatalism, apathy, anger,
alienation,ntt humiliation, loss of control over one's life,ott boredom, rejection,
embarrassment, worthlessness and depression.nuo
What then, are some of the social consequences of prolonged unemployment, apart
from those mentioned above such as poverty, impaired housing security and
psychological deterioration?
Studies indicate that there is a correlation between prolonged unemployment and
divorce and family breakdowrr,out violence, child abuseou' anã wife bat[ering.ou' There
were almost 47,000 reported cases of child abuse in1990-91,.uun
As many studies have confirmed, prolonged unemployment is a major factor in
many suicides.ous ln 199'1., the heart of the recession, there were 2,380 suicides, and




Graeme Brewer, op. cit., p.71.,72.
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male unemployment' in Sheila Allen, Alan Waten, Kate Purcell & Stephen Woods, (eds), TIrc Experience of
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464 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Australia's Welføre 1993: Seraices and Assistølzce, Australian
Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1993, p.1,83.
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this marked the first time since the Great Depression that suicide numbers had
exceeded the road toll.*uu
Increased unemployment has also been shown to correlate with increased physical ill
health, both for the unemployed and their family. At best, this includes diminished
physical tone, body image, appeafance, fitness and posture.out Worse is the
correlation between unemployment and increased heart disease, ulcers, overall
health rates,ouu hospitalisationoue and death.nto
There is also a correlation between prolonged unemployment and crime.ott Dunstan
tested many of traditional theories on the causes of crime, including income,
education and social status, and found that the variable most significantly related to
crime was unemployment.ntt
Long-term unemployment can also produce more specific employment related
disadvantages. It can lead to skill atrophy, discouragement of active work search,
loss of contact with a network of workmates who can provide informal information
of job vacancies and, most particularly, employer stigmatisation.o" Employers often
discount the value of long-term unemployed people, preferring to employ school
and tertiary-trained entrants to the labour market.otn
Studies confirm that people in long-term unemployment struggle to gain
employment. Between 1983 and1990, when almost L.6 million jobs were created, the
numbers of long-term unemployed fell only 90,000 and the number of those
unemployed for two years or more fell only 30,000. For every seven jobs created in
the period, only one job went to an unemployed person.ott The Green Paper on
Employment found that a person unemployed for less than three months has more
than four times the chance of gaining employment than someone unemployed for
two years or moÍe.otu
Thus, the rationalist view that'resources released' can be readily redeployed may be
unrealistic. People in very difficult economic and social circumstances struggle to
cope and can not readily become the building blocks of a restructured economy.
466 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Causes of Deøth Australia 199L, Cat. no.3303.0, p.2,8.
ou' P"t , Kelvin & Joanna E. Jarrett, op. cit., p.68,74,75,79,
468 Philippa Smith, op. cit., p.125.
nu' Lindu L. Viney, op. cit., p.1.34.
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473 P.N. funankar &. Cezary A. Kapuscinski, 'The incidence of long-term unemployment in Australia', op. cit.,
p.327.
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Structural Dislocation in Regions
The dislocation caused by free market policies to regions is proportionally more
disruptive because regional centres and country towns often have narrow industry
bases. Negative multipliers are substantial where a sector takes up a large proportion
of a region's output, while a narrow industry base means there are often few
alternative opportunities for those displaced.o" In a context of high unemployment,
slow or negative growth, the continuing decline of the rural sector and low labour
mobility, free market policies are creating much long-term structural unemployment
in regional Australia.
Rationalists have tended to overlook regional adjustment problems because, as noted
above, they tend to assume that resources released are readily redeployed. Such
adjustment in regions is dependent on high labour mobility.o'u Unfortunately,
dislocation caused in regions often produces pools of long-term structural
unemployment because many people are unwilling to move from regions in
structural decline to regions experiencing sound employment growth.
Numerous submissions from the regions to the IC's Impediments to Regionnl Industry
Adjustmenf inquiry stated that a lack of labour mobility, in the context of dislocation,
had left large pools of long-term structural unemployment and very high
unemployment ratesl" This was also a key conclusion reached by the Independent
Pnrlinmentary Inquiry Into Tørffi ønd Industry Deaelopmentnuo and numerous
submissions thereto.os' The general consensus among regional submissions was
summed up by the Bendigo branch of the Australian Chamber of Manufactures:
The Industry Commission Issues Paper talks coldly about labour mobility when in fact most
labour is not mobile. The available people remain when an industry closes, and become
social welfare recipients probably being retrained for non-existent employment and with no
real prospect of future employment."'
A BIE study of adjustment shocks in six regional areas found that 80 per cent of those
displaced refused to move to improve their employment prospects, a trend for which
the IC found support in their regional visits as part of their regional adjustment
inquiry.os' The IC itself noted a range of studies showing low labour mobility
477 Australian Chamber of Manufactures, Bendigo, Submission to the Independent Inquiry Into Tarrfþ and Industry
Deuelopment, p.1. [The second page 1]
478 N. R. Norman, op. cit., p.324.
47e Australian Chamber of Manufactures, Bendigo, op. cit., p.2,3; Maryborough & District Development
Committee, op. cit., p.2; Riverland Development Corporation, op. cit., p.5,6; Kojonup Shire Council,
Submission to the Industry Commission Inquiry Into lmpediments to Regional Industry Adjustment, Unpublished,
"1992, p.2; and Brotherhood of St Laurence, Impediments to Regional Industry Adjustment: Subnùssion to tlrc
Industry Commission, Unpublished, 1993, p.2.
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Independent Parliamentary Inquiry Into Tarffi and Industry Deaelopment, op. cit., p'14.
481 For example, City of Maryborough per Peter R Marshall, op. cit., p.1',2.
482 Australian Chamber of Manufactures, Bendigo, op. cit., p'2.
483 Industry Commission,Impediments to Regional Industry Adjustment Draft Report: Volume 1: Report, op. cit.,
p.83,84.
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between States, on a regional basis, between industries, and even on a sub-State level,
meaning disequilibrium in regional unemployment rates persist.o'o
So exactly how long does adjustment take, especially for the most depressed areas?
Andrews and Karmel produced findings based on the avetage response of regions in
the 1985-1991 period. They estimated that, for regions that experienced an
employment shock that increased their unemployment rate 5 per cent relative to the
national average rate, it would take 40 years before the rate returned to the national
average. In the period of rapid employment growth between 1984 and 1990, the
standard deviation in unemployment between regions fell only slightly, from 3.9 to
3.3 percentage points. The study showed that, of t}:re291, regions in the worst third of
regional unemployment rates in 1984, 67 per cent remained there in 1991.0" Thus,
where free market policies produce significant dislocation for regions, the dislocation
can persist for decades, particularly given the other factors impeding employment
growth in regions, such as periodic recession and the decline in agriculture.
There are numerous reasons why labour is immobile across regions. People are often
reluctant to leave an area they perceive as their home, where they have family ties,
friendships and an established lifestyle.o'u People often have long-term commitments
in the local area, like home mortgages and children in education. One's spouse may
already have attractive employment.u*t People also have less information about
employment and acconunodation in other regions, and may not be able to draw on
their network of friends and relatives, nor direct contact with employers, to gain
employment.ott
The impact of regional decline on housing values can reduce mobility. Funds gained
from selling a home in a region in decline may be significantly less than the cost of
buying a comparable home in an expanding area. Major transaction costs associated
with buying new homes also discourages labour mobility, as does a range of
resettlement costs.ott
In short, a person's location is generally determined by factors other than
employment. ABS figures and recent studies indicate that employment concerns
influence only about 14 per cent of the combined interstate and intrastate movement.
Numerous other factors, including housing, finance, changes in marital status,
retirement and health were given as the key factor why people had moved.o'o Thus,
484 Industry Commission, Impediments to Regional Industry Adjustment Draft Report: Volume 2: Appendiccs, op. cit.,
p.D1,D13,D15.
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where free market restructuring produces significant dislocation for a region, it often
creates a major pool of long-term structurally unemployed people, as those displaced
are often unable or unwilling to move to regions experiencing employment growth.
The Economic Implications of Significant Structural Dislocation
In addition to producing major social upheaval, dislocation entails economic costs.
Rationalist organisations such as the Treasury and the IC generally assume that
displacement has no consequences for unemployment beyond the short-term.o''
Unfortunately, by creating major pools of long-term unemployment in regions,
sectors, occupations and industries, free market policies have made a gross
contribution to increasing hysteresis and the long run unemployment rate.
An increasing body of empirical and theoretical research shows that short-term
increases in unemployment tend to raise the long run level of unemployment and
lower national income.ott Rising long-term unemployment increases the mis-match
between the available jobs and the skills of the unemployed. This results in wage
pressures and skill shortages emerging early in recovery phases, which limits
growth. The greater the proportion of long-term unemployed, the slower vacancies
will be filled, leaving lower tax, income and output, and a higher 'natural' rate of
unemployment. The Green Paper on Employment noted studies which indicated that
the increase in the unemployment rate attributable to higher long-term
unemployment in the mid-1980s was in the range oÍ 0.75 to 1,.25 per cent.nn'
Of course, the production lost as a result of creating unemployment also has
significant implications for economic growth and living standards. Further, long-
term unemployment can lead to skills atrophy, which reduces national
competitiveness by reducing the national skills base.o'o
Rising unemployment also produces reduced government revenue and rising
outlays, which can reduce economic welfare by requiring greater taxation or reduced
public investment. Upon becoming unemployed, people generally no longer
contribute to tax revenues, and produce higher government outlays through their
need for income support. In additiory unemployed people may become eligible for a
range of income tested benefits such as rental supplements, Austudy and child care
fee relief. Unemployment is also associated with many social problems, such as
psychological dysfunction, crime, ill health, suicide, domestic violence, child abuse
and family breakdown. Rising unemployment therefore leads to higher spending in
areas such as health care, correctional services and emergency support.ont Finally, the
build up of very high unemployment and much long-term structural unemployment
has necessitated significant expenditure on labour market programs. The
Commonwealth's labour market expendifure averaged around $600 million from
4e1 MafthewDomary'spectreof"joblessrecovery"',TheAustralianFinancialReuieut,lSeptember1,993,p.19.
on' 
Iohrr Quiggan, op. cit., p.82.
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1983 to lggl,onu and this rose to $1.133 billion in1992-93.n" lÍrWorking Nøtion, Labor
committed itself to increasing labour market expenditure to $2.2 billion in 1995-96
and to $2.4 bi11ionin1996-97.0n'
Junankar and Kapuscinski estimated that in 1992, the revenue and expenditure loss
of a one per cent increase in unemployment was $3-6 billion annually.*t Thus, free
market policies, which generally produce significant structural dislocation over the
short to medium-term, are likely to have produced significant annual costs to
government in the adiustment phase.
Free Market Dislocation Regardless of Economic Context
A final key weakness of rationalist policy in the period was that it was implemented
as if universally applicable. In particular, too little consideration was given to the net
impact on employment of free market policies, in combination with the impact of the
state of the economic cycle and the remainder of the Government's policy agenda.'oo
Rationalist restructuring is most effective in a context of strong economic growth,
with supporting policies to encourage the redeployment of displaced resources.
Specifically, the Hawke-Keating Governments, in the period from 1990 to 1992,
reduced employment through free market reform of tariffs, infrastructure and the
general government sector, while other policies and the economic recession were also
creating significant displacement. This approach ensured that many of those who lost
their jobs, experienced long-term structural unemployment, thereby creating
significant economic and social costs.
Free market reforms were implemented while numerous other factors contributed to
unemployment.
Firstly,'boom-bust' macroeconomic policies were implemented. The Government's
first mistake was in not further mitigating the late 1980s boom, which sowed the
seeds of the later contraction. Monetary policy needed to have been tighter in the
1987 to mid-1988 period and contracted earlier than May 1988. Fiscal policy was also
too loose throughout this period, especially due to the $5 billion tax cut on 72 April
1989, given that it impacted in a booming economy.'o'
The Labor Government then mishandled the boom. History has shown that the
combination of an excessive boom, and the late application of restraint in
macroeconomic policy, is a recipe for a major subsequent contraction. Operating in
4e6 Australian Council of Trade Unions, A ProgrømTou¡ards Full Employment, op. cit., p.65.
4e7 Industry Commission, Impediments to Regionnl Industry Adjustment Draft Report: Volume 1: Report, op. cit.,
p.224,225,227,229,230.
4eB Working Nation: Policies and Programs, op. cit', p.109.
o" Thi, was from a forthcoming Office of EPAC Background Paper by Junankar and Kapuscinski 'The Costs of
Unemployment in Australia', Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, "1992, as cited in
Economic Planning Advisory Council, RegionøI Policies: Future Directions, op. cit., p.15,L6.
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¡ohr, Quiggin, op. cit., p.63 writes: 'The IC has been particularly strong in its support for the view that
rnicroeconomic reform should proceed as rapidly as possible, regardless of any associated job losses and
regardless of the state of the national economy''
s01 Paul Kelly , op. cit., ch.19'The 1980s boom' pp'361'-385 .
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this context, the tight monetary policy, involving an increase in cash interest rates
from 11 to 18.5 per cent over tlne2-1, months from April-May 1988,t0' was an excessive
response, which constituted a major partial cause of the 1990-91, recession, as Keating
has admitted.to'The stance of monetary policy failed to shift from contraction until
January 1990, which was roughly the point that the economy began to contract.
Given that the main effect of monetary policy shifts do not impact on the economy
for 12-18 months, the Government's late application of very tight monetary policy
had its main impact during the worst of the recession. The inadvisability of this
poticy was also compounded by the high level of debt in the economy, which
fostered widespread bankruptcies when the economy slowed.too As Labor Senator
Peter Walsh stated:
We ultimately implemented a policy with interest rates running at around 20 per cent for 12
to 18 months... [I]f you hold interest rates at that level for that time I would have thought it
was highly predictable that there would be a fairly serious recessior,.tot
Various studies of the causes of the recession have stated that monetary policy was
its key cause. For example, the NIEIR found that real interest rates were responsible
lor 2.2 of the 3.9 per cent deviation from trend growth over the recession period.tou
Secondly, the economic context in this period was domestic recession initially,
followed by a slow recovery.
Thirdly, a major world recession was emerging, which acted to slow Australia's
recovery from 1992.
Fourthly, there was a fall in the terms of trade associated with the world economic
downturn.
Fifthly, the fallout from financial deregulation was impacting in the 1990-1992
period. Financial deregulation brought rapid credit growth to finance highly geared
investments. Too much of this investment was in speculative, rather than productive
activities. Asset prices boomed in the mid-1980s, before falling equally dramatically,
leaving widespread bankruptcies and low investment.uot
so2 ibid., p.377.
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Sixthly, import growth was strong in the period despite the recessiory which meant
displaced local production and jobs.
Seventhly, labour supply was unusually strong by comparisons with the levels
usually associated with recession, leading to larger than usual unemployment over
the period. Access Economics argued that the different labour supply behaviour in
the 1990-91 recession, compared with previous recessions, accounted Íor 0.7 of the 2.9
per cent deviation in the unemployment rate from historical trends over the
recession period.to*
Eighthly, real wages rose by six per cent in the three years from the third quarter
1988. The Access Economics study estimated that this accounted for 0.5 of the 2.9 per
cent deviation in unemployment in the recession period.ton
Ninthly, unemployment levels were very high, peaking at more than lL per cent.
Finally, Australia's exchange rate was overvalued by the financial markets
throughout the post-deregulation 1980s, up until 1992. A promised benefit of
financial deregulation was that it would help keep the current account in
approximate balance, as any deterioration would lead to a lower dollar, which, in
turn" would increase the competitiveness of Australian exports and remedy any
disequilibrium. While there was a significant response after financial deregulation,
the dollar has not depreciated sufficiently to prevent continuous, significant current
account deficits over the 15 years since the float of the Australian dollar.
Thus, free market policies had been implemented as if universally applicable and
regardless of the economic context. The result of this combination of factors could
only ever have been a major recession and significant dislocation. Between January
1990 and December 1992, in seasonally adjusted terms, the unemployment rate
increased from 6.1 per cent to 11,.2 per cent, employment fell by more than 230,000
and long-term unemployment increased from 115,800 to342,100.5'o
This major labour market deterioration, by creating a large pool of structurally
unemployed people, increased hysteresis and the long run unemployment rate. This
criticism of rationalism is even more substantial when one imagines the dislocation
that would have been caused by implementation of the more hardline rationalist
recommendations made in the period, such as Treasury's 1988 submission
recommending the complete removal of tariffs within five years.tt'
The lesson for policy from this period of dislocation is that free market policies,
because they tend to produce significant dislocation, are best implemented when the
economy is growing, and in conjunction with policies that focus on creating growth,
so that resources released can be redeployed in new firms and sectors. A policy
framework to produce growth and restructuring in outlined in part two.
so' ibid., p.60.
soe ibid., p.61,65,66.
5r0 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Labour Force Australia 1,978-95, op. cit., p.24,435.
5rr Randall G. Stewart, op. cit., p.113.
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Conclusion
The evidence in this chapter suggests three major conclusions on restructuring and
employment growth in the period.
Firstly, the failure to restructure the economy in the decades after 1950 was a major
lost opportunity and impeded economic performance under the Hawke-Keating
Labor Governments.
Secondly, rationalist policies - aside from causing significant dislocation - are likely
to have had a moderately positive net effect on restructuring and employment
growth. After decades of very slow strucfural change, Australia reversed the long
run decline in its exports to GDP ratio, continued more vigorously the reduction in
its commodity reliance, hastened the decline of low wage manufactures, began the
rapid growth of ETM exports, and sped the rise of services in total exports. Solid
economic and employment growth was also achieved in the period. In addition, it
could be argued that the high external deficits of the period largely reflect an
economy making the investments necessary to underwrite future restructuring,
while the high unemployment of the period reflects an economy producing
signif icant structural adjustment.
Flowever, rationalist policies appear to have had only a moderate impact in fostering
restructuring and employment growth, rather than a radical impact. Indeed, some
measures indicated that the effects of the policies were decidely mixed. For example,
Australia's trade account, current account, net foreign debt and national savings
record was very poor in the period. Further, while economic and employment
growth were high by OECD standards, they were only solid in absolute terms, low
by Asian standards and insufficient to make major inroads into unemployment. In
addition, the improvements in Australia's export structure were all fostered by
strong world trade growth trends, and in most sectots, merely continued long run
Australian trends in export growth, if at a faster Pace.
The third major conclusion is that much of the task of restructuring the economy,
driving employment growth and achieving national competitive advantage remains
to be achieved. Australia remains far too dependent on commodities. ETMs are still
only around 20 per cent of exports, despite being a majority of world exports, while
nearly 75 per cent of merchandise imports are ETMs. The vast potential to increase
service exports remains largely untapped. With this export structure, arry growth of
above four per cent will bring an unsustainable increase in the current account
deficit. Lagging living standards and mass unemployment will continue unless
Australia can rapidly restructure its export base to ETMs and sophisticated services.
Finally, the chapter argued that the free market restructuring gains came at the cost
of significant structural dislocation, which produced negative social and economic
consequences during this 'transition phase'. In particular, the social and
psychological impact on the people affected is likely to have been severe/ many
regions face very long periods of high unemployment and decline, and long run
economic and employment growth may have been affected. Free market reforms are
best implemented during periods of economic growth, and in conjunction with
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policies aimed to create solid growth, so that many of those displaced can be quickly
redeployed.
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Part Two: Economic Rationalistrt - The Key
to National Competitive Advantage,
Restructurirg and Employment Growth?
In part two, an examination is made of why rationalist policies have not produced
more substantial improvements in national competitiveness, restructuring and
employment growth.
In chapter five, the overall rationalist approach to economic policymaking is
examined. It is argued that, in the Labor years, rationalist dominated institutions
became extreme, almost automatically prescribing market policies in a range of
policy areas. It is argued that this view is based on a false conception of a 'plrre'
market, which rationalists invariably assume produces optimal economic outcomes.
This conception is argued to be not just empirically false, but also dangerous, because
private sector growth has always been crucially dependent on a range of support
structures provided by government. The rationalist'no industry policy' prescription
therefore can impede the creation of economic prosperi$ by failing to build capacity
in a range of crucial areas subject to market failure.
The remainder of the thesis argues that the key weakness of this rationalist approach
and the k"y reason rationalism fails to substantially propel national
competitiveness, restructuring and employment growth - is that it fails to foster the
creation of an innovation-driven economy. For this argument to have validity, two
propositions must be evidenced.
Firstly, it must be demonstrated that innovation is the key to national competitive
advantage, restructuring and employment growth. This is the key task of chapter six.
Secondly, it must be demonstrated that the rationalist paradigm can not produce an
innovation-driven economy. This is the key task of chapters seven to 1.4. In these
chapters, it is argued that establishing competitive advantage on the basis of
innovation requires that the nation build up excellence in a range of innovative
activities, which include R&D, technology diffusion, work organisation, industrial
financing, education and training, management and export marketing. Together,
such capabilities comprise an'innovation chain' because each is crucial to achieving
competitive advantage through innovation. Market failure and Australian
weaknesses in each of these areas explains why Australia has failed to establish an
innovation-driven economy. Rationalism, because it remains extremely reluctant to
acknowledge market failures and rules out active industry policy, can not build
excellence in these capabilities. Strategic industry policies that could help Australia to
achieve excellence in each part of the'innovation chain' - and thereby bring national
competitive advantage, successful restructuring and economic and employment
growth - are outlined.
Of course, factors other than innovation are important to fostering national
competitiveness and the appropriate mix of public and private activity needs to be
actively explored in a range of policy areas. Flowever, this thesis focuses on
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innovation because it is the most important factor in creating national competitive
advantage, and the most important factor explaining the limited economic success of
the rationalist paradigm.
It should be noted that conclusions to chapters five to seven are foregone due to their
brevity. Further, chapter seven outlines the key arguments and the structure for
chapters eight to'1,4. For this reason/ conclusions to these remaining chapters are also
foregone to avoid repetition. Key conclusions from part two are discussed in the
conclusion to the thesis.
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Chapter Five: The Rationalist Paradigm and Strategic
Industry Policy
Introduction
In this chapter, a critique is made of the rationalist approach to economic
policymaking in the 1983 to 1996 period. It is argued that rationalists tended to place
overwhelming faith in the capacity of markets - virtually alone - to bring sound
economic outcomes. It is argued that this view can impede economic development
because private sector growth has always been crucially dependent on government
investment and government support structures.
No Industry Policy!
Modern Australian rationalism generally assumes that a market allocation of
resources maximises efficiency and growth, and that industry policy invariably
reduces growth. Rationalists have applied this view in each area of industry policy
with unyielding rigour. Indeed, it is this reductionism, theoretical neatness and
seeming capacity to solve economic problems with simple maxims that is so
attractive to rationalists.5"
Rationalism stands in great contrast to a long and continuing tradition of progressive
neoclassical economics, where market failure is accepted, some government
intervention is viewed as necessary and the key debate is about the type and extent
of intervention required. For example, neo-classical economists investigate
externalities, where market failure occurs because the benefits of an activity can not
be fully captured by a private firm, but the activity is essential to maximising growth
in the economy overall. Government provision of education and tax concessions for
R&D expenditure have been endorsed on these grounds.
Unlike progressive neoclassical economists, rationalists have stopped searching for
ways that industry policies could improve economic outcomes over a market
allocation of resources. For example, the IC outlined their approach to industry
policy in their submission to the 'Mortimer Review' of business programs. They
wrote:
Market failure is often given as a reason for government intervention... However, examples
of significant 'failure' are few and far between. While markets rarely allocate resources
'perfectly', in time, they will usually deliver reasonable outcomes for most market
participants.
Moreover, even where there is potential for governments to improve on market outcomes,
often they do not have the necessary information to do so. And government intervention is
tt' Pa.rl Chapman, ch.3 'Australian industry - Surely not "no policy"' in Michael Costa & Michael Easson (eds),
Australian Industry: It\høt Policy? , Pluto Press in Association with the Lloyd Ross Forum of the Labor Council
of New South Wales, Leichhardt New South Wales, 1991., at pp.69-96 at p.7'L; and John de Ridder,
'Cumulative causation versus comparative advantage', lournøl of Australian Political Economy, no.20, October
1.986, pp.44-48 at p.46.
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not costless. Apart from administrative and compliance costs, raising revenue needed to
pay for programs can have significant efficiency costs. Thus, government must be very
cautious about their capacity to deliver better outcomes than the market.sr3
Elsewhere the IC have written:
...[O]nly that production which can survive without special treatment from the Government
should be regarded as truly viable and internationally competitive.sla
[It is bad to reinforce]...the belief that the provision of assistance is an acceptable practice.sls
The zealous moral overtones of the final quote in particular is striking and shows the
complete closure of options for strategic industry policy that results from the extreme
rationalism advocated by bodies such as the IC. Market outcomes are seen as
legitimate, but government'intervenes', 'corrupts' or 'distorts'. Assistance is not an
acceptable practice!
IC 'inquiries' are based on these fairly extreme views and are therefore almost
exclusively about removing all assistance and discrediting government initiatives.
The IC rarely undertake serious investigation of whether and how active government
policies could increase growth over that achievable by the market alone. For
example, in the IC's draft report accompanying its inquiry into regional industry
adjustment, they made the blanket statement that '...policies such as tax
concessions...lead to a misallocation of resources among economic activities, thereby
reducing national income...'5'u This statement was made without consideration of the
numerous reports - both in Australia and overseas - that have demonstrated that, in
some instances, tax concessions have indeed increased economic welfare by
encouraging investment in crucial activities, such as R&D.s"
In short, rationalists have stopped actively considering ways strategic industry
policy can improve economic welfare. As Donald Horne has written:
The trouble is that they put their faith in the metaphor of the 'market', and they turn this
faith into a mystique which they then pursue without any scepticism at all... [T]he two most
grievous errors of economic fundamentalism is that it is utopian and reductionist.st8
This extreme rationalism, which is similar to economic libertarianism, dominated
economic debate in the Labor years. Most disciplines have a pluralistic and critical
tone. Numerous schools of thought are discussed, compared and actively debated.
By contrast, economics has become a discipline in which conforming to the doctrines
513 Industry Con'rmission , Submission to the Reaieut of Business Programs, Unpublished ,1997 , p.16.
s14 Industry Comrnission, The Automotiae Industry: Report: Report No.S, Australian Government Publishirrg
Service, Canberra, 1990, p.2,133.
sls ibid., p.139.
sr6 Industry Commission, Impedintents to Regional Industry Adjustment Draft Report: Volume 1: Report, Inclustry
Commission, Canberra, 1993, p.222.
t" Fo. exarnple, see Bureau of Industry Economics, R€tD, Innooøtion and Competititteness: An Ettaluation of thc
Research and Deuelopment Tax Concession: Research Report 50, Australian Government Publishir-rg Service,
Canberra, 1.993, p.xi,l03.
s18 Donald Horne, 'It's time for a think' in Donald Horne (ed.), The Trouble With Economic Rationalisnl, Scribe
Publications, Newham, Victoria, 1992, pp'2-"12 aI p.8,9.
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of one school, namely economic rationalism, has become the key to receiving
acknowledgment of one's expertise. Most disturbingly, extreme rationalism
dominates policymaking by the Federal economic bureaucracy and the Federal
Government.ttt Those economists actively exploring the role that industry policy can
play in increasing economic welfare have become a marginalised, scorned minority.
The State and the Market are Intricately Linked
A fatal flaw in the rationalist conceptual framework is the failure to recognise - or at
least the tendency to conveniently forget - that the State and the market are
intricately linked. Rationalists generally infer that the system is divisible into a Pure
component, namely the free market, and an impure, distortionary component,
namely government activity. This conception ignores the reality that the market has
never been unfettered. It has always relied on support provided by government,
including the provision of health, education, economic infrastructure and scientific
and technological expertise. All production is the result of a mixture of government
and market inputs. For example, even firms regularly described in economic
discourse as being unassisted or 'left to the market' generally have workers who
have been educated in public schools and kept healthy by universal public health
insurance. The firm's orderly functioning is facilitated by a publicly funded system of
law, police and public administration. The firm may also get its electricity, gas and
water from public firms, and transport its goods along public roads or rail systems.
This interlinkage of market and State inputs to all production means that the
rationalist prescription that everything should be left to the market defies the reality
that there is no pure market, separate from goverrunent activity.s2o
This argument can be stated another way. In 1995, the average size of government
among small OECD nations was 49 per cent of GDP.ttt If government constitutes half
or even a third of GDP, policy prescriptions stating that everything should be left to
the market clearly contradict the reality of industrialised economies."' Indeed, if
government spending were to rise a couple of extra percentage points of GDP in such
economies, it would make as much sense to talk about free markets intervening in
the'government economy'.
This is a fatal flaw in the logic underpinning rationalist policy prescriptions. On the
one hand, rationalists argue that market forces virtually alone produce optimal
economic outcomes. Yet government dominates the ownership of a range of
industries, such as education and various infrastructure sectors. If general rationalist
mantra were applied in these cases, abolition of such activity would have to be
t'' P"t". Ewer, Winton Higgins & Annette Stevens, Llnions ønd the Future of Australian Mønufacturing, Allen ancl
Unwin, Sydney, 1987, p.53,54.
520 
Evan Jones, 'Laissez-faire and the " p1tte" market are eternal fictions', The Australian Financial Reuieut' 20 July
1994, p.18.
521 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OËCD Economic Outlook lune 1996, Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, 1996, p.A3O. The figure for small OECD nations comes
from the small nations among the 20 OECD nations that provided figures'
u" Philip Yetton, Jeremy Davis & Peter Swan, Going International: Export Myths ønd Strategic Realities: Report to the
AustrøIiøn Manufacturing Council, Australian Graduate School of Management Ltd, Kensington, New South
Wales, 1992, p.71.
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advocated. For instance, rationalists would have to argue that: 'Funds diverted to
education and the system of law and public administration distort market outcomes
and therefore the efficiency of resource allocation. These activities therefore reduce
economic welfare and should be abolished.' Thus, in some areas, all assistance is
deemed welfare reducing. Yet in other areas crucial to economic prosperity,
pervasive government involvement is conveniently overlooked.
Rationalists have sometimes sought to overcome this failure in logic by arguing that
some areas of policy affecting industry, like tariffs, are'industry policy' and therefore
welfare reducing, while other policies affecting industry, like the education system,
are outside the scope of industry policy' and are therefore legitimate. Of course,
'industry policy' must be taken to include all the ways government interacts with
industry, given that all such activity affects the capacity of industry to compete and
grow.
Given the major role of government in the economy - including its majority
ownership of some whole industries - the rationalist prescription that industries can't
receive small amounts of assistance appears to be flawed. Yet this is what rationalism
prescribes. Even generic policies - such as those to improve industry capabilities in
R&D, access to finance and technology up-take - are generally viewed as welfare
reducing, without active consideration of their benefits. By contrast, majority
government ownership of whole industries is conveniently overlooked.
The conception of a pure market is not only false, but also damaging. The
government support structures noted above do not constitute unwarranted
interference or excessive government intervention. Instead, they are critical to
building and maintaining a competitive, high employment growth economy. This
system of private firms and government support structures needs constant
reconstructiory yet rationalism seeks to eliminate the government support needed to
ensure growth and competitiveness.s'3
The IC wrote that:
A central, though often understated principle underlying the organisation of rnodern
developed economies is that relatively unencumbered markets generally represent the best
way to organise the allocation of scarce ."ror.."r.t'n
In reality, without goverrunent support structures, private sector activity would be
gravely constrained.
Capitalism has always been crucially dependent on State action.t" This has been the
experience of all developed nations, including Australia.ttu As noted in part one,
s23 
Evan Jones, op. cit., p.18.
s24 Laftimore, R., Martin, 8., Madge, A. & Mills, J., Design Principles for Small Business Programs and Regulations,
Auslnfo, Canberra, 1998, p.48.
s25 Donald Horne, 'It's time for a think' in Donald Horne (ed.), op. cit., pp.2-12 arp.7.
s26 Greg Crough & Ted Wheelwright, Australia: A Client Støte,Penguin Books, Ringwood, Victoria, 1982, p.88;
and Bill Malcolm, ch.6 'Rural industry policies' in Brian W. Head & Allan Patience (eds), From Fraser to
Hautke: Australian Public Policy in the 1.980s, Longmann Cheshire, Melbourne, 7989, op. cit., pp.132-158 at
p.133.
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massive government capital investment, most notably in transport and
communications, was crucial to Australian development and assisted private capital
formation.t"
Rationalism Provides No Guidance for How to Intervene
Thus, rationalism, which simply prescribes a market allocation of resources and 'no
intervention' as a cure-all, provides little guidance as to what policies are required to
achieve economic and social well-being. As Brian Toohey has argued:
Once it is accepted that markets can fail - they can result in mountains of toxic waste or
allow cripples too die in the gutter - a simple recitation of the abstract virtues of the free
market provides little precise guidance for policy.s2s
Rationalist prescriptions appear to stem from simple acceptance of the implications
of the standard neo-classical model, with little or no explanation of areas of market
failure. And, as the BIE wrote:
...[The neoclassical model is] able to explain very little because the forces behind growth in
these models are determined outside the model. The model has little to offer in terms of
policy advice to governments wishing to provide assistance to firms because the long-run
growth rate is unaffected by what governments do.52e
Thus, rationalism can not provide adequate guidance on what government policies
are required to achieve restructuring, employment growth and national competitive
advantage.
What Policy, Not No Policy
Thus, we return to the realisation that the rationalist prescription of 'no industry
policy' is unhelpful and indeed, highly damaging. The national policy debate must
move away from the continuous, unthinking, unimaginative regurgitation of the
rationalist maxim that all should be left to the market. Instead of the 'no industry
policy' prescription prevailing, it is hoped journalists, economists, bureaucrats,
political parties and tertiary economics courses could refocus attention on the critical
question that will determine Australia's economic future, namely: 'What mix and
type of public and private sector activity is necessary to produce strong economic
and employment growth, restructuring and national competitive advantage?' In
other words, the national policy debate must shift from the constant recitation of the
'no policy' prescription, and towards active consideration of the critical 'what policy'
question. This would involve an open-minded, rigorous investigation of the
following questions. In which areas should goverrunent activity be largely removed?
t" K. Sheridan & P. Chapman, ch.2 'Australia's economic achievement - Comparison's with Japan in Kyoko
Sheridan (ed.), The Australian Economy in the lapanese Mirror, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia,
Queensland, 1992, pp.5-26 at p.15-20.
s28 Brian Toohey, 'Chronicle of a decade that changed us all', The Sunday Age,27 December 1992, Agenda 9.
t'n Brr."uu of Industry Economics, Recent Dez¡elopments in the Theory of Economic Grouth: Policy Intplications:
Occasional Paper 1.1, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1992, p.1,.
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In which areas and how could existing goverrunent activity be usefully augmented?
Finally, in which areas and how should new government initiatives be established?
The 'what policy' question needs to be investigated in a vast range of areas,
including economic infrastructure, regulation, macroeconomic policy and social
policy. Answers to these questions are not attempted below.
The remainder of this thesis discusses those areas crucial to the establishment of an
innovation-driven economy because: innovation is perhaps the critical element in
establishing national competitive advantage, restructuring and employment growth;
and the failure to establish widespread policies to catalyse the creation of an
innovation-driven economy is the most important factor explaining the limited
economic success of the rationalist paradigm. The next chapter provides evidence for
the former proposition, while chapters seven to 1,4 provide evidence for the latter
proposition.
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Chapter Six: Innovation - The Missing Link
Introduction
In part one, it was concluded that rationalist policies produced some moderate
benefits, but left much of the task of creating a competitive, high employment growth
economy to be completed. This chapter argues that the k"y missing link is
innovation.
Innovation: The Key to National Competitive Advantage
A vast body of literature, and the experience of many firms and nations, highlights
that the key to national competitive advantage in most areas of world trade lies in
being able to innovate, and most particularly, produce and export sophisticated, high
quality, innovative products and services, aimed at well defined market niches. This
requires that a significant minority of the nation's firms can compete on international
markets through customer focused innovation. Success in such segments demands
that firms meet customer needs and provide value - through features, style, quality,
utility and perhaps brand name - rather than simply provide the cheapest price.
Numerous authors have stressed this atgument.t'o
The capacity to undertake process innovation is a crucial accompaniment to
excellence in product innovation. Thurow illustrated this point by noting that
Japanese companies have dominated sales of the video camera, video recorder, fax
and CD players, even though they were invented in other nations. They did this by
becoming masters of process technologies, achieved through investment in skills,
knowledge and innovative work organisation.t3'
A range of studies have provided evidence that innovation is crucial to achieving
competitiveness. For example, the 1992BlE survey of over 800 R&D tax concession
registrants found that product and process innovation were the key to establishing
s30 
John M. Legge, A Submission to the Senate Enquiry into the Efficacy of Tariff Protection, lJnpublishecl, '1992, p.2;
Jenny Stewaft, The Lie of the Leuel Playing Field: Industry Policy and Australia's Future, Text Publishing,
Melbourne, 1994, p.130; Paul Chapman, ch.3'Australian industry - Surely not'no policy" in Michael Costa &
Michael Easson (eds), op. cit.,pp.69-96 atp.79,80; Bill Mansfield, ch.9'Trade unions and the challenge of
change' in Michael Costa & Michael Easson (eds), op. cit., pp.187-206 at p.192; Michael E. Potter, The
Competitioe Adaantage of Nations, The Free Press, New York, USA, 1990, p.45,49-52,173,627; Anand Kulkarni,
ch.19'Networking and industry development' in Michael Costa & Michael Easson (eds), op. cit., pp.357-372
atp.359; Australian Manufacturing Council & McKinsey and Company, Tlrc Wealth of ldeas: Hoto Linkages
HeIp Sustøin Innot¡ation and Groutth, Australian Manufacturing Council, Melbourne, 1994, p.1'; Peter Ewer,
Winton Higgins & Annette Stevens, op. cit., p.39-44,55-56,70,76-77; Stephen S. Cohen & John Zysrnan,
Manufacturing Matters: The Myth of the Post-Industrial Economy, Basic Books Inc., New York, USA, 1987,
p.206,207; ACTU/TDC Mission to Western Europe, Australiø Reconstructed: ACTU/|DC Mission to Wcstern
Europe: A Report by the Mission Members to the ACTII and the TDÇ Australian Government Publishing Service,
Canberra, 1987, p.84; Australian Council of Trade Unions, A Program Toutards FnII Employntc.nt: The ACTU's
Progrøm for Sustàinable Employment and lobs Grou¡th for the L990s and Beyond, Australian Council of Tracle
Uni,ons, ir4elbourne, 1993, p.12,13,24,25; and Ralph Evans, ch.1 'The Global Challenge report and the clash of
paradigms' in Michael Costa & Michael Easson (eds), op. cit., pp'1'5-46 at p.32.
s3r Lester Thuro w, The Future of CapitøIism: lfsTp Todøy's Economic Forces WiU Shape Tomorrou's World, Allen ancl
Unwin, St Leonards, New South Wales, 1'997, p'68'69,280.
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competitive advantage, while a range of other innovative activities were important
contributors.
Importance to Competitiveness of Various Forms of Innovation






















Source: Bureau of Industry Economics, R&D, Innottøtion and Competitioeness: An Eoaluøtion of the Research and
Deoelopment Tax Concession: Research Report 50, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1993, p.147
The survey also found that technological innovation was imPortant to a range of
aspects of competitiveness.t"



































Source: Bureau of Industry Economics, R&D,Innoaation and CompetitiT,eness, op. cit., p.145.
Porterrs four year, ten nation study into the keys to competitive advantage in
hundreds of industries and sectors concluded that national affluence accrues to those
nations in which a significant group of firms compete in sophisticated market
segments on the basis of innovation in products and services, not on the basis of
price alone. In turn, such product and service innovation is achieved through
innovation in production, work organisation, technology development, marketing,
distribution and a range of other activities.s" Similar findings were made in Australia
by the McKinsey report.s34
So exactly how and why is innovation so important to achieving competitive
advantage? At its most successful, innovation involves the creation of a product or
service that is unique in value in the market due to its features, style, btand, quality
or utility, or more likely, a combination of these. Creating unique Products is
u" Br.rr"uu of Industry Economics, R€¡D, Innoaation and Competitiueness, op. cit., p.145.
533 Michael E. Porter, op. cit., p.2L,4L,45,49-52,773,554,621'
534 McKinsey and Company & the Australian Manufacturing Council Secretariat, Emerging Exporters: Australia's
High Valie-Added Manufacturing Exporters: Final Report of the Study by McKinsey Ü Company and the Australian
Mlanufacturing Council Secretøriàt b the Australian Manufacturing Council, Australian Manufacturing Council,
Melbourne, 1993, p."19'20.
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important because it can bring premium prices, increased market share and above
average returns on investment.t" As John M. Legge argued:
When an in¡ovative product is offered to an appropriate rnarket, there will be no direct
competitors and so potential users will judge its value by its probable impact on
themselves... It may take from two to ten or more years before imitators are able to offer a
functionally similar product to the original entrepreneur's and a further four to ten years
before a majority of the original entrepreneur's customers come to believe that the
alternative is, in facl of equal value. During this period the entrepreneur enjoys a
competitive advantage. A new product can command extremely high margins for as long as
it is unique. The available margins continue high, if diminishing, for some tirne after that.
When an innovative entrepreneurial company can maintain a sufficient rate of innovation,
these margins will continue indefinitely, and such entrepreneurs will be able to support
affluent lifestyles for themselves, their employees, their suppliers and their country.
Professor Michael E. Porter relied on this fact in placing the'innovative-driven' economy at
the top of the hierarchy he described (Porter, 1990: pp.543-560).s36
Similarly, Thurow showed that by constantly creating new products that no
competitors could match, companies such as Intel and Microsoft sustained very high
returns on investment (or disequilibrium quasi-rents in the terminology of
mainstream economics) over the medium-term.s37
Thus, to sustain competitive advantage over rivals and continue to reap premium
prices, firms (and nations) must have the capacity for continuous innovation. While a
premium price can be charged for unique products at the point of first release, the
price of a typical product is likely to decline by around 60 per cent over 10 years, as
competitors adopt the innovation and customer demand is exhausted. In response,
the firm will have to innovate again and again in order to maintain a competitive
advantage over rivals and re-ignite consumer demand. The alternative strategy,
namely trying to maintain competitiveness and market share by reducing prices, will
eventually lead to bankruptcy. The only route to long-term survival is to create better
products, not simply cut prices.u"
Innovation can also enable firms to sustain their advantage over rivals by broadening
the number of distinct sources of advantage. For example, where a company achieves
an advantage by creating a unique product, they can help to sustain it by upgrading
their marketing, or improving their distribution, or adding new features. The more
sources of competitive advantage a firm can create, the more sustainable their
advantage will be.s3'
u'u 
¡ohrl M. Legge, The Competitiue Edge: Hout Innouation Creøtes and Sustains the Competitiae Aduantage of
Enterprises, Allen and Unwin, North Sydney, New South Wales, 1992, p.32,33,35; and Jenny Stewart, The Lie
of the Level Playing Field, op. cit., p.54.
t'u 
Johtt M. Legge, A Suhmission to the Senate Enquiry into the Effcacy of Tariff Protection, op. cit., p.2. Jenny
Stewarg fni L¡e of the Leztel Pløying Field, op. cit., p.130 states: 'The market monopoly (however transient) of
having a new or better-designed product to sell is a key element of international competitiveness.'
537 Lester Thurow, The Future of Capitalism, op. cit., p.72,73.
t'u 
¡nhr, M. Legge, The Competitiue Edge, op. cit., p.38,39,'126. This point is also made in Philip Brass, ch.14'The
need for a national vision' in Michael Costa & Michael Easson (eds), op. cit., pp.271'-280 at p.275.
53e Michael E. Porter, op. cit., p.51.
137
The capacity for continuous innovation can also assist a firm to arrest declining
competitiveness. Where a firm's competitors have gained an advantage based on
innovation, the firm can seek to ensure its survival in two main ways. Firstly, it can
seek to create a new product, or product range, with unique advantages. Where the
advantages are significant, this approach has the potential to bring the firm a large or
even dominant share of the market. Secondly, the firm can seek to simply match the
market leader's product. Such innovation generally needs to occur within 12 to 18
months of the launch of the market leader's product to give the firm a chance of
survival in that market segment. F{owever, the benefits of this more conservative
approach are likely to be less substantial, as the firm's product has to compete with
an accepted product in a growth period, without any value advantage.uon
By contrast, without the capacity for continuous innovation, firms in high value-
added market segments will quickly perish. If a firm fails to match or supersede a
market leader's innovations more than two years after the cycle begins, it is very
likely to lead to the end of the firm's competition in that market segment, and
perhaps even the end of the firm itself. Consumers will change preferences to the
market leader's product, and their value advantage and high market share is likely to
persist while other firms undertake the two to seven year long process of innovation.
By the time the firm has caught up with the market leader's initial innovation, the
market leader will have probably innovated again, thereby re-establishing their
value advantage and their market dominance.un'
Firms also need the capacity to quickly upgrade products and services because the
competitive effect of a new product will be greatest when a firm is first among
competitors to bring it to market. Where two previously equal competitors launch
products of similar value into the market, the firm that releases their product first
will gain a major competitive advantage. Legge estimates that for a typical consumer
product, the value of the project is cut more than 20 per cent where the product is
launched a year after a competitor launches a product with an innovation of similar
value, and by over 50 per cent after three years. The respective losses in the industrial
durable sector are nearly 60 per cent after one year and nearly 100 per cent after three
years.tn'
While these'first mover advantages' are significant in general competition, they can
be particularly decisive in emerging market segments. Porter's study found: 'In a
remarkable number of industries, early movers sustained position for decades."o'
Firms gain advantage from being 'first movers' because they are first to: reap
economies of scale; reduce costs and gain advantage based on innovation through
cumulative learning; and establish brand names and customer relationships. First
movers also get first selection of distribution channels, production location and
sources for inputs.ton Thus, economies with the capacity to quickly innovate to create
uoo 
lohn M. Legge, The Competitizte Edge, op. cit., p.39-41
541 ibid., p.36,42,44.
tn' 
Johrl M. Legge, The Competitizte Edge, op. c1t., p.229.




new products and services that meet emerging market segments will be well placed
to grow, restructure and compete effectively.
Innovation: The Key to Restructuring and Employment Growth
Innovation is the key to restructuring and employment growth because - rather than
seeking to simply sell more existing products - a strategy that leads to ever declining
sales, the creation of new products entails entirely new production. Innovation can
thus bring growth through the creation of new firms, and, in special cases, whole
new industry sectors or market segments.unu For example, the walkman, the
photocopier and the facsimile machine are just a few of the products which drove
Japan's rapid economic growth before the 1990s.sou
Studies have confirmed the importance of innovation to sales, exports and
employment growth. Barraclough (1996), using data collected for the ABS Innottation
in Austrnlian Manuføcturing 1994 survey, found that average sales among the 10 per
cent of Australian manufacturing firms that were 'integrated innovators' - those that
engaged in technological and non-technological innovation - were $26 million,
compared with average sales of $1 million among the 56 per cent of manufacturing
firms that were'non-innovators'. Average exports among the'integrated innovators'
were $S.Z million, compared to fi77,000 among 'non-innovators'. 'Integrated
innovators' also achieved two times the sales per employee of 'non-innovators'
(fi246,000 to fi122,000) and five times the exports per employee ($8,000 to $42,000).'n'
Obviously, if many of the 56 per cent of manufacturing firms that are currently 'non-
innovators' could be assisted to become 'integrated innovators', national economic,
export and employment growth would increase markedly.uot
The ABS publication, Innoaation in Manuføcturing 1996-97, demonstrated the
importance of innovation to creating employment and turnover. It found that, while
only 26 per cent of manufacturing businesses undertook technological innovation in
the 1 July 1994 to 30 June 1997 period, these businesses contributed two-thirds of
total manufacturing employment and three quarters of total manufacturing turnover.
On average, these technological innovators had over five times as many employees
as non-innovators and almost 10 times as much tutnover.tnt Similarly, aBIE survey of
R&D tax concession recipients found that 62 per cent of the sales of firms were
primarily due to new or improved products and processes, and the percentage was
significantly higher for high value-added manufacturers. Innovation by firms was
s4s Metal Trades Unions, Poticy for Industry Dettelopment and More lobs, Metal Trades Unions, Melbourne, 1984,
p.265-267.
546 
Sam Rosevear,'Best practice and enterprise bargaining: Your edge to competitive advantage' , Benchmark: The
Magazine of Workplace Reþrm, no.12, August1995, pp.6-7 atp.6'
547 Barraclough and Co., Enterprise Improuement Through Innoaation: A Study for Auslndustry by Barraclouglr and
Co., Barraclough and Co., n.p., 1996, p.21.
s48 Barraclough and Co., Enterprise Improoement Through Innoztation, op. cit., p.21.,22 noted that simply attributing
the average sales and exports achieved by integrated innovators to other firms in the economy would bring
an increase in sales of fi379 billion and an increase in exports of $104 billion. While this is a simplistic exercise
that overstates the potential gains in the medium-term, the findings do illustrate the importance of
innovation to growth in sales and exports.




sales growtþ increasing market share and overall
Innovation also drives restructuring because it is the key to competitive advantage in
the crucial ETM and advanced services sectors. As chapter four showed, these sectors
are vital because they are achieving rapid growth in world and Australian trade.
Growth in the exports of these innovative sectors also helps to reduce Australia's
dependence on commodities, which are experiencing long-term, significant relative
decline in world and Australian trade.
The McKinsey report found that innovation is the major basis of competition in the
ETM sector. The report noted: 'Most born global firms emerge as a result of
significant product or process breakthroughs that apply cutting edge technology,
either to developing a unique product or to a better way of doing business."t' A
survey in 1994 found that 30 per cent of emerging ETM exporters rated having a
unique product as one of their top three competitive advantages, while 38 per cent
cited technology and 25 per cent cited product design.'s' Precisely because they are
elaborate products, ETMs provide considerable scope for value adding,
diversification, technological change and the creation of new products and
processes.tt'
The LEK study of Australia's service exporters found that the key to competitive
advantage in advanced services was to produce unique products through a range of
innovative activities such as R&D, education and training, marketing, management,
leadership, focusing on quality, distribution and delivery, and tailoring products to
customer needs.ttn LEK wrote:
Overwhelmingly, service exporters reported that they were innovative and that innovation
plays a big role in their ability to identify markets, replicate their service and successfully
deliver it. Many enterprises also reported that remaining innovative was a key to keeping
ahead of their competitior,.sss
Continuous innovation is of particular importance to the restructuring of the
Australian economy because 90 per cent of Australia's emerging exporters operate in
niche markets, in which success is dependent on finding and serving the next niche
with a better product than any of the competitors."u The McKinsey report on high
value-added manufacturers found that faster growing firms were more than twice as
likely to develop specific products for export markets as slower growing firms. The
report also found that having a high customer orientation and tailoring products to
meet particular customer requirements was one of three key elements of best practice
among successful ETM exporters.tut Among the LEK survey of Australia's leading
Bureau of Industry Economics, R€¡D, Innottation and Competititteness, op. cit., p.87,135-137,150.
McKinsey and Company & the Australian Manufacturing Council Secretariat, op. cit., p.11.
Australian Manufacturing Council & McKinsey and Company, op' clt., p.2.
Jenny Stewart, The Lie of the Leoel Playing Field, op. cit., p.46.
LEK Partnership, op. cit., p.47,48,62.
ibid., p.61.
Australian Manufacturing Council & McKinsey and Company, op. cit., p.3.










service industry exporters, 60 per cent said responding to customer needs was the
main driver of innovation.utt
From a Factor'Driven Economy to an Innovation-Driven Economy
To achieve national affluence, Australia must make the transition from a factor-
driven economy to an innovation-driven economy. Porter's study noted a range of
stages of competitive development. The first stage is the 'factor-driven' stage, in
which a nation's firms gain advantage from basic factors and compete solely on price.
Nations at this stage, such as Australia, have little capacity to compete in
sophisticated areas of production because they have not mastered the sophisticated
capabilities necessary to competing in such market segments. Porter's study shows
that competing simply on the basis of price and natural resources can not bring
sustained competitiveness and productivity growth, and leaves the nation vulnerable
to a swift decline in competitiveness and living standards.ttt
For developed nations in particular, such as Australia, seeking competitive
advantage based on cost alone is not sustainable. Lower-order advantages - like low
wages, cheap, abundant sources of raw materials, cheap inputs or economies of scale
achieved through technology - arc relatively easy to imitate, particularly by firms in
developing nations with low wage and tax rates. Competing on the basis of cost can
therefore only bring short-lived competitive advantage.uuo
As Porter argues, the solution is to move to the 'innovation-driven' stage, which
brings national affluence. At this stage, firms compete in sophisticated market
segments on the basis of innovation, rather than cost. Indigenous firms continuously
create world best products and processes. Leading firms have global strategies,
possess their own international marketing and service networks, and have growing
brand reputations world-wide. The sophistication of a nation's universities,
infrastructure and research facilities grows. New mechanisms form to create, and
continually upgrade, advanced and specialised factors. Deep industry clusters
develop in sophisticated market segments and often spawn new clusters. A stronger
position in sophisticated services emerges, with services that support sophisticated
production, such as marketing and engineering, likely to be particularly developed.
All components of Porter's diamond - namely rigorous domestic rivalry,
sophisticated home demand, clusters of related and supporting industries and factor
creation mechanisms capable of producing advanced and specialised factors - are
fully in place.'u' For Australia then, the key challenge is to move beyond the factor
driven stage, to create an economy that can compete on the basis of innovation.
s58 LEK Partnership, Intelligent Exports...and the Silent Reoolution in Sentices, Australian Trade Commission,
Sydney, 1994, p.61.





Rationalism, Costs and an Innovation'Driven Economy
This analysis may provide some insight into why rationalism failed to catalyse
Australia's development from a factor-driven economy to an innovation-driven
economy. The rationalist policy agenda - including tarifÍ cuts, free market
infrastructure policies, small government policies and the deregulation of the labour
market - is centrally directed to reducing costs.
It is true that cost reductions improve national competitiveness. Price is clearly one
factor influencing a consumer's decision on what product to purchase. Price is
particularly important to many small firms in low value-added sectors, where there
is little scope to offer value through non-price factors such as quality, features or
style. The large growth in employment in small businesses in the Labor years, a large
proportion of which was part-time employment, suggests that this sector benefited
from improved cost competitiveness. Prices can also be an important consideration in
higher value segments where other factors are broadly similar. This has treen shown
by the success of Hyundai cars in Australia.
FIowever, by focusing on costs, without building the capacity of the nation to
innovate, the rationalist policy agenda ensured that Australia remained within the
factor-driven stage of development. This may be the key reason why rationalism
failed to make significant inroads into unemployment, and left much of the
restructuring task yet to be completed.
For Australia to restructure its economy and improve its competitiveness, it must
build its capacity to innovate. Throughout industrialised nations, a small core of
dynamic, innovative, export-oriented firms make a disproportionate contribution to
national competitiveness, and to sales, export and employment growth. As we have
seen, the competitiveness of such firms is driven primarily by non-price factors such
as quality, features and style. To encourage the growth of such sectors, governments
must help to build the nation's capacity for innovation.
Chapters seven to1,4 seek to explain why free market policies alone cannot foster an
innovation-driven economy. Market failure prevents the establishment of national
excellence in each of the capabilities crucial to establishing an innovation-driven
economy - such as R&D and export marketi^g - yet rationalists rule out active
policies to build up capacity in these areas.
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Chapter Seven: The Innovation Chain
Introduction
This chapter outlines the key arguments and structure of the remainder of the thesis.
The k"y argument is that rationalism can not produce an innovation-driven
economy. Strategic industry policies are needed to build rp excellence in those
capacities - such as R&D, and education and training - which are subject to market
failure, but crucial to establishing an economy that can compete on the basis of
innovation.
The Innovation Chain
The concept of a 'national innovation system' has been widely discussed in recent
literature on innovation and has been defined in various ways by varying authors.
For example, the IC have described the national innovation system as comprising
'...the institutions performing innovation-related activities; those providing support;
and the incentive structure motivating and guiding innovation-related decisions."u'
An alternative approach has been the concept of a 'dynamic innovation system',
which DIST has defined as including enterprise culture, technology up-take,
incremental improvement, R&D and commercialisation.tu'
This thesis puts forward a simple variant on these conceptions of the national
innovation system by introducing the concept of an'innovation chain'. The concept
refers to the range of capabilities that must be mastered if a nation's firms are to
consistently achieve product and process innovation. In part two, each chapter
discusses one of the capabilities in the innovation chain as follows:
R&D (Chapter eight);
Technology Diffusion (Chapter nine);
Work Organisation (Chapter 10);
Management (Chapter 11);
Education and Training (Chapter 12);
Finance (Chapter 13); and
Export Marketing (Chapter 14).
562 Indushy Commission, Research and Deuelopment: Report No.44, Australian Government Publishing Service,
Canberra, 1995, p.79.
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Of course, the components of the innovation chain discussed below are not
exhaustive, but simply include some of the capabilities of greatest relevance to
achieving an innovative economy.
The concept of an'innovation chain', while simple, is useful for two key reasons.
Firstly, it pinpoints the key capabilities firms and nations must master to achieve
competitive advantage through innovation. It therefore provides a tight focus for
policy and avoids some methods of industry policy, such as tariffs, unfocused
subsidies and ill-advised sectoral policies, which would harm economic welfare,
even if directed at innovative sectors. This approach also recognises that a somewhat
different emphasis in active goverrunent policies is required in the modern era.
Given the emergence of a knowledge-based economy, primary emphasis must be on
knowledge-based infrastructure, with less relative emphasis on providing basic
physical infrastructure, such as gas and water.suo
Secondly, the concept is entitled'the innovation chøin' in recognition of the fact that a
firm or a nation will not be able to consistently innovate if it can not achieve
excellence in every capability in the innovation chain. For example, a firm may be
unable to commercialise an innovative idea if it can not gain access to venture capital.
New technology will not be effectively utilised if a firm's work organisation does not
facilitate continuous improvement. Effective R&D can not occur without skilled
technical staff. Product innovation will be impeded if management cannot grasp
opportunities to innovate, or if firms fail to adequately market innovative products.
Establishing an economy that is successful at innovation is crucially dependent on
achieving excellence in all of the capabilities in the innovation chain.
This helps to explain why Australia is poor at commercialising its researchtut and
performs inadequately at innovation more generally. While Labor did implement
some useful initiatives in areas like R&D, education and training, and export
marketing, national excellence had not been achieved in any of these areas when
Labor left office. Inadequate investment in these areas, and, more particularly, the
failure to adopt significant reforms in the remaining capabilities in the innovation
chain, is the key reason Labor failed to create an innovation-driven economy.
The 'innovation chain' concept provides an overall framework for the discussion in
remaining chapters. Each chapter discusses one of the elements of the innovation
chain. In most chapters, discussion occurs in four major sections.
In the first section, the importance of the capability to achieving innovation, and in
turn, competitive advantage, restrucfuring, exports and economic and employment
564 Lester Thurow, Heød to Head: Conting Economic Battles Among lapøn, Europe, and Americø, Morrow, New York,
U9A',1992, p.291.
s6s Ian Lowe, Submission to the Parliømentøry Inquiry Into Tøriffs and Industry Deaelopment, Unpublished,
November 1992, p.7 argues that Australia's inability to translate our good record in formulating innovative
ideas into marketable products '... has long been our most serious problem.' Australia's poor record at
commercialising its research is discussed in: Andrew Theophanous, 'The re-industrialisation of Australia:
Some suggestions for government policy', Journal of Australian Political Economy, no.20, October 1986, pp.18-
28 at p.23; ACTU/TDC Mission to Western Europe, Australia Reconstructed, op. cit., p.96,97; and Bureau of
Industry Econornics, R€tD, Innouation and Competititteness, op. cit., p.10,24,25.
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growth, will be explained. Given that rationalism barely discusses each of the
ðlements of the innovation chain, it is important to justify their importance. It will be
argued that these capabilities should be the central focus of economic policy making.
In the second section, it is argued that the capability - like each of the elements in the
innovation chain - is subject to market failure, and that Australia's weaknesses in the
area are inhibiting the nation's capacity to compete on the basis of innovation. These
sections indicate that Keating was wrong to claim in his launch of the Innovation
Statement that: 'Australia already has the ingredients of a dynamic and effective
innovation system.'uuu Labor's inaction in the key areas of the innovation chain, when
so many of them were functioning ineffectively, was its key economic failure in
government.
In the third section of each chapter, it is argued that rationalist policies have not, and
will not, produce excellence in the capability. Despite Australia's weaknesses and the
market failures throughout the innovation chain, rationalists advocate little or no
active industry policy to improve Australia's poor performance. For example, the IC
has stated: '...firms can and do build up competitive advantages more or less
independently of the national innovation system in which they operate..."ut
Rationalists in political parties, the media, universities, and the bureaucracy fail to
recognise the importance of innovation and the critical capabilities needed to
constantly produce it and are unable or unwilling to acknowledge market failures
occurring in areas crucial to establishing an innovative economy. As a conseçluence/
rationalists have no significant policy agenda for creating an innovative economy.
Indeed, rationalists rarely even consider policies to create an innovative economy,
seem to believe active policy formulation is the task of someone else and almost
never attempt to formulate well-researched detailed policies that can create an
innovation based economy.
As illustrated on the tables below, rationalist policies have not produced an economy
in which a substantial group of firms compete on the basis of innovation. Indeed, the
second table indicates that the nation's innovation capacity may even be declining.
Percentage of Businesses Undertaking Innovative Activity 1993-94
Product Innovation Process lnnovation Technologicallnnovation (subtotal)
Non-Technological
lnnovation
7.0 8.8 12.2 13.8
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Innooation in Industry 1993-94, Cat. no.811 7 .0, p.4. Note: The table does not
include figures for: agriculfure, forestry and fishing; and government administration and defence.
s66 paul Keating , Speech by the Prime Minister, The Hon P. | . Keating MP, The National Trade ønd Outlook Conference,
Melbourne, 6 December 1995,Unpublished, '1995, p.3.
s67 
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Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Innoaation in Australian Manuføcturing 1,994, Cat. no.8116.0, p.5,7; and
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Innoaation in Manufacturing 1996-97, Cat. no.8116.0, p.7.
These third sections show that the passive 'do-nothing' rationalist approach can
never produce an economy that can compete on the basis of innovation. Without
government support to build up capacity in each link in the innovation chair¡ the
great bulk of Australian firms will remain unable to continuously innovate, and
Australia will continue to have limited capacity to compete on global markets in vital
innovation-intensive sectors. This is a key reason why market induced structural
adjustment is too slow, not so much in ripping resources away from inefficient
sectors, but rather in redeploying resources in growth sectors.uut As the Epsie report
noted: 'This Committee knows of no country which has succeeded in establishing a
climate for investment in high technology enterprises without the government taking
positive action and, at a minimum, adopting a catalytic role."un
As Thurow has argued, the k"y fast growing industries are all man-made
'brainpower' industries that have to be created by nations investing in knowledge
and skills. Where such industries will be located depends on who organises the
'brainpower' to capture them.t'o Similarly, Porter's study found that achieving
sustainable competitive advantage through innovation requires sustained,
cumulative investment in sophisticated capabilities - such as R&D, technology up-
take and export marketing - combined with excellence in performing the activities
involved.ut'
This helps to explain why the theory of comparative advantage, advocated by many
rationalists,s" is outdated. In debunking the theory of comparative advantage, Porter
writes of 'Íactor creation' because the factors most important to competitive
advantage in most areas of world trade are specialised and advanced factors that
have to be created. For example, factors like highly skilled workers and advanced
technology are created through a combination of investment by individuals in
education and training, investment by goverrunents in the education and training
system and R&D programs, and investment by firms in technology and human
resources. Factor creating mechanisms include education institutions, apprenticeship
programs, research institutes and economic infrastructure providers. Nations achieve
tuu 
Johtr M. Legge, A Submission to the Senate Enquiry into the Efficacy of Tariff Protection, op. cit., p.13.
56e Australian Academy of Technological Sciences, Deaeloping High Technology Enterprises for Australia: A Report
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competitive advantage, not by relying on natural resource endowments, but by
creating and upgrading factors, particularly by maintaining high quality institutional
mechanisms for advanced and specialised factor creation.tt3 Achieving expertise in
these crucial capabilities requires enormous planning, co-ordination, strategic
thinking, investment and creativity, which are created by firms and can very usefully
be fostered by assistance from government.
This is why Porter argued that the key role for government is to foster the capacity of
firms to: continuously innovate; upgrade competitive advantages by introducing
more sophisticated technology and methods; continuously shift to more advanced,
higher productivity market segments; and foster the capacity of firms to compete in
new industries.uto
This is why the pervasive regime of government policies and programs, which
account for 30 to 50 per cent of GDP in most industrialised economies, are an
important factor in international competition. The industry policy regime of the
Australian Government competes with the policies of foreign governments to attract
investment and jobs. Hence the importance of strategic economic and industry
policies."'As Cohen andZysrnan have argued: 'Policy...can help upgrade a nation's
competitive position in substantial and enduring ways or it can handicap national
producers and accelerate a downward spiral of weakening production capability,
slow and timid introductions of new production technologies...[and] offshoring..."'u
Economic rationalism, by prescribing a weak and ineffectual role for government, is
gravely inhibiting national economic development, most crucially, by failing to foster
the development of an innovation-driven economy.
In the fourth section of each remaining chapter, overviews of some of the
government policies and programs that could bring excellence in the capability are
provided. These sections, while not intended to be comprehensive, are important to
showing that, in contrast to the rationalist method of relying on the market, strategic
industry policies can produce excellence in each component of the innovation chain,
and thereby produce competitive advantage through innovation. They also seek to
answer the frequent rationalist claim that its opponents criticise but rarely provide
credible alternative policies that could benefit the economy. Governments in many
OECD and Asian nations have for decades adopted positive innovation policies."'
Such policies have succeeded in establishing national capabilities to assist firms to
continuously innovative and build significant positions in vital ETM and innovative
services sectors. Australian governments must do the same.
Australian policymakers must cast off the false certainty and security offered by the
'no industry policy' prescription. Rationalists, by denying market failure and
denying the utility of active government programs, can avoid difficult questions and
believe that complex economic problems can be solved by simple prescriptions, such
s73 Michael E. Porter, op. cit., p.74,77-80.
s74 
ibicl., p.617,6'18.
ttu Philip Yetton, Jeremy Davis & Peter Swan, op. cit., p.72.
s76 
Stephen S. Cohen & John Zysman, op. cit., p.xiv.
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as leaving everything to the market, and cutting wages and taxes. The most
important economic questions lie beyond the simple prescriptions that dominate
mainstream Australian economic rationalism, in the areas where there is market
failure and where active government policies may be able to foster competitive
advantage. It is through research and policy creation in these areas that an
innovative, competitive economy can be built. Flowever, opening up these questions
exposes a complex world where solutions are difficult to pinpoint, mistakes can be
made and economics is revealed to be a helpful guide in a complex global economy,
rather than an all-knowing science. In short, national debate must shift away from
the 'no policy prescription', to address the 'what policy question'. If readers find
themselves engaging in debate with the policy prescriptions outlined below,
agreeing with some ideas, believing others to be futile and feeling others could work
with adjustment, then the thesis has achieved its aim, to move the economic debate
onto the grounds that will determine Australia's future. A continuation of rationalist
policy will not produce an innovative economy and will produce ever declining
living standards. Only through engaging in the difficult, imperfect and complex task
of implementing active industry policies aimed at creating an innovative economy
can Australia achieve national economic (and social) prosperity.
The industry policies that stem from focusing on the innovation chain have a number
of benefits. Firstly, they are primarily directed to establishing excellence in each link
in the innovation chain for the benefit of all firms. Generically available policies can
avoid the pitfalls involved with sectoral targeting. \Atrhile in some nations at
particular times, targeting may be able to foster growth of emerging or highly
formed clusters of related and supporting industries, Australia has not yet achieved
significant clusters of globally competitive sectors outside unprocessed resource
based industries.ttt In addition, while some sectors are dominated by ETMs and
advanced services, these innovation-intensive firms can be found within the
sophisticated market segments of all manufacturing and services sectors. For these
reasons, the best approach may be to mainly provide generically available programs
that build up excellence in capabilities that are vital to the achievement of innovation
by all firms in the economy. Such policies can be expected to be taken up
disproportionately by innovation-intensive ETMs and sophisticated services firms
and so encourage sound restructuring, thereby producing targeting in eÍfect, without
extensive use of explicit sectoral targeting. In a small minority of cases, where clearly
justified, the policies outlined in part two will advocate targeting to ETMs and
sophisticated services, but targeting of individual sectors or clusters is never
advocated.
The policies advocated satisfy Porter's instruction that government should aim to
provide firms with the tools necessary to compete through policies to bolster factor
creation, while ensuring firms are under strong competitive pressure. Government
must be careful to avoid providing any assistance that reduces the pressure on firms
to continuously upgrade.tt'This was a key mistake made in Australia's long high
s78 
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áriff era, during which firms became complacent because they were shielded from
international competition whenever it threatened production and employment.
The policies to follow also focus primarily on assisting indigenous firms because they
view the nation as home base, and therefore develop competence in the innovative
activities necessary for achieving national competitive advantage at home. By
contrast, foreign multinationals generally keep the high value parts of their
production chain in their home nation. Dependence on foreign sources for
technology means firms can catch up to world best practice, but neveÍ surpass it.
Therefore, foreign firms are less valuable vehicles for creating an innovation-driven
economy.tto
The industry policy advocated below is also a challenge to the view that the size of
government must be reduced øt øny cost.lt is true that the level and complexity of
company tax is an important determinant of national competitiveness. Australia
should therefore seek to retain its relatively small govetnment sector by OECD
standards and establish a competitive business tax regime. Flowever, as chapter three
showed, while government consumption expenditure can harm economic outcomes,
the level of total (public and private) investment is a major determinant of economic
growth. Given Australia's weaknesses throughout the innovation chain, Australian
Governments will need to invest significantly in the coming decades if we are to
create an innovation-driven economy.tu'
Thurow has argued that capitalism faces a major challenge because its logic, and the
ideology currently dominating many Western economies, is focused on radical short
run individualism, when the future of capitalism is dependent on nations making
significant, long run, social investments in R&D, skills, knowledge, education and
infrastructure, which are not in any individual's immediate self interest. Only
through forcing a high level of public and private investment in these activities can
capitalism maximise its long-term growth.ttt
Relying on the market to bring excellence in the components of the innovation chain
has not and will not work because each suffers significant market failure. Only by
government helping industry to achieve excellence in these capabilities can Australia
hope to compete on the basis of innovation.
s80 Michael E. Porter, op. cit., p.677,678.
s8r Michael E. Porter, op. cit., p.622,623 notes that achieving competitive advantage in an indushy generally
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Chapter Eight: Research and Development
L. The Importance of R&D to Competitive Advantage Based on
Innovation
R&D is crucial because it is central to the product innovation process, as well as to
process innovations that can improve efficiency, lower costs and help create product
innovation. Not surprisingly, studies indicate that business investment in R&D
brings, on average, significant returns to individual firms and, through spillovers, to
industries and the economy as a whole. After an extensive survey of empirical work
in the area, the IC concluded that estimates on returns to individual firms vary
between a range of 15 per cent to 50 per cent, or 1,.2 to 4 times the return to physical
capital. Estimates of industry level returns are genetally in a range of 10 to 50 per
cent. Regarding spillovers, studies indicate that the rate of return in other industries
to R&D carried out in a particular industry may be around 75 per cent.'u' A study by
Coe and Helpman (1993) estimated returns on investment in R&D to the nation were
100 per cent among G7 countries and 90 per cent among the 15 non-G7 countries
included in the study. The IC estimated that the social rate of return to investment by
Australian firms in R&D was likely to be between 25 per cent and 90 per cent.'uo
BIE surveys also provided evidence that R&D leads to growth in sales and profits.
Between 1988-89 and 1991.-92, recipients of the 150 per cent R&D tax concession in
manufacturing achieved annual sales growth of 5.9 per cent annually, compared to
2.4 per cent for all firms. Between 1989-90 and 199L-92, concession recipients in
manufacturing had a profit to turnover ratio of 6.7 per cent compared to 3.6 per cent
for all firms.ttt
An in-house capacity for R&D is a key driver of innovation within a firm. In order to
capitalise on opportunities created by the expansion of new knowledge, firms must
be able to firstly, recognise that new knowledge could have value, secondly, have the
capacity to monitor and evaluate new knowledge relevant to innovation in their
sectoï, and thirdly,be able to exploit new knowledge by creating new products or
processes or improving efficiency. These are complex tasks which require significant
commitment and experience to master. Only with a substantial, on-going in-house
R&D capability can firms effectively monitor, recognise, evaluate and exploit new
knowledge. By contrast, firms without an internal R&D capability cut themselves off
from the innovation process.ttu
2. Market Failure and Australia's Weaknesses in R&D
Markets fail to bring the optimal amount of R&D for several reasons. Firstly, the
public good nature of R&D means that some of the benefits which flow from R&D
cannot be appropriated by the firms carrying it out, but rather spill over to other
s83 Industry Commission, Research and Deaelopment, op. cit., p.L42'
s84 ibid., p.156-158.
s8s Bureau of Industry Economics, R€¡D,Innouation and Competitiaeness, op. cit., p1,4L-'1.43.
s8ó Michael Welbourne, Martin Wardrop & Kevin Bryan! op. cit., p.15,21',27,736; and Industry Commission,
Research and Deaelopment, op. cit., p.73,L48.
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firms who can use the knowledge to drive their own innovation. Other firms can also
benefit from the migration of researchers, their skills and human capital from the
R&D performing firm. Because private returns to R&D are based on the benefits that
firms capture, the presence of spillovers may result in a lower level of investment in
R&D activity than necessary to produce optimum innovation and economic
growth.ttt As even the IC have argued: 'Where spill-overs exist - and empirical work
suggests that they are widespread - there is prospect that not enough R&D will be
performed unless goverrunent steps in [to increase the private incentive to undertake
R&D].',*u
Secondly, firms may lack access to the R&D information they need to maximise their
profitability and growth. Managers, particularly in small firms, may lack the
awareness, time, resources and skills necessary for undertaking the very complex
task of monitoring the latest developments in knowledge relevant to their firm
occurring world wide.ttn
Thirdly, firms may under-invest in R&D because the results to be gained are difficult
to predict and firms may be unable to afford the possibility that a costly investment
may fail. New product successes are somewhat infrequent. Several new product
ideas are necessary for every product that succeeds.tto While the IC is lukewarm
about risk and uncertainty as a rationale for government intervention, even they
admit: 'Innovation, because of its inherent technological and market uncertainties,
need not always be successful. It will only occur in the first place if firms have either
a strong incentive to undertake it or are under threat of extinction if they fail to do
so."" The ABS Innovation in Manufacturing Survey showed that innovation projects
are risky. Among businesses undertaking technological innovation between July
1994 andJune1997,31..7 per cent had abandoned innovation projects for a variety of
reasons such as costs being too high and difficult to control, expected returns being
too low, the payback period being too long, competitor activity making their project
obsolete and being unable to resolve technical difficulties. The survey found that32.6
per cent of businesses undertaking technological innovation stated 'excessive
economic risk perceived by business or parent company' was an important barrier to
the commencement of innovation projects.u" While rationalists may wish to argue
that risk does not constitute a market failure in theory, in practice, many firms faced
with such risk do not invest in R&D, even though their projects may have turned out
to be profitable. The result is an under-investment in R&D on an economy-wide
basis.
Fourthly, smaller firms may invest insufficiently in R&D because such investment
sometimes involves high fixed laboratory and equipment costs, meaning they are
u" B.rr"u., of Industry Economics, R€,¡D, Innoaøtion and Competitioeness, op. cit., p.18; and Industry Cornuission,
Research and Deztelopment, op, cit., p.10,189.
588 Industry Commission , Research and Deaelopment, op. cit., p.10.
tu' Mi"hu"l Welbourne, Martin Wardrop & Kevin Bryant, op. cit., p.23-24.
uno L"u D. Dahringer & Hans Muhlbacher, International Marketing, Addison-Wesley Publishing Cornpany,
Sydney, 1991., p.361.
ser Industry Commission , Research and Deaelopment, op. cit., p.148.
5e2 Australian Bureau of Statistics, lnnooation in Manufacturing 1996-97 , Cat. no.8116. O, p.13,14.
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unable to realise scale economies or make the minimum investment necessary. For all
these reasons, relying on the market alone to create and diffuse technology will lead
to sub-optimal outcomes.tn'
Australia's R&D performance is poor. It invests too little in R&D overall, and
insufficient investment by private firms is a particular problem. Near the end of the
Labor years, when nations such as Sweden, Switzerland,Japan, the United States and
Germany were all investing around three per cent of GDP in R&D, the great majority
of it private, Australia was investing less than half that as a percentage of GDP, with
most of it public.s'o
Australia's business expenditure on R&D (BERD) to GDP ratio was very low by
international standards when Labor came to power, being only 0.26 per cent of GDP
in1983, compared to 0.94 per cent among OECD nations. For decades, government
reports had recognised Australia's low private sector R&D expenditure,t" but only
piecemeal attempts were made to rectify the problem. Programs attempted involved
minimal expenditure, were inadequately targeted and poorly administered and
private sector R&D expenditure as a proportion of GDP fell by half between1968-69
and 1981-82.'nu By contrast, as Labor globalised the economy and implemented active
R&D policies, BERD grew rapidly. By 1995, Australia's BERD had risen to 0.87 per
cent of GDP. Flowever, it was still one-third below the OECD average of 1..23 per
cent.tnt
Only a small minority of Australian firms consistently perform R&D. The 1993 BIE
study found that only around L,000 firms consistently performed R&D, which paled
into insignificance against the roughly 48,000 manufacturing firms or the 550,000
businesses operating in all sectors of the economy at that time.s'8 Scoreboørd '97
reported that only 2 per cent of firms were undertaking R&D.t'n Thus, most firms are
largely removed from the innovation process.
While the quantity of Australia's public investment in R&D is sound by OECD
standards, too much is unrelated to assisting businesses to develop ideas they have
for new products and processes, either indirectly, through generic tesearch, or
directly, through contract work with firms. IMD's World Competitir)eness Yenrbook
1996 lound that Australia ranked a mediocre 24tkr in the utility of basic research in
encouraging long-term economic and technological development.uoo The McKinsey
5e3 Michael Welbourne, Martin Wardrop & Kevin Bryan! op. cit., p'23-24.
se4 LEK Parhrership, op. cit., p.68.
ses For example, see White Paper on Manuføcturing Industry, Australian Government Publishing Service,
Canberra, 1977, p.26.
unu P.t". Ewer, Winton Higgins & Annette Stevens, op. cit., p'86.
se7 Figures calculated at my request by the Science and Technology Policy Branch, Deparhnent of Industry,
Science and Tourism, August 1998. Note that the OECD average is only for the 19 countries for which
reliable data was available namely Ireland, Australia, Sweden, Denmark, Canada, Finland, Austria, Norway,
France, New Zealand, Japan, Spain, United States, Belgium, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Italy, Germany
and Switzerland.
5e8 
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see 
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report showed that less than ten per cent of emerging exporters had research
connections to a research institution such as the CSIRO or a university and that many
firms felt lack of technology was a critical constraint to their growth.uo' Only 11 per
cent of emerging exporters rated public R&D partners as 'very important or critical'
joint-initiative partners.uo'ABS data shown below confirms that public (and private)
researchers are failing to provide Australian manufacturers with many ideas to
propel their product or process innovation.























87.7 6.6 4.0 1.1 0.6
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Innot¡ation in AustrøIian Manufacturing 1994, Cat. no.8116.0, p.33.
These figures are particularly disturbing because they only include the 33.7 per cent
of manufacturers that undertook technological innovation at some point in the three
year period between July 199L and lune 1994. Most ideas gathered by firms for
technological innovation came from within the firm or through external commercial
sources such as suppliers, customers and other industry sources.uo'
The weak linkages between researchers and industry is a critical weakness in
Australia's innovation chain because there is evidence that successful innovation by
firms is dependent on effective communication with external sources of scientific and
technological expertise and advice. This is all the more concerning because research
indicates there are hundreds of firms who could commercialise research, but whose
potential remains untapped because of a lack of linkages with researchers.uoo
Weak linkages between public researchers and industry persist for a range of
reasons, including: the fact that a significant amount of public research is unrelated
to any practical outcome, let alone economic reward; low BERD; the reluctance of
some academics and researchers to assist new technology firms;uou the loss of
technically minded workers to major firms overseas due to the few opportunities
available in Australia;uou and the culfural gap between public sector researchers and
people in private firms.uot Firms sometimes view public sector research institutions as
601 McKinsey and Company & the Australian Manufacturing Council Secretariat, Emerging Exporters, op. cit.,
p.54,55.
602 AustralianManufacturingCouncil&McKinseyandCompany,TheWealthofIdeas,op.cit.,p.34.
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inefficient, remote and impractical, while researchers sometimes focus on their own
priorities, rather than those of firms. The cultural gulf between researchers and firms
remains large, in contrast to the increasingly close relations being developed
throughout the industrialised world.uou The lack of effective interaction between
researchers and firms means the benefits of Australia's research are often realised
overseas.uo'
Innovation is also impeded by the small size of Australia's ETM and capital goods
sectors. Researchers that produce innovative ideas often have to pursue
commercialisation offshore because firms capable of taking up the idea do not exist
in Australia.u'o \Mhere such firms do exist, their small size and the small size of the
domestic market makes it harder for them to absorb large innovation costs and adopt
major internationalisation strategies.utt Causation also runs in the other direction.
Without a strong manufacturing industry in Australia, innovative ideas are less
likely to be developed. Without the stimulus of practical commercial problems to be
resolved, Australia's public sector R&D effort has tended to reflect the priorities of
the R&D institutions, not business.ut'
3. Rationalism and R&D
Labor's initiatives to encourage R&D generally occurred in spite of the protests of
rationalists in the bureaucracy, who did not understand the importance of
innovation to competitive advantage. For example, Ministers with industry-related
portfolios were delighted that the 150 per cent R&D tax concession was retained in
the 199L Industry Statement, given opposition from Treasurer Keating and Treasury,
who for years fought to have the concession scrapp"d.ut'This is precisely the extreme
rationalism against which this thesis argues. If rationalists can't even support
government assistance to R&D, they certainly remain open to the criticism that they
automatically prescribe a market solution to virtually all problems and have ceased
thinking about where government can increase growth. This stands in contrast to
progressive neoclassical economists who have supported the tax concession due to
spillovers and the lack of appropriability of the benefits by firms.u'o
In fairness, the IC did complete a report on R&D in 1995 which included a
quantitative assessment that concluded that'...removal of the tax concession would
608 Michael Welbourne, Martin Wardrop & Kevin Bryant, op. cit., p.45,46.
60e Anand Kulkarni, ch.19 'Networking and industry development' in Michael Costa & Michael Easson (ecfs),
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uto Iu., Lowe, op. cit., p.7; and Department of Employment, Education and Training, Committee to Reuieto Higher
Education Research Policy: Report, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1989, p.35.
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613 
Bruce Juddery 'Free trade the winner as tariffs are cut', Australian Business, vol.ll, no.21, 20 March 1991,
pp.22-23 atp.23.
6t4 Bureau of Industry Economics, R€¡D, Innooation and Competitioeness, op. cit., p.18.
154
lead to a reduction in GDP.'u's It is rare that rationalists can ever agree that active
industry policies can improve economic performance, so this was an important
breakthrough. However, one belated report after decades of inactivity in R&D policy,
and continuing inactivity after the report, hardly indicates that rationalists have
made a serious shift towards serious exploration of industry policies that could
produce an innovative economy.
The IC report shows why hardline rationalism will never produce an innovative
economy. Throughout the report, discussion is largely focused on arguing why
active goverrunent policies can fail. It almost reads like the IC is seeking to justify
continuing inaction. By contrast, little thought is given to how government policies
could or were improving business investment in R&D. Equally disturbing is the lack
of open-minded research into policies advocated in literature or on the plethora of
R&D policies run successfully by nations overseas. The best the IC can do is 'Some
Guidelines for R&D Policy Design'.utu Presumably, these guidelines are for anyone
wishing to develop active policy proposals to encourage R&D! One has to ask why
rationalists never think it's their role to develop active government policy and
program proposals. As the Federal Government's key adviser on industry policy,
surely the IC should produce creative policy options, beyond how to cut or re-work
existing programs. Rationalism is seemingly unable to even attempt the exploration
of policy options, let alone the creation of pro-active policies to improve R&D or
innovation more broadly.
The IC chapter on'Rationales for Government Intervention' pinpoints spill-overs as
the only legitimate basis for intervention, and then attempts to discredit a range of
other rationales for government action to encourage BERD. By defining the rationale
for intervention narrowly, they create a framework for rejecting many sensible
proposals to encourage innovation by firms. For example, because spillovers are seen
as the only suitable rationale for assistance, the IC argue that no assistance should be
provided to firms for commercialising R&D,ut7 even though Australia has long been
poor at commercialising its research. When confronted with the stark difference
between rationalist theory and the reality that Australia has a decades old deficiency
in commercialising its research effort, the IC disregard reality and reaffirm their
theory.
The IC chapter goes on to quote a commissioned paper by Dowrick which states that:
countries should not seek to imitate other high growth countries who have achieved
competitive advantage; Australia's poor R&D performance by international
standards is not evidence that more R&D would improve economic welfare; and
private institutions may be better than government at correcting failure in the market
for knowledge.u" The IC also regurgitates its old chest-nuts that: R&D incentives
might create high technology industries ill-suited to the '...nature of the
61s Industry Commission , Research and Deaelopment, op. cit., p.29.
616 
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economy...'ute; R&D assistance will assist some industries at a cost to others; excessive
assistance to R&D will reduce economic welfare; and market failure might not justify
intervention because government action might do more harm than good.u'o While
there are elements of truth to all these statements, they comprise an inappropriate
focus given that innovation is the key to competitive advantage, yet Australian firms
are generally non-innovators. Taken together, the chapter is really about justifying
continued inaction on the part of government.
Particularly disturbing is the IC's assertion that:
The lower R&D expenditure, relative to production, of Australian companies can be
explained by the long standing protection of manufacturing and Australia's traditionally
low participation in world trade... The Commission does not consider the gap betrveen
Australian business R&D intensity and that overseas to be attributable to lack of
government assistance.62'
The IC at least note that the Government's implementation of various policies to
encourage BERD happened at the same time as BERD increased significantly,u" afler
decades of stagnation, although presumably the IC believed that these two
happenings were co-incidental. The message is that free market microeconomic
reforms will solve Australia's economic problems, and no active industry policy is
required. While it is no doubt true that exposing firms to increased competition and
greater participation in world trade forced some firms to search for better ways of
competing, the fact that Australia's BERD performance remains so poor by
international standards after 15 years of rationalist policy indicates that more needs
to be done to encourage R&D. Yet despite Australia's poor R&D performance, the IC
remain wedded to a rationalist policy paradigm that permits little or no government
action to help create an innovative economy.
The rationalist approach to targeting R&D assistance is also flawed. In the rare cases
where rationalists recoûunend generic industry policies, the approach is typified by
the following recommendation from the not always rationalist BIE: 'The BIE
recommends that, as a general principle, the level of total support to business R&D
should be uniform across all sectors unless higher than average spillover benefits can
be demonstrated.'u" While this statement is perfectly sensible, the problem is that
rationalists never undertake detailed investigation of whether higher than average
spill-over benefits do arise from supporting any particular sector and instead
automatically recommend uniform benefits.
In practice, rationalists are against any targeting of R&D assistance, claiming that it is
not possible to distinguish between the variation in R&D spill-overs between firms
and sectors.u'o The weakness of the rationalist approach is shown in the IC report in
61e Industry Commission , Research and Deuelopment, op. cit., p.177.
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which, on one page, the IC note that '...the most R&D intensive industries -
computers, communication equipment, electronic components and aircraft - are those
where spillovers appear greatest',6ts but later in the page argue that targeting of
assistance is doomed to failure because'...there is not adequate information to allow
fine judgements to be made between research proposals in terms of their likely net
social payoff.'u'u This argument appears to suggest that certain sectors are innovation-
intensive and produce greater than average spill-overs, but policy should not target
particular sectors because it is not possible to determine which sectors bring the
greatest spill-overs.
The rationalist argument against targeting is flawed for two key reasons.
Firstly, the rationalist view fails to recognise that targeting already occurs within so
called'generic' industry policies. For example, the 150 per cent R&D tax concession
provides uneven assistance between firms. Six sectors account for 60 per cent of
eligible R&D and 5 per cent of firms account for nearly 60 per cent of R&D
expenditure.u" Thus, generic R&D schemes result in targeting innovation-intensive
firms and sectors.
Secondly, some targeting may be appropriate because contrary to rationalist dogma,
there are clear differences in R&D intensity and expenditure between industries. For
example, well over three quarters of business expenditure on R&D is undertaken by
manufactrJring,u" despite manufacturing production comprising less than 20 per cent
of total production. The table below shows that far more innovation occurs in
manufacturing than the average for all industries.




















Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Innooation in Industry 1993-94, Cat. no.8117.0, p.4. Note: 'All industries'
excludes: agriculture, forestry and fishing; and government administration and defence.
Furthermore, differences in R&D intensity between sectots can be clearly deduced.
For example, the R€lD Scoreboard series has shown that sectors such as biotechnology,
computer software and services, electronic equipment manufacturing, medical and
scientific equipment, and telecommunications have a significantly greater R&D
intensity performance than average.62e
Given these facts, targeting particular sectors or industries may maximise returns in
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on agriculture and mining, sectors in which prices are in long run relative decline.
The IC estimated that at 1990-91the effective rate of R&D assistance to agriculture
was 3.4 per cent, while manufacturing received just 1,.2 per cent and services close to
nothing.uto There appears to be a case for redirecting more public R&D investment to
manufactures, particularly ETMs, as well as high value-added services in which there
is much greater scope for innovation and value adding (not to mention export
growth and employment creation) than in unprocessed commodities.u" Such
targeting can be a market conforming strategy, speeding up restructuring to growth
sectors and improving resource allocatiory rather than distorting it as rationalists
assert virtually any non-market policy does.
Achieving and maintaining competitive advantage and significant world exports in
advanced production requires continuous innovation. This requires a consistently
large R&D effort. No nation can achieve this in more than a significant minority of
sectors. The implication for policy is that, while policy should generally be available
to all firms, some public R&D investment could usefully be targeted at ETMs and
sophisticated services.
4. Industry Policies to Foster Excellence in R&D
Encouraging R&D Performed by Firms
Australia's R&D policies should be more strongly focused on encouraging R&D by
firms. While only some of the R&D performed by public institutions is directed to
increasing national economic performance, R&D completed by firms is likely to focus
on core business needs. For example, business completes 80 per cent of Australia's
experimental development and has a strong focus on coÍunercialisation.u3' Most of
the ideas for technological innovation in Australian manufacturing come from within
a firm's business group or external commercial sources such as customers, suppliers
and other industry sources, rather than research institutes.u" User-driven research is
therefore the most efficient way of creating product innovation, sales and export
growth and job creation. Empirical studies suggest that R&D by firms: typically
produces returns of 15 to 50 per cent; produces significant spillover benefits to other
firms throughout the economy; and produces teturns significantly higher than
returns from research undertaken in public institutions. In short, firms are the key
agents in the economy for converting R&D knowledge into improved economic
outcomes.u'n Therefore, R&D policy must place more emphasis on assisting firms to
innovate.
Internationally, there has been a trend towards R&D funding and performance
occurring in the business sector, rather than in goverrunent. Importantly, firms tend
to keep their R&D activities in their home nation, even where they expand their
activities internationally. Governments have therefore encouraged the trend towards
630 Industry Cornmission, Research and Deaelopment, op. cit., p.89.
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the performance of R&D by firms, recognising that such activity builds up national
capabilities in R&D.u'5
Despite these trends, the Federal Government continued to give too little emphasis to
encouraging BERD. The IC's 1995 report on R&D noted that, whereas 58 per cent of
Federal Government funding supporting industry went to government research
agencies and Universities, and a further 24 per cent is allocated to grants and other
public programs, incentives for business sector R&D comprise only 18 per cent of
such funding.u'u Given the crucial importance of R&D by firms to national
competitiveness, and Australia's weakness in BERD, greater emphasis needs to be
placed on encouraging BERD.
While more needs to be done to encourage BERD, Labor did much to encourage it
through the 150 per cent R&D tax concession, the Grants for Industry Research and
Development (GIRD) Scheme and the Co-operative Research Centres (CRC)
program. The success of these programs demonstrates the important role
government can play in creating an innovation-driven economy.
The tax concession improved Australia's R&D effort above that deliverable by the
market alone. A BIE study on the tax concession concluded that, between L984-85
and 1986-87, the concession induced an additional L0 to 17 per cent of BERD, which
seems unlikely to be an overestimate, given that BERD increased by 70 per cent over
the period. The tax concession was estimated to have stimulated between $0.60 and
$1.00 of additional R&D spending per dollar of tax revenue foregone, an estimate
which ranks in the middle of estimates on similar overseas schemes. The study also
found that an additional 200 continuous R&D performing firms emerged in each of
the first three years of the concession.u"
A 1992 BIE survey found that the concession had been 'critical' to 23 per cent of
respondents proceeding with at least one R&D project in the last 3 years. As shown
below, the R&D concession also helped many firms to continue projects, improve
their quality or widen their scope.u'u
u" 
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The Tax Concession and R&D Decision Making
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Source: Bureau of Industry Economics, R€tD and Internøtional Competitiaeness, op. ciL., p.96.
In additiory the concession underwrote significant attitudinal change, which will
improve R&D performance in the future. A1989 BIE survey found that 58 per cent of
respondents reported the concession had been important in encouraging a more
favourable attitude to R&D, 51 per cent said it encouraged placing R&D more
centrally in their business strategy, 34 per cent said it had improved R&D project
management skills and 24 per cent said it lowered perceptions of the riskiness of
R&D.*t
The BIE study concluded that the concession was likely to have increased
international competitiveness and been welfare enhancing, and clearly contributed to
increased innovation by firms. It therefore recommended the retention of the R&D
tax concession as a permanent feature of industry policy.uno
The Labor Government also increased R&D by firms beyond that achievable by the
market alone through the GIRD scheme. Establishedinl9Sí, GIRD provided support
for R&D projects undertaken by industry both individually and in collaboration with
publicly funded research bodies. Grants were made available for companies
ineligible for the tax concession, exceptional projects or for pre-competitive strategic
research into generic technologies.'' GIRD brought considerable collaborative
research on specific projects and the development of closer contact between
scientists, engineers, universities and the CSIRO.U" The grants schemes also appeared
to induce R&D projects that would not otherwise have been undertaken. Such grants
schemes have great potential because, if administered effectively, they can target
projects with a high social payoff.unt Flowever, the BIE's tax concession report argued
that the effectiveness of the scheme had been limited because it was only receiving
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The increase in R&D achieved in the period indicates that Labor's schemes to
encourage BERD, including the CRC program to be discussed below, may have been
successful. BERD increased, in constant 1996-97 dollars, from just over $1 billion in
1984-85 to more than $4 billion in 1995-96.uot Between 1988 and 1995, Australia's
BERD to GDP ratio grew at nearly 10 per cent per year, which was the second fastest
growth rate among OECD nations.uoo
The tax concession could be reformed to improve its capacity to foster increased
R&D by business in a number of ways. The definition of eligible expenditures under
the concession could be enlarged to include patent and licence work directly
concerned with R&D projects, market research, testing and development, quality
control, and making cosmetic or stylistic changes to products, processes and
production techniques. Further, given the fast growth of both domestic and world
exports in high value-added services, investment in innovation in services processes
should be eligible under the concession.uo'Further, given that the BIE survey found
lhat 67.5 per cent of firms would increase their R&D expenditure if the Federal
Government provided 200 per cent tax deductibility for eligible R&D expenditures,
this measure could be considered.uot FIowever, given that much of the concession
moneys foregone support R&D expenditure that may have occurred anyway, it may
be sensible to provide a 200 per cent concession, but only to expenditures above 25 or
50 per cent of the previous year's investment.
Reforms to the R&D grants program could also improve its effectiveness. The
program could be largely focused on providing grants for R&D projects which are
repayable upon successful commercialisation through a royalty or similar
agreement.6o'It may be useful to follow the IC view that non-repayable grants remain
for companies in tax loss and for projects involving collaborative R&D, but repayable
grants be introduced for closer to market R&D activities outside the scope of the tax
concession. Repayable grant schemes are used widely overseas, and in nations such
as Japan, Germany and Sweden, are the major form of support.uto A significant
increase in funds could be made available under the cost recovery element of the
grants program, thereby allowing many more firms to receive grants when they need
them, without the cost of the scheme rising significantly. This accords with Porter's
finding that high direct grants often bring unsatisfactory results because without
having to bear financial risk, firms sometimes chose poor projects or don't manage
them well.utt The non-repayable grants component of the scheme should remain
modest because: the administration costs, both for the Government and applicants,
645 Department of Industry, Science and Tourism , Australian Science and Technology øt a Glance 1.997, op. cit., p.22.
646 Figures calculated at my request by the Science and Technology Policy Branch, Deparhnent of Inclustry,
Science and Tourism, August 1998.
uo' LBKPartnership, op. cit., p.71,72.
648 Bureau of Indushy Economics, R€tD, Innooation and Competitioeness, op, clt., p,99.
un' Ho*urd, John & Department of Industry, Science and Tourism,Inttesting for Groroth: tlæ Hozuard Gouernment's
Plan for Australian Industry, Department of Industry, Science and Tourism, Canberra, 1997, p.32,33 outlinecl
the Government's new R&D Start initiative entitled R&D Start-Premium. Under this element of the program,
the IR&D Board could provide assistance of up to 72 per cent of an R&D project's total cost, repayable upon
successful commercialisation through a royalty or similar agreement.
6s0 Industry Commission, Research and Deaelopment, op. cit., p.32.
6sr Michael E. Porter, op. cit., p.632-635.
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are high; the Government can pick bad projects; grants induce lobbying by firms; and
assistance goes to a relatively small number of firms.ut'
The Federal Government must also ensure that significant generic, strategic basic and
applied research is being undertaken in Australia's high growth, R&D intensive
sectors. Such research can bring important advances in knowledge that can assist the
whole sector to compete more effectively through innovation. Unfortunately, the
public good nature of R&D can mean that firms are unwilling to undertake the R&D,
instead hoping to free ride on that performed by others.uu' Very few such sector-
specific R&D institutions or networks have existed in Australia's manufacturing
industry. As SMEs generally lack the time, expertise and resources to monitor the
vast array of technological developments occurring across the globe, programs
directed to establishing sector-based R&D arrangements can bring firms the capacity
to benefit from R&D to an extent not achievable were they acting alone."oo
Therefore, the Federal Government should consider working co-operatively with
firms from Australia's fastest growing, R&D intensive sectors to organise the finance
and capability to form institutions to conduct on-going R&D in areas potentially
lucrative to many firms within the sector. Arrangements would need to be tailored to
the needs of the sector. For some, key firms in a sector may wish to participate in one
or more CRCs. Alternatively, some could follow the model of the rural R&D
corporations and councils, which are funded by a levy on producers up to a
maximum of 0.5 per cent of production, matched on a dollar for dollar basis by the
Federal Government. Under these arrangements, producers vote on the level of the
levy and the composition of the Board.uuu
The Government could also consider building up a significant national technology
development infrastructure to assist manufacturers to undertake product and
process innovation. Such facilities are generally provided overseas, but are gravely
under-developed in Australia. However, in seeking to build up such infrastructure,
any initiatives must not result in excessive fragmentation of existing infrastructure,
or duplication of functions. Already, CRCs, higher education institutions and the
CSIRO are playing a role in technology development. Flowever, much of this work is
generic, basic, long-term research and a significant proportion is not focused on the
needs of industry. Given this situation, there does seem scope for the development of
a national network of Advanced Manufacturing Technology Institutes (AMTIs).
Their niche in the national research infrastructure would be to focus exclusively on
close-to-market technology development with firms in the AMT area. They would be
market and industry driven and focused on the core problems of individual firms.u'u
In combination with Australia's existing research infrastructure, AMTIs could
6s2 Industry Commission , Research and Deaelopment, op. cit., p.31,32.
6s3 ibid., p.167.
6s4 
See Ian Chater and Michael Welbourne, Appendix Two: 'Australian inter-firm networks: An unrealisecl
potential for technology up-take?' in Michael Welbourne, Martin Wardrop & Kevin Bryant, op. cit., pp.69-80.
6ss The rural R&D corporations and councils are discussed in Industry Commission, Research and Deoelopment,
op. cit., at p.37-39,187.
6s6 Michael Welbourne, Martin Wardrop & Kevin Bryant, op. cit., p.106.
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provide the technology development infrastructure needed to help create a vibrant,
internationally competitive ETM sector.
Supporting tax loss firms is also important to encouragíng R&D by firms. To create
an innovation driven economy, people must be encouraged to establish new
businesses with the aim of commercialising their innovative ideas. F{owever,
converting ideas into lucrative products generally requires significant investment
over several years, during which firms must often absorb significant losses. More
support is needed for innovative start-up firms making losses because it is
impossible for them to take advantage of the tax concession, yet such businesses are
crucial to building an innovation-driven economy. A remedy for this problem would
be to create a significant venture and development capital market. Policies to achieve
this are discussed in chapter 13. Furthermore, the Government could provide tax loss
companies with a non-taxable grant equal to the nominal value of a tax deduction of
50 per cent of the cost of undertaking R&D.uu'
As Stewart stresses, public purchasing and the contracting out of development work
by government departments and authorities are important but much neglected
methods of encouraging technological acquisition and development. Australian
Governments could establish a significant client-supplier relationship with the
manufacturing industry in order to encourage a greater R&D capability among
indigenous firms.'u'
Stewart also points to the positive role played by offsets programs in encouraging
R&D, production and exports in three key industries, namely aerospace, information
technology and telecommunications.use Labor's 'Partnerships for Development'
program aimed to offset the massive imports of multinational companies in key
global industries by establishing an agreement that by the seventh year, expenditure
on R & D be equal to 5 per cent of its annual turnover, exports be 50 per cent of
annual imports and exports include an average of 70 per cent local value-added.uuo It
may be that such partnership agreements could be revived to assist local firms to tap
global networks in technologically significant industries,uu' offset imports and gain
the sales revenue and experience necessary to undertake export drives in such
sophisticated market segments.66'
As the great majority of new technological knowledge is produced overseas/
Governments can also improve innovation by providing grants to encourage
collaboration between Australian researchers and industry and their counterparts
overseas. Funds can support individual projects, bilateral relationships, overseas
657 Industry Commission, Research ønd Deaelopment, op' cit., p'33,
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661 
Pappas, Carter, Evans & Koop/Telesis, op. cit., p.178-180.
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visits, exchange programs, conferences and access for Australian researchers to major
research facilities unavailable in Austr alia.uu'
Public Research Institutions and the Needs of Industry
Traditionally, Australian industry and public researchers have not, in general, co-
operated effectively, and have therefore foregone the opportunity to create wealth
through innovation. This section outlines measures that could produce effective co-
operation, firstly, through reforms of CRCs, the CSIRO and higher education
research and secondly, through various supporting measures. Labor's achievements
in these areas will be detailed. They comprise evidence of the important role
governments can play in fostering an innovation-driven economy.
The key theme of the proposals is that for nations to achieve national competitive
advantage, public research bodies must focus strongly on meeting the needs of
industry, particularly by establishing strong, productive links with firms and
concentrating on commercially relevant research.uun Governments in strong R&D
performing industrialised nations have aligned their large publicly funded research
institutes with the needs of business through co-operative arrangements.uut By
contrast, only around 40 per cent of expenditure by Australia's public research
institutions is directed to economic development.uuu This needs to increase if Australia
is to create a competitive, innovation-based economy. In particular, public research
agencies need to increase their focus on fostering Australia's emerging high growth,
SME exporters in the ETM sector. While manufacturing firms do the bulk of business
R&D, only around 13 per cent of Commonwealth funding for research agencies is
focused on manufacturing and State programs are almost totally devoted to
agriculture.uut
A second and related key theme of the proposals is that the Federal Government
should give greater relative weight to applied research and experimental
development because such research creates product and process innovation, and in
turn, jobs and exports. By international standards, Australia has a high ratio of basic
to applied research and does a relatively small amount of experimental development
as a proportion of R&D expenditure. Only one-third of Australia's R&D expenditure
is on experimental development, compared with more than one half in nations such
as the United States, Sweden and Japan.uut At present, Australia produces much
important basic research, but commercialises too little of it. Undertaking research in
areas in which Australia lacks production capacity leads to publicly funded ideas
being exploited offshore to the benefit of Australia's competitors. Government
663 Department of Industry, Science and Tourism, Annual Report 1.995-94 Australian Government Publishing
Service, Canberra, 1996, p14 notes that $5.6 million was devoted to such activities in1995-96.
664 Michael E. Porter, op. cit., p.632,633. A similar point is made in Jenny Stewar t, The Lie of the Leuel Playing
Field, op. cit., p.130,13L.
Jenny Stewart, TIrc Lie of the Leztel Playing Field, op. cit., p,38.








should therefore increase the focus of Australia's research infrastructure on closer-to-
market research aimed at creating new products and processes.
Flowever, this increased focus on applied research and experimental development
should not be achieved through a reduction in Australia's commitment to strategic
basic research in absolute terms. Public research institutions can make an important
contribution to the innovation capacity of industry by focusing on commercially
relevant strategic basic research that would not otherwise be performed and
disseminating the new knowledge throughout the economy at low cost.uu'Strategic
basic research is vital because: it brings advances in knowledge in broad areas that
can be used by firms to undertake more specific, commercially focused innovation;
and it forms the major training ground for future researchers.uto Any savings required
should be made in pure basic research. In a society with significant social and
economic problems, research undertaken without any practical outcome in mind
should be accorded a lower priority than research that can contribute to positive
economic, social or environmental change.
Porter's research showed that one of the most successful methods of encouraging
strong links between research institutions and industry has been to establish a range
of specialised research institutes focused on industry clusters or transformative
technologies. Porter wrote: 'One of the strongest findings from our research is the
frequency with which internationally leading national industries are associated with
specialised research institutes or university departments, often located in close
proximity.'ut' Porter emphasised that universities in particular can assist in
encouraging industry R&D because: newly trained scientists are likely to focus
research on new technologies; research diffuses well in an open university setting;
and, formation of innovative new businesses is encouraged as students and/or staff
commercialise their ideas.ut'
Labor began the process of building productive linkages between researchers and
firms through their CRC program, which led to the establishment of 61 CRCs over 4
selection rounds between 199'1, and 1994. Each centre had to have at least one higher
education institution as a core partner and half have two or more, the CSIRO are
participants in 52 of the 61 CRCs and more than 200 companies were involved as at
December 1994. Participants are required to provide at least 50 per cent of the
resources for a CRC through cash or in-kind contributions over 7 years. Overall,
resources valued at over fi2.7 billion were committed over the life of the 6L CRCs, of
which the Labor Government committed nearly $850 million. The program was
commenced following research showing the successful operation of similar programs
in a range of OECD nations.uT'
uun 
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The CRC program has helped to re-orient Australia's public research effort towards
the needs of industry because participating firms have input into the type of research
undertaken and partly fund the research. In this way, CRCs have produced much
high quality, long-term strategic research of significance to Australian industry.
Because research is generally focused on industry needs, innovative ideas are more
often used by Australian companies to produce closer-to-market research directed at
producing innovative products.utn CRCs also encourage innovation by firms by
signalling to them the importance of emerging technical areas, Commercialisation is
improved because participating firms are often given the first right of refusal to CRC
intellectual property. The program has also improved the capacity of researchers to
meet the needs of industry by giving researchers experience in major co-operative,
user oriented research programs, facilitating research training and enabling the
formation of high quality research teams across several States and among numerous
public and private organisations.6ts
As the 1995 review by the CRC Evaluation Steering Committee concluded, the
program has improved co-operation between higher education institutions,
government research agencies and industries, creating linkages that had previously
not existed.u'u In particular, it has promoted effective linkages between manufacturers
and researchers, which has for a long time been a deficiency in the national
innovation system (in contrast to the long standing and effective linkages between
researchers and firms in mining and agriculfure). Most of the research centres focus
on manufacturing.u" T}ire program may have also improved the quality of the
linkages between industry and researchers. CRC linkages are long-term,
underpinned by a legal framework, formal management and strategic planning and
budgeting and involve at least a critical mass of researchers and end users. By
contrast, linkages outside CRCs tend to involve only a limited number of researchers
and be short-term, project specific and informal.utu
Importantly, the CRC program has also facilitated further investment in R&D by
industry. By late 1995, the CRCs had levered $400 million dollars worth of industry
investment in R&D.u" The success of these centres is an example of how government
can foster an innovation-driven economy. The program could usefully be
expanded,uto particularly as researchers could still play a much greater role in helping
industry to innovate.
674 Philip Yefton, Jeremy Davis & Peter Swary Going International, op. cit., p.77.
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The CRC program could also be improved. There is evidence that some CRCs are not
meeting industry needs. Some participating firms have complained that they lack the
capacity to influence research objectives and that the focus of research is more on the
interests of researchers than on potentially lucrative research. It is vital that industry
has sufficient capacity to influence the research undertaken by CRCs to ensure the
research is commercially focused.utt To this end, the Government could encourage
more use of methods already established to encourage industry involvement in
CRCs, such as participation by industry research groups and industry associations,
as well as rural R&D corporations. Six CRCs have 'industry associate or affiliate'
categories which, for an annual fee, enable firms access to research information and
the CRC's research staff, and enable the firms to have input into the CRC's research
agenda.u" These innovative methods of facilitating industry involvement could be
extended.
The Federal Government also needs to ensure that there is an appropriate balance
within CRCs between long-term, generic, strategic basic and applied research on the
one hand, and closer-to-market research directed at commercialisation on the other.
The IC has criticised the fact that under the program, there has been an increasing
emphasis on near-to-market research and commercialisation activities. In some
CRCs, research has gone beyond simply generic research to include consultancy
services. The IC believes that orienting the program towards producing research of
benefit to participating firms, rather than research of generic benefit to a broad cross-
section of industry, undermines the public good rationale for government funding of
the program.u" It is important that a majority of research performed in CRCs is
directed at issues of importance to firms throughout the sector.
FIowever, CRCs should also be encouraged to provide consultancy services to firms
involving near to market research aimed at producing commercial benefit from the
more basic knowledge advances produced by the CRCs. Australia has a long
standing deficiency in commercialising its research. \¡Vhere CRCs produce research
that is commercialised by participant firms, they are remedying a long standing
weakness in the Australian economy and improving our capacity to compete on the
basis of innovation. Therefore, such activity should be encouraged, not frowned
upon. Flowever, as such research involves fewer spill-over benefits, it should
comprise only a significant minority of the CRC's work and occur on a cost recovery
basis.
While the CRC program is a major initiative, the Government could do more to focus
the higher education sector on assisting firms to innovate. The Government could set
national research priorities that would be considered by the ARC in assessing
applications for grants.uto The priorities would ensure that a large percentage of funds
681 Industry Commission, Research and Deaelopment, op, c1t,, p.862.
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were directed to achieving firstly, an economy capable of continuous innovation and
secondly, the restructuring needed in the Australian economy, namely toward ETMs
and high value-added services.uuu Priority would be given to those fields crucial to
establishing an innovation-based economy, such as engineering, science, business
and management. Further, in a world with massive social and economic problems,
research not directed to achieving practical economic or social progress should not be
funded.uuu
The quality of research could be improved by further concentrating resources in
institutions of research excellence. Research policy should be directed to establishing
and maintaining several centres of research excellence in each field nationally, rather
than having most tertiary institutions each providing merely adequate quality in
virtually all fields of study. To achieve this, a greater percentage of research funding
could be provided on a competitive basis, a trend begun by the Hawke Government
in the late 1980s. Only those faculties with demonstrated capacity for world class
research would receive this component of research funding.utt To further improve
research quality, some academic appointments could focus largely on teaching, with
a research component sufficient only to maintain reasonable subject knowledge.out
Greater funding could be provided for research infrastructure. DEET reported in
1989 that there was a serious deficiency in infrastructure support for research,
research training and teaching. Much of the research equipment, particularly in
science, was obsolete, meaning that graduates often lacked the knowledge to
effectively operate new technology and equipment. In turn, this deficiency in
equipment based training impeded the take-up of technology.u" Funding since that
time has been insufficient to produce world class research infrastructure.
The research performance of universities would also be improved if research careers
were made more attractive. Many factors discourage Australia's brightest people
from becoming researchers, including an inadequate career structure, too few
permanent positions and low wage levels relative to what people can earn with
comparable qualifications in other fields. DEET warned in 1989 that there was an
urgent need to attract more Australian students into research, particularly in
engineering and applied sciences, to avoid restricting Australia's international
competitiveness.u'n
68s Department of Employmen! Education and Training & John Dawkins, op. cit., p.9 argued that a greater
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To attract students to a research career, the Government could: increase the number
of academic positions available; expand the number of postgraduate research
scholarships and increase the amount paid under scholarships; make all research
training, including part-time research training, HECS exempt; establish a greater
number of renewable, five-year career fellowships; establish attractive career
structures in research;ut' attd improve remuneration.
To further improve the interaction between higher education researchers and
industry, the Government could encourage the growth of the commercial arms in
universities, which sprang up in the 1980s. These bodies can harness the research
capacity of universities for the benefit of industry.
The Government should also maintain healthy funding for higher education research
more generally. It is important to establishing an innovative economy because
universities: undertake some research of benefit to industry; pass on to graduates the
knowledge and skills necessary to contributing to the economy; and, through their
research programs, prepare the next generation of researchers to enter the system.u"
The movement of university graduates and trained researchers is an important
mechanism for the diffusion of knowledge throughout the economy.utt Labor made a
considerable contribution to diffusion of knowledge in this way. Between L984-85
and 1994-95, the number of R&D personnel in the Australian economy rose from
51.,254 to 86,'162, with the numbers in higher education rising from 20,844 to 40,096
over the same period.u'o
The CSIRO is Australia's largest research organisation (attracting planned budget
outlays of around $450 million in 1995-96) and has a long history of achievement.unu
Flowever, while the CSIRO has a legitimate role in conducting research into a wide
range of disciplines, there appears scope it to concentrate more on research of direct
benefit to industry.u'u This should take two forms.
Firstly, the key task of the CSIRO should be to undertake research of a strategic and
applied nature aimed at producing important generic knowledge which can then be
exploited by firms undertaking closer-to-market R&D aimed at specific commercial
applications. This generic, public good research should also be focused more strongly
on those sectors crucial to establishing an innovation-driven economy, namely ETMs
and sophisticated services.
Secondly, the CSIRO should continue to play a secondary role in undertaking
contract work with firms. Such work is important because it helps focus the work of
6e1 These measures are recommended in Department of Employment, Education and Training, Committee to
Reuieut Higher Education Reseørch Policy, op. cit., p.25,31..
6e2 Department of Employment, Education and Training, Committee to Reoiew Higher Education Research Policy,
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the CSIRO on assisting firms to achieve competitive advantage through innovation.u"
This work was sensibly encouraged by Labor's decision to require that the CSIRO
raise 30 per cent of its funds from outside sources. The McKinsey report noted that
this reform prompted the CSIRO to seek out leading edge firms with which to
conduct joint research that could benefit Australian industry. McKinsey argued that
this reform be continued and other funding incentives be applied to encourage a
greater business focus from the CSIRO.U"
Flowever, the CSIRO's contract work has been too focused on large firms,
particularly multinationals, and has often involved research that no Australian firm
could commercialise.u" Through direction and by subsidising a helpful minority of
the cost of research contracts, the Government could ensuÍe that the vast majority of
contract work is done for Australian firms, with particular attention given to SMEs
creating ETMs and sophisticated services.too
A number of supporting measures could be established to further encourage
productive co-operation between researchers and industry. The Government could
seek to foster a culture in which business leaders and managers have an affinity for,
and experience with, technology, innovation andf or scientific or engineering
training. To do this, tertiary courses could be reformed to ensure that science and
technology students could acquire business skills and an understanding of
commercial innovation, while business sfudents were given an understanding of the
importance of innovation to economic development.to'
The Government could usefully encourage greater interchange between public
researchers and industry through secondment schemes,to' given the importance of
human carriers to the innovation diffusion process. A McKinsey study showed that
half the SMEs surveyed said they would value highly the opportunity to have CSIRO
technicians seconded to their company and 40 per cent would highly value
seconding their staff to CSIRO laboratories. Virtually all successful cases of SMEs
collaborating with CSIRO have involved secondments.'o'
The Government could also consider catalytic action to produce an information
market that linked researchers in particular fields with firms in the same area. At
present in Australia there is no genuine market for R&D ideas. Many firms have
challenges that scientists could overcome, but gaining access to each other is slow
unt Mi.huel E. Porter, op. cit., p.633 recommends significant use of research contracts between governrnent
research institutions and industry because they introduce market disciplines and facilitate better co-
operation.
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and difficult. There is no integrated system to link ideas and opportunities.'oo One
method of improving the links is to follow the lead of the University of California,
which has developed the'Access Model', which includes information on technology
available for licensing in universities and federally funded research programs in
progress and the capabilities of more than 39,000 high tech corporations in
California. Firms are able to match their activities with the activities of either
technology providers or the firms that may be able to use the technology that they
have developed.to'
Finally, Australia's ability to compete on the basis of innovation will rest crucially on
reforms to achieve excellence in the remaining areas of the innovation chain. Ooty
when Australia achieves competence in activities throughout the innovation chain
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Chapter Nine: Technology Diffusion
The previous chapter focused on R&D and therefore covered the deuelopmenf of new
products and processes. This chapter is focused on the diffusion of key technologies,
including both their up-take and effective application by firms. Of course, the two
topics are highly inter-related and success in one is highly dependent on success in
the other. For example, an in-house R&D capability can assist a firm to understand
the importance of technology,monitor technological developments and take-up
appropriate technologies.'ou Further, while the up-take of some technology can
require relatively little effort, in other cases, applying technology to production
processes or to creating new products can involve significant R&D. As they are part
of the same process, the distinction between technology up-take and technology
development can become blurred. R&D is important to technological up-take and
R&D policies assist firms with technology up-take, as well as with technology
development. However, this chapter has been included because specific technology
diffusion policies can augment the capacity of firms to take-up and exploit new
technology, beyond that achievable by R&D policies alone.
1-. The Importance of Technology Diffusion to Competitive Advantage
Based on Innovation
Rapid diffusion of key technologies is crucial to achieving competitive advantage
based on innovation because we are living in an era in which transformative
technologies are facilitating improved competitiveness for firms throughout the
economy by creating new opportunities for product and process innovation.to'For
example, information technolog/, most particularly word processing, electronic mail
and the Internet, have revolutionised processes throughout the economy and greatly
added to the capacity of many firms to create new products. Key transformative
technologies include microelectronics, biotechnology, the new materials-science
industries, telecommunications, civilian aviation, robotics plus machine-tools and
computers plus software.tou Such sectors are also important because they are rapidly
spawning new products and growing quickly themselves. Thus, those nations that
are among the first to master and widely diffuse transformative technologies can
create a surge in competitive advantage, firstly, through innovation in these sectors
themselves, and secondly, by transforming and upgrading products and processes in
traditional industries throughout the economy.to'
In this wayt technological advance is a key driver of economic growth. Fagerberg's
1988 study of OECD nations showed that technological capability was a far more
important explanation of differences in the growth of GDP and market shares than
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cost competitiveness.Tlo Porter's study also found that: '...technological
change...accounts for much of economic growth."" Not surprisingly, studies show
that the general economic benefits from technology up-take substantially outweigh
even the direct economic, benefits of R&D and its commercialisation."' T]rre 1994
White Paper on Employment stated that: 'It is estimated that the economic benefits of
diffusion of technology exceed those of research and development by two to one.""
By driving growth and innovation, technological change also drives restructuring. In
particular, in the technology intensive sectors on which Australia's economic future
depends, firms with a substantial in-house technology capacity are best placed to
succeed."n The McKinsey report stressed that technology was a key to competitive
advantage for ETM exporters because it enables firms to: establish unique
manufacturing processes; produce unique products; achieve continuous product
innovation; and tailor existing products to meet the needs of specific export
markets."s Almost 40 per cent of Australia's emerging ETM exporters attribute their
competitive advantage to technology. Of those receiving the 150 per cent R&D tax
concessiory those with the highest technological innovation averaged growth rates of
1,6 per cent annually, while those with the lowest technological innovation had
growth rates of only 8 per cent.tt6
In particular, advanced manufacturing technology (AMT) is vital to competing on
the basis of innovation. Computer-aided manufacturing and flexible manufacturing
systems enable firms to do short production runs economically, and thereby facilitate
the continual refinement of products to meet changing consumer demands.t't The
KPMG Peat Marwick Survey has shown the importance of AMT to improving
quality, increasing labour productivity, reducing delivery lead times, cutting
inventories, improving profits and sales volumes, reducing overheads and cutting
the time needed to introduce new products.T'8 Thus, adoption of AMT is vital to
achieving a competitive advantage in ETMs.tt'
Technology has also nullified the importance of factors of production that were once
significant, particularly natural resources and labour costs. Advanced materials are
often made from cheap and ubiquitous resources. In advanced sectors, advanced
manufacturing technology is now a far more important determinant of the location
of production than low labour costs. This was shown in the 1980s when many plants
moved to high labour cost locations to be close to markets, rather than the reverse.t'o
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Technological change also drives organisational improvement. The introduction of
technology generally requires work reorganisation, changes to management
processes and investment in training so that staff can reap maximum economic
rewards from the technology. This can result in improved organisational
performance. For example, computers have brought quality and productivity
improvements by facilitating the devolution of responsibility and authority
downward, employee multiskilling and flatter structures."'
Technological change is also increasingly facilitating a global orientation among
firms, thereby providing the opportunity to sell to huge markets across the globe,
rather than simply to Australia's small domestic market. These opportunities have
been facilitated by new communications technologies such as the facsimile,"' e-mall,
the Internet and on-line and tele-conferencing facilities.
2. Market Failure and Australia's Weaknesses in the Diffusion of
Technology
The process of acquiring and exploiting technologies is subject to massive market
failure. Studies have shown that: it can take 20-30 years after the initial adoption for a
major new innovation to be taken up by the great majority of firms in an industry;
and the rate of adoption can differ markedly between nations.t" Therefore, nations in
which governments foster the up-take of transformative technologies can achieve
increased competitiveness, relative to nations with minimal or ineffective technology
policies.
Markets fail to produce the optimal amount of technology diffusion due to: lack of
appropriability of the benefits by firms and the existence of spillovers; the risk and
uncertainty about the results to be gained from technology up-take; the inability of
firms, particularly small ones, to realise scale economies or make the minimum
investment necessary for adoption; and the lack of access by firms to information
about relevant technologies and how to exploit them. To keep abreast of
technological advances occurring across the globe requires a major research capacity.
Managers may lack the time, resources and skills necessary. For these reasons,
relying on the market alone to diffuse technology will lead to sub-optimal
outcomes.t'o
Numerous studies have shown that the up-take of technology by most Australian
manufacturers is unsatisfactory and the performance of Australian manufacturers
lags behind overseas competitors by a substantial margin.T2s At199'J,, only 4L per cent
of Australian manufacturers with 10 or more employees had incorporated one or
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more pieces of AMT into their manufacturing process.t'u Among all businesses in the
manufacturing industry, only 24 per cent acquired any of a broad array of AMT
surveyed between 1 July 1994 and 31 June 1997 and only a further 1.4 per cent were
currently installing AMT or planned to over the next two years."' After 12 years in
office, Labor wrote in its \¡Vhite Paper that '...the take-up of new technology by
Australian industry, in general,Iags three to eight years behind our competitors."'u
Smaller firms have a particularly low rate of technology up-take. A1994 DIST report
found that approximately 30 per cent of medium sized firms and 65 per cent of small
firms report no use of production process technology. Total technology use among
small firms was minimal.t"
Many Australian firms do not understand the advantages of using new technology.
Tlne 1994 DIST report noted that around 50 per cent of Australian businesses have
neither acquired technology nor plan to acquire it in the next five years. Only a small
minority of firms appear to have a comprehensive understanding of the importance
of technology to their performance.t'n
Australian managers generally lack the knowledge and skill to identify and choose
between technology options. Given their lack of resources and the large investment
needed for effective technology management, small firms generally need to be in
networks with other firms to maintain an effective technology strategy.
Unfortunately, many Australian firms remain reluctant to co-operate with other
firms. As such, many firms are largely unaware of technology developments, use
out-of-date technology and under-invest in technology.'3'
Even where firms do take-up technology, managers and workers often lack the
knowledge and skill to adapt and exploit it to its maximum advantage. Where
technology is purchased, it is often not focused on improving the core operations of a
firrn."'This is alarming because it is through adaptation of technology to a firm's
core activities that major product and process innovations can be created.
3. Rationalism and Technology Diffusion
Hardline rationalism also fails to address technological change. Incredibly, while
technological change is acknowledged as a driving force behind growth,
technological change is exogenous to rationalist economic models and barely
mentioned in rationalist discourse. The standard neoclassical model does not include
any theory about how and why technological change occurs. Consequently, in the
model, technological change can not be affected by any form of economic activity
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such as increased investment or government policy.t" As the BIE conclude: 'The fact
that the standard model does not provide any explanation of what influences
... [technological advancement], the most important factor determining growth, is
widely considered to make the model most unsatisfactory..."'n While rationalists
could argue that they don't agree with all the assumptions of the standard
neoclassical model, their failure to advocate active industry policy (including
programs to foster the creation and diffusion of technology) are outcomes that flow
from the'logic' of the standard neoclassical model.
The Labor Government's approach to technology policy has been barely more
positive than this hardline rationalist approach."t Under Labor, Australia had no
substnntial programs explicitly and exclusively directed to encouraging the up-take of
technology. Where programs existed, they were too small to be effective,
rudimentary, and insufficiently focused on industry needs. The name, nature and
purpose of the programs have often been obscure and confusing to firms.t'u The
relative neglect of technology diffusion by the Labor Government, by comparison
with its support for technology development, was a serious policy error, given the
economic benefits that can ensue from the widespread application of new
technology.
Partly as a result of this rationalist neglect of technology policy, Australia does not
have major, co-ordinated national facilities for manufacturing technology
development, in contrast to many OECD and emerging Asian nations.t3t As the Labor
Government wrote after more than a decade in power: '...the existing infrastructure
for technology diffusion is fragmented, lacks critical mass and is poorly performing
in terms of meeting industry requirements."'u Australia's weakness in technology
diffusion is a key impediment to creating an innovation-driven economy and to
restructuring to innovation-intensive manufactures and services, yet rationalism
prescribes that governments pay little attention the issue of technological change.
4. Industry Policies to Foster Excellence in Technology Diffusion
Given that the process of acquiring and effectively deploying transformative
technologies throughout the economy can take decades, there is major scope for
government policies to foster the diffusion of technology and so increase the rate of
innovation, restructuring and growth beyond that achievable by the market alone.
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Technology diffusion policy must ensure that firms can not only take-up technology,
but also deploy it to their maximum advantage. Much of the benefit from technology
comes from its effective application by firms. Some have argued that the key reason
for the Japanese miracle was not so much technology development as their capacity
to use borrowed technology to create new and better products.t" Unfortunately, in
Australia, firms that have acquired technology have often been unable to benefit
substantially due to a lack of skill in applying it. Therefore, effective exploitation of
new technology is an important component of technology diffusion policy.'oo I. many
cases, technology diffusion policy must therefore feed back into R&D policy.
Technology diffusion policy should have two key foci. Firstly, it should target
transformative technologies. Research and knowledge spillovers are likely to be
higher than average among those technologies with applications in numerous
industries.to'
Secondly, technology diffusion policy should focus on technologies of crucial
relevance to key sectors. Technology policy is vital to restructuring because the
technologies that we focus on are important determinants of the sectors in which we
can compete. In turn, this is a major determinant of our growth and living standards.
For example, Japan's dominance of world markets in numerous ETM sectors has
been underwritten by active government policies to foster generic technologies in the
manufacturing and advanced electronics area and through ambitious policies to
diffuse numerically controlled machine tools and robots among small producers who
would otherwise be slow to adopt such technology.'o'By contrast, Australia's greater
relative investment in research in unprocessed commodities, which are declining
areas of world trade, has been a factor in our substantially poorer economic
performance. Thus, decisions on which technologies a nation will specialise, are
critical in determining the nation's industry structure, competitiveness and growth.
Technology diffusion policy should therefore focus on the technology needs of ETMs
and sophisticated services. These sectors are dependent for their competitiveness on
technology and, as a consequence, will produce a higher rate of technological
advance and diffusion than other sectors. In particular, government policy should
target the diffusion of those advanced manufacturing technologies vital to creating
competitive advantage in ETMs.
To target transformative technologies and the technologies of key sectors, the Federal
Government could also establish a Centres for the Diffusion of Key Technologies and
Best Practice Program, based on overseas programs where national networks
provide technology advisory services to firms at a local level.t" A comprehensive
i" Lee D. Dahringer & Hans Muhlbacher, op. cit., p.15.740 Michael Welbourne, Martin Wardrop & Kevin Bryan! op. cit., p.22,25.
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network of centres throughout Australia could help firms to take-up and exploit new
technologies in two key ways.
Firstly, the centres could provide to firms advice and information, education and
training, and referral to bodies that can licence or sell technologies. The information
and advice function could include a substantial global component, Given that the
vast majority of new knowtedge is generated overseas, and the fact that individual
firms generally lack the time, resources and expertise to monitor global technology
developments, the centres could provide information to assist firms to import the
latest technologies. This would follow the success of such centres set up by
Governments elsewhere, such as in Sweden, Germany, France, Japan and Korea.ton
Secondly, the centres could provide technology advisers or consultants on a fee-for-
service basis to assist firms to identify, take-up and effectively apply k"y
technologies. This service is particularly important because studies have shown that
one of the most effective ways of transferring the vast array of knowledge needed for
successful technological innovation is to transfer it via people with previous
experience in the take-up and exploitation of technology.'n'
The program could work in two key ways. Firstly, it could be made available to any
firms that sought out the program's services, and secondly, technology advisers
could proactively seek out SMEs in the ETM and high value services sectors that
would benefit from technology up-take.'nu The latter approach is particularly
important because, as the OECD found, many firms are unaware of new technology
despite information on technology being available, and many have only a limited
understanding of its nature and potential benefits. Therefore, programs that actively
bring new technologies to firms tend to be more successful than programs that
require firms to take the initial steps.'n'As DIST has argued, leaving aside the 500 or
so 'McKinsey firms', there are around 5,500 manufacturing firms with 20 to 99
employees that could benefit markedly from technology up-take. Technology policy
focused on such manufacturers might achieve strong growth in domestic and export
sales among ETM firms and help to produce an economy capable of competing on
the basis of innovation.t"
Such technical assistance could usefully be augmented by an enterprise improvement
component, chiefly involving the supply of experts - on a fee for service basis - to
assist firms to address critical business areas such as finance, work organisation,
networking, marketing and exporting. Such an approach is important because
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practice work organisation. If the National Industry Extension Service program still
existed, such a program could have been built on to the network."'
Where firms wished to engage in major technology development projects (ut
opposed to more simple technology up-take projects), the technology advisers could
broker a consultancy contract between the firm and researchers. In formulating this
part of the program, the Government could draw on the experience of the
Norwegian TEFT program, which involves technology advisers, drawn from
research institutes, assisting SMEs in the manufacturing industry to complete
technology projects in conjunction with research institutes. The two goals of the
program are to: improve the ability of SMEs to work with research institutes and
complete technology projects; and help research institutes to focus their activity on
commercial problems. Under the program, technology advisers approach companies
and do an audit of their general capabilities and technology deployment to
determine their readiness for a technology project. Where a firm has sufficient
capacity to benefit from a technology project, the technology advisers work with the
firm to develop a technology project focused on their core business needs, facilitate a
contract between the firm and a research institution, and then remain on hand to
provide advice and assistance to implement the project. Under the program, the
Government pays for aroundTS per cent of the project and the firm pays for around
25 per cent of the project. Firms can only participate once in the TEFT program."o
The TEFT program has been successful in a myriad of ways. Technology advisers,
backed by significant knowledge of the firms in their geographical area, have been
more successful in selecting firms with potential to successfully complete technology
programs than grant-based programs. Almost half the participating firms have
continued their collaboration with research institutes one to two years after
participating in the program. Many participating firms improved their development
of new products and processes, increased their on-going investment in R&D, and
achieved higher revenue and lower costs.ttt International experience has shown that
using technology advisers as intermediaries between firms and public research
organisations is moÍe effective than simply relying on direct relationships between
firms and researchers, who often have vastly different outlooks and approaches.
Intermediaries can be useful because they can provide information on technologies in
a manner suited to effective communication with firms.tt'
In the Australian context, technology advisers could broker technology development
consultancies between firms and research organisations such as CSIRO, higher
education institutions, industry R&D bodies and CRCs. It may also be sensible to
provide a lower subsidy to firms than under TEFT to help ensure projects are tightly
focused on core business needs. Such a program could target key technology
development needs for Australian industry, namely to: encourage relationships
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between firms and research institutes; facilitate technology development by firms;
and encourage a more applied, commercial focus from research bodies.
To Labor's credit, WorkingNøtion did involve provision of $118.3 million dollars over
4 years from 1994-95 to establish a network of technology diffusion centres. Specialist
Technology Counsellors were recruited to provide a technology information,
advisory and referral service for SMEs to assist them to identify, evaluate and adopt
key technologies, largely through the National lndustry Extension Service network."'
Flowever, the program had run for less than two years when the Government lost
office and a substantial network of technology centres had not been established.
Given the importance of key technologies to establishing competitive advantage on
the basis of irurovation, the Government must show much greater urgency in
building up a comprehensive national technology infrastructure that can assist firms
to take-up and effectively apply key technologies.
Technology diffusion (and development) policy must include a significant education
and training component. For firms to rapidly take-up and exploit new technologies,
they must have staff with technical skills and prior experience of successful
adaptation and have an ongoing R&D capability so that key developments in
technology and competition can be monitored and responded to. Further, managers
must be: technologically astute; able to assess the strategic significance of new
technologies; receptive to continual technology upgrading; committed to
encouraging creativity, learning and risk takinü and willing to implement any work
re-organisation and training necessary to facilitating effective deployment of
technology.tt'
Unfortunately, in Australia, as in many OECD nations, a key reason for the slow
diffusion of key technologies and their sub-optimal application is the scarcity of
technically trained specialists and technologically astute managers. While many
managers have a somewhat vague general awareness of new technologies, most lack
a significant understanding of the specific ways new technologies could assist their
business. In the absence of full receptiveness to technology by managers, access to
technology will not lead to significant technology up-take by firms."' Thus,
technology policy must include significant investment in education and training in
areas crucial to technology development and diffusion, such as science, engineering
and management.ttu
Government could also fund R&D consortia from key sectors to undertake projects
targeted on key technologies, as done in Japan and Europe. Groups of companies
from a sector decide on a R&D project on a technology of particular importance to
them all. Government never provides more than 50 per cent of the funding to ensure
that companies focus on projects that are worth them risking their money.ttt
Flowever, goverrunent funding,by reducing risk and providing financial incentive,
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encourages speedier and more substantial development efforts in new technologies.
Such an approach can increase the rate of technology development and diffusion
across wide areas of the economy.ttt
The Government could also consider the provision of incentives to firms to help
them to lease or purchase specified key technologies. Such policies helped Japan
diffuse numerically controlled machine tools and robots among smaller producers
considerably faster than their foreign competitors.tt' The Italian Government has
encouraged the diffusion of advanced manufacturing technology through similar
mechanisms. Where there is rigorous domestic rivalry among suppliers of the
relevant technology, incentives to lease or purchase advanced technology can
increase innovation and upgrade competitive advantage by firstly, encouraging
firms to take-up advanced technology quickly and thereby achieve advantage based
on innovation and secondly, by stimulating local suppliers of such advanced
technology.tuo
Alternatively, the Government could also consider the merits of establishing a
Technology Credit Insurance Corporation (TCIC), following the example of the
japanese Machinery Credit Insurance System, but focusing it more narrowly on key
technologies. The TCIC would insure lease contracts and instalment-sales contracts
for strategic technologies. This would enable lease companies, manufacturers and
distributors to more readily lease or sell technology to SMEs by removing the risk of
a serious loss caused by the default of leasees or buyers. For the cost of an insurance
premium (which in the Japan scheme is on average less than one per sent of sales
revenue), technology providers could greatly increase sales growth. In this way, the
rate of diffusion of key technologies to SMEs could be increased. In Japan, the
Japanese Credit Insurance Corporation has insured between 235,000 and 299,000
leases or purchases of machinery a yeat, thereby speeding the diffusion of key
technologies such as machine tools, computers and software.'u'
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Chapter L0: Best Practice Work Organisation
1. The Importance of Best Practice Work Organisation to Competitive
Advantage Based on Innovation
In most eras in modern history, particular work organisation paradigms have been
crucial to achieving competitive advantage. Today, firms and nations that can
establish work organisation conducive to fostering innovation can achieve
competitive advantage. Japanese lean production is very instructive in this regard,
because it can enable firms to achieve competitive advantage, through innovation,
over rivals persisting with Taylorist mass production. IA/hile lean production is
primarily applicable to manufacturing, many of its tenets can usefully be applied to
other sectors of the economy. A five year study by the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology of 90 car plants in17 different countries found that lean production: was
twice as productive as mass production; produced much higher quality, with more
than three times less defects per 100 cars; and produced a greater rate of product
innovation, allowing firms to constantly innovate to meet customer needs. Lean
production helped Japan to increase their share of world car production from two to
25 per cent in the 25 years from 1955.?u'
Many nations are yet to have fully mastered the modern best practice paradigm.
Therefore, a major increase in competitive advantage awaits those nations who can
gain the knowledge of what modern best practice involves, disseminate that
knowledge, and then implement best practice throughout their workplaces.
Precisely what best practice work organisation entails is a contentious issue. This part
of the chapter therefore requires an extra task compared with other chapters in part
two. Firstly, it must outline the components of best practice, and secondly, justify the
selection of the component by detailing its importance to achieving an innovation-
driven economy. The components of best practice outlined below are not exhaustive,
but simply highlight some of the best methods of establishing an innovation-driven
firm.
Recognising the Importance of Innovation
The first element of best practice is to recognise that innovation is the key to
competitive advantage. Only then can firms tailor their workplace to the demands of
competing through the creation of high quality, innovative, value-added products.
Innovation Chain Capabilities
Best practice firms have sound capability throughout the innovation chain.
Management capable of implementing best practice work organisation, creating
innovative products and seeking out export opportunities is a crucial part of best
practice. Management is discussed in the next chapter. Of course, an in-house R&D
'u' 7u u" P. Womack, Daniel T. Jones & Daniel Roos, The Machine that Chønged the World, Macmillan, New York,
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capacity, the ability to gain finance and well-developed export marketing capability
are also vital to the innovation process. These matters are discussed in chapters eight,
13 and L4 respectively.
Innovation through Co-operative Linkages
To maximise the capacity to innovate and improve performance, firms must draw on
ideas and information from leading edge customers, R&D providers, suppliers and
other firms in their industry. The following discusses each of these linkages in turn.
Linkages with leading edge buyers, which are generally the most respected firms in
the most sophisticated market for a firm's product, can improve the capacity of firms
to innovate in several ways. Firstly, leading edge buyers generate ideas for firms by
asking them to develop new products or processes, and by exchanging ideas on new
products and processes. Among McKinsey's emerging exporters, 80 per cent said
overseas customers were 'very important or critical' sources of information and 72
per cent said domestic customers were 'very important or critical' sources of
information. Secondly, leading edge buyers foster innovation by giving firms access
to other strategic customers. This assists by providing direct sales and further access
to ideas, and bolsters the firms credibility in the market. Overall, 30 per cent of
McKinsey's emerging exporters said that buyers were very important or critical for
finding and developing new overseas buyers. Finally, when leading edge buyers use
Australian firms to supply their products, they demand very high standards. A
survey of McKinsey's emerging exporters found that 82 per cent believed that
overseas customers were 'very important or critical' in raising their performance
over the last 5 yeats.'u'
Best practice firms also work constructively with their suppliers in order to identify
opportunities to innovate. The close relationship leads to suppliers shifting their
focus from simply seeking to be the lowest cost supplier in order to win contracts, to
instead focusing on the keys to international competitiveness for both firms and
suppliers, namely innovation, quality and value adding. The best of McKinsey's high
growth emerging exporters were willing to: work closely with suppliers on product
development; invest in and train their suppliers; and encourage open communication
and the exchange of ideas. They demanded targets for performance improvement
and regularly evaluated their performance. In turn, the McKinsey firms gained
because suppliers had incentive to focus on, and invest in, the firm's long-term
success.tun In such circumstances, the lead firm gains significantly through access to
innovation from suppliers, and by gaining efficiency through having a reliable, high
quality, long-term source of supply.tuu Porter's study also found that close co-
operative relationships between firms and suppliers was important to achieving
competitive advantage through innovation.tuu
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A close relationship between the parent firm and its suppliers is a key tenet of
Japanese lean production. In lean production, suppliers are picked on the basis of
long-term relationships, not on the basis of being the lowest bidder. Each supplier
specialises in one type of component and does not compete with other suppliers for
that component, so suppliers actively exchange knowledge on innovative production
techniques among each other. Suppliers work constructively with lead firms to
produce the best possible component. In return, the parent firm fosters the
relationship in a range of ways, such as by: respecting the right of the supplier to
make a lair profit; allowing the supplier to keep any proceeds that come from cost
saving innovations; keeping supply orders as constant as possible; providing finance;
and sharing personnel. This engenders the necessary collaboration between suppliers
and parent firms and produces great incentive for continuous improvement and cost
cutting. The lean production method of organising suppliers led to a vastly superior
performance than achieved among mass producers in productivity, innovation,
quality, cost and responsiveness to changing market demands for both suppliers and
parent lirrns.'u'
By contrast, in Taylorist production systems, which are still prevalent in Australian
manufacturing, firms and their suppliers have adversarial relationships. The parent
firm generally designs the part in intricate detail, with supplier's bids competing on
cost alone. Working to blueprint, suppliers have little opportunity or incentive to
suggest improvements in production design based on their own experience, meaning
a significant source of innovation, quality and cost reduction is ignored, Indeed,
suppliers actively withhold information from the lead firm about how parts are
produced so as to seek maximum profits. Further, because each supplier is 'bidded
off' against the others, they don't share ideas on production techniques, thereby
retarding productivity and innovation. The overall approach brings lower quality,
less innovation and higher costs than where suppliers and assemblers work
together.tut
Best practice firms also work collaboratively with other firms. Many firms,
particularly SMEs, lack the resources needed to finance investments in capabilities
vital to their competitiveness. joint initiatives among firms can facilitate projects on
research, technology or product development, disfribution and marketing.^' AMC-
McKinsey research found that Australia's best performing SMEs in the ETM area are
much more likely than average to engage in joint initiatives in product development,
to apply new technology. Firms gain quick access to information, to new ideas and insights, and to supplier
innovations. They have the opportunity to influence suppliers' technical efforts as well as serve as test sites
for development work. The exchange of R&D and joint problem solving lead to faster and more efficient
solutions. Suppliers tend to be a conduit for transmitting information and innovations from firm to firm.
Through this process, the pace of innovation within the entire national industry is accelerated.'
'u' ¡u ." P. Womack, Daniel T. Jones & Daniel Roos, op. cit., p.61,,62,'1.46-151..
768 ibid., p.58,59,67,140-1.42,1.44,14s.
76e Australian Manufacturing Council Secretariat & McKinsey and Company, op. cit., p.39,40; and Jenny
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product research and process R&D.770 Firm collaboration can thus assist firms to
innovate, compete, grow and export beyond what they could achieve alone.
Thus, it is a complex mix of competition between firms in some contexts, and co-
operation in others, rather than simply unfettered competition, that leads to solid
economic performance.tt'
Constant Innovation to Meet Customer Needs
Best practice firms recognise the importance of continuously innovating to meet
customer needs. Fast changing consumer demand creates opportunities for firms to
create competitive advantage by being the first to irurovate to meet new customer
needs."'This requires that firms have flexible production systems. Lean production
allows new cars to be designed in half the time taken by mass producers. Japanese
firms have used short model cycles and product proliferation to achieve competitive
advantage in a range of areas, including cars, motor cycles, cameras, watches and
consumer electronics. By contrast, Taylorist production systems rely on mass
production of standard products to achieve economies of scale, and do not have the
capacity to produce flexibly. Such systems therefore can not meet changing consumer
demands as effectively and result in declining competitiveness.tt3
In the Japanese car sector, flexible production means that cars can be ordered by
customers with precise specifications. Dealers and manufacturers have close
relationships. Dealers have information on computer on all their customers in their
geographic area and periodically visit them to identify their customer needs. These
customer preferences are fed back into the product development process, with sales
staff being loaned to the manufacturer at that stage. In this way, innovations are
always directed at meeting customer needs. The strong investment in providing
excellent service induces brand loyalty and repeat sales and ties the customer to the
retailer and the manufacturet."n
By contrast, in mass production systems, manufacturers produce large numbers of
standard cars and can not produce to order. Further, the relationship between the
manufacturer and the dealer is antagonistic. As sales are left exclusively to the
dealers, there is no mechanism for customer preferences to be fed back to the
manufacturer. Customer needs are not met as effectively. Indeed, given the
antagonistic relationship between manufacturers and dealers, sales people seek to
give customers as little information as possible and sell for the maximum possible
770 McKinsey and Company & the Australian Manufacturing Council Secretaria! op. cit., p.41,42 reported that
among Australia's emerging ETM exporters, 65 per cent of high growth firms have joint initiatives for
product development compared to 39 per cent of all firms, 45 per cent have joint initiatives for product
research compared to 28 per cent for all firms, and 40 per cent have joint initiatives for process R&D
compared w1th22 per cent of all firms.
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price. The focus is on one profitable sale, rather than establishing the trust necessary
for a lifetime of sales.ttt
Worker Empowerment
Best practice firms also utilise the full potential of workers to maximise competitive
advantage. Such worker empowerment can be facilitated in two key ways. Firstly, it
can be facilitated at the workplace level through reforms such as: reducing or
removing supervision and devolving more responsibility to workers; increasing
training and multiskilling to equip workers with the skills to manage their more
demanding roles; establishing work teams; fostering worker commitment by giving
staff ownership over their work; and achieving continuous improvement by
establishing mechanisms to implement the ideas of workers on work organisation."u
Worker empowerment is a key part of ]apanese lean production and it helped
Japanese manufacturers to create a competitive advantage over their Taylorist rivals.
Taylorism involves workers doing a simple, unskilled, repetitive, alienating task on a
production line. Classification structures are hierarchical. Supervisors act as
disciplinarians and specialists undertake other activities such as machine repair. Such
hierarchical structures and deskilled workers can not produce competitive advantage
in key areas such as quality, innovation, flexibility, continuous improvement and
customer Íocrts."' By contrast, Japanese lean production empowered workers to
achieve competitive advantage in all these areas. Workers were placed in teams and
put in charge of their own part in the production process. The maximum number of
tasks and responsibilities were transferred to those workers actually adding value on
the line. Supervisors were entirely removed, thereby saving money on what had
been an activity that added little or no value. Investment in training was increased
greatly as workers had to become multiskilled, learning all the key tasks in their
work area. Workers were actively encouraged to think proactively about how to
improve the production process, and management were prepared to delegate
maximum responsibility to the work team. The teams periodically met to suggest
methods of improving work processes, which led to continuous, incremental
improvement. This process has more recently been called'quality circles'.ttt
A significant competitive advantage was achieved by empowered workers under
lean productiory compared with their de-skilled, alienated counterparts in Taylorist
production systems. \Alhite most workers in Europe and North America did not
make a single suggestion on how to improve work processes over a year, Japanese
workers made an average of 62 suggestions per yeaÍ, most of which were
implemented."'One study found that 60 per cent of industrial innovation in Japan
775 
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emerges from the shop floor.tto Empowering and inspiring workers to lead the
innovation process brought surging competitive advantage through improvements
in work processes, quality, productivity and product innovation.tu'
Worker empowerment also improves product quality because it limits supervision
and instead places ultimate responsibility on workers for the outcome of their work.
Some Australian managers would find this a ridiculous suggestion, believing that
supervisors can detect the faults of workers and fix them, thereby improving quality.
In fact, it is precisely when the 'safety net' of supervision is removed and staff are
held ultimately responsible for the outcomes of their work that quality has been
shown to rise. Quality also rises because giving staff control over their work
improves work satisfaction and the pride workers take in their work. Workers also
have more time to focus on quality when they are freed from having to constantly
show their work to managers.
The Womack, Jones and Roos study showed that giving workers control and
responsibility for their work outcomes leads to improved quality. In mass production
plants, workers were not held responsible for the quality of their work. They simply
allowed defects to pass down the line because they knew there was a rework area at
the end of the line. By contrast, in lean production, workers were made responsible
for the quality of their work. Over time, as work teams gained experience in
identifying and tracing problems to their ultimate cause, the number of errors
dropped dramatically and although every worker could stop the line, it almost never
stopped. Eventually, Toyota assembly plants performed negligible rework, yet had
among the lowest number of defects in the world. By contrast, most mass production
plants devote 20 per cent of plant area and 25 per cent of their work hours fixing
mistakes. Productivity and quality achieved are considerably lower.'u'
The second way worker empowerment can be facilitated is through the
establishment of industrial democracy structures that allow co-determination of
company decisions in areas such as training and skill formation, work organisation,
innovation, quality control, investment and marketing. Austrnlia Reconstructed noted
that such structures have been operating in West Germany, Austria, Sweden and
Norway for decades. For example, in Sweden, there are generally two worker
representatives on Boards of Directors and at least 50 per cent worker representation
on industrial democracy structures such as economic committees, works councils and
safety committees. Austrnlia Reconstructed concluded that employee empowerment in
those nations, by unlocking the potential of workers, led to improved output,
productivity, quality, customer service and competitiveness and reduced disputation
and absenteeism. Employers agreed that worker empowerment was positive
economically, even in its most contentious applicatiory namely representation on
780 ACTU/TDC Mission to Western Europe, op. cit., p.155,156.
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Boards of Directors."' These benefits of industrial democracy and employee
empowerment have been confirmed elsewhere.ttn
Utilising the Talents of All
Best practice firms do not discriminate against women and minority groups. Instead,
they recruit on the basis of merit because they recognise that achieving competitive
advantage in innovation-intensive production requires a highly skilled workforce.
Studies have confirmed the importance of equal employment opportunity (EEO) to
economic performance. A United States study of Standard and Poors 500 companies
found that companies committed to promoting women and minority workers had an
average annual return on investment of L8.3 per cent, compared with 7.9 per cent
among those firms with poor EEO records.ttt Given the under-representation of
women and migrants in senior positions, it is vital that firms have EEO strategies to
ensure recruitment, selection, promotion and transfer occurs on the basis of merit.'uu
Best practice firms complement these measures with initiatives to assist workers to
reconcile efficient and productive work with their family responsibilities, a vital
consideration given that 60 per cent of families with dependent children have both
parents in the workforce.ttt
In summary, to achieve competitive advantage based on innovation, a new style of
workplace is required. Hierarchical structures that actually prevent staff from
making a significant contribution to continuous improvement must give way to
work organisation that: recognises innovation and quality as central to achieving
competitive advantage; gives workers the skills, autonomy and responsibility to
drive continuous improvement; focuses on customer needs; maintains strong
linkages with leading customers, suppliers and other firms directed at increasing the
rate of innovation; and includes strong capability in R&D, management, deploying
technology and export marketing. If Australia could rapidly implement best practice
throughout its economy, it could achieve a surge in national competitiveness through
innovation.
2. Market Failure and Australia's Weaknesses in Best Practice Work
Organisation
History shows that markets can take decades to disseminate new paradigms of best
practice throughout national economies. The capacity to implement new forms of
work organisation has been a key cause of differing economic outcomes between
nations. Nations that have quickly mastered new best practice paradigms have
783 ACTU/TDC Mission to Western Europe, op. cit., p.136,162.
784 Department of Employment and Industrial Relations, Industrial Denrccracy and Enryloyee Participatiotr: A Policy
Discussion Paper, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, "1986, p.37.
785 Stephen Gaskill, A Solid Int¡estment: Making FuIl Llse of the Nøtion's Hunnn Cnpital: Reconunendations of tltc
Federal Glass Ceiling Commission, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis Missouri, Washington D. C., 1995, p.5.
786 Affirmative Action Agency, A Practical Guide to Afirmatioe Action, Affirmative Action Agency, Sydney, n.d.,
outlines an EEO policy.
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achieved national affluence. For example, in the 1800s, English mastery of crnft
production, in which each worker made whole products, was an important cause of
their economic dominance. In this century, the rise of the United States to economic
superpower was partly caused by their mastery of Taylorist or Fordisú production.'uu
By the 1940s, the United States accounted for more than half the world's gross
national product.tte By contrast, Europe did not convert to Taylorist mass production
for decades after the United States, leaving a gulf in economic outcomes. It took 50
years to diffuse across the world. Finally, the unprecedented economic performance
of the japanese economy since 1950 was partly due to the fact that they were first to
master leøn production, which has been shown to lead to vastly superior quality,
productivity and innovation than that achievable under Taylorism. While Japan had
invented lean production and was disseminating it widely throughout their economy
by the 1950s, Western manufacturers ignored lean production for decades and stuck
with their mass production techniques. Many still persist with Taylorism."o
Australian firms have barely begun to implement modern best practice work
organisation. Indeed, most do not recognise that innovation is the key to national
competitive advantage and are not aware of many of the key components of best
practice. Instead, many firms focus on negative cost-cutting and selling low cost
products. The ensuing work organisation can never achieve competitive advantage
through innovation, Firms that seek to compete on the basis of cost in innovation-
intensive market segments are prone to failure because their focus on low prices
creates insufficient revenue to finance sufficient investment in capabilities necessary
to producing and selling innovative products, such as R&D, skills development and
marketing. The result is that firms move progressively into market segments
vulnerable to price-based competition from developing countries. As argued earlier,
this can not be the basis for sustainable competitive advantage.'n'
Given that Australian firms generally lack awareness of what constitutes best
practice, it is not surprising that they have not implemented it to any great extent.
The widespread ignorance and poor overall competency of Australian management
is a key reason why best practice work organisation has failed to spread widely
throughout the econoÍr1y.'n'The R&D performance of most firms is poor, many lack
the skills to attract finance, and the great majority do not export.
Australian firms generally do not utilise linkages with leading edge customers, R&D
providers, suppliers and other firms in their industry. An AMC-McKinsey study
found that even most of Australia's emerging ETM export firms still lack the web of
relationships that could provide them with ideas for innovation and performance
improvement. While many had developed strong links with customers, few had
ttt 
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strong links with other firms, suppliers and public R&D providers."'Australian firms
have generally been opposed to joint projects because they believe sharing market
knowledge with competitors gives away potential advantage. Unfortunately, it is
often only through joint projects that SMEs can make the investments necessary to
survive and grow in innovative segments.t'o The failure to share information also
retards the diffusion of innovative ideas, technology and best practice work
organisation throughout the economy.t"
Worker empowerment has not been substantially achieved in Australia, although the
award restructuring process did lead to a significant increase in multiskilling,'nu
brought some progtess in establishing skills-based classification structures and flatter
structures, and led to increased investment in training.ttt FIowever, many workplaces
remain hierarchical, with workers untrained, given little responsibility, heavily
supervised and understandably apathetic. Many managers remain paternalistic and
defensive of 'managerial prerogatives'. Adversarial relationships between workers
and management still generally prevail and workers aÍe seen as costly factors of
production to be controlled, rather than assets with much to contribute towards
achieving competitive advantage. There is little enthusiasm for active employee
involvement in workplaces through work groups on the shop floor.'nt A 1995 EPAC
paper noted that'...the transition from a 'compliance' to a 'commitment' model of
employment relations ...is incomplete or piecemeal in many organisations..."" The
Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey found that in 1990, only 13 per
cent of all workplaces with over 20 employees had installed quality circles or
productivity improvement groups.too Progress towards the establishment of work
teams has been poor.tot
In manufacturing, Australia is being crucially disadvantaged by widespread
continuation of Taylorist work organisation. Taylorist workplaces, because they
alienate and stifle workers, rather than empower them to drive change, can never
bring competitive advantage based on innovation.to'
There is also little enthusiasm for active employee participation though
representation on industrial democracy structures. Kitay and Lansbury noted that
'...there has been little role for unions and employees in the governance of
7e3 Australian Manufacturing Council Secretariat & McKinsey and Company, op. cit., p.lä,6,7.
tto Th"r" are the views of Dr Cantoni, director of the Australian Telecornmunications Research Institute at
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enterprises...'uo' Forums in which management and labour could discuss work
organisation reforms have not developed in most organisations.uon Surveys have
shown that a large majority of managers believe that employee involvement in
decision making has 'little impact' on productivity.*o' In nearly three quarters of
workplaces, unions are not consulted or even informed about organisational changes
that affect employees. Only seven per cent of workplaces have workers on Boards of
Directors.sou
Thus, while nations like japan extract maximum input from employees on how to
create competitive advantage, the vast majority of Australian firms persist with
hierarchical, top-down management and thereby ignore the vast potential of the
workforce to contribute to innovation, quality and productivity.so'
The talent and skill of women continues to be under-utilised. Despite having higher
numbers in higher education, women are under-represented in jobs critical to the
establishment of national competitive advantage. At November 1996, women
remained concentrated in low paid occupations, with 53 per cent of female
employees working as clerks and sales and personal service workers and a further 9
per cent working as labourers and related workers. Meanwhile, women comprised
only 2.1of Australia's 6.3 million full time workers; were over-represented in part-
time and casual work; and made up only 24 per cent of managers and administrators
and 45 per cent of professionals/para-professionals.tot Tlne 1996 Boards of Directors in
Australia study found that only one per cent of company executive directors were
women.to' Widespread introduction of work and family measures is also yet to be
achieved.tto
People from non-English speaking backgrounds are also under-represented in key
occupations including management. This is particularly concerning given their
capacity to increase exports through their language skills and understanding of
export markets.ttt Given that women and migrants account for the majority of the
population, their under-representation in jobs crucial to national competitiveness is
harming national economic performance.
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3. Rationalism and Best Practice Work Organisation
Orthodox theory subsumes any explanation of the dynamic process of work
organisation under an abstract model of factor substitution and technical changes
induced by changes in relative factor prices.tt'Partly as a result, rationalists tend to
believe that competition and unfettered markets will alone produce best practice
work organisation.
There are two key weaknesses in the rationalist approach to the labour market. The
first weakness is that wage and cost reductions are seen as the key to improved
economic outcomes. For some rationalists, this prescription stems from their focus on
factor substitution. Any unemployment is assumed to stem from wages being above
their market clearing level. Wages must be cut to increase the demand for labour and
eliminate unemployment. As noted earlier, a sole focus on cost-cutting can not
produce sustainable competitive advantage.
The second rationalist policy weakness is the assumption that relatively free markets
will produce best practice. Rationalist prescriptions in the labour market are almost
solely directed to methods of deregulation, such as moving from centralised wage
fixing to a deregulated enterprise bargaining framework, with a minimal role for
awards, unions, workers, government and the Australian Industrial Relations
Commission in influencing workplace outcomes. Very little attention is given to the
desired ends of workplace change, namely what constitutes best practice work
organisation and how it could be implemented. It is simply assumed that in an
environment of free markets and competition, firms will know what to do. The
weakness of this approach is that, as demonstrated above, most firms have little
knowledge of the components of best practice, let alone the means or will to
implement it. Indeed, the situation is worse than this. The rationalist dominated
debate has convinced many employers that the k"y to improved economic
performance is to focus largely on cutting costs, wages and conditions. Again, the
market has failed to disseminate best practice work organisation, despite the
existence of a modern best practice paradigm for more than four decades.
4. Industry Policies to Foster Excellence in Work Organisation
In an environment in which the market mechanism can take decades to diffuse new
forms of best practice, Australia can increase its international competitiveness by
being among the first nations to implement the new paradigm of best practice. In
manufacturing, only one nation has mastered lean production, while many are just
beginning to implement it.813 Given the improvements to competitiveness available
through implementing best practice, this situation provides a major opportunity for
Australia to significantly improve its economic performance.
In all nations that have been relatively successful in diffusing best practice
throughout their economies, public agencies have guided the diffusion."o Much of
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what can be done to encourage best practice work organisation is discussed in other
sections in part two. In particular, the spread of best practice would be fostered by
policies to improve Australia's capability in education and training, management,
R&D, technology diffusion and export marketing.
Government can build on these initiatives in two key ways. Firstly, Australian
employers, managers, unions, workers and bureaucrats must be comprehensively
educated in what best practice involves. This will require the Government, in
consultation with industry and unions, to formulate and publish a vision of best
practice and disseminate it widely. Secondly, the Government needs to provide
mechanisms to facilitate the rapid implementation of best practice.
To diffuse best practice quickl/, the capacity to produce workplace change across
whole industries should be restored and fostered. Devolving agreements solely to
the workplace level means there is little capacity to quickly implement best practice
across whole industries and thereby achieve rapid surges in competitiveness.
Nations that have advanced the furthest towards best practice have kept a strong
industry level approach and some centralisation, sometimes in concert with
workplace deals.t" To foster industry-wide workplace change, industry workplace
change committees could be established with representation from employers and
unions. Their aim would be to establish an overall vision for workplace change in the
industry and then produce industry agreements to implement the vision in the
industry's workplaces over time. It is hoped that industry agreements,
complemented by specific agreementS at the workplace level, would facilitate the
rapid diffusion of best practice across the economy.
The Government could establish an Industry Reform Program to support the
establishment of industry agreements. The program could provide partial funding
for agreement making, research and expert personnel and could help produce
literature on workplace change being undertaken in the industry. Ideally, industry
agreements might comprehensively tackle several major planks of the best practice
agenda. For example, firms could decide to establish the worker empowerment
agenda over a three year period. Having numerous firms in the industry complete
the process together would provide great opportunities for shared learning and
efficient implementation. It would also make production of information facilitating
the process efficient and effective. Conceivably, industry agreements, with the
support of the Industry Reform Program, could lead to widespread implementation
of the best practice agenda within a decade and produce a surge in competitive
advantage.
Workplace agreements could usefully complement such industry agreements.
Flowever, such workplace agreements must involve co-determination by workers
and management, not an employer/management driven process with mock
consultation of the workforce.t'u Legislation andf or a national agreement between
the ACTU, peak employer organisations and the Government could achieve co-
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determination through 50 per cent worker representation on industrial democracy
structures covering areas crucial to the competitiveness of firms. The Government
could also consider legislation to require employee participation on Boards of
Directors in companies with more than 100 employees.t" Employees, because they
work at the coal face, can make substantial contributions to productivity if their
potential is unlocked via participation on workplace governance structures, rather
than being substantially ignored, as is the case at present.
To encourage positive economic outcomes, a'no disadvantage test' should remain on
workplace or industry agreements and a minimum award safety net covering all
'standard' conditions should be enshrined in legislation. There should also be regular
National Pay Cases to provide across the board pay increases.t" Such a framework
prevents firms from seeking the ultimately self-defeating strategy of cutting worker
entitlements as a means of improving competitiveness. Instead, as shown by the
experience of firms in Japan, Germany and Italy, firms must focus on reforming their
work processes and implementing best practice to achieve sustainable competitive
advantage.tt'
The Government could encourage the spread of lean production throughout
manufacturing through a Lean Production Program. The Government would
provide incentives for ]apanese firms to locate plants in Australia where they involve
the establishment of lean production. In return, the firm would train Australian
workers and managers to run the enterprise so that we could establish a skills and
knowledge base in lean production. Site visits by other Australian firms and
publications on lean production would assist to disseminate lean production
throughout manufacturing. It has been shown lean production, after a learning
period, can be successfully transplanted in nations outside Japan, and that having
lean competitors nearby mass producers shows the latter the methods for reform.u'o
These initiatives could be complemented by the recommencement of programs
established by Labor which, although relatively small insize, showed the potential of
government programs to diffuse best practice. In particular, the National Industry
Extension Service (NIES) network delivered enterprise improvement programs
through a network of offices throughout Australia. In \994-95, nearly 3,000 firms
participated in Auslndustry-NlES enterprise improvement programs.t" A 1996 Price
Waterhouse review of Auslndustry's enterprise improvement programs argued that
market failure was occurring in the spread of best practice due to spillovers and the
inability of small manufacturers to assess the benefits of best practice activities,
leading to an underinvestment in best practice by firms. The study showed that firms
t" Th""" icleas are derived from, but are somewhat different to, the reforms suggested in ACTU/TDC Mission
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participating in enterprise improvement programs formed a higher level of
commitment to a range of best practice activities. Between 1990-91 and 1994-95,
enterprise improvement participants achieved: total sales growth of 18 per cent,
compared to 14 per cent among all manufacturers; and export growth of 63 per cent,
compared to 39 per cent among all manufacturers. Given the market failure
occurring in the diffusion of best practice and the benefits achieved by the prograÍn,r"
the study concluded that: 'ongoing Government intervention in the SME "fi:rarket"
for EI [Enterprise Improvement] programs is warranted...'u" Thus, these enterprise
improvement programs could be recommenced as part of the Centres for the
Diffusion of Key Technologies and Best Practice program suggested in the previous
chapter.
Labor's Australian Best Practice Demonstration Program (ABPDP) assisted 42
companies to implement best practice and achieve substantial improvements in
performance. Best practice initiatives were then demonstrated to other firms.o'o It
may be that the program could be usefully recorrunenced, particularly if focused on
SMEs, which are often have little awareness of best practice.
In the early 1990s, Labor also established the Business Networks Program, which was
effective in establishing a range of networks between SMEs (and sometimes between
SMEs and research agencies, tertiary institutions and/or large enterprises) to
facilitate activities including procurement, product or process development,
distribution, domestic andf or export marketing and after sales service. Under the
program, network brokers assisted with feasibility studies and the development of
the business plan and seed funding was provided for the first year of operation.u" At
30 June 1996, L81 networks, involving almost 900 firms, had received support under
the program. Of these, 15 networks had lapsed and'1.66 networks were in the process
of being established or were fully operational."u Such funding is important because
set-up costs are an important impediment to the establishment of joint initiatives.*"
The program played an important role in fostering the networking so important to
enabling SMEs to compete on the basis of innovation. Given Australia's weakness in
this area, the program could usefully be recommenced.
The Government could also foster the diffusion of best practice by establishing a
national network of volunteer mentors, based on the Service Corps of Retired
Executives (SCORE) Association in the United States. SCORE was founded in 1964
and has 12,400 volunteer members and 389 chapters throughout the United States.
Working and retired executives and business owners provide confidential
counselling and mentoring to help people start and operate small businesses
successfully. Volunteers also co-ordinate low-cost seminars and workshops to
822 Price Waterhouse, The Longer Tern Impacts of Participation in Auslndustry Enterprise Improttenrcnt Programs:
Report for the Office of AusIndustry, Price Waterhouse, Canberra, 1996, p.i-äi,17,38,39.
82.1 lþld./ p.lll.
824 The improvements in work organisation achieved by the ABPDP are outlined in Department of Industrial
Relations, Best Prnctice in Action, Department of Industrial Relations, Canberra, 1995.
82s Auslndustry, Business Nehoorks Program, Department of Industry, Science and Tourism, Canberrc, 1997,
p.4,5,8,9,12.
826 Department of Industry, Science and Tourism , Annual Report 1995-96, op. cit., p.60,61.
827 Australian Manufacturing Council Secretariat & McKinsey and Company, op. cit., p.45,50.
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provide business people with additional training on specific business topics. In1996,
almost 257,000 business people were assisted with counselling and workshops and
more than one million hours were donated to help small business people.ttt Australia
does not have a comprehensive network providing mentoring support for
businesses. The Federal Government should have several grant rounds to provide
small amounts of seed funding to help organisations to establish such mentoring
support services for businesses in their local area. For minimal short-term cost,
significant on-going mentoring support for businesses could be facilitated through an
Australia wide network of experienced volunteer mentors, thereby producing
further diffusion of best practice.
The Government could also foster EEO by: providing sufficient resources for the
Affirmative Action Agency; disseminating information on establishing EEO
programs; directing the private sector to set their own, realistic targets for the
increased participation of women in private sector management, corporate boards
and academia and setting quotas if satisfactory performance is not achieved within 5
years;u" and increasing incentives for the establishment of work based child care
centres.
828 United States Small Business Administration Homepage at2SJanuary 1998.
82e Industry Task Force on Leadership and Management Skills, op. cit., p.27-29.
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Chapter 1l: Management
L. The Importance of Management to Competitive Advantage Based
on Innovation
Skilled and experienced managers are vital to achieving competitive advantage
thfough innovation because it is management that must oveÍsee those innovative
processes that can turn a potentially lucrative idea into a fast selling product. For
example, managers must oversee R&D projects and create excellence in work
organisation. Managers must also decide on the take-up of new technology, attract
finance, create and maintain a skilled workforce, implement marketing plans and
seek out export markets. In addition to having the skill to manage these complex
processes, managers must be able to determine which ideas have commercial
potential and be prepared to invest significantly, often at considerable risk, to create
a successful product. It is management that must grasp the opportunities offered in a
global environment in which some products and services may become quickly
obsolete, while major market opportunities open up elsewhere. Firms and nations
with managers that can affect continuous organisational change to get out of
declining market segments, and seize export opporfunities in growing segments, will
achieve successful restructuring, high exports and strong growth. Firms and nations
with managers that are unable to adapt to change will suffer stagnation."n
Management skills are thus a key determinant of the capacity to export. McKinsey's
world wide research has shown that one of the critical factors that enables firms to
successfully export is to have rr\anagement that is pro-active and committed to
innovation and change. A McKinsey/AMC report found that the leadership of a
firm's top management and their commitment to exporting was one of the three key
elements distinguishing high exporting firms from non-exporting firms.
Management commitment is vital because export success can require much
perseverance, sometimes including three to ten years of low or negative returns,
before fruit is born. The report further noted that many non-exporting firms had the
quality products and overall potential for achieving high exports, but did not export
simpty because they lacked the vision of themselves as an exporting firm.ut'
Management is also crucial to restructuring. While the McKinsey report found that
management skilt was important in achieving exports of ETMs,tt' the LEK
Partnership study showed that committed, passionate individuals in leadership were
a highly common feature of successful service exporting firms.t"
Managers, through their capacity to drive innovation, are also pivotal to achieving
employment growth. A 1994 OECD paper, the Employment/Unemployment Study,
concluded that the principle reason for the decline in employment growth
throughout the OECD has been an insufficient capacity to innovate and adjust, and
ibid., p.6,93,1O0.
McKinsey and Company & the Australian Manufacturing Council Secretariat, op. cit., p.17-19,57
ibid., p.77-19.






that the key reason for this is that management skills and education and training in
all countries, bar lapan, had fallen behind the requirements of a technologically
advanced economy.uto
Thus, management skills are crucial to building innovative, export-oriented firms
and therefore to restructuring, employment growth and national competitive
advantage.
2. Market Failure and Australia's Weaknesses in Management
Markets fail to produce large numbers of effective managers because for individual
firms, the cost of providing the educatiory training and experience needed to
produce good managers can rarely be returned to the firm, given that managers can
leave the firm.
Australia's overall management capability is poor.t" The Karpin report estimated
how Australian enterprises were performing on a range of tasks compared to world
best practice at 201.0. The results were as follows:
Australia's Management Competence in a Range of Tasks: Percentage of 20L0 Best
Practice












Source: Industry Task Force on Leadership and Management Skills, Enterprising Nation: Reneuting Australia's
Managers to Meet the Challenges of the Asia-Pacifc Century: Report of the Industry Task Force on Leadership and
Management Skills: Executiue Summary, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1995, p.7,8. Note
that the figures have been read from a bar graph and rounded to the nearest five per cent.
IMD's World Competitiueness Yearbook 1996 found that Australia's management was
poor by world standards, with overall management efficiency ranked 30th of the 46
nations included in the study. Of particular concern was that Australian managers
834 Industry Task Force on Leadership and Management Skills, op. cit., p.94.
83s Industry Task Force on Leadership and Management Skills, op. cit., p.14,15 noted that a1995 study by the
Institute for Research into International Competitiveness of Australia's customers in 5 Asian nations founcl
that Australian managers were rated a long way behind the other five competitor nations in the stucly
(Gerrnany, Japan, Taiwan, UK and the USA) in a range of managernent competencies inclucling
entrepreneurial skills, networking with businesspeople overseas, creativity in generating new business
venfures and ability to explore business opportunities. Others to note the poor overall cornpetency of
Australian management include: Julian Disney, Some Priorities for National Deuelopment - A Paper Prepnred for
the 'Conference on SociøI lustice' organised by the ACT Council of Social Seraice, Canberrn, 2 April 1993,
Unpublished,1993, p.14; ACTU/TDC Mission to Western Europe, op. cit., p.120; and Peter Ewer, Winton




















were ranked 37th for 'entrepreneurship and innovation' and 32nd for the time they
take to launch new products into the market.t'u Indeed, there is often significant
contempt for innovators and their technical abilities among Australian managers.t"
Australian managers tend to be strongly focused on negative cost-cutting, rather
than new product development.t"
Part of the weakness of Australian management in encouraging innovation can be
explained by the short-term horizons imposed by Australia's management and
accounting systems, which focus on quarterly and annual returns on investment. In
seeking to maximise annual returns, it can be far easier to reduce investment, rather
than seeking to maximise returns, by reducing spending on activities crucial to
continuing success for the enterprise. This short-term focus can be reinforced where
managers receive large annual bonuses based on annual profits. Achieving and
maintaining competitive advantage requires continuous innovation, which
necessitates considerable investment in innovative activities. Unfortunately, this can
mean that capital budgeting requirements will vary significantly from time to time.
High short-term investment and debt - and ensuing low returns - are often vital to
achieving longer term competitive advantage based on innovation. While Australia's
firms often sacrifice investment for short-term profit, world best competitors
establish a competitive advantage through further innovation. By the time Australian
firms begin to lose market share, it is generally too late to regain lost ground. Thus,
the short-term profit focus of our management plays an important part in the cycle of
disinvestment, stagnation and business failure.u"
Not surprisingly,lack of management skill appears to be constraining growth of high
technology firms. These firms often have particular management and financing
requirements given high R&D expenditures, early involvement in export markets
and rapid growth. The Epsie report found that lack of management skills was
constraining the growth of high technology firms because: they are often run by
people with strong technical backgrounds but minimal management skills; they
underestimate the importance of employing management, marketing, finance,
accounting, production and administration expertise; the education system is failing
to provide appropriate management training for high-technology entrepreneurs;
high technology firms often have difficulty recruiting managers with the necessary
skills and experience; and, managers in high technology firms can't get the finance
they need to fund their rapid growth because they are reluctant to take on the equity
836 IMD, op. cit., p.63,511,515.
t" 
John M. Legge, The Competitiae Edge, op. cit., p.xii,xiir.t" FI. Sowaga, ch.4 'The role of innovation and top management in Australian corporations - A survey of
manufacturing companies' in Kyoko Sheridan (ed.), op. cit., pp.51,-64 at p.53-55 reported that in his survey,
only 31 per cent of Australian firms focused their management strategies on new product development
compared to 55 per cent of Japanese firms, while only 12 per cent of Australian firms focused their
management strategies on diversification compared to 27 per cent of |apanese firrns. Typically, curtailing
costs was the prime management focus among Australian firms, with almost 40 per cent having cost cutting
as their prime management focus, a figure more than three times the proportion of Japanese firms that were
similarly focused.
u'n 
1u..,", Juniper, op. cit., p,69,70,74,75; Paul Chapman, ch.3'Australian industry - surely not "no policy"' in
Michael Costa & Michael Easson (eds), op. cit., pp.69-96 at p.70,71,; and Peter Ewer, Winton Higgins &
Annette Stevens, op. cit., p.60,64,65.
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investors, lack the experience in framing investment proposals and often pursue
inappropriate loan funds.uoo
The capacity of Australian management to achieve export growth also appears
questionable. The 1996 IMD report found that Australia's senior managers were
ranked 26th in terms of their experience in international business.tn' The Hughes
Report found that the k"y reasons why most of Australia's 40,000 potential
manufacturing and service exporting firms did not export was because Australia's
managers lacked the knowledge and experience necessary to export and were
excessively risk averse.tn'The McKinsey survey of emerging exporters also found
that inadequate management skills were a significant constraint to exporting,
particularly as firms grow and the range of management skills required expands.uo'
Australian managers generally have little knowledge about what best practice
involves, let alone the capacity to implement it. Many view negative cost-cutting as a
priority and continue with a hierarchical, adversarial approach. Few have
substantially adopted key elements of best practice, such as worker empowerment,
working with leading edge customers and suppliers and focusing on quality and
innovation. Australian enterprises, training providers and educational institutions
are moving much slower towards the implementation of the new management
paradigm than many of their counterparts overseas.t*
In 1994-95, only around 17 per cent of managers had tertiary business
qualifications.'ot Further, the Karpin report estimated that 180,000 of Australia's
400,000 frontline managers have no formal management training. This is of major
concern because frontline managers are the largest group of managers numerically
and are central to a firm's performance.tnu
Many of Australia's SMEs stagnate and fail because of a lack of management
competence. Evidence outlined in the Beddall report suggested that 86 per cent of
people considering whether to start a small business had not undertaken any
training in managing small businesses and only one-fifth of owner/managers had a
trade, technical or professional qualification that required study extending beyond a
year. Many small business people appear to believe that small business advisory
services and management training are not necessary nor valuable. This is a
disturbing situation given that, simply to survive, small business owner/managers
need a range of operational skills, such as financial planning and cash flow
management, and must deal with a complex array of legislative issues such as
840 Australian Academy of Technological Sciences, op. cit., p.1.,1'J.,1.2,17,'1.8,37,38.
84r IMD, op. cit., p.518.
842 Report of the Committee for Review of Export Market Development Assistance, Australian Exports:
Perþrmance Obstacles and Issues of Assistance: Report of the Contmittee for Rettieut of Export Market Dettelopnrent
Assistance, Australian Government Publishing Serwice, Canberra, 7989, p.40.
843 McKinsey and Company & the Australian Manufacturing Council Secretariat, op. cit., p.52,53.
844 Industry Task Force on Leadership and Management Skills, op. cit., p.3-6.
84s Industry Commission & Department of Industry, Science and Tourism, A Portrøit of Australian Business:
Results of the L995 Business Longitudinal Suntey, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra,7997,
p."170.
846 Industry Task Force on Leadership and Management Skills, op. cit., p.33,34.
200
taxation, industrial relations, superannuation, workers compensation and business
licensing. Evidence provided to the Beddall committee suggested that this lack of
management education led to between 66 and 90 per cent of small businesses failing
within five years.to'Thus, the great majority of small business owner/managers don't
have the management skills to survive, let alone the skills in managing R&D,
technology, work organisation, finance, marketing and exporting needed to grow
into world competitive exporters in affluent market segments.
The Karpin report found that part of the reason for Australia's poor management is
that the typical management education provider is substantially below best practice
in virtually aIl areas of management education. Australia's university management
schools are not effectively teaching best practice work organisation, nor the new
paradigm for management and there are no world class management schools in
Australia. TAFE management and small business training is also below world best
standard.uot
The Karpin report also found that '...while there are examples of best practice
management development in Australia, overall performance is weak across large,
medium and smaller enterprises."ot The development of Australian managers was
failing in a range of areas including: low levels of education and training undertaken;
over-reliance on short courses; failure to handle the transition from specialist to
manager; failure to link management development to strategic business direction;
and failure to evaluate management development activities.tto
The Karpin report concluded:
...[I]n the Task Force's opinion, most Australian managers, enterprises, education and
training providers are currentþ a long way from world best practice... Australian
management must improve significantþ in the next decade if enterprises expect to even
meet today's world best practice standards... [T]he evidence of Task Force consultations and
research clearly indicates that the majority of Australia's managers do not have the
education and skill levels of those of the major trading nations, nor are most of our
educational and training institutions providing world class ser,rices.85'
3. Rationalism and Management
Rationalists view management as a private concern exogenous to policy making. For
example, the Hughes report argued: '...[G]ood management [is]...large1y a function of
a competitive environment.'8s' While competition can be a useful spur to
performance, the evidence above indicates that increasing competition and freeing
uut Ho.rr" of Representatives Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technol ogy, Snnll Business in
Austrølia: Report by the House of Representatiues Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology,
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1990, p.208-212. Industry Task Force on Leadership
and Management Skills, op. cit., p.7 also found that SME managers are generally not tertiary qualified ar-rd
generally do not undertake management development to any significant extent.





852 Report of the Committee for Review of Export Market Development Assistance, op. cit., p.36.
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markets has not brought sound management. The Labor Government generally
followed rationalist approach to management, doing very little to improve it over 13
years,"' despite the fact that government reports had been highlighting the
importance of management since the 1970s,ttn and despite considerable information
showing Australia's management was amongst the worst among industrialised
nations. The Karpin report noted that while policymakers have focused on
improving workforce skills and productivity, '...managers - whose skills can
determine enterprise and economic performance - have received scant attention from
analysts and policymakers."tt Even after the Karpin report outlined the vast
weaknesses of Australia's management performance, and outlined a range of
initiatives that could build Australia's management capacity, Labor did little to
address this key weakness in Australia's innovation chain. This rationalist 'do
nothing' approach will continue to result in Australia having poor managers and a
constrained ability to innovate, compete, restructure and grow.
4. Industry Policies to Foster Excellence in Management
Government action can do much to improve management. The scope for gains is
significant given the importance of management and the fact that most of Australia's
one million managers are performing well below world best practice.ttu
To overcome Australia's weakness in management education and training, the
Government should adopt the Karpin report recoÍunendation to establish a National
Management School with satellite centres in at least two capital cities. It is hoped the
school could achieve excellence through sound resourcing and economies of scale,
attracting world class academics and students and developing close links with the
top regional schools in Asia. In turry the school could drive improvements in the
quality of management education across Australia by: training the management
academics of the future; advancing Australia's understanding of management by
supporting quality research; developing world class management education and
training curricula; fostering improved teaching; and informing other management
schools of better approaches through the organisational learning that would ensue in
such a facility. The national management school itself could produce numerous
quality Master of Business Administration graduates for Australian enterprises and
improve the continuing education of practicing managers through executive and
company training.ut'
The quality of management education and training could be further advanced
through the establishment of a professional accreditation system, which would
encourage management schools to achieve minimum professional standards in their
8s3 
For example, note the dearth of initiatives on nÌanagementinWorking Nation: Policies ønd Programs, op. cit., at
p.72.
8s4 Write Pnper on Mønuføcturing Industry, op. cit., p.27; and John Crawford, Brian Inglis, R.J.L. Hawke & N.S.
Currie, Study Group on Structural Adjustment: Report, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra,
"t979,7.62.
8ss Industry Task Force on Leadership and Management Skills, op. cit., p.5.
8s6 ibid., op. cit., p.13.
8s7 ibid., p.42,4s,46.
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course offerings and provide a quality assurance indicator for prospective students.
Financial incentives to improve quality could also be provided.utu
The quality of management education could be further encouraged by providing
additional funding for applied research, particularly by way of PhD scholarships at
the proposed national school. This would provide a higher level of training for many
management students and produce more research on specifically Australian
management issues for enterprises and managers.tt'
Increased funding for curriculum development and dissemination is also required.suo
Particular emphasis should be placed on exporting (a recommendation of the
Hughes report),tu' best practice work organisatiory the new paradigm for
management and the basis for competitive advantage in the modern economy.
Management and accounting systems that facilitate adequate investment in
innovative activities, rather than encourage disinvestment aimed at short-term profit,
should form part of such curricula.
Reforming TAFE management training is also vital because it is the largest provider
of management education and training in Australia and is performing below world
best standard. To improve TAFE management training, government could: foster the
professional development of senior TAFE managers, focusing on their responsibility
for leading the reform required in their colleges; provide financial incentives to TAFE
institutions to improve their quality; fund the professional development of TAFE
staff to provide them with the skills to create and deliver management development
programs; and fund the establishment of an articulated TAFE/University course in
small business formation and management and ensure its availability to students
throughout Australia.'u'
Given the importance of high technology enterprises, their extensive management
needs, and the weaknesses of their current management, particular emphasis could
be placed on developing training programs for high technology entrepreneurs. Such
courses would need to emphasise marketing, finance, small business management,
patent strategy and, in particular, how to deal with early involvement in export
markets and rapid growth.uu'This could be a key focus of a reactivated enterprise
improvement program. Comprehensive, specialist degree or diploma courses in
managing high technology enterprises could also be developed.
Small business management training also needs to be given high priority as, firstly,
many small businesses fail largely due to lack of management skills and secondly,
some small businesses produce considerable innovation, exports and employment.
Comprehensive accreditation processes for small business trainers, educators,
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and provide small business with a sound method of identifying suitable training.s6o
The Government could also act to overcome the reluctance of small business
owner/managers to seek advice for small business problems by providing small
business owner/managers with a certificate of entitlement to purchase accredited
one-to-one advising, with the aim of encouraging the long-term use of professional
advisers in solving business problems and developing management skills.su' Finally,
the Government could more substantially adopt the recommendation of the Beddalt
report to include management subjects as an option at the secondary education level,
in apprenticeships and in professional education at the tertiary level. This would
introduce to students the possibility of establishing a small business as a career path
and improve their management skills should they do so. It would also assist to
remedy the situation where, at present, many people in professions and trades set up
their own business, despite having few management skills.su6
To address the grave lack of management development occurring in Australian
enterprises, the Government could implement the recommendation of the Karpin
report that Australia's untrained managers be provided access to what the report
calls the Nntional Certificøte inWorlcplace Leødership, to be delivered by TAFE.uu'Such a
course would teach the basics of world best practice management including
exporting, innovation, best practice work organisation and managing diversity.
Completion of the course would provide credits towards the completion of more
extensive training such as MBAs. It would be hoped that most of Australia's
untrained managers would have completed this course within several years and that
many were encouraged to do further tertiary education and training.'uu
It seems likely that the implementation of these management reforms would be a
sound investment towards taking Australian management from being among the
industrialised world's worst to among its best, thereby spreading best practice work
organisation across the economy and fostering national competitive advantage based
on restructuring toward innovative, high quality, high value-added products and
services.
864 Industry Task Force on Leadership and Management Skills, op. cit., p.22.
865 ibid..,p.23.
866 
House of Representatives Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technolo gy, op.cit., p.212,213.
867 Indushy Task Force on Leadership and Management Skills, op. cit., p.33þa.
868 ibid., p.38.
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Chapter 12: Education and Training
L. The Importance of Education and Training to Competitive
Advantage Based on Innovation
Michael Porter's international study found that:
There is little doubt from our research that education and training are decisive in national
competitive advantage. The nations we studied that invest the most heavily in education
(Germany, ]apan, and Korea) had advantages in many industries that could be traced in
part to human resources. What is even more telling is that in every nation, those industries
that were the most competitive were often those where specialized inveshnent in education
had been unusually great... Education and training constitute perhaps the single greatest
long-term leverage point available to all levels of government in upgrading inclustry.s6e
Lester Thurow has argued: '... [I]n the twenty-first century, the education and skills
of the workforce will end up being the dominant competitive weapon.'u'o Similarly,
Cohen and Zysrnan argued: 'The skill base of a nation and how it's employed is
likely to be a decisive factor in determining national competitiveness.'87r Numerous
studies have also concluded that education is an important determinant of economic
growth.ut'
Education and training are pivotal to achieving product and process innovation. In
particular, education and training is important to gaining the potential innovation
and productivity benefits offered by new technologies. To apply the process
technologies vital to producing new products and increasing efficiency, the
education and training levels of the great majority of the population will need to be
substantially increased. For example, as information technologies are integrated into
production processes throughout the economy, office, factory and retail workers will
need to be able to apply such technology. Those nations in which workers are well
trained to apply new process technologies will achieve rapid innovation. In an
environment in which capital, natural resources and product technologies will move
around the world with ever increasing ease, people will become an increasing source
of competitive advantage.tt'
Education and training also facilitates restructuring because building alarge pool of
skilled employees facilitates the growth of brain-based, technology-intensive sectors,
particularly ETMs and advanced services.tto
86e 
Michael E. Porter, op. cit., p.628.
870 
Lester Thurow, Head to Head, op. cit., p.40.
871 
Stephen S. Cohen & John Zysman, op. cít., p.228.
872 
Bureau of Industry Economics, Recent Deaelopments in the Theory of Economic Growth, op. cit., p.-f636. See also
the discussion of the literature in Ross Williams 'Funding Higher Education in Australia', p.5-7 in Higher
Education Financing and Policy Review Committee, op. cit., Appendix 14.
873 Lester Thurow, Head to Head, op. cit., p.51.,52,54; and Stephen S. Cohen & John Zysman, op. c1t., p.228.
874 
Stephen S. Cohen & lohn Zysman, op. cit., p.230. Michael E. Porter, op. cit., at p.256,257 stated that a nation's
stock of specialised, skilled professional and technical workers was often crucial in international service
competition. Business services in particular required highly trained workers in management, engineering
and scientific fields. LEK Partnership, op. cit., p.50 noted that education and training is a key factor facilitating
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Furthermore, as Porter's study found: 'A system for vocational, technical and
specialized industry training is a central priority in any advanced economy.'87s In
particular, government should encourage many of the nation's most intelligent
people to devote themselves to creating new products and services.utu As Porter has
written: 'Training the most promising young people in science and engineering is
unusually beneficial to an economy because it provides the greatest spur to
innovation."tt The strong engineering tradition in successful industrial nations such
as Sweden, Germany, and Japan shows that engineers are of particular importance
because of their role in tying together research and industry by applying science to
production.ttt Strong investment in education and training is also needed in other
areas of the innovation chain, such as marketing, management and exporting.
While investment in universities is important, the education and training levels of
those not attending university is a vital determinant of national competitiveness. It is
vital that the great majority of people not attending university undertake vocational
education and training at both the secondary and tertiary levels.u" Competitive
advantage in sophisticated sectors requires that the great majority of workers have
advanced skills.
Nations can make large returns on their investment in education. Thurow, writing
about the United States, noted:
...the difference in median wages between those with and those without education (928,747
for a white male high school graduate and fi42,259 for a white male college graduate)
indicates big differences in average productivity and a huge direct social payoff when those
educational investments are averaged across millions of workers.88o
Finally, higher education is important because it can deliver considerable export
income. Even despite all the difficulties experienced by the sector, the education
industry grew to become a major export earner under Labor. The number of fee
paying overseas students in Australia grew from 7,1.00 in 1987 to 143,000 in 1996. In
1996, 53,200 foreign full fee paying students undertook higher education courses at
publicly funded institutions. Education exports grew rapidly and reached $3 billion
in 1.996. The strong growth in international student numbers is expected to
continue.tt'
significant services exports among leading service export nations, such as Hong Kong, Singapore and the
Netherlands. Bill Mansfield, op. cit., p.200-201, argued that education and training is vital to bringing a high
wage, high skill, high value-added economy. IMite Pøper on Manufacturing Industry, op. cit., p.29-32 argued
that investing in training in areas of future growth could speed adjustment to a more economically
rewarding industry structure.
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2. Market Failure and Australia's Weaknesses in Education and
Training
There is obviously market failure in the provision of education and training.
Competing internationally in advanced sectors requires a workforce with high
quality prirnary, secondary and tertiary education and training. Due to labour
turnover, firms could rarely capture the full benefits of providing such education to
people. Indeed, there is even market failure in firm specific training for the same
reason. While it may be rational for an individual firm not to provide training in this
environment, collectively, such an approach will produce insufficient skill formation
to maximise the growth of the economy.tt'Thus, goverrunents must play the key role
in providing primary, secondary and tertiary education and may need to encourage
firms to undertake firm specific training.
In Australia, the rationalist decree of small goverrunent has led to insufficient
investment in secondary education. Under the strain of severe fiscal stringency, State
and Territory Governments have struggled to fund secondary schools adequately
enough to provide the basis of an internationally competitive workforce. The school
system is not providing the basic skills and competencies upon which further
education and training can be built for a significant number of young people. In
particular, vocational education in secondary schools is under-developed by
international standards. These are major competitive disadvantages because studies
have shown that countries that have been able to provide sound education for the
bulk of students in language, maths, science and other general education topics, and
which provide comprehensive vocational training, tend to have a superior
productivity perf ormance.tt'
Labor also under-invested in higher education. While the numbers in higher
education were almost doubled,tto a magnificent achievement, few extra resources
were provided to the sector. In 1988, the Dawkins \¡Vhite Paper recognised the
'...urgent need to refurbish and upgrade many existing facilities, particularly on
inner-urban campuses',ttu yet extra funding commensurate with rises in participation
was not provided. Federal Government operating grants for higher education rose
from $3.1 billion to $4.6 billion between 1983 and 1996 (inconstant 1997 dollars). Net
of the HECS liability, the rise was from $3.1 billion to $3.7 billion,"u which is a decline
in expenditure relative to GDP. Commonwealth expenditure on higher education as
a percentage of GDP, at 1.1 per cent (including HECS payments and liabilities) in
1996, is roughly average by OECD standards and nine nations spend more."'
88' 
Lester Thurow, Head to Head, op. cit,, p.274,275.
883 Comrnittee on Employment Opportunities, Restoring FuII Employment: A Discussion Pøper, Ausûalian
Governrnent Publishing Service, Canberra, 1993, p.8'1.,82,88,89.
884 Australian Labor Party, Shaping the Nation: Achieaements of the Labor Gouernment, Australian Labor ParÍy,
Canberra, 1995, p.67; and Higher Education Financing and Policy Review Committee, op. cit., p.97.
885 Department of Employment, Education and Training & John Dawkins, op. cit., p.83.
ttu High". Education Financing and Policy Review Committee, op. cit., p.116
887 Ross Williams, 'Funding higher education in Australia' in Higher Education Financing and Policy Review
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Compounding this insufficient public investment is the fact that there has been no
large scale private equity investment in higher education in Australia.uut
The rationalist desire for expenditure cuts has reduced equity and access in higher
education via: excessive tightening of eligibility for Austudy, which is denied to
many prospective students in difficult financial circumstances; the gradual move to
up front fees for certain courses; and insufficient public investment in education. The
result has been that many prospective students can no longer afford university and,
in each year from 1985 to 1996, between 30,000 and 100,000 qualified students have
been denied a place in higher education."n Working class people, Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islanders, women and migrants from non-English speaking
backgrounds have long been denied equal opportunity to quality secondary and
tertiary education.t'o While Labor increased the absolute numbers of people from
disadvantaged groups in higher education, the relative proportions of people from
different socio-economic groups remained little changed, apart from a modest
improvement on extreme disadvantage in the case of people from Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander backgrounds. Rates of completion of year 12 also remain
significantly lower for young people from low socio-economic backgrounds than for
those from high socio-economic backgrounds.t" By denying access to education,
Australia has reduced its pool of skill and talent, and thereby reduced national
economic progress.t"
The quality of teaching provided to higher education students has also declined. This
is primarily because higher education funding has not risen in the same proportion
as the growth in student numbers. The 1993 Green Paper on Employment stated that
'universities are under-resourced for undergraduate teaching, with the result a
decline in quality of course provision."" Further, while Australian institutions have
many outstanding academics, a significant minority of lecturers are poor teachers. A
key reason for this is that most lecturers are never taught to teach and some therefore
lack the necessary skills. Some lack effective oral communication skills and the great
majority of lecturers do not provide well structured, detailed lecture notes. Others,
protected by tenure, are complacent or disinterested after decades in the sector. Some
academics also place minimal priority on teaching, viewing it as an unwelcome
distraction from their research work. This may partly reflect the fact that, while
research excellence is rightly accorded high status and is financially rewarded,
minimal status and few, if any, financial rewards are provided to gifted teachers.
Grants allocated through the Committee for University Teaching and Staff
Development are about $7 million per year, compared with $410 million allocated for
competitive and peer reviewed research and $220 million allocated under the
Research Quantum.*'o Thus, teaching quality is suffering from insufficient funding
888 Higher Education Financing and Policy Review Committee, op. cit., p.24.
ttt 
lbid.., p.92.
"o S"" John S. Western, Social Inequality in Australian Society, MacMillan, Melbourne, 1983, pp.49-60,137-148,212-
217,262-270.
8e1 Higher Education Financing and Policy Review Committee, op. cit., p.3,20.
*" Thi, was recognised in Department of Employment, Education and Training & John Dawkins, op. cit., p.7.
8e3 ibid., p.80.
8e4 Higher Education Financing and Policy Review Committee, op. cit., p.19.
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and a minority of lecturers provide poor teaching due to lack of skills, incentive and
motivation
A further weakness in the higher education sector is that too little of Australia's
research effort is directed to meeting industry needs, a matter discussed in detail in
chapter eight.
The higher education system is also producing few graduates able to provide policy
advice on creating an internationally competitive economy. Much of the current
teaching of economics at university involves unrealistic models and mathematical
equations that conclude that a market allocation of resources maximises economic
welfare. Economics students receive little knowledge about industry policy (beyond
why it inevitably fails), the practical realities confronting businesses, nor the keys to
international competitive advantage. During this temporary hegemony of rationalist
economics, such students are often highly regarded and become policymakers in key
bureaucratic posts. Not surprisingly, they have been unable to produce policies to
substantially foster international competitiveness. This is compounded by the fact
that public and private providers of industry policy often have no practical training
in the area.
Australia's under-developed vocational education and training (VET) system is a
further significant competitive disadvantage. Labor admitted inWorking Nntion that
Australia has one of the lowest rates of participation in secondary school level
vocational education in the OECD.8" Ooty from the early to mid 1990s were all State
and Territory Governments taking significant steps to integrate vocational education
into the secondary curriculum.seó At the tertiary level, the 1993 Green Paper on
Employment noted that only 20 per cent of young Australians were getting a
vocational (non-university) educatiory compared with the OECD average of around
50 per cent.8e7 Employers stress that the public system is: not meeting their needs; far
from international standards; not well directed toward the present and emerging
skill needs of the economy; and too slow in adjusting training to match changes
occurring in technologies, products and services.ttt
Australia is a long way behind world leaders in VET. For example, more than a
decade ago, West Germany committed themselves to providing a training place for
every school leaver who wanted one and had nearly met the goal. Of those finishing
the first level of secondary school at 15 or L6 years old, 60 per cent entered the 'dual
system' involving in-plant paid training provided by employers and school based
training provided by government, 10 per cent went into full-time vocational training
and only 20 per cent studied to enter universities or colleges. After three yeaÍs, those
in the dual system become 'journeymen' with known skill levels. After a further 3
years work and additional courses in law, technology and business management,
8es 
Working Nation: Policies and Programs, op. cit., p.90.
8e6 Australian Labor ParÍy, Shaping the Nation, op. cit,, p.67; and Working Nation: Policies and Progranrs, op. cit.,
p.9l-93.
8e7 Committee on Employment Opportunities, Restoring FuIl Employment, op. cit., p15.
8e8 Pappas, Carter, Evans & Koop/Telesis, op. cit., p.67,68; and Committee on Employrnent Opportunities,
Restoring FuIl Employment, op. ciT., p.82.
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they can become a'master', a credential necessary to open one's own business. This
training system is a key source of competitive advantage in Germany.tn'Recognising
the importance of VET to national competitiveness, many OECD nations have built
up strong vocational systems.noo
Industry provision of training is low by international standards.'o' Apart from a small
number of large firms, there are very few firms that provide regular training.
Managers tend to view training as having little value.'o'Thus, most employees gain
skills through experience on the job, without a planned program of training and
skills development.'o'This is occurring at a time when the skills required to be an
internationally competitive workplace are higher than ever before and rising.
Australia has one of the lowest rates of participation in apprenticeships in the
OECD.'* The 1993 Green Paper on Employment noted that both the apprenticeship
and Australian Traineeship System are flawed because: there are too few places;
many occupations and industries are not covered; employers generally choose only
the most advantaged students, leaving few opportunities for most young people;
employers reduce places significantly in difficult economic periods; both systems
largely exclude people older tl;.an 20; participation by women in apprenticeships
other than hairdressing is very low; apprenticeships have traditionally been directed
to people doing the boring or unpleasant work, rather than acquiring specific skills;
traineeships have low status among young people and employers and drop-out rates
have been high; and traineeships have been insufficiently focused on industry
needs.'ot
National competitiveness is also being impeded by the large percentage of the
population with inadequate English language skills.'ou Around one million adults
have difficulty with basic reading and writing tasks. The Office of Multicultural
Affairs found that a lack of English language skills is the most important reason that
people from a non-English speaking background are unable to access training,
retraining or better employment opportunities.eo'Too little English language training
is being provided even though around 55 per cent of Australia's manufacturing
employees are born overseas. The Global Challenge report noted that the total cost of
adult illiteracy was over $3 billion per annum.tou
Finally, Labor under-invested in labour market programs. In the 1980s, rationalist
policies, combined with globalisation, produced significant structural displacement,
but Labor's labour market programs were insufficient to enable many displaced
8ee L"rte. Thurow, Heød to Heød, op. cit., p.54,55.
'oo Jirn Kitay & Russell D. Lansbury, op. cit., pp.17-72atp.46,47,71,.
e01 
Committee on Employment Opportunifles, Restoring FuIl Emptoyment, op. cít., p.74,75.
e02 ACTU/TDC Mission to Western Europe, op. cit., p.120.
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eOs Committee on Employment Opportunities, Restoring FulI Employment, op. cit., p.78.
e06 Report of the Con'rmittee for Review of Export Market Development Assistance, op. cit., p.36.
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people to return to work quickly. Between 1984 and 1990, L.5 million jobs were
created but long-term unemployment fell by only 90,000. After the recession,
between three and four hundred thousand people were long-term unemployed.non
Insufficiently active labour market programs reduced national competitiveness and
growth for three key reasons. Firstly, people who are unemployed for long periods
often experience psychological and physical decline, and poverty. Under harsh social
circumstances, some people commit crime, turn to alcohol or other drugs, experience
family breakdown and some, tragically, kill themselves. People experiencing harsh
economic and social conditions cannot readily form the workforce of new,
internationally competitive firms. Secondly, because people in such circumstances
can become effectively detached from the workforce, growth is reduced because
employers take longer to fill vacancies. Finally, where a large pool of long-term
unemployed people are effectively detached from the workforce, skill shortages and
pressures for wage increases emerge even though unemployment may still be quite
high.n'o
3. Rationalism and Education and Training
The rationalist desire for small government has led to a view of education as a
welfare reducing cost to be minimised, rather than a vital investment directed to
achieving international competitiveness. As noted above, insufficient public
investment has resulted in many weaknesses in the system, including: qualified
students being denied places; prospective students being unable to afford education;
falling quality in education provision; an education system that does not meet
industry needs; and a gravely under-developed VET sector. This under-investment
has slowed the pace of restructuring to brain-based, innovative sectors, lowered
national competitiveness and slowed economic and employment growth.e"
4. Industry Policies to Foster Excellence in Education and Training
Reforms to education and training should begin with a significant increase in
funding for public secondary schools. Even the Labor Governmentrs modest
performance in the area, involving a $3 billion plus allocation to the States to
supplement their funding on schools, illustrated what government can achieve in
education policy, even despite the mediocre allocations by the States (partly caused
by low Federal Government grants to the States). Year'1.2 retention rates rose from 36
per cent in 1983 to around 78 per cent a decade later.n" However, such rates should
be near to 100 per cent. Individuals who do not complete secondary education
generally face a life of limited opportunity and nations in which a large proportion of
eoe Working Nation: Policies and Programs, op. cit., p.108,110.
nto 
The latter two reasons are from Working Nation: Policies and Progrnms, op. cit., p."107.
et1 Higher Education Financing and Policy Review Committee, op. cit., p.1 notes that many submissions to the
West Comrnittee argued that funding levels over the last L5 years had impeded the capacity of institutions to
fulfil their roles in contributing to national economic and social progress. Submissions from employers and
employer organisations consistently argued that universities were not producing the graduates business
need to create competitive advantage.
e12 Australian Labor Party, op. cit., p.68.
211,
students do not complete secondary education will face economic decline. Significant
funding increases should be provided to: improve year 12 retention rates: improve
the quality of education provided in many currently underfunded public schools;
provide improved income support to students from disadvantaged backgrounds;
and build up a significant vocational component in secondary schools.
The Government should also aim to create a world class tertiary education system in
order to foster national competitiveness by providing higher quality teaching to
many more Australian students. A secondary, but important benefit of a world class
tertiary system is that it could achieve strong export growth. The reforms suggested
below are directed to these goals.
Government will need to be the primary source of increased investment in education.
Student contributions should remain at approximately the level they were at the end
of the Keating Government. At that time, they were at a modest level and
repayments were not required until students were making approximately average
weekly earnings. Such a HECS framework brought a solid contribution from
students without significantly impeding equity and access. The Government could
also encourage the private sector to invest in higher education. Options that could be
explored include: offering matching funding for private investment in new
institutions; providing subsidies to encourage venture capital investment in post-
secondary education; and providing generous tax treatment for donations to tertiary
institutions.el3
Government must also do more to increase participation in higher education. Labor
demonstrated what governments can achieve by increasing the numbers in higher
education from 340,000 in 1982n'o to 634,000 in 1996. Further, in 1996, 1.35 million
students enrolled in vocational programs within the VET sector at some point in the
year and a further 390,000 enrolled in personal enrichment courses.n" Flowever, even
after a decade of significant progress, only 17 per cent of 17 to 19 year olds and 15 per
cent of 20 to 24 year olds were participating in higher education in1995.n'u To become
an internationally competitive economy, participation in tertiary education must be
radically increased through greatly increased public investment and reform.
To increase the pool of talent and skill in the economy, Government must address
Australia's historical denial of equal opportunity to education to disadvantaged
groups. A range of reforms can foster equity. The eligibility criteria on Austudy
could be loosened so that all people in difficult financial circumstances could afford
to attend tertiary education. HECS fees could be set at a level that did not deter
students from studying by the prospect of massive debt. All up-front tertiary fees
could be abolished (including in the TAFE sector). Finally, universal access to HECS
loans could be provided and students given the option to defer the payment of
tuition fees until they earn at least average weekly earnings.
e13 Higher Education Financing and Policy Review Committee, op. cit., suggested the latter two options at
p.27,34,35.
e14 Australian Labor Party, op. c\t., p.67.
ntt High", Education Financing and Policy Review Committee, op. cit., p.97.
e16 ibid., p.15.
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The higher education sector should be more strongly focused on fostering national
competitiveness and restructuring, as the 1988 Dawkins White Paper argued. This
requires: a particular focus on science, technology, engineering, information
technology, business and management studies;t" antd maintaining a commitment to
humanities so as to provide industry with workers with strong research, analytical,
conceptual and communication skills and to ensure we retain a pool of people who
can critique and improve our economy and society.n"
A number of other reforms could improve the quality and efficiency of higher
education. In particular, the Government should encourage institutions to specialise
in areas of excellence. The 1988 Dawkins \Atrhite Paper sensibly argued that providing
funding to institutions on the basis of tradition to provide a full range of courses
should give way to the provision of funding for both teaching and research on the
basis of merit and demonstrated capacity."'It concluded:
Institutions that attempt to cover all areas of teaching and research compromise their ability
to identify, and build on, areas of particular strength and the achievement of areas of
genuine excellence. The ultimate goal is a balanced system of high quality institutions, each
with its particular areas of strength and specialisation but co-ordinated in such a way as to
provide a comprehensive range of higher education offerings.e2o
This policy should be intensified, given that such specialisation is yet to be achieved.
Specialisation could facilitate higher quality education and export growth as faculties
attracted the best talent and achieved economies of scale. Progress in curriculum
development, research, innovation in teaching methods and course quality might be
expected to rise. The ultimate goal would be for Australia to have a handful of large,
world class centres of excellence for each faculty amongst its institutions nationwide.
This policy would need to be tempered to cater to the reality that many students are
unwilling to move States to undertake education and therefore will alter their course
choices even if it means reduced individual and national prosperity. For this reason,
students would need to be able to choose from comprehensive course offerings from
among the institutions in their State.
Government could improve the quality of teaching by providing moïe resources to
ensure quality staff can be employed and class sizes are not too large. Further,
lecturers should be taught to teach. Just as prospective lawyers are required to
complete a General Diploma of Legal Practice, all prospective lecturers should be
required to complete a practical one year diploma course in best practice teaching
methods. Teacher training courses also need to be more widely available for
incumbent academics. Finally, mechanisms are also needed to manage under-
performing academics. Where academics are under-performing they should be given
access to training and counselling to improve their performance. Where they fail to
respond after a reasonable period of time, they should be sacked.
e17 Department of Employment, Education and Training & John Dawkins, op. cit., p.8,17
er8 ibid., p.8,9.
ete Department of Employment, Education and Training & ]ohn Dawkins, op. cit., p.28.
e2o ibid., p.28.
213
The Government could also increase the quality of course content and lower costs by
providing, ofl a competitive basis, funding for consortia of academics from
throughout the nation to establish curricula in particular fields. By having the best
minds in each field collaborate on curriculum development, rather than having each
academic producing curricula separately, higher quality course content and learning
outcomes would be achieved.
Serious consideration could also be given to giving students the option of completing
semester subjects over the surrì.rner break because it could: increase course
completion rates and thereby free up places for more students; increase efficiency by
utilising facilities currently left dormant over the summer; reduce foregone income
for students; and increase the amount of students graduating per public dollar
expended.n"
Reforms to higher education research could also ensure the sector played a much
greater role in fostering competitive advantage. Ideas for research policy were
presented in chapter eight.
The Government must also explore new modes of teaching. An information and
communications revolution, is facilitating delivery of education courses in ways that
may make traditional methods obsolete. In particular, the Internet, because it is a
location independent and low cost form of communication, and facilitates delivery of
courses across the world, frãy make lecturing in large, costly lecture halls an
increasingly obsolete method of teaching. \A/hile these developments could constitute
a threat to existing institutions if they fail to change, they could also constitute an
opportunity to provide quality education to many more Australians and to increase
education exports. Providing courses on the Internet produces a number of
advantages. Courses can be provided to large numbers of students domestically and
internationally at a relatively low cost. Web based technologies also provide
opportunities for improving the effectiveness, and reducing the cost, of the
distribution of materials, student testing and assessment, administration and
marketing. Because of the potential scale involved, markets can be highly segmented
in terms of price, quality and product differentiation. The online education industry
is growing rapidly in the United States. ln 1996, US$162 million was invested by
venture capital firms in new on-line education businesses. Listed education software
and services firms have a market capitalisation of US$5 billion. ln 1996, turnover in
on-line courses in the public domain was estimated to be US$90 million and growing
at 100 per cent per annum.t"
Therefore, the Federal Government cannot afford to provide barely enough money to
maintain existing teaching methods. They should capitalise on this window of
opportunity by providing grants to Australian higher education institutions on a
competitive basis to develop the teaching of higher education courses to domestic
and international students on the Internet. This could increase the quality and
e21 The widespread introduction of summer terms was foreshadowed in Department of Employment, Education
and Training & John Dawkins, op. cit., p.85.t" }jrigh., Education Financing and Policy Review Committee, op. cit., p.2,9-11.
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quantity of education provided to Australian students and achieve significant export
growth.
The Government also needs to ensure that the higher education system teaches a
significant pool of graduates about industry policy. Two key reforms are required.
Firstly, tertiary economics curricula need to be radically transformed so that students
gain a comprehensive understanding of industry policy, are encouraged to explore
the ways active industry policies could increase competitiveness, understand the
keys to international competitive advantage and appreciate the importance of public
investment in areas such as R&D, technology, finance, education, management,
marketing and exporting. Secondly, degrees and diplomas specialising in policy
development and program delivery in industry policy must be established to ensure
programs are well-conceived and effectively implemented.
To meet industry needs, Australia must establish a world class VET system. National
competitive advantage is dependent on ensuring that most of the great majority of
people who do not attend university, undertake VET. To become a competitive
economy, Australia must radically increase the supply of vocational training places
in each of the pathways to training, namely school, TAFE, private providers and
industry. The Government should seek to establish a system similar to that of
Germany's system, where approximately 60 per cent of students commence
vocational education and training in secondary school and such courses are linked to
tertiary education and training and provide those skills needed by industry. This
could build on Labor's establishment and expansion of the Australian Vocational
Certificate Training System (AVCTS), a structured national system of entry level
training, which provided access to post-secondary vocational courses through a
range of learning pathways, combining education, training and work experience.n"
Finally, to encourage rising demand for vocational courses, students in the tertiary
vocational stream should be allowed to defer fees through HECS for courses leading
to qualifications at the Associate Diploma or Diploma level.n'n
Much more also needs to be done to encourage employers to invest in training.
Porter's study revealed that one of six characteristics of education policy most
conducive to creating competitive advantage was that firms invest heavily in
ongoing in-house training, individually or through industry associations.e's Options
to achieve this include: greater incentives to employers to take on apprentices and
trainees, particularly during recessions; increasing the role of Group Training
Companies in facilitating training, particularly in the small business area; engaging
industry in managing the system and ensuring the system meets industry needs;
building on progress made in expanding apprenticeships and traineeships beyond
traditional 'male' areas to embrace all significant occupations, including those with
lower skill levels and those dominated by women;"u improving the national
e23 Australian Labor Party, op. c\t., p.66.
e24 Connrittee on Employrnent Opportun ities, Restoring FuII Employrnent, op . cit., p.87 .
e2s Michael E. Porter, op. cit., p.629,630.
e26 This was a recommendation in Australian Council of Trade Unions, ACTU Presentation: - Federal Got¡ernment
Meeting on Youth Unemployment: The Carmichael Reþrm of Vocational Education and Training, Unpublished,
1992, p.2.
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recognition and portability of training; and continuing with the training wage
established by Labor,"'where it leads to a recognised qualification.
The Government could also foster the establishment of skills based career structures,
linked to competency based training as pioneered in the metal industry in 1996. This
encourages skill acquisition because workers are given a path to move through the
classification structure via the attainment and use of skills. Such training also helps
ensure workers gain the precise skills needed for establishing competitive enterprises
in their sector.
Government could also raise competitiveness by expanding English language
training. While the Labor Government provided significant resources to encouraging
the acquisition of basic language skills by workers at risk of displacement through
the Workplace English Language and Literacy Program,n" a huge pool of
Australians, many long-term unemployed, are still to acquire sound English
language skills.
Finally the Government should establish comprehensive, active labour market
programs. Labor did eventually show the way in Working Nation in 1.994. The key
aim of the package was to ensure that unemployed people were given access to
training andf or employment and therefore hope, rather than were passively
unemployed and in despair. For those unemployed for more than 18 months, the Job
Compact was to provide more intensive case management, combined with assistance
such as training and voluntary work, a job for six to twelve months (achieved
through payment of significant wage subsidies to employers), and access to informal
on-the-job training and in some cases structured and accredited training. This aimed
to provide the skills, confidence, financial independence and track record necessary
to gaining further employment.n'n
Other impressive components of Working Nation labour market reforms included: the
establishment of the training wage, available to adults for the first time, which
encouraged the taking on of unemployed people and provided them with a
certificate of competency under the AVCTS or the equivalent certificate of
competency applying in their industry; case management linked to assistance such as
vocational training, remedial training, employment programs and voluntary work
for newly unemployed people assessed as 'at a high risk of long-term
unemployment'; the Youth Training Initiative, which involved case management for
all unemployed people under 18 years of age and doubled the number of places in
labour market or vocational training;n'o and intensive assistance for disadvantaged
job seekers.n" In an environment of rapid sfructural change and displacement, such
active labour market policies should be pursued with attention focused on ensuring
that quality training is provided. Training should be linked to the wider entry level
training system so that people can count such training towards the achievement of a
e27 
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recognised training qualification and case managers should, where appropriate,
Íecofiunend that long-term unemployed people enter tertiary education and training,
given that it is a key to individual prosperity and national competitive advantage.
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Chapter L3: Finance
L. The Importance of Finance to Competitive Advantage Based on
Innovation
Finance is a critical link in the innovation chain. In sophisticated market segments,
retained earnings are often insufficient to finance the investment needed to
commercialise innovative ideas. Finance is crucial in three contexts. Firstly,
innovative start-up firms must often make significant investments - for example in
R&D, applying for patents, taking on employees and establishing the company
premises - at a time of little or no sales revenue. Secondly, major investments in
marketing and distribution are needed when breaking into new export markets. As
the McKinsey report found, the process of ETM exporting generally involves 3 to 10
years of low or negative returns, with finance proving a major constraint."'Thirdly,
competitive advantage in sophisticated product segments depends on producing
superior products or services, meaning high short-term investments are often needed
to facilitate the process of continuous innovation. Thus, only through adequate
provision of finance can innovative firms start-up, grow and export.
In particular, dynamic high growth SMEs (HGSMEs) often need access to equity
finance. As significant investment is required to facilitate their rapid expansion,
HGSMEs often have insufficient cash flow to make the regular repayments required
in debt finance arrangements. Thus, the widespread provision of equity finance to
HGSMEs, at the start-up, development and growth stages of their development, is a
key to achieving growth and exports through the creation of innovative, high quality
products.n"
In particular, venture capital firms can provide the finance and management skills
needed to enable HGSMEs to become established and grow thereby filling two key
missing links in the innovation chain. A1997 Coopers and Lybrand study of venture
capital backed firms found that, among the companies surveyed, 40 per cent
indicated that they could not have existed or survived without the support of
venture capital investment and a further 47 per cent said they would have developed
more slowly.n'n Nations that encourage new business formation can achieve high
levels of innovation because new businesses often have products or services that are
new or unique, apply new technologies, serve new market segments and bring new
skills and resources to an industry.n3u
e32 
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Fund managers can often make a significant contribution to the management of a
firm. They often have extensive experience with start-ups, sound management skills
and knowledge of the dynamics of the industry. The Coopers and Lybrand study
showed that venture capitalists made a major contribution to the management of
firms by: acting as a sounding board for ideas (65 per cent); advising on corporate
strategy and direction (58 per cent); providing financial advice (48 per cent) and
challenging the status quo or providing another opinion (40 per cent).n'u In turn,
because fund managers have a sound understanding of the firms in which they are
investing, their provision of finance is more flexible and focused on the needs of the
firms than traditional sources of finance.
Venture capital firms are also important because they help channel a greater
percentage of the nation's savings into productive investment. Individual passive
investors can be encouraged to invest in venture capital companies - rather than
unproductive activities - because in well-functioning markets, they generally provide
good returns on investments. Furthet, because venture capital companies spread risk
by investing in a range of companies, they shelter individual passive investors from
the inherent risks of investing in individual small businesses.n"
Venture capital can foster employment and economic growth. The Coopers and
Lybrand study found that, between 1992 and 1996: employment grew 20 per cent
annually in venture-backed companies, compared to the average annual
employment growth of just 2 per cent among the top 100 Australian companies; and
average sales grew by 42 per cent per year, compared to 6 per cent average annual
sales growth among the top L00 companies.n"
The informal equity market is also important to creating competitive advantage
through innovation. 'Business angels' are people who provide equity capital for
small businesses, typically between $50,000 and $100,000. They fill a major gap in the
equity finance market because such amounts are too small for a venture capital fund,
given the high costs of administration and risk involved in financing small
businesses. There is evidence that the 'business angels sector' has the potential to
provide an enormous amount of equity finance to small businesses. United States
estimates indicate that business angels provide at least five times as much funding in
dollar terms as the venture/development capital funds, and finance at least 20 times
more ventures. Some business angels also provide debt finance, importantly on a
long-term, patient basis. Many also play a key role in managing the businesses they
invest in. Often, business angels have a strong business background and can
therefore provide the management skills and business contacts that the small
business owner/manager may lack. This close involvement enables the business
angel to monitor the investment and ensure its success in a way not feasible for
larger equity capital funds."'Thus, business angels can foster the establishment and
growth of innovative SMEs through the provision of finance and management
expertise.
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Access to debt finance on reasonable terms is also an important determinant of the
level of investment, and therefore innovation and growth. The level of interest rates
is an important determinant of the rate of investment because investment in
productive activity only occurs where returns in excess of that achievable through
putting money in financial institutions can be expected.
2. Market Failure and Australia's Weaknesses in the Provision of
Finance
The Labor Government soundly summed rp the inadequate financial system they
were presiding over in the1994 \iVhite Paper on Employment:
...the financing problems of small business have continued to feature prominently in
industry submissions to government. This has been reinforced by key reports to
government suggesting that access to both debt and equity finance continues to be a
constraint on the development of potentially high growth firms, including early stage
businesses, those with new technologies, and those seeking to expand into overseas
markets.94o
The following table shows that at the end of the Labor Government's term,
manufacturers stated that a number of finance-related indicators continued to
impede the commencement of innovation projects.
Barriers to Starting Innovation Projects 1996-97
Barriers
lnsufficient retained earnings
Lack of appropriate sources of finance
lnsufficient funds to recruit skilled staff
Excessive economic risk perceived by
financiers/investors












Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Innottation in Manufacturing L996-97, Cat. no. 8116.0, p.13.
Equity Capital for SMEs
The absence of a significant equity capital market for SMEs is a key weakness in the
innovation chain. Ideally, innovative SMEs, which generally require amounts that
fall below the minimum capital raising requirements of the Australian Stock
Exchange,'nt would gain finance from a vibrant venture capital market.
Unfortunately, when Labor came to power, there was no such market. In 1983, the
Epsie report on impediments to the development of high technology firms in
Australia stated: 'A major obstacle is the absence of appropriate sources of capital to
enable these enterprises to establish and develop. There is no venture capital market
in Australia."n' At the end of the Labor Government's reign, only a very small
venture capital market had emerged, despite the Management and Investment
Companies program and financial deregulation. The 1995 Finnncing Grorcth study
e40 
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stated that less than 350, or only 2-3 per cent, of the high growth SMEs, were
receiving funds from Australian venture and development capital funds. The bulk of
SME equity financing activity was concentrated in just six funds.'o'
There are many impediments on the supply side to the development of a vibrant
venture/development capital market for SMEs.
Firstly, the high costs incurred in establishing individual funds are a major barrier to
the establishment of venture capital firms. Costs in excess of $1 million can be
incurred in the first year in obtaining licences and premises, hiring a management
team, raising capital from investors, selecting and managing equity investments and
so on.noo
Secondly, fund managers generally do not invest in SMEs because such investments
carry large administration costs relative to the amount of money involved. Fund
managers can only manage a limited number of investments. The cost of establishing,
monitoring, managing and exiting equity investments in firms is very large and is
roughly the same for firms of all sizes. Therefore, to offset high administration costs,
venture capitalists seek large investments. The minimum threshold per project
typically ranges between $1 million and $5 million and very few investments are
made at the smaller end of this threshold.'o'This means that many SMEs cannot get
the equity finance they need to maximise their growth. Unpublished research by the
Yellow Pages in L995 found that 97 per cent of small businesses seeking external
equity finance to fund their growth need less than $500,000.*u
Thirdly, the lack of a significant venture capital market is itself an impediment to its
emergence. Investors are reluctant to invest in SMEs because there is no well
developed market into which they can sell their investment if the company is
performing poorly. Furthermore, an investor's money has to be tied up for long
periods before equity investments in SMEs can be profitably realised. Early sale of an
equity share is likely to bring very poor returns because the firm is likely to be
investing heavily with expected growth still a long way off and uncertain. It
generally takes longer than five years for an SME to reach a point at which it might
be desirable for an investor to sell their share. The lack of an exit mechanism for SME
equity investments constitutes a major risk for investors and is a key reason they are
reluctant to invest in SMEs.tnt
Fourthly, the development of a vibrant venture capital market has been impeded by
the fact that it is not well established as an asset class. The segment has not been
e43 Marsden Jacob Associates, op. cit., p.51,59.
e44 ibid., p.60.
e4s ibid., p.31,56. Ernst and Young & the Centre for Innovation and Enterpríse, lnuestment Readiness Study: A
Report Produced by Ernst €t Young ønd the Centre for Innotttttion nnd Enterprise for the Depørtment of Industry,
Science and Tourism, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1997, p.11 reports investors as
claiming the existence of a gap in funds in the $0.5 million to $2.5 million dollar range, which falls betweeu
the business angels sector and the formal venture and development capital sector.
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e47 Arthur Anderson, Strategic Study on Deuelopment Capitø\, Arthur Anderson, n.p., 1997, p.13; and Marsden
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defined in a consistent manner over time, with the profile of the managed equity
funds industry shifting from venture capital in the 1980s, toward development
capital more recently. Partly as a result, there is little information on the history of
returns to venture/development capital firms. Institutional investors will not invest
until they have relevant data on which to base their investment decisions,
particularly given the abundance of less risky asset classes to invest in, such as
bonds, property and shares.nnt
Fifthly, investors also reject the provision of equity finance to many sound firms
because very high rates of return on investment are required to offset the risks
involved in financing SMEs. Such rates are also higher in Australia because of the
added risk associated with an under-developed market, such as the lack of an exit
mechanism. Whereas investors might invest in Treasury bonds for an annual return
of 8 per cent because of their lack of risk, they generally won't invest in unlisted later
stage SMEs unless the expected annual rate of return is 25-30 per cent. For
investments in early stage SMEs, expected returns of 40-50 per cent per annum are
needed to attract equity investors,tnt ar¡d where high technology is involved, higher
rates of expected return are required.
Sixthly, fund managers can afford to be extremely selective in choosing investments
because there are few funds operating in Australia and many SMEs seeking finance.
More than 95 per cent of proposals put to fund managers are rejected, often after
many months of investigation. This limits the amount of finance provided to sound
firms.tto
Seventhly, superannuation firms have been reluctant to make equity investments in
SMEs. While legislation mandates that huge amounts of savings flow to
superannuation funds, far too little of the money is being directed to productive
activities. Only 17 oÍ more than 160 large superannuation funds appear to invest in
SMEs, either directly or through venture/development capital funds. Much less than
one per cent of superannuation assets are invested in SMEs and very little of this is
early stage financing. By contrast, US superannuation funds invest around 3.5 per
cent of their funds in SMEs, thereby providing a strong stimulus to the US
venture/ development capital industry.ns'
There are a range of reasons why superannuation funds don't invest in SMEs beyond
the significant reasons outlined above. Superannuation firms, because they manage
other people's money, are also subject to fiduciary responsibilities, due diligence
requirements and prudential supervision. This produces high costs and encourages
superannuation firms to favour very large, later stage investments that carry lower
risks.tt' Furthermore, many superannuation fund trustees among the 100,000-plus
superannuation funds in Australia have little understanding of their role and
therefore tend to be highly conservative in their asset allocation decisions. Many
e48 Marsden Jacob Associates, op. cit., p.54,57.
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have no awareness of equity investments. Some do not appear to understand that the
Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act enables them to adopt a portfolio
approach to investment decisions and does not require them to defend each
individual investment. Most trustees rely heavily on advice from a handful of asset
consulting firms, all of which are highly conservative in their asset allocation advice.
Many of these consultants come from an actuarial background and rely heavily on
published performance data on alternative assets and fund managers. Because there
is no such data for SME based investments, the consultants generally do not even
consider investment in SMEs.'s'
There are also many impediments to the flow of equity finance to SMEs on the
demand side.
Firstly, many SMEs have little awareness of equity finance, partly as a result of the
lack of an identifiable market for SME investments."n
Secondly, many SMEs are reluctant to consider equity finance because it entails some
loss of control of their firms, even though many would benefit if they took on equity
finance, as well as the management expertise that can accompany it.es5 This is
evidenced by a September 1995 Yellow Pages survey which found that, among small
businesses aiming to grow, 71, per cent were seeking debt finance to fund the growth,
1.2 per cent were seeking equity finance and 5 per cent were seeking a combination of
both."u
Thirdly, many SMEs struggle to gain access to equity finance because they are not
'investment ready'. Finøncing Groruth stated that the great majority of SMEs do not
understand the basic steps involved in attracting equity investments, such as being
able to provide accounts, a realistic business plan and audited financial statements.esT
Disturbingly, this lack of investment readiness is often an impediment to gaining
finance for Australia's emerging ETM and service exporters."t Compounding this
problem is the fact that each equity investor type, such as Pooled Development
Funds, Venture and Development Capital Funds, business angels and
superannuation firms, has different requirements that need to be met before they will
provide equity capital.tt' In turn, this lack of investment readiness impedes the
development of a venture/development capital market because fund managers can
not find enough investment ready firms in which they can invest. Given the small
sums involved by comparison with available investments in other asset classes, the
es3 Marsden Jacob Associates, op. cit., p.53.
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amount of time and money expended looking for 'quality deal flow' is often not
worth the effort for many institutional investors.'uo
Fourthly, SMEs are deterred from seeking equity investments because they face
significant search costs'u' given: the lack of an identifiable equity market; the dearth
of available finance; high rejection rates; and the significant time and money that
must be expended to meet all the criteria necessary to attract an equity investor.
Fifthly, the key advisers of SMEs, namely their accountants, management consultants
and lawyers, also tend to have little understanding of equity investment. Most have
had little or no exposure to equity finance, but many have considerable knowledge of
debt finance options. This reinforces the lack of knowledge among SMEs of equity
finance and their preference for debt finance.'ut
Thus, there are a multitude of impediments to the development of a vibrant equity
capital market for SMEs. This lack of finance is preventing many potential firms from
starting up and impeding the development and growth of many existing firms,
thereby reducing innovation, restructuring, growth and competitiveness.
Most critically, market failure is most acute in the areas most crucial to achieving
competitive advantage based on innovation, namely start-up firms, innovative high
technology firms and firms seeking to grow rapidly through exports.
With respect to start-up firms, the 1995 Finnncing Groruth study reported that
Australia's highly under-developed equity capital market had reduced even its
minor role in providing venture capital, preferring to focus on firms in development
phases. Many fund managers simply exclude small early stage firms from
consideration because of their higher risk.nu'
Market failure is acute in the provision of seed and start-up equity finance to
innovative, high technology firms. The 1983 Epsie report on high technology
enterprises found:
Equity finance, which is the appropriate funding for the start up and early growth phases,
has rarely been available... [T]he lack of a venture capital market...substantially reduces the
chances of success for Australian high technology enterprises compared to their
counterparts in other countries...96a
[T]he Australian society has no effective vehicle for marshalling its people's savings
towards the equity funding of new industrial enterprises leading to growth and creation of
jobs through irlnorration.e6s
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Similarly, the 1990 Beddall Report found: 'Currently, it is easier for [people with]
viable inventions to obtain overseas money instead of Australian money which of
course means that some promising ideas do not get developed in Australia.'euo The
report noted a 1987 BIE survey that found that 70 per cent of innovative small
businesses in emerging industries stated that their growth had been impeded by lack
of access to finance.'ut
Five years Iater, Senator Cook, in announcing the Innovation Statement, admitted the
innovation chain was breaking down due to a lack of equity finance:
As a country, we need to be better at accessing, commercialising and using ideas.
We should congratulate ourselves as a country of ideas.
But far too many good ideas get away.
The biggest sticking point is access to finance.
A number of recent studies have identified a lack of depth in venture and development
capital and an immature equity finance market in Australia.e6s
The Labor Government never addressed this market failure. At 1997, with demand
for such venture capital far exceeding supply, investors still refused to support the
sector.e6e This failure to intervene to address a clear market failure thereby impeded
restructuring to innovative market segments.
Markets fail to provide adequate equity finance for innovative start-up firms for
several important reasons in addition to those outlined above. Firstly, such
investments are particularly risky, as the results from seed and early stage equity
investment in high technology are difficult to predict. Secondly, fund managers often
do not understand the nature and potential of the technology,meaning they can not
adequately assess the risk of high technology investments and often fear them,
despite the potential for significant returns. Under these circumstances, many
investors prefer to play safe in the less risky bond, property and share markets."o
Thus, a particularly severe market failure exists in the provision of finance to those
firms upon which national competitiveness is crucially dependent.
Much research has also confirmed that Australian firms lack access to the venture
and long-term debt capital needed to finance export drives.n" Most concerning is that
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the rise of ETM and service exporters is being significantly impeded by a lack of
access to finance. A McKinsey survey found that 62 per cent of 'born global stand
alone' ETM firms viewed finance as 'a very or critically important constraint' to
exporting,t" while the LEK Partnership study found that access to finance was the
number one concern of more than 50 per cent of Australia's emerging service
exporters. More than 50 per cent of the latter had been refused finance in the last
three years and57 per cent of the non-exporters indicated that finance was the major
barrier preventing them from establishing exports. Furthermore, the LEK study
found that very little equity finance had been provided to service exporters from the
local market.tt' Financial institutions, in particular, lack the expertise to lend to
innovative SME exporters.t'n lll/;any lack the skills to assess the risk involved in export
projects. This leads to excessive conservatism. For example, banks are reluctant to
finance the export expansion of SMEs with few assets, even where firms have high
cash flow and a successful record of export growth.
'Short-Termism'
The financial system is also excessively focused on short-term profit, rather than
facilitating the investment needed for long-term prosperity in innovation-intensive
market segments. For example, most investors on the stock market have little
understanding of the businesses in which they invest, and therefore buy and sell
shares largely on the basis of short-term profit results. Being either impatient or
uninformed about a company's problems, investors tend to dump their stock at the
first sign of difficulty, rather than focus on how to re-build the competitiveness of
firms."' This short-term focus is reinforced by the fact that many chief executive
officers have salary packages linked to short-term profits or sales. The focus on short-
term profit can lead to an undue focus on mergers and acquisitions, often
accompanied by significant debt.ntu Investment in new products and processes and
other underpinnings of competitive advantage are often avoided or delayed because
any short-term earnings fall would be punished by investors selling their shares and
forcing the stock price downward.tt The overall result is slower growth and a less
competitive economy.
Banks also tend to have little understanding of, or interest in, the investments needed
by firms to become and remain competitive. They generally have little or no stake in
the firms to which they lend and rarely engage in long-term strategic relationships
with their business clients. The result is that banks simply look at borrower's balance
sheets and short-term prospects. If the business has a short period of financial
instability, banks simply foreclose. This focuses the attention of businesses on short-
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term profits, rather than investment in the underpinnings of long-term
competitiveness.ttt
Debt Finance
As the Beddall report found: 'A significant obstacle to successful growth and
development of small business has been access to finance under favourable terms
and conditions."" That report found that while deregulation had led to growth in
banking activity in a number of market segments such as the money, bond and
foreign exchange markets, it had not brought an improved performance by banks in
making finance available to small business. Banks have been too conservative in
lending to small businesses and have put too few resources into understanding small
business. For small businesses starting up, accessing finance can be particularly
difficult and, even when small businesses are established and have a record of sound
management and performance, banks still generally emphasise the need for collateral
security.'uo The Beddall report concluded: 'The market place continues to ignore the
needs of small business to borrow sums of up to $100,000 where a short fall in
security exists and despite demonstrated good cash flow projections."t' The result of
this conservatism was that banks passed up opportunities for sound loans, small
business were denied fair access to loans and the growth of the Australian economy
was impeded.
The experience of the Labor Governments also suggests that markets do not always
produce a level of interest rates consistent with bringing full employment. The fact
that Australia's cost of capital was significantly higher than the OECD average in a
deregulated financial system, where the market is the greatest determinant of rates,
indicates market failure that left Australian enterprises at a considerable competitive
disadvantage for the entire period from the 1983 reforms to the end of the Labor
Government. Many of the 400 submissions to the Hughes report on exporting noted
that the high cost of capital was one of the key disadvantages faced by Australian
exporters.'u'High interest rates mean that much of the investment that would have
been economic with the interest rate climate that prevailed in many overseas nations,
was not proceeded with in Australia. Growth and restructuring were thereby
impeded.tt'
3. Rationalism and Finance
The Labor Government's desire for meaningful policies in the equity finance area
was revealed when the Beddall Committee, having effectively identified a number of
major weaknesses in the financial system impeding the flow of finance to SMEs,
n" 
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recommended that the IC undertake a review of the availability of finance to small
business."n A cynic would suggest that this was a way of appearing to take action,
while establishing a process that would ensure no government action was taken.
The IC report was extreme rationalism at its worst, revealing an organisation with
little knowledge of active industry policy, barely able to admit that markets fail and
seemingly unable to even contemplate any active government action to improve the
functioning of the Australian economy. Many submissions to the IC, and indeed the
final report, outlined the numerous weaknesses of the equity capital market.'ut
Flowever, having outlined the weaknesses, the report avoided any serious
exploration of possible government solutions. For example, despite numerous
government reports and submissions indicating that the lack of equity and
development capital for SMEs has been a problem for decades, the IC simply
asserted that the market was working effectively, stating that: '...the competitive
search for profit would tend to fill any gaps that reflected real profitable
opportunities."tu The IC reasoned that the venture capital market was not under-
developed because if it was, fund managers would be making above normal profits.
Given that fund managers were often making poor profits, the IC reasoned that this
proved the market was not under-developed.'ut This ignores the vast array of
structural impediments to the establishment of adequate venture capital markets
outlined above. Yet the IC declared any problems were primarily due to the
recession and high interest rates, not structural issues."t \rVhile the IC reported that
SME representatives'claimed'n'n there was a lack of equity finance"o and themselves
acknowledged the market was small, they simply re-asserted that the market was
working effectively and gave no serious consideration to how government action
could address the clear structural weaknesses in the equity finance market.
The same approach was taken to all key structural problems in the equity finance
market. For example, the IC acknowledged that superannuation funds were
extremely conservative and were failing to invest to any significant extent in SMEs,
noted many of the impediments to super fund investment in SMEs, and then
recommended that superannuation funds not be directed to allocate funds to SMEs,
without any detailed analysis of the issue. Indeed, the IC recommended that no
action be taken to increase funds available to SMEs from any institutional investors,
again without any detailed consideration on how government policies could make
this work. The IC argued that the lack of institutional investment in SMEs and their
general failure to consider any equity investments of less than $1 million is not a
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market failure.'nt The fact that failure to provide venture capital to assist innovative
firms to start up and grow may be costing the nation dearly in jobs, restructuring,
growth and competitiveness was not seen as relevant.
In another section of the report, the IC noted that many SMEs are not investment
ready and that investment in the sector is impeded by the lack of an exit mechanism,
but failed to even consider any way of remedying these problems. Instead, the IC
simply took these problems as given,t2 stating: 'I¡Vhat is at issue therefore, is whether
smaller enterprises are receiving less outside equity than they should, taking these
factors into accouîrt.'nn'In another section of the report, the IC noted that would be
business angels and SMEs needing finance have difficulty locating each other but
recommended that the Federal Government play no role in providing or catalysing
matching services.nnn
In short, the IC approach was to ignore the plethora of previous reports and
submissions outlining the lack of equity capital, the enormous economic
opportunities missed due to the lack of equity capital and the numerous solutions
proposed to remedy the situation. Markets were simply assumed to work effectively
and no serious consideration was given to government proposals to remedy clear
market failures occurring in the finance sector.
A market based approach to equity finance has failed dismally in producing the
optimal amount of equity finance to SMEs. From the Crawford Report of the -1,970s to
the Kelty Report on regional development in the early 1990s, this market failure has
been recognised and government action proposed to rectify the problem.nnt
Numerous successful examples overseas demonstrate how this crucial weakness in
Australia's innovation chain could be remedied.
Unfortunately, Laborrs attempts to encourage the emergence of a powerful equity
market for SMEs were inadequate, the PDF program notwithstanding. The Labor
Government wound down its only ever small focus on Management and Investment
Companies, believing that the facilitation of the operation of market forces through
financial deregulation would bring optimal results in financing. This market forces
strategy hasn't worked and a decades old market failure remains.
The result of a lack of action to establish a venture and development capital market
over previous decades has been that tens of thousands of firms with innovative ideas
have not been able to commercialise their investments due to a lack of finance, or
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have commercialised their investments offshore, to the benefit of nations overseas.
Based on the experience of nations like the US, it is reasonable to suggest that among
such a cohort of firms, a significant minority of firms would have failed, many would
have grown quickly and been more profitable than average, and a handful may have
become large global players. The rationalist inspired failure to act to build up
venture capital may have prevented the emergence of a raft of innovative ETM and
high value services exporters, thereby reducing economic and employment growth
and national competitiveness.
4. Industry Policies to Foster Excellence in Industrial Financing
Labor's reforms to establish a competitive financial market were important. A
competitive financial market will often provide adequate amounts of capital at
reasonable rates to many businesses."u Flowever, active industry policies must
complement competitive market policies, chiefly to catalyse a vibrant venture and
development capital market.
In every nation in which there is an identifiable venture capital market, government
has been the catalyst for its emergence.tt Active policies are necessary due to the
impediments to the growth of a venture capital market caused by its own lack of size,
as discussed above. Interestingly, however, it has been the experience of a number of
countries that once a certain critical mass has been reached, the sector flourished and
became self-sustaining. By contrast, market forces alone will not bring the
establishment of a vibrant venture capital market. In nations where the Government
has failed to take effective action to stimulate the emergence of a venture capital
market, they simply do not develop.
To address the market failure in the crucial area of seed, start-up and early expansion
phase equity capital for innovative, high technology firms, the Labor Government
could have established a program similar to that established in1997 by the Coalition.
The Innovation Investment Fund involves the provision of $130 million by the
Federal Government on a 2:'1. basis with private sector capital, thereby facilitating the
creation of five investment funds in the range of $30-50 million each. Expert private
sector fund managers were selected to manage each of the funds. Funds are to be
directed to small, technology based companies in the seed, start-up and early stage
phases. The Innovation Investment Fund is directed to: developing a self-sustaining
early stage, technology based venture capital industry; developing experienced fund
managers; establishing a self-funding program over the medium-term; and
encouraging the development and growth of innovative, new technology companies
that are commercialising R&D through the provision of finance and management
expertise.nn' The program is likely to be welfare enhancing because: it is directed to
two key links in the innovation chain and will therefore promote innovation, growth
and restructuring towards sophisticated products and services; the Government gets
its money returned with interest and a small share of any profits on the sale of firms,
ee6 Michael E. Porter, op. cit., p.639.
ee7 Australian Acaclemy of Technological Sciences, op. cit., p,104.
ttu 
Iohlr Howard, More Time for Business, op. cit., p.'10'J.,102.
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provided the funds are successful; and, where firms that would not have been
established without the scheme are assisted to become successful, growth and tax
revenue are increased.
The Government should also encourage the venture capital market for SMEs more
generally, and foster the development capital market to enable established firms to
grow rapidly and launch export drives.
Much can be learned from the United States experience. In L958, when the United
States had no institutional venture capital market, the Federal Government passed
the Small Business Investment Act. Under the Act, the US Small Business
Administration licences Small Business Investment Companies (SBICs), which are
private venture ønd deaelopment capital companies that make equity capital and long-
term credit available for small independent businesses. In return for pledging to
finance small businesses (which in the United States means less than 500 employees),
SBICs may qualify Íor goverrunent backed long-term loans.'n
The program was highly successful, with 649 SBICs being establishedby 1964. Two
reports in the early 1980s showed the program had been welfare enhancing to a
significant extent. SBIC funded enterprises had generated 10 times the rate of
employment growth than the average for all small businesset.'ooo By 1994, SBICs had
invested around $12 billion in nearly 100,000 small businesses. A group of firms that
today are large, global firms, such as Apple, Federal Express and Intel, were
established through the SBIC program. A 1992 report by the US Small Business
Administration showed that more than US$500 million in direct taxes had been paid
by SBICs and it is understood that taxes paid by portfolio companies are in the tens
of billions of dollars.'oo' Further, a 1992 reform of the SBIC program, which allows
fund managers to invest goverrunent guaranteed funds in conjunction with their
own through 'participating securities', has increased the rate of private capital
raising by SBICs by more than ten times the previous rate, with new capital raising
now running at $1 billion per annum.'oo'This has brought a great expansion in the
number of SBICs and the amount of money raised, even though the US Federal
Government gets a return of its money with interest and a percentage of the profits,
where a combination of private and public money is invested using Participating
Securities.'oo'
In addition, the success of the SBIC Program provided the stimulus for a now large,
exclusively private, venture capital sector by: creating a well-functioning market;
demonstrating the profitable opportunities available; and providing the training
ground for many private venture capitalists. Most private venture capital
investments are in high technology areas because of their potentially massive
eee Wi[iam Dunbar, 'Today's SBIC: New design, renewed commitment', Venture Capitøt lournal,May "1995, p.6.
1000 Australian Academy of Technological Sciences, op. cit., p.105,106.
toot 
Williurrr Dunbar, op. cit., p.6.
too' ibi,l., p.6.
t003 S^all Business Investment Corporations athpt/ /www.envista.com/nasbic/SBlCs.htlm., p.2.
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returns,'ooo meaning the private venture capital sector is playing a key role in
achieving growtþ innovation and restructuring to sophisticated product segments.
The Government should draw on the US experience to establish a comprehensive
venture and development capital market in Australia, most particularly through
participating securities. An 'IIF/SBIC approach' could involve the Government
investing along with private funds on a dollar for dollar basis, with government
funds returned with interest, but fund managers gaining a disproportionate share of
profits to encourage their participation. In return, fund managers would invest only
in SMEs and agree to invest a minimum percentage of funds in SMEs at the venture
stage, with remaining funds devoted to development capital to assist firms in their
growth phases.
If necessary, such initiatives could be complimented by tax concessions. Labor's
Pooled Development Funds (PDF) program was somewhat successful, particularly
after a 1994 review of the program led to a reduction in the concessional rate of tax
for PDFs from 25 to L5 per cent for income derived from investments in SMEt.toot By
March 1997,48 PDFs were registered with the PDF Board and over $150 million in
capital had been raised,'oo' although the program failed to substantially address the
market failure in equity finance for amounts below fiZ million.'oo' Thus, tax
concessions can encourage investment in venture capital. It may be that such
favourable tax treatment could usefully be provided under an Australian version of
the SBIC program, at least until a vibrant venture and development capital market
has emerged.
Having private venture capitalists make all investment decisions would be crucial.
As Porter found, direct provision of venture capital by government is generally
ineffective because of the inability of bureaucrats to consistently select good projects.
By contrast, private venture capitalists, because their own money is on the line, have
a stronger motive for avoiding unsound ventures and capitalising on promising
ventures.toou
The Government could also seek to get institutional investors to participate in the
venture and development capital market. In particular, the Government could
capitalise on the concentration of both money, and the power to decide how funds
will be allocated between various asset classes, in the superannuation industry. More
than half of Australia's superannuation assets are controlled by around 160 funds,
each with assets in excess of $100 million. The investment allocation decisions of
much of the superannuation industry are largely made by around 30 individuals in
¡004 Australian Academy of Technological Sciences, op. cit., p.106,108.
t005 
Working Nation: Policies nnd Programs, op. cit., p.75.
toou 
lohn Howard, More Tinte for Business: Statement by the Prime Minister, the Hon lohn Houard MP, Australian
Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1997, p.110.
tooT A.thr. Anderson, op. cit., p.8.
toot Mi.hael E. Porter, op. cit., p.668,669. This vicw is also advanced in Australian Academy of Technological
Sciences, op. cit., p.48.
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five major asset consulting firms. There is also only a small number of
venture/ development capital managers.too'
This concentration of money and power creates tremendous scope for the Federal
Government to reform the industry. A mixture of co-operation, education and
facilitation could ensure that these key decision-makers provide sufficient equity
finance to meet both the venture and development finance needs of HGSMEs and
also build up mature venture and development capital markets, either by
establishing their own fund managing firms or by investing in others. Large
superannuation funds are particularly well suited to provision of equity finance
because of their risk profile and cash reserves. Merely one per cent of the reserves of
the top ten institutions has been suggested as sufficient to establish a substantial
venture capital market.'o'o Therefore, the larger superannuation firms could make a
major contribution to establishing alarge venture and development capital market,
without putting at risk the retirement savings of workers.
The Government could provide two k"y inducements to encourage the
superannuation industry's participation in venture and development capital activity.
Firstly, they could participate in the SBIC-type program. Secondly, given the
importance of building up national savings, legislation increasing the percentage of
wages to be paid in to superannuation fund to a much higher level could be traded
for a commitment by superannuation firms to provide significant amounts of venture
and development capital to SMEs.
In seeking to encourage the supply of equity capital, government must do more than
simply provide financial incentives and direction. Because the sector is gravely
under-developed, the skills necessary to underwriting vibrant venture and
development capital markets are not widely available. Government will need to
work to address the microeconomic constraints to the supply of finance.
Training venture and development capital fund managers is a key priority, given
they are generally inexperienced and perform well below world class standards.
Government could also provide funds Íor training, directed to ensuring that
Australian bankers, accountants and superannuation fund managers have the
necessary skills to assess the risk involved in financing exports, as well as venture
and development projects, particularly in high technology areas. Such education
could explain the benefits of such investments. Providing this knowledge could
mean that sound ventures would no longer be rejected through an irrational fear
born out of ignorance, but would be sensibly funded to the benefit of the banks, the
exporter and the Australian economy.'ott In the superannuation sector, the
Government could establish training for the key asset consultants and trustees in
allocating equity funds to SMEs.'0"
toot Marsd"n Jacob Associates, op. c1t,, p.26,53.
toto Puppur, Carter, Evans & Koop/Telesis , op. cit., p.1'63.
tott M.Kirlr"y and Company & the Australian Manufacturing Council Secretariat, op. cit., p.51.
tot' Mursden Jacob Associates, op. cit., p.53,54 recommends intermediate courses for superannuation trustees
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In additiory the various asset classes within the venture and development capital
market segments must be established, together with consistent performance
measurement principles and regular reporting by venture/development capital
funds. Money will only be invested in equity funds when investors can measure past
performance.'ot'
Governments must address demand impediments to the flow of equity finance.
Failure to address such impediments is a key reason why government incentives to
encourage the supply of equity finance have sometimes failed.'o'o
A particular impediment to the provision of equity finance to SMEs is the fact that
many firms are not investment ready. In high technology HGSMEs, the people who
achieved the technological advance often become management by default. Many
have few management skills and little or no management experience. Investors will
not provide equity finance in such circumstances.totu
In addition to the proposals outlined in chapter 11. to improve Australian
management, the Government could establish an enterprise improvement program
based on the Victorian Government's Investment Ready program, which assists
innovative, R&D intensive, export oriented HGSMEs to obtain equity finance
through: a free information seminar on equity investment; an investment ready
review or workshop delivered by registered consultants; a further consultancy
directed to addressing aspects of the company that need to be improved; and a final
consultancy in which an investment prospectus and presentation are developed. The
program thus improves the management of SMEs, assists them to become
investment ready and helps to provide quality deal flow for investors. Government
assistance is provided in the form of a subsidy for the cost of the consultancy services
provided.totu A Federal Government program could also draw on Arthur Anderson's
'development funnel' concept.tott
More generally, there is a need to educate the SME sector about: the fact that equity
finance is an option; the benefits of equity investment and its importance to
developing innovative HGSMEs; the types of equity investors and which types suits
their particular needs; the investors perspective of investing in an SME; and how the
Australian SME cultural attitude towards ownership and control can impede
business growth and success.tott
To complement the build-up of the formal equity capital market, the Government
should act to build up Australia's informal equity market. There is currently a large
under-utilised pool of business angels who could provide much needed management
and equity finance to SMEs. Overseas surveys show that business angels would
to't 
Mu.rd".,Jacob Associates, op. cit., p.55,60.
t0'4 
Err-,"t and Young & the Centre for Innovation and Enterprise, op. cit., p.2.
tott A.thu Anderson, op. cit., p.16,26.
totu Stut" Government of Victoria, rNhat is Inaestment Ready? Hou to Finance Contpøny Grouth, Business Victoria,
Melbourne, 1,997, p.2-7.
tott S"" Arthur Anderson, op. cit,, p.14,15,22,28,29.
tott Err,rt and Young & the Centre for Innovation and Enterprise, op. cit., p.89.
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invest much more if they could find suitable investments and that there is a vast
untapped pool of prospective experienced business angels. In Australia, a sizeable
pool of experienced ex-managers exists, and many middle-managers in larger
corporations would like to manage a smaller enterprise. While many SMEs could not
pay salaries coûunensurate with the skills often possessed by business angels, this
can be offset by the promise of significant returns made on equity invested. '0"
To capitalise on the potential of business angels to inject vast amounts of equity
finance and management expertise into small businesses, the Government should
undertake a comprehensive policy development process on how to foster the sector.
Lower capital gains tax or tax concessions might encourage the injection of
management expertise and equity finance into small businesses. The Coalition
Government encouraged the growth of the sector by establishing the Business Equity
Information Service, which provided funding to investor matching or brokering
services that match SMEs and potential investors through database matching
services, bulletins, meeting in person and investor forums. A range of such services
have been established and are successfully matching SMEs with people able to
provide equity finance and management skills.'o'o Some also train SMEs to become
investment ready and train investors in evaluating SME proposals. The potential for
using accountants to provide introduction and matching services could also be
explored.to"
The Government could also consider measures to encourage investors and financial
institutions to abandon their short-term profit fixation and instead focus on solid
investment by firms directed to achieving long-term competitive advantage. Porter's
study found that in nations such as lapan, Germany and Switzerland, where
regulations allow financial institutions to hold corporate equity, major lenders hold
significant equity stakes and play an important role in corporate governance,
including through representation on company boards. Because financial institutions
in such companies hold both debt and equity, they are motivated to be concerned
with long-term company health through significant strategic investment, rather than
focusing on short-term profits and debt coverage. Most shares are held for long
periods and are rarely traded, and short-term fluctuations in stock prices are not seen
as important. As financiers understand the firms in which they hold equity: the firms
are freed from the constraints of the stock-market, with its focus on short-term profit,
and can make the investments necessary to sustaining competitiveness over the
longer term;to" and financiers provide assistance with finance and management
where firms suffer recoverable declines in performance.'0" As Porter concludes: 'This
benefits long-term productivity growth and hence the nation's standard of living.''o'o
Thurow has argued that US financial institutions should be encouraged to take
controlling stakes in firms and drive corporate strategy so that the relationship
tot' Murrd"nJacob Associates, op. cit., p.43.
'o'o ¡oh.t Howard, More Time for Business, op. cit., p.108,109
to" Mu.rd"n Jacob Associates, op. cit., p.47.
'0" Mi.huel E. Porter, op. cit., p.110-112,661,.
t023 L"ste, Thurow, Head to Head, op. cit., p.34,35.
to'o Mi.hu"l E. Porter, op. cít., p.66L.
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between firms is transformed from an arms-length relationship focused on short-
term profit to a co-operative relationship focused on building competitive
corporations through strategic investment. Thurow and others believe that the power
of the business-financial groups, such as that found in Japan's keiretsu structure, may
be what is needed to build strong international firms in today's highly competitive
global economy.'0"
These arguments hold much force but Australia's financial system is vastly different
to those in nations such as Japan. Banks have traditionally been legally prevented
from making widespread investments in SMEs. Labor, in the 1994 Innovation
Statement, allowed banks to make a small amount of equity funds available for their
SME clients.to'u At present, banks can make equity investments in businesses up to an
aggregate amount equal to five per cent of their core capital, without prior
consultation with the Reserve Bank of Australia. Further, since July 1996, equity
investments by financial institutions have been taxed under the capital gains tax
provisions, rather than the income tax provisions.to" These reforms have encouraged
greater equity investments by banks in SMEs, although only to a relatively limited
extent. The Government could therefore consider further liberalisation and other
encouragement to expand the role of banks in providing SME finance. However, the
pace of reform should perhaps be gradual because, at present, Australian banks have
little experience in making equity investments in SMEs. The most appropriate
approach may therefore be gradual deregulation, commensurate with the banking
sector's improved knowledge and capability in making equity investments in SMEs.
To further reduce the incentives for short-termism, quarterly profit statements
should be replaced with annual profit statements, a reform already implemented
successfully in Japan. This will enable managers to make significant investments in
one quarter, with the aim of longer term profits without any fear of being penalised
by falling stock prices.'0"
The Government could also consider catalytic action to facilitate the re-establishment
of the second boards of the Australian Stock Exchange. The second boards,
established in 1984, brought increased access to risk capital for young SME
companies that could not afford to list on the main boards by providing a mechanism
for investors to exit and realise their investment.to" Unfortunately, the second boards
ceased in1992.'o3o
102s L"rt", Thurow, Head to Head, op. clt., p.286-288,290. For analysis of the finance benefits of the Japanese
keiretsu structure, see Michael Gerlach, ch.4'Keiretsu organisation in the Japanese econorny: Analysis and
trade implications' in Chalmers Johnson, Laura D'Andrea Tyson & John Zysman (eds), op. cit., pp.741,-776;
James P. Womack, Daniel T. Jones & Daniel Roos, op. cit., p."194,"195,198; Pappas, Carter, Evans &
Koop/Telesis, op. cit., p.90; and Lester Thurow, Head to Head, op. cit., p.34,35.
to'u Put", Cook, Putting ldeas toWork for Austrnlia, op. cit., p.8.
to" 
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Flowever, second boards have been successful in the United States and Japan and a
pan-European board has been introduced.'03' A 1997 Catalyst Institute study
completed comprehensive research on the experience of alternative equity markets in
the United States, Europe and Asia and concluded that a growth equity market
(GEM), in the form of a formalised Australian stock exchange, would be beneficial.
The report found that such a stock exchange would be useful for medium sized
companies with a turnover of at least $30-40 million. Such a GEM, by providing a
visible market for trading of shares and by providing investors with a mechanism to
exit and realise their investment, would encourage the flow of capital to medium
sized growth firms, thereby facilitating their expansion to larger domestic and global
players.'." The Government should consider ways of catalysing the establishment of
such a GEM.
Finally, with respect to debt finance, it is true that during the period of the Labor
Government, too many sound small businesses were denied access to debt finance.
Flowever, with increasing competition in the home mortgage market, itself partly a
result of the Labor Government opening up competition in the banking sector, banks
are beginning to focus more on loans to small business. In particular, some banks are
now offering loans without primary emphasis on security, instead focusing on
matters such as sound business plans or demonstrated skills and performance. While
catalytic action appeared appropriate during the time of the Hawke Governments, it
may be that banks operating in a competitive market will be able to serve small
businesses effectively in the debt finance area.
To reduce the cost of debt finance, Government should seek to establish a low, stable
rate of inflation through: rigorous microeconomic policy, including further tariff and
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Chapter'1.4: Export Marketing
L. The Importance of Export Marketing to Competitive Advantage
Based on Innovation
Firms, particularly those in innovative market segments, need to export because:
exports help to achieve the sales volume necessary to absorb the investments in
R&D, management and other key capabilities needed to remain competitive;'0"
competing on global markets against world best firms encourages firms to constantly
upgrade their sources of competitive advantage;'o'n huge global markets provide the
opportunity for massive sales; world trade is growing significantly faster than world
economic growth/'" and exporting itself provides the knowledge and experience
required for successful on-going exporting.
Exports help to foster national competitive advantage because: exporting is crucial to
building a significant national capability in each link in the innovation chain;
globalisation has made the tradeable sector of the economy a greater determinant of
national prosperity; exports allow solid growth without running into unsustainably
large current account deficits; quality exports provide reputation enhancement for
other Australian exports;'o'u the act of exporting helps to change Australia's business
culture towards an outward looking, global orientation;'o" and a high exports to GDP
ratio appears to encourage economic and employment growth.
To achieve the export sales necessary for survival and prosperity in innovative
product segments, firms must master marketing. As the BIE study on the R&D tax
concession noted '...the successful introduction of new products and processes to the
market depends importantly on firms' capabilities in marketing and distribution."o'u
The LEK study of Australia's leading service exporters found that the firms
considered marketing the second highest source of competitive advantage. It was
also the area of greatest difference between the 'high achievers' ,52 per cent of which
rated marketing as a main form of competitive advantage, and the 'less successful'
group, of which only 22 per cent felt similarly. Successful export firms had long-term,
integrated marketing and production strategies, while the less successful group
1033 Australian Academy of Technological Sciences, op. cit., p.39; Ian Lowe, op. cit., p.2,3; Ross Garnau t, Australia
and the Northeast Asian Ascendancy: Report to the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs nnd Tradc,
Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1989, p.208; and Report of the Committee for Review
of Export Market Development Assistance, op. cit., p.5.
to'n Ind.rrt y Commission , Research and Deoelopment, op, cit,, p,1,54, Austrade, Helping to Meet the Export Challenge,
Austrade, Sydney, 1994, p.xvi notes that exporting has a significant positive impact on a firm's business
practices, such as implementing components of best practice, and also improves the firm's competitiveness in
the domestic market. Report for the Committee of Review of Export Market Development Assistance, op. cit.,
p.31 concluded that when firms began to exporÇ it was often associated with increase productivity, lower
costs and improved design, R&D management quality, production engineering and marketing.
tott World Trade Organisation, InternationøI Trade: Trends ønd Statistics L995, World Trade Organisatiory Geneva.
1995, p.15,17,19,20.
totu R"port of the Committee for Review of Export Market Development Assistance, op. cit., p.40.
t03t Report of the Committee for Review of Export Market Development Assistance, op. cit., p.41,42 notes that
export assistance can be an important signal and can encourage the development of an export culture. At
p.xxix, recommendation one is: 'The inculcation of an export culture in the Australian community...'
to" B.r."u., of Industry Economics R€¡D,Innoaation and Competitiaeness, op. cit., p.190.
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tended to focus on the short-term and be reactive and opportunistic.'03n The costs of
marketing and distributing many products exceeds the combined costs of developing
and manufacturing them. It is thus a crucial source of competitive advantage,
particularly in innovative products.'ooo
Export marketing must be a key focus of national economic policy making because it
is extremely complex and risky, requires enormous commitment and investment,
and is difficult to perform effectively. These impediments discourage most firms
from exporting, while those that undertake it, often struggle to succeed.
The following paragraphs discuss the components of export marketing. The section
achieves two key aims. Firstly, it demonstrates the importance of the export
marketing process to achieving exports, and therefore to creating competitive
advantage through innovation. Secondly, the section shows that export marketing is
highly complex, costly and risky, which helps to explain why relying on the market
alone will fail to produce a level of exports consistent with maximum economic
growth.
Before firms can commit to strategic exporting, they should complete a
comprehensive company review, assessing whether they have the skills, resources,
commitment and information to support sustained exporting. In general, such a
review will reveal that the firm must build up more capacity for exporting in a range
of areas.too'
Once firms are ready to export, they can usefully: conduct research to select potential
markets; examine the potential markets to assess the opportunities and risks in
serving them; and select those markets in which there are significant opportunities
and in which the firm is likely to have a significant competitive advantage.'oo'
Successful firms ensure their product is directed to meeting the needs of particular
customers better than any competitors in the target export markets. In seeking to
enter a product market, they undertake market research to: determine customer
needs; and analyse the activities of competitors, including their number and size,
market share, product range and market strategy. With a comprehensive
understanding of competitors, firms can then select the group of customers at which
their products will be directed and plan a product range that will satisfy their
particular customer group more effectively than any competitors. For many
Australian exporters, this will involve the production of innovative, quality products
aimed at niche market segments.ton' Every facet of a product, including its features,
styling, quality, brand name and packaging, must be designed with the customer
'0" LEK Partnership, op. cit., p.47,48.
'ooo ¡ohn M. Legge, The Competitioe Edge, op. cit., p.x.
toot Bu..u.lough and Co. & BSA Management, Winning Exports, Pitman Publishing, South Melbourne, Victoria,
1996, p.6,"13.
tont Lu" D. Dahringer & Hans Muhlbacher, op. cit., p.57,58. This process is cliscussed in Barraclough and Co. &
BSA Management, op. c1t., p.16-27.
1043 Barraclorrgh and Co. & BSA Managcmcnt, op. cit., p.36,37; and Philip Kotler, Peter Chandler, Rosalie Gibbs &
Rodney McColl, Marketing in AustrøIia, 2n.i edn, Prentice Hall, Sydney , 1989 , p .55,299 ,300,348.
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target market in mind.tono Market research can show whether a product is likely to sell
amongst the intended market and what modifications are necessary for the product
to sell.'oot In many cases, firms will need to adjust their existing product range to meet
the needs of foreign customers.tonu Market research and analysis needs to be on-going
so that changes in the pattern of demand and customer needs are fed back into the
R&D and production process.'ont For export marketing to be successful, each part of
the organisation must work together towards the overall marketing strategy.'oo' It
particular, product managers must create a consensus among sales, production and
development staff, so as to guide the firm's product development according to
marketing principles.toot
Determining the price to charge lor a product is a further key determinant of the
success of innovative products. To determine likely demand at various price levels,
firms need to undertake considerable market research. Given that most Australian
exporters compete primarily on innovation and quality, rather than price, firms will
generally set prices according to what customers perceive the value of the products
to be, rather than on a cost-plus basis.toto Prices need to be high enough to recoup the
significant investment required to produce and market innovative products and to
provide reserves for future investment. Many small innovative businesses have
failed because they set their prices too low, meaning they did not generate adequate
cash flow to fund future investments.'ott On the other hand, prices need to be low
enough to ensure significant demand for the product.
Distribution is also crucial to the success of innovative products. Firms must pay
special attention to physical distribution, given the great distances between the firm
and the export market. Good suppliers can lock customers in by satisfying customer
needs, providing advice, understanding their products and providing after sales
service.tot'Choice of retailer is crucial because purchasers generally pick a supplier
first and then pick a product from that supplier's range. Customers also consistently
buy from the same supplier and often stick with the same brands. Only a minority of
customers - in the range of L0-15 per cent - make a concerted evaluation of alternative
brands and suppliers. This is because of the cost and time required to investigate
alternatives, knowledge that a particular brand can guarantee satisfaction, and fears
about the performance of unknown products. Thus, if a firm's product is widely
available at suitable retailers, there is a good chance it will be considered by
customers. By contrast, a poor choice of retailers can mean the product will be
touo Th" importance of tailoring the various components of a product - such as quality, features, style, size, brand
name, packaging and labelling - to the needs of customers in export markets is discussed in detail in
Barraclough and Co. & BSA Managemenf op. cit., p.60-63.
toot 
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automatically missed by most customers, who may then form loyalty to other
brands.tot'
Given the importance of distributiory it is not surprising that establishing
representation in overseas markets, rather than simply exporting directly to overseas
customers, has been shown to be pivotal to achieving strong export growth.'oto Given
the small size of most Australian firms, many achieve this by using a distributor or
representative agent when first breaking into export markets, rather than employing
more elaborate options, such as establishing their own marketing operations in the
export market. Such partners located in target countries can often market the firm's
products more cheaply and effectively, given their local market knowledge, contacts,
and possibly, existing infrastructure.'ouu
The choice of distributors is crucial. Many firms have one or more experiences with
poor distributors before they find a good one. Unfortunately, choosing the wrong
distributor can ruin an export drive, spoil a company's reputation in other markets
and lead to major losses.'otu Ideally, firms will find distributors with: a sound financial
position; knowledge of the market; understanding of the firm's products; facilities
and offices accessible to customers; appropriate warehousing and servicing facilities;
appropriate geographical coverage to target the firm's intended customers; sound
sales staff; and sound promotion skills and capacity.''"
First Steps to Export Success tested the importance of a range of variables in
distinguishing high exporting firms and low exporting firms, based on data gathered
from 434 export projects. It found that developing close, long-term relationships with
local agents and distributors, rather than engaging distributors impersonally from a
distance, was one of only two of many variables tested, shown to distinguish high
and low export performing firms over the first five years of an export project. High
performing exporters had frequent contact with local distributors, sought to develop
a long-term partnership and co-operated on key aspects of marketing strategy. Joint
planning helps to build co-operation and enables firms to benefit from the local
knowledge and experience of the distributor.tott
Innovative products must also be effectively promoted if export drives are to
succeed. Promotion is even more important in export markets than in domestic
markets because most Australian products are little recognised offshore. Promotional
strategy should be worked out and implemented jointly with distributors, in order to
tot' 
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eighth year in the EMDGS, average exports by firms with overseas representation were arouncl $3.4 million





tott Ch.i, Styles & Tim Ambler, First Steps to Export Success: A Project by tlrc PAN'AGRA Research Progranune of
London Business School utith the Support of British Oaerseas Trade Board, Australian Trade Conmùssion, British
Overseas Trade Board Secretaria! London & Australian Trade Commission, Sydney, 1997, p.1,2,9,15.
Barraclough and Co. & BSA Managemenf op. cit., p.56-58 also stressed the importance of developing close
relationships with distributors.
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make full use of the distributor's local knowledge and to develop the relationship.'o'n
Methods including advertising, sponsorships, sales promotion, publicity, personal
selling and direct mail should be used to ensure target customers are aware of the
products existence, are attracted to purchasing it, and know where to buy it.r060
Promotional campaigns must be sustained over a significant period of time if they
are to convince a substantial number of people to try a new, unknown product and
eventually build a loyal cohort of buyers.tout
Promotion is particularly critical to competing on the basis of innovation because it
can highlight the unique features, quality or performance of new products. Even
where competitor's products have similar features, a firm can create the impression
of being more innovative and concerned to meet customer requirements if they are
first to promote the product's features.'062
To maximise the chances of an export drive succeeding, firms must visit their
intended export markets to identify customer needs, analyse competitors, develop
pricing policy, engage distributors and formulate promotional strategies.'ou' First
Steps to Export Success found that breaking into export markets is best facilitated by
firm's gathering rexperiential' information via well-prepared market visits, rather
than simply relying on general published information and exporting from Australia.
Visiting export markets was one of only two of the many variable tested, shown to
distinguish high and low exporting firms in the first five years of an export project.
The survey showed that discussions with distributors, general visits to the market
and personal visits to retailers and wholesalers were regarded as'highly valuable' by
80 per cent, 81 per cent and 70 per cent of firms respectively. In contrast, general
published information was viewed as 'highly valuable' by only 8 per cent of firms,
while commissioned market research was viewed as 'highly valuable' by only 20 per
cent of firms. Most firms found these information sources'somewhat valuable'.'ouo
On this basis, First Steps to Export Success recommended a three step process when
entering export markets. Firstly, firms should undertake extensive pre-visit
preparation, utilising published sources, target country embassies and Austrade
services to gather information on the nation and its industry. Secondly, firms should
visit target markets to experience the culture and gather information through
discussions with distributors, wholesalers, retailers and consumers. Thirdly, on the
basis of information gathered, market research can be commissioned to help inform
the export drive.tott
Once this market research completed, firms need to undertake comprehensive
budgeting and gain access to finance. Gaining finance from commercial sources is the
most difficult component of exporting for many firms, as banks require extensive
tot' Bu.ru.lo.,gh and Co. & BSA Management, op. cit., p.75.
touo Philip Kotler, Peter Chandler, Rosalie Gibbs & Rodney McColl, op. cit., p.563.
tout 
lohr, M. Legge, The Competitiae Edge, op. cit., p.157,159-161.
tou' 
ibið.., p.lzs.
tou3 Bur.u.lorrgh and Co. & BSA Managemenf op. cit., p.44,45.
'ouo Ch.i, Styles & Tim Ambler, op. cit., p.1 ,?,7,
touu ibid., p.13.
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evidence of the firm's capacity to succeed in their export venture. Finally, firms need
to protect themselves against a number of risks by: taking out insurance to cover
transit risks; arranging contracts that protect against exchange rate risks; and
insuring against commercial and political credit risks.'n'o
Once well established in an export market, firms need to consider their next steps for
export expansion. The least risky option is to entrench the firm's position in existing
markets by greater investment in marketing and distribution networks. Particularly
where firms are exporting innovative products, being closer to the market can assist
in ensuring products are developed to meet changing customer needs. Exporting
through distributors or representative agents can provide insufficient control over
the marketing process. For example, a firm's products may be only some of those
supplied by the distributor, an:rd the distributor may have less knowledge of, and
commitment to, the firm's products.tntt
For these reasons, established firms with innovative products may wish to take a
greater role in marketing and distribution in the export market themselves. They
might establish a joint marketing venture, which can allow a firm to benefit from the
local knowledge of their partner's firm, as well as their production, marketing and
distribution facilities and staff. Alternatively, a firm could open a branch office, to
establish Australian representation in the export market, establish control over
management and marketing, ensure the company's interests are advanced and gain
more accurate market feedback. Finally, a firm might make a greenfields investment
in the foreign market thereby facilitating: total control over marketing, management
and production; the tailoring of the firm's infrastructure to the precise needs of the
foreign market; creation of products focused on the precise needs of target
consumers in the export market; and a long-term presence in the market. Care needs
to be taken before firms choose these more significant options because they require
significant investments.'out Flowever, for firms to become large, global players in
innovative product areas, they may need to work towards establishing their own
international marketing and distribution networks.
Thus, marketing is very complex and difficult for firms to master, ¡ret a crucial
determinant of the survival and prosperity of innovative firms. Importantly, there is
still a significant window of opportunity in the marketing part of the innovation
chain. As major parts of the global economy operate without adequate consideration
of marketing, Australia can assist in gaining a competitive advantage in innovative
products by establishing expertise in marketitg.'ou'
2. Market Failure and Australia's Weaknesses in Export Marketing
Relying on the market alone will fail to bring the necessary quantity of exports to
maximise growth and competitiveness. For general, non-firm specific information on
foreign markets and product markets within them, market failure occurs because
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gathering such information is not economic for individual firms, yet government
provision of such information can help to make exporting economic for thousands of
firms throughout the economy.
Market failure also occurs where individual firms, particularly SMEs, decide against
exporting, due to the risk, difficulty, cost and complexity of the task. Breaking into
export markets generally takes several years and requires significant investment in
new capacity, often involving the production of new or refined products, and a major
expansion of marketing activity. For innovative SMEs, the cost of gaining the
detailed market information needed to break into export markets is very high
relative to sales.toto The investment required often means firms have to either take on
equity investment, or borrow at high interest rates, due to the riskiness of export
sales and the conservatism of Australia's banking system. Such investment,
combined with the likelihood of minimal sales for several years as the product is
introduced, means significant losses must generally be absorbed for the first few
years. Obviously, if the export drive fails, the viability of the business can be
threatened. Compounding the risks involved is the complexity of marketing
products in foreign lands to consumers with different tastes and a different culture,
against foreign competitors. This risk and complexity means that many businesses
decide against attempting to break into export markets and remain content with
operating domestically. While firms may see significant potential gains through
exporting, many are understandably not willing to risk everything for a chance at
major gains.tot'
These problems are decades old. As the Epsie report noted:
Many entrepreneurs discussed their difficulties in entering export markets... The single
greatest obstacle they faced appeared to be the relative size of the financial ancl marketing
effort required by a small Australian company to enter larger USA or Western European
markets, even for niche products.l072
In turn, the risk and uncertainty involved in exporting can result in financial
institutions failing to provide finance to many sound export proposals, thereby
limiting export expansion. The Hughes report noted:
Despite financial deregulation, exporting firms found it difficult to obtain funds from
financial institutions. Lenders were often cautious in their assessment of risk, or perhaps
found less risky opportunities to fund in protected domestic markets.1073
In Australia, most firms are ineffective at marketing in the domestic market, let alone
marketing in export markets. For example, many managers don't undertake external
market research to test new product and service ideas.'oto Even in the late 1980s, only
toto M.Ki.rr"y and Company & the Australian Manufacturing Council Secretariat, op. cit., p.12.
'ott Th" thrust of this argument is made in Report of the Committee for Review of Export Market Development
Assistance, op. cit., p.40,41,83,84.
1072 Australian Academy of Technological Sciences, op. cit., p.40.
t073 R"po.t of the Committee for Review of Export Market Development Assistance, op. cit., p.40.
1074 Frederick G. Hilmer, op. cit., p."174,175.
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25 per cent of Australian companies had marketing research departments.'ott
Marketing is often addressed as an afterthought, rather than as an integral part of the
overall business plan. Many firms underinvest in marketing, particularly in harsh
financial periods, when it is marketing that is so important in generating sales. The
result is a long-term loss of viability as current customers are lost to competitors who
market their products more effectively.totu
The export marketing performance of Australian firms is generally poor. Most do not
even attempt it. In 1994-95, only around four per cent of Australian firms exported.
Of those firms that did export, 75 per cent exported directly to firms overseas, with
the great majority of this to unrelated companies. Only \2 per cent of firms used
overseas agents.tot
Poor export marketing is impeding export growth in manufacturing and service
industries. LEK found that service exporters rated marketing as by far their area of
greatest competitive disadvantage. Many were unsatisfied with their marketing
arrangements, with 28 per cent citing 'lack of market information' as a major
constraint to the growth of their exports, while 28 per cent cited 'lack of offshore
facilities', 26 per cent cited 'distance from markets' and 15 per cent cited
'language/culture'.'ott Many of Australia's emerging ETM exporters from the
McKinsey study were shown to have conducted their export marketing in an ad hoc
way, relying on personal contacts and general impressions of market potential.'ot'The
KPGM Peat Marwick 1993 Manufacturing Suraey found that nearly 40 per cent of
manufacturers rated 'lack of market knowledge' as the first, second or third major
barrier effecting their ability to increase their international business over the next two
years.'oto Thus, many Australian firms do not undertake comprehensive export
marketing. This results in the failure of many export projects, while other export
drives miss opportunities for greater gains.
Many Australian firms also have difficulty gaining overseas representation, a key to
successful export drives. Emerging Exporters reported that: 'Virtually every born
global firm we interviewed had difficulties in developing overseas representation.''ou'
Many had suffered bad experiences with overseas representation.'08'
There is also a shortfall of Australian workers and management with suitable
qualifications and experience in exporting. The Hughes Report found that one third
of first year Export Market Development Grants Scheme (EMDGS) claimants
regarded the inability to access consultants with appropriate marketing skills as a
major difficulty in export marketing. This lack of skills reduces exports by reducing
'otu Philip Kotler, Peter Chandler, Rosalie Gibbs & Rodney McColl, op. cit., p.1.27.
'otu Johtr M. Legge, The Competitiae Edge, op. cit., p.270,274.
'ott Industr), Commission & Department of Industry, Science and Tourism, op. cit., p.22,129.
tott LEK Partnership, op. cit., p.98,100.
tott M.Kirlr"y and Company & the Australian Manufacturing Council Secretaria! op. cit., p.11.
toto KPGM Peat Marwick , op. cit., p.22.




the efficiency with which exporting occurs, and by fostering negative attitudes
toward exporting among firms.tot'
T}ire \994 evaluation of the EMDGS found that Australia had still not developed a
significant export culture, given that only around 200 companies had annual exports
of more than $25 million, and Australia's exports to GDP ratio was much lower than
many industrial nations of similar size.totn
Australia's weaknesses in marketing mean that, even where our firms overcome all
the other market failures in the innovation chain and successfully produce
innovative products, sales and exports are often gravely impeded by poor
marketing.tott
3. Rationalism and Export Marketing
In light of the crucial importance of export marketing and exports, coupled with
massive market failure in the area and poor performance by most Australian firms in
export marketing and exporting, what is the rationalist policy response?
The IC are against government assistance to export marketing. They have written:
...there is little evidence of widespread and significant spillover benefits to other firms from
export market development activity. Yet such spill-overs provide the main rationale for
firm-specific export assistance, such as the Export Market Development Grants ,ch"-e.to8u
The IC are also against any targeting of assistance to exports. They have written:
The Commission...disagrees with the proposition that program supports should be targeted
at firms in the traded sector... Greater efficiency benefits the community irrespective of
where in the economy it occurs.tosT
4. Industry Policies to Foster Excellence in Export Marketing
Fortunately, Labor disregarded hardline rationalist views on export marketing and
demonstrated, through successful export marketing programs, that government can
increase the level of sustainable export marketing and export sales beyond that
achievable by the market alone.
Porter's study found that government policies should actively encourage an
international outlook and exports, for example through provision of foreign market
and technical information via networks of foreign offices.'ouu Labor had a sound
1083 Report of the Committee for Review of Export Market Development Assistance, op. cit., p.44,73.
'oto Philip Kotler, Peter Chandler, Rosalie Gibbs & Rodney McColl, op. cit., p.37.
to*t B.r."uu of Industry Economics R€¡D, Innooation and Competitiaeness, op. cit., p.27,34.
1086 Industry Commission, Submission to the Rez¡ieut of Business Programs, op. cit., p.iv.
tout ibi.l., p.31 .
'ouu Mi.hu"l E. Porter, op. cit., p.657.
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record in this area. It established Austrade in 1986.10t' By June 1996, Austrade had 99
offices in more than 80 countries able to provide Australian exporters with detailed
market intelligence, including market research for specific firms.'oto This work is
complemented by the work of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT),
which provides a considerable amount of general export market information,
particularly through their Country Economic Briefs, and can also refer firms to more
specific information sources.to"
Together, Austrade's foreign and domestic networks of offices give general
information and advice on export marketing, provided free or at low cost. For
example: basic export marketing advice and referral is provided through the Export
Hotline;'on' hundreds of seminars providing export advice and discussing
opportunities in export markets are conducted annually; and a network of regional
managers around Australia assist firms to break into export markets by providing
general advice, and by introducing firms to Austrade's network and the services it
provides. ln 1995-96, regional managers helped 3,795 firms create $270 million in
exports.tot' The foreign and domestic offices also provide: information, including
market research, to assist firms to understand, select and enter export markets, for
which firms generally pay 70 per cent of the cost; and detailed work to assist firms to
expand their overseas business, for which firms pay full costs,'o'n
The work of Austrade was also complemented by Auslndustry under Labor. Client
managers provided free information and advice, and for firms requiring a high level
of individual assistance, referral to accredited consultants, who, for a daily fee, often
subsidised by government, helped firms to break into export markets by taking thern
through the various components of the export market development process.'ont
Labor also ran two major schemes to assist firms to break into export markets,
namely the Export Market Development Grants Scheme (EMDGS) and the
International Trade Enhancement Scheme (ITES).
The EMDGS provided taxable grants for expenditures incurred by SMEs in seeking
out and developing export markets. The precise details of the scheme were changed
over time. ln 1994, annual grants re-imbursed 50 per cent of eligible expenditure
incurred above $15,000, subject to a minimum expenditure of $30,000 and a
maximum grant of $250,000 per annum. Marketing expenditures eligible for re-
imbursement under the scheme included costs associated with: establishing overseas
'out E.o.ro-ic Planning Advisory Council, International Trade Policy: Council Pøper No.18, Economic Planning
Advisory Council, Canberra, 1986, p.25.
t0e0 Austrade, Australian Trade Commission Annual Report 1995-96, Australian Government Publishing Service,
Canberra, "1996, p.51..
'ott Bu.ru"lorrgh and Co. & BSA Management, op. cit., p.8.
t0e2 
Austrade , Australian Trade Commission Annual Report 1995-96, op. cit., p.52 reports that the Hotline is
available to provide advice on exporting or referral for potential or current exporters, agents and traders and
export consultants, with more than 70,000 inquiries answered in1995-96.
10e3 
Austrade , Australian Trade Commission Annual Report 1995-96, op. cit., p.52,54,60.
'ono Fo. details on the services provided by Austrade's foreign and domestic offices, see Austrade , Australinn
Trade Commission Annual Report 1995-96, op. cit., partrcularly pp,20-77.
t0e5 Burru.lough and Co. & BSA Management, op. cit., p.v,98.
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representation (33 per cent of expenditures in 1992); producing brochures and
advertising material (18 per cent of expenditure in 1992); fares; samples; tenders;
communications; Australian consultants; overseas consultants; patent search,
registration, renewal and insurance costs; and overseas visit allowance. There was a
normal maximum of eight grants per claimant. However, from 1992-93, exporters
who had received eight grants could get grants for up to three more years for each
new market they entered, thereby encouraging further expansion by Australian firms
into global markets. Between 1988 and 1993, the scheme assisted between 2,000 and
3,700 firms per annum to enter export markets, with average grants of $42,000-
fi67,000 per annum.totu
Sensibly, Labor introduced a performance test into the scheme, which linked grants
payable to export performance. The performance test does not apply to the first two
years in the scheme, as firms develop export markets. Thereafter, firms must achieve
strong export growth to gain maximum grants. Grants will only be paid up to 40 per
cent of the claimant's exports in the third yeart with the test harsher each year until
grants of up to five per cent of total exports are provided from year seven.'ont In this
wayt the program encouraged improved export performance by firms.
The EMDGS was very successful in increasing export sales. In 1995-96, fi202 million
in grants were paid to 3,251, claimants, who, in turn, achieved $5.7 billion in export
sales, a ratio of exports to grants of 28:L.tont A1994 evaluation estimated, on the basis
of actual industry and year-in-scheme data comparing claimants and non-claimants,
that EMDGS grant payments of $156 million resulted in additional export marketing
expenditure of fi1,47 million and incremental exports of $1.4 billion, a multiple of nine
times the value of grant payments. After firms have been in the scheme for a few
years, they generally achieve exports 15-25 times the level of their marketing
expenditure.'onn The Hughes Report noted that, in 1987-88, firms that had been in the
scheme for between six and fourteen years, achieved exports 35-57 times their
marketing expenditure."oo The scheme also appears to assist firms to enter more
export markets. Claimants typically promote in three country markets in their first
year of the scheme and this rises to an average of more than four by the sixth year.''o'
The EMDGS, in many cases, helps firms to make the transition from viewing exports
opporfunistically, to viewing exports as a core and growing part of their business.
Exports as a percentage of a firm's turnover typically rise from around five per cent
in the first year in the scheme, to around 20 per cent in the seventh and eighth years.
For the period 1988-1992, average exports per claimant increased for each successive
year in the scheme, from $0.49 million in year one, to fi2.46 million in year eight."o'
Importantly,'graduate firms', or firms that have completed the full-cycle of eight
grants, generally become even more export oriented after they exit the program. The
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vast majority of graduate firms maintain or increase their export marketing
expenditure in all categories and, since their last year of EMDGS support, graduate
firms, on average: market in six new export markets; achieve sales in four new export
markets; promote five new products/services overseas; and export four new
products/ services overseas.tto'
The scheme also appears to be encouraging Australia's emerging manufacturing and
service exporters. In 1991,-92, nearly 80 per cent of the claimants were from
manufacturing or services.tton The McKinsey report found that EMDGS was rated
highly by the emerging exporters for: providing valuable finance, especially in the
early years of exporting, when firms often suffer early losses on their exports; and
playing a powerful psychological role in assisting domestic based firms to export."o'
On the basis that EMDGS was succeeding in its objective to encourage firms to seek
out and develop new export markets, and due to the rise in exports fostered, the1994
review Íeconunended that the scheme be extended for a further five years."ou It is
testimony to the shortsightedness of hardline rationalism, that it was widely known
that the Coalition intended to scrap the scheme when they came to office. It was only
intense lobbying by stakeholders that ensured the scheme was only radically down-
sized, rather than abolished, with total expenditure capped at $150 million and
eligible expenditure categories cut to six."ot
The establishment of the ITES was recoûrmended by the Hughes Committee, in
recognition of the fact that breaking into export markets involves significant
investment in new capacity and marketing, and substantial risk, which causes many
firms to avoid exporting."o' Labor established the scheme in 1990-91. It was a
discretionaïy program providing low interest loans or advances to firms with strong
export prospects to assist them to develop export markets. Funds were available to
support marketing related activities incurred offshore, such as travel and promotion,
advertising, salaries and set-up costs. Applicants were selected on merit, based on
their demonstrated capacity in international business, strong management skills,
financial strength and commitment to the export project."o'The ITES provided loans
averaging $1.5 million to SMEs and sought a 20:1. increase in export sales and
repayment of the loan. To monitor performance, Austrade relied on detailed half-
yearly and quarterly reports and the use of performance targets. This produced costs
four times lower than those typically incurred where firms gained finance from
development capital firms.ttto
tto' ibid., p.27,28.
1t04 ., . ,
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The ITES also helped to address a market failure in the financial system in two key
areas. Firstly, it provided funds to experienced exporters seeking to make a
significantly increased commitment in export marketing, a task requiring long-term
patient financing. Banks are reluctant to lend to many such high potential firms.
Secondly, ITES provided funds for small, new, high potential, often technology-
based 'born global' firms, which are often refused {inance from the banking system
due to lack of physical security. ITES met both these needs by providing low cost,
medium to long-term loans, with deferred repayment terms.""
The ITES was particularly successful. From 1990 to the end of 1995-96, fi178 million
was committed to 118 participants, which produced around fi2.7 billion in export
earnings in funded projects alone. There had been no bad debts from the scheme and
loan repayments were 100 per cent of budgeted repayments."" The McKinsey report
found that ITES was rated highly by the emerging exporters in terms of providing
valuable finance, especially in the early years of exportirg."" A 1994 evaluation
concluded it had successfully helped firms to increase their export marketing
investment, break into export markets and expand their export sales. In addition,
half the companies funded reported increased exports in non-ITES markets. In many
cases, firms identified these opportunities via marketing activities undertaken for
their ITES project. Participants generally agreed that the planning process imposed
by the scheme had assisted them to develop a disciplined, structured approach to all
their export activity. The scheme also appeared to influence competitors of ITES
recipients to commence their own export marketing activities.ttto
In an act of economic rationalism at its worst, the scheme was terminated by the
Coalition Government, effective 1 July 1996."'u (Labor in Working Nntion had
announced the extension of the scheme for a further four years with an allocation of
$SO million per year)."'u Rather than being abolished, the scheme should be
expanded. With significant marketing to promote the program among Australian
firms, it appears likely that applications meeting the selection criteria could be
received amounting to around $100 million per annum.t"t Given the success of the
scheme in increasing export marketing and export sales way beyond that which
could be achieved by relying on the market alone, and given the scheme was a
revolving fund and had met with no bad debts, the scheme should be strongly
lttl 
Austrade , Helping to Meet the Export Challenge, op. cit., p.47. At p.47,48 it is explained that funding of five per
cent of projected net foreign exchange earnings is available, normally up to $2.25 million. For exceptional
projects, projected to produce $45 million over five years, up to $5 million was available. For medium to low
risk projects, six year loans were provided, interest free for three years and thereafter at interest of up to 40
per cent of the Commonwealth Bank Loan Reference rate. Initially, only firms with projected net foreign
exchange earnings of at least $20 million over five years were funded. This threshold was reduced to $10
million following the findings of Emerging Exporters, which found that the scherne was excluding high
potential emerging exporters.
1112 Austrade , Australian Trade Commission Annual Report 1995-96, op. cit., p.45-47.
t "' M.Kirlr"y and Company & the Australian Manufacturing Council Secretariat, op. cit., p.51.
11la Austrade , Helping to Meet the Export Challenge, op. cit., p.52-57.
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marketed, with funding provided to any firms that can meet the criteria and
successfully pass through the rigorous selection process.
Labor also established a number of other programs to assist firms to break into
export markets. The Export Access Program (EAP) was established in October 1991"'u
to assist SMEs not currently exporting or new exporters to enter export markets on a
sustainable basis. Funded and administered by Austrade, and delivered by Industry
Associations, the EAP involves project managers providing advice to firms on the
various elements of the export development process, including assistance with
identifying export opportunities and preparing for market visits. Meetings are often
arranged with prospective export pattners."'n By the end of 1995-96,1.,566 companies
had been assisted under EAP, which helped to generate $84 million in exports.'"0
Trade fairs are also an important source of export sales and the gaining of overseas
distributors. In 1995-96, Austrade co-ordinated Australian participation at 82 trade
fairs internationally. The 1,338 Australian companies involved reported fi187.3
million in on-site sales and anticipated they would earn more than $3 billion in the 12
months following the fairs. Exhibitors appointed 872 agents and signed 404 joint
venture arrangements.""
Labor commenced the Asia-Pacific Fellowship Program in 1991,-92. It provided
financial assistance to firms so they could place key managers and graduates in Asian
markets for up to six months, to gain a greater understanding of the markets. Some
4L fellowships were offered in 1995-96. Between 1991.-92 and 1995-96, participant
companies reported exports of $152.5 million, an export to grant ratio of 3L'|1.""
Under the Asia-Business Links program, financial assistance was provided to
Australian firms to bring important Asian market contacts (314 in 1995-96) to
Australia for up to six months for training and experience in the firms operations.
The scheme has contributed to $133 million in exports, an export to grant ratio of
147:1.""
Overall, in1995-96, Austrade assisted firms to produce $6.65 billion in exports. For 6
per cent of sales, firms stated they 'would not have made the sale without Austrade',
in 18 per cent of cases, Austrade was 'a key factor in the success', while for 76 per
cent of sales, Austrade was'a positive factor'."'n
Labor also showed that government can help to increase sustainable exports beyond
that achievable by the market alone by assisting the Export Finance Insurance
l't8 Ind.rrtry Cornrnission, Annual Report 1991-92, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1992,
p.230.
l1te Bu..aclough and Co. & BSA Managemen! op. cit., p.101.
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Corporation (EFIC) to expand its export finance and insurance activity."" EFIC
facilitates increased exporting by accepting risks, through a range of finance and
insurance services, that exporters and their financiers are unable to carry."% EFIC
provides export credit insurance against non-payment of exporters due to political or
commercial factors.1127 IÍr1996-97, $6.6 billion of exports were covered by insurance
against non-payment."'u EFIC also supports the provision of additional working
capital by lending institutions to finance work in progress on an export contract,
where the exporter lacks additional security from its own resources.lr2e In 1996-97,36
export working capital guarantees supporting $106 million of export contracts were
provided.t'3o EFIC also provides favourable finance terms to overseas buyers to
enable export firms to compete with foreign competitors supported by government
supported loans."" In 1996-97, fi420 million in new loans were signed for capital
goods and services, covering 43 contracts."" Overall, in the five years ended 1996-97,
EFIC supported, on its commercial account, $30 billion in Australian exports.ttt'
While facilitating extra exports for Australia, EFIC remains self-financing, having
built sufficient reserves to underpin substantial support for exporters in the future."'n
The success of Labor's export assistance demonstrates that government export
marketing programs can increase exports and growth beyond that achievable by the
market alone. Indeed, there appears to be some scope to build on Labor's
achievements in export marketing. While Labor's policy regime assisted firms to
become established in export markets and indeed expand their activity, it may be
that more assistance is needed to help established innovative niche exporters to make
the transition to becoming significant global players, a transition few Australian
firms have been able to make. Australia's export performance is gravely impeded the
fact that we have very few large global exporters. Given the small size of the
Australian economy, establishing several clusters of large firms with major global
export sales could make a major impact on Australia's current account and
employment growth performance.
t'" Rob".t J. L. Hawke, Paul Keating, John Button & Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Building a
Conryetitiae Australia: Statements by Prime Minister, Bob Hautke, Treasurer, Paul Keating and Industry Minister,
lohn Button, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 7991,, pJ,.9 announced the provision of
$200 million to EFIC's reserves to enable it to expand its export finance and insurance activity, as well as a
further $50 million to establish a bond facility in EFIC, to enable exporters to meet the demands of
performance bonds without using their own reserves. Working Nation: Policies and Programs, op. cit., p.76
announced that EFIC's Working Capital Guarantee facility was to be extended to cover exports of services
and manufactured goods rather than simply capital goods; and the Performance Bond facility was expancled
to provide Advance Payment Bonds to enable exporters to undertake export contracts, where they had the
technical and financial capacity to do so, but lacked the assets needed to establish a bond facility.
"'u E*port Finance and Insurance Corporation, Annual Report 1997, Australian Government Publishing Service,
Canberra, 1997, p.1.
"" Barraclough and Co. & BSA ManagemenÇ op. cit., p.100.
tt'8 Export Finance and Insurance Corporation , op. cit., p.6.
t'" Ba..u"lorrgh and Co. & BSA ManagemenÇ op. cit., p.100.
t"o Etport Finance and Insurance Corporation, op. cit., p,6,19.
tt31 Burru.lo.rgh and Co. & BSA Managemen! op. cit., p.100.




To make the transition from innovative SMEs to major global players, firms must
establish a significant marketing and distribution presence in export markets,
through joint marketing ventures, opening a branch office, or making a greenfields
investment in marketing and distribution networks. In a global environment,
strategic partnerships in particular have become an important competitive weapon,
allowing firms to perform better in international markets by combining their
strengths with those of other firms.tt'u Trading houses focused on particular sectors
can also provide crucial infrastructure for export firms.
Various reports, such as McKinsey's Emerging Exporters and the Epsie report on high
technology firms, have recommended that the Government encourage the
establishment of such strategic, long-term marketing infrastructure in foreign
markets.'''u While it is true that a handful of trading houses and joint ventures were
funded under the EMDGS,"" and the ITES provides financial assistance to help firms
to expand their export activity, there is scope for the Government to play a more
proactive role in assisting innovative firms to establish significant marketing and
distribution infrastructure in export markets.
To achieve this, the Government could consider the ACTU's proposal that a new
category be established in the EMDGS for certain innovative, export oriented sectors,
where exporters of any size are eligible and can claim beyond the maximum grant
amount.tt'* This could apply where firms sought to establish joint ventures or make
greenfield investments in marketing infrastructure in foreign markets.
Furthermore, the Government could use Australia's existing industry export
networks to establish significant marketing infrastructure in key overseas markets.
Under Labor, Austrade facilitated the formation of a range of industry export
groups, usually comprising 30-50 firms, which undertook co-operative initiatives in
export market development."3e To build on this progress, the Government could act
to ensure that: firstly, such industry export groups were established in all key
innovative sectors; and secondly, seed funding was provided to enable such groups
to develop export marketing facilities for their firms in key foreign markets.
To build up the skills and experience of Australian workers and management in
export marketing, the Government could: ensure that business, management and
t'3t L"" D. Dahringer & Hans Muhlbacher, op. cit., p.333.
tttu M.Ki.rr"y and Company & the Australian Manufacturing Council SecretariaÇ op. cit., p.62,63, recommended
that the Government should encourage joint ventures between Australian exporters and Asian firms to assist
with their export marketing efforts, given the importance of establishing sound overseas representation and
the great difficulties many firms have in gaining effective representation. Australian Academy of
Technological Sciences, op. cit., p.18,19,40 recommended: increased assistance for the establishment of
international marketing and distribution organisations for high technology products to enable small firn'rs to
overcome key difficulties in their efforts to break into export markets; and financial assistance to facilitate the
establishment of Australian trading houses in major overseas high technology markets to provide SMEs with
shared low cost accommodation, office facilities and other services necessary to enabling them to rnaintain a
presence in such markets.
t137 
Austrade , Australian Trad.e Commission Annual Report 1995-96, op. cit., p.45 noted that there were nine trading
houses in the portfolio.
"tt ACTUTTDC Mission to Western Europe, op. cit., p.94,95.
l13e Australian Council of Trade Unions, ACTU Submission Re Economic Statement, Unpublished ,1992, p.24,25.
253
marketing courses include a comprehensive component in export marketing;"oo
maintain and enhance Austrade's National Exporter Education Program, which
promotes export training, and supports the establishment, upgrading and
accreditation of export training courses;t'n' and maintain a sizeable pool of
experienced export consultants through programs such as the Export Access
Program.
Finally, active policies to open global markets can also assist to increase exports.
Labor showed that even a small player like Australia can help to open markets in a
range of ways.
Firstly, by establishing the Cairns Group oÍ 1.4 fair trading agricultural exporters,
Labor helped to ensure an organised push for free trade in the Uruguay Round of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, even if the results were less than brilliant,
due to the position and power of the United States, lapan and the European
Community.
Secondly, the Government's leading role in establishing the Asia Pacific Economic
Community (APEC) appears to have encouraged the opening of markets. In
particular, the Bogor Declaration of December 1994, in which 18 Asia Pacific nations
agreed to free and open trade and investment by 2020, with industrialised members
to achieve this by 20'1.0,"n'will create great opportunities for export and jobs growth
in Australia. As the Karpin report noted: '...the continued growth of Asian economies
will create the demand for higher value-added products and services on a scale never
before seen in history."tn'While full implementation of the agreement remains far
from certain, Labor's important role in negotiating the Bogor Declaration may lead to
a very substantial increase in national income, exports and jobs growth.
ttoo R"port of the Committee for Review of Export Market Development Assistance, op. cit., p.42 supports the
expansion of export education.
l1a] 
Austrade , Austrøliøn Trade Commission Annual Report 1.995-96, op. cit., p.61 notes that initiatives in the 1995-96
year included the establishment of a database of export training courses, promotion of country specific
training courses, upgrading and accreditation of export management courses, and the Export Skills program,
which by June1996, had supported 11 export training courses.
t'o' B.r."u, of Industry Economics, Potential Gains to Australiø from APEC: Open RegionøIism and tlrc Bogor
Declaration - Occasional Pøper 29, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1995, p.1.
1'n3 Industq, Task Force on Leadership and Management Skills, op. ctt., p.92.
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Thirdly, Labor achieved significant gains through bilateral negotiations, such as the
Closer Economic Relations agreement with New ZeaIand, which resulted in the
removal of the great majority of barriers to trade between Australia and New
Zealand.t'*
These initiatives show that Governments in small nations can create enormous
opportunities for export expansion through well-resourced, creative multilateral,
regional and bilateral trade liberalisation initiatives.
ttnn D"purtment of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Austrølia's Trade Deoelopment Progrøm 1993-94: Budget Related Paper
No. 6, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1993, p.21,.
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Conclusion
This thesis examined whether economic rationalist policies, as implemented by
Labor, and as recommended by rationalists in the period 1983 to \996, were the key
to achieving national competitive advantage, restructuring and employment growth.
The thesis produced three major conclusions.
The first conclusion is that, while the free market policies may have produced net
benefits in restructuring, employment growth and national competitiveness, the
benefits have been only moderate. Furthermore, these net benefits were achieved at
the cost of significant social and economic dislocation.
In part one, three key rationalist policies implemented in the period - namely tariff
cuts, free market infrastructure reform and small government policies - were
examined. Each policy appeared to foster restructuring.
Tariff reductions contributed to restructuring, most particularly through: achieving
input cost reductions; removing most of the assistance bias against exports; exposing
firms to international competition, which forced firms to improve in order to survive;
and stopping the practice of 'propping up' declining sectors, thereby encouraging
them to become productive and survive, or decline and give up their resources for
use in more efficient sectors. Crucially, tarÌff reform also ended Australia's fixation
with the tariff as the key instrument for industry development. Tarill protection does
nothing to address the major determinants of competitive advantage and indeed, can
often delay much needed adjustment and upgrading
Rationalist infrastructure reform fostered restructuring, primarily by reducing the
prices charged by Australia's key economic infrastructure sectors. In particular,
introducing competition in sectors formerly dominated by poorly performing
government monopolies, such as in electricity, gas and telecommunications, brought
significant efficiency improvements and cost reductions. Between 1987-88 and 1994-
95, averase real prices charged by GTEs fell roughly 17 per cent and labour
productivity more than doubled.t'ot Privatisation could also produce benefits if
handled properly. In the context of a competitive national market, the profit motive
engendered by private ownership could be expected to make some contribution to
improved performance from infrastructure providers. Given that infrastructure costs
are an important part of the input costs in many industries, infrastructure cost
reductions must have assisted the restructuring of the Australian economy.
Cuts to goverrunent spending may have also contributed to restructuring by freeing
up resources to be deployed by the private sector. This conclusion is consistent with
the strong growth achieved during the main period of government spending cuts,
from 1984to1989.
ttot St""rir,g Committee on National Performance Monitoring of Government Trading Enterprises, Got¡ernntent
Trading Enterprises Perþrmance Indicators 1987-88 to 1,992-93,Industry Commission, Canberra, 1994, p.3,4; and
Steering Committee on National Performance Monitoring of Covernment Trading Enterprises, Cot¡enmtent
Trøding Enterprises Perþrmance Indicators 1990-9L t0 1994-95,Industry Commission, Canberra, 1996, p.6.
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Unfortunately however, it appears that the net benefits of these policies were only
moderate. Each policy had key limitations. In particular, while each policy made a
contribution to reducing costs, none had a strong effect on the development of the
key capabilities that firms must master if they are to innovate, export and achieve
fast growth and competitive advantage, such as R&D, management, best practice
work organisation or export marketing. In addition, none of the policies made a
substantial contribution to creating net employment growth. Even the IC's ORANI
model made this finding in relation to tarifÍ cuts and infrastructure reform.
Meanwhile, chapter three found that, among OECD nations in the period, there was
not a strong correlation between the size of government on the one hand, and
economic growth, employment growth, unemployment, and the percentage of the
working age population employed, on the other. Furthermore, neither tariff cuts, nor
infrastructure reform, appear to improve the trade balance because they foster
imports at least as much as they foster exports, meaning they make no net
contribution to removing the external constraint on economic and employment
growth.
Each of the policies also had significant weaknesses. In particular, each brought
significant dislocation, whicþ in combination, appeared to involve the loss of several
hundred thousand jobs. Unfortunately, free market reform is particularly prone to
creating structural unemployment because assistance removal often leads to
permanent job losses in particular sectors. This makes structural adjustment highly
problematic. Where people become structurally unemployed, it can be particularly
difficult for them to gain alternative employment. Where people experience
prolonged unemployment, they often face very harsh social conditions, including
poverty, which can strongly contribute to psychological and physical decline, and a
range of socially negative behaviour. People in such difficult circumstances can not
readily form the basis of a restructured Australian economy.
Rationalist policies also appeared to contribute to the significant dislocation
experienced by many of Australia's regional areas. Because most people are
unwilling or unable to move from areas that have suffered dislocation, free market
reforms are producing numerous pools of long-term, structural unemployment in
regions throughout Australia. In addition to producing major social costs, this
dislocation has major economic costs. In particular, it produces a significant gross
contribution to the hysteresis in Australia's unemployment rate, lowers production
and involves significant adverse impacts on government outlays and revenue. Such
dislocation could have been far worse had rationalist plans for more rapid reform
been implemented. Rationalist policies may be more effective in destroying
inefficient firms than fostering the creation of new firms.
Rationalists also tend to advocate rapid reform regardless of the economic context
and the net impact of all government policies on employment. For example, rigorous
tariff cuts and free market infrastructure reforms were continued during the worst
recession in 60 years, and amidst very high interest rates. This combination of factors
brought a significant rise in unemployment, which included an alarming rise in long
term unemployment.
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A key lesson of the period was that free market reforms are best implemented during
periods of economic growth, and need to be accompanied by policies - such as those
outlined in part two - which encourage growth and the redeployment of displaced
labour.
The conclusion that free market reforms brought only moderate - rather than
substantial - benefits, was broadly supported by the empirical evidence outlined in
chapter four.
On the positive side, chapter four showed that, after decades of little beneficial
structural change, the Labor Government helped to reverse the long run decline in
Australia's exports to GDP ratio, continue with renewed vigour the reduction in
commodity reliance, and begin the rapid growth of exports of ETMs and services.
Australia's economic and employment growth were also strong by OECD standards,
although this growth was only solid in absolute terms, and low compared to the
growth achieved by the 'Asian tigers' in the period. The employment growth was
also insufficient to substantially reduce unemployment, which remained high by
OECD standards. The quality of the employment growth was also open to question.
Nearly half the jobs created were part-time jobs, and in yearly averages, there were
only 70,000 more full-time jobs in 1995-96 than there were in1989-90."0u
On the negative side, Australia ran significant deficits on the trade and current
accounts in the period, while the net foreign debt rose dramatically and national
savings declined from an already low starting point. Australia also remains far too
dependant on unprocessed commodities, which are in long run relative decline in
world trade. Despite being a majority of world exports, Australia's ETM exports
comprised only 23,4 per cent of Australia's merchandise exports in1995-96, but were
75.5 per cent of Australia's merchandise imports."o' Australia has also done little to
capitalise on the potential to rapidly increase the growth of services exports. With
this export structure, any growth of above 3.5 to 4 per cent appears to be
unsustainable. Lagging living standards and mass unemployment will continue
unless Australia can rapidly restructure its export base to ETMs and sophisticated
services over the coming decades.
In sum, the evidence outlined in part one suggested that rationalist policies may have
produced only moderate net beneficial effects for national competitiveness,
restructuring and employment growth.
The second major conclusion of this thesis is that the overwhelming faith placed in
free markets by rationalists in the period has the potential to reduce economic
welfare.
In the period of the Hawke and Keating Labor Governments, the rationalist
dominated economic bureaucracy became extreme, almost automatically prescribing
1146 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australiøn Economic Indicators June 1997, Cat. no.1350.0, p.62; and Australian
Bureau of Statistics, Australian Economic Indicøtors lanuary/February 1993, Cat. no.1350.0, p.90. The figures are
original figures.
1147 Departmcnt of Forcign Affairs and Tradc, Composition of Tradc Australia 1,995-96, Dcpartmcnt of Forcign
Affairs and Trade, Canberra, 1,996, p.19.
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market policies in a vast array of economic policy areas. Little attempt was made to
actively explore how active industry policies could improve economic outcomes.
Rationalists often simply assumed that industry policies reduced economic welfare.
This view has the potential to reduce economic welfare because the growth of the
private sector and the economy as a whole, is, and has always beery dependent on
government investment and support structures, such as the system of law and public
administration and the public provision of health, education, economic infrastructure
and scientific and technological expertise. These government support structures
require constant reconstruction, not the dismemberment rationalists invariably
advocate. In particular, the rationalist approach can impede the creation of economic
prosperity by failing to build capacity in a range of areas crucial to national economic
development, but subject to market failure. Australia's future economic development
is crucially dependent on its economic elite refocussing on the key industry policy
question, namely: 'In what areas and how can government investment improve
economic welfare?'
In part one, this rationalist approach was argued to be flawed in two contexts.
Firstly, rationalists may have impeded economic growth by under-investing in the
nation's economic infrastructure. This was evidenced by the fact that: a range of
studies have indicated that public investment in economic infrastructure has played
a key role in fostering economic growth in nations throughout the world, including
Australia;"*u and many vital infrastructure projects were yet to be commenced or
completed when the Labor lost power.
Secondly, the rationalist desire for small government appeared to preclude
investments in a range of crucial areas. For example, too little was done to address
the need to create a world-class vocational education and training system. It may be
that a balance needs to be struck between minimising government spending and
taxation on the one hand, and undertaking sufficient public investment to maximise
the growth of the private sector and the overall economy on the other.
This brings us to the third, and most important, conclusion of the thesis. The key
reason rationalism fails to substantially propel national competitiveness,
restructuring and employment growth is that it fails to foster the creation of an
innovation-driven economy. This conclusion is based on two key arguments.
Firstly, innovation is now the most important factor in creating national competitive
advantage, restructuring and employment growth. A vast body of international
literature, and the experience of many firms and nations, highlights that the key to
national competitive advantage in most areas of world trade lies in being able to
innovate, and, more specifically, produce and export sophisticated, high quality,
innovative products, aimed at well defined market niches."oe'Where firms can create
a product that is unique in value in the market, they can charge premium prices
ttou Fo, example, see William Easterly & Sergio Rebelo 'Fiscal policy and economic growth: An empirical
investi ga tion', l ournal of Mone t ary E conomi cs, v o1.32, "1993, pp.417 - 458.
"on Fo. example, see Michael E. Porter, The Competitiae Adaøntage of Nations, op. cit., p.45,49-52,173,62L
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andf or achieve increased market share.ttto This competitive advantage can then be
sustained by continuous innovation to upgrade and broaden the sources of
advantage.
Innovation increases economic and employment growth because the creation of new
products entails entirely new production. Innovation can thus bring growth through
the creation of whole new firms, industry sectors or market segments, as well as
through the spin-off growth they create for existing and new suppliers."5' In almost
every industrialised nation, a small core of dynamic, innovative, export-oriented,
high growth firms make a disproportionate contribution to national competitiveness,
and to sales, export and employment growth. Innovation is the main driver of
restructuring and employment growth.
To consistently compete on the basis of innovation, firms and nations must have
strong capability in each area within the innovation chain, namely R&D,
technological diffusion, work organisation, management, education and training,
finance and export marketing. For example, sales of an innovative product will be
constrained if the firm's workforce can not consistently produce high quality
products, or if management can not effectively oversee export marketing strategies.
The second key argument underpinning this conclusion is that the rationalist
paradigm can not create an innovation-driven economy because, in each of the key
capabilities crucial to creating an innovation-driven economy, markets fail, yel
rationalists are extremely reluctant to investigate, let alone formulate, industry policy
initiatives which would support capacity building in these areas. While the reasons
for market failure are not the same for each link in the innovation chain, common
reasons are the presence of spillovers, lack of knowledge and information as to the
importance of the task and how to perform it, and the complexity, cost and risk
involved in undertaking the tasks. Without intelligent goverrunent action to create
excellence in these key capabilities, Australia will remain unable to establish an
innovation-driven economy.
Not surprisingly, given market failure and the lack of effective government action,
Australia has acute weaknesses in each area of the innovation chain. In R&D,
Australia's BERD to GDP ratio is still around one third less than the OECD
average,"u' only a small minority of firms consistently perform R&D, and the
linkages between public researchers and industry remain weak. The up-take of new
technology by Australian industry, in general,Iags three to eight years behind our
competitors,t't' and Australia's technology infrastructure remains vastly under-
ttto 
¡ohn M. Legge, The Competitizte Edge: Hout Innoz¡øtion Creates and Sustains the Competitiue Adttantage of
Enterprises, Allen and Unwin, North Sydney, New South Wales, 7992, p.32,33,35; and Jenny Stewart, The Lie
of the Leztel Playing Field: Industry Policy and Australia's Future, Text Publishing, Melbourne,1994, p.54.
tttt M"tul Trades Unions, Policy for Industry Deaelopment and More lobs,Metal Trades Unions, Melbourne, 1984,
p.265-267.
t't' Fig.rr", calculated at my request by the Science and Technology Policy Branch, Department of Industry,
Science and Tourism, August 1998. Note that the OECD average is only for the 19 countries for which
reliable data was available namely Ireland, Australia, Sweden, Denmark, Canada, Finland, Austria, Norway,
France, New Zealand,Japan, Spain, United States, Belgium, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Italy, Gerrnany
ancl Switzerland.
11s3 Working Nation: Policies ønd Programs, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1994, p.65.
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developed. Best practice work organisation has been embraced by only a small
minority of firms. Australia's managers are among the worst in the OECD and are
particularly weak in fostering innovation and entrepreneurship."'o While skills are
crucial to innovation and national competitiveness, Australia continues to under-
invest in education, particularly in public secondary education. The vocational
system is also particularly under-developed, including in key areas of relevance to
creating an innovative economy. Additionally, disadvantaged groups continue to be
denied equal access to the education system, and participation in upper-secondary
and tertiary education is still far too low to build and sustain an innovative,
competitive economy. A number of market failures continue to exist in the financial
system. Most importantly, Australia has not developed a sufficiently large informal
equity market, or a substantial formal venture and development capital market. The
result is that too many innovative SMEs can not gain access to equity capital and
many innovative product ideas are therefore never commercialised, at least in
Australia. Finally, few firms have developed significant export marketing capability,
and Australia continues to have an export to GDP ratio lower than most
industrialised natiofls,"uu and lower than consistent with an innovative economy. As
a consequence of these weaknesses throughout the innovation chain, Australia is
unable to compete to a significant degree on the basis of innovation.
What was the rationalist response to such a situation? Hardline rationalists were
focused on the establishment of market-based policies and paid little attention to
how government policies could foster innovation. In most areas of the innovation
chain, hardline rationalists denied the existence of market failure, despite substantial
evidence to the contrary, and despite the significant weakness of the Australian
performance throughout the innovation chain over recent decades. In none of the
links of the innovation chain have rationalists made a substantial effort to formulate
policies to foster Australian excellence in the capability. In short, rationalists make no
attempt to foster the creation of an innovation-driven economy.
Without government support to build up capacity in each link in the innovation
chain, the great bulk of Australian firms will remain unable to continuously
innovate, and Australia will be unable to compete on global markets to a significant
degree in vital innovation-intensive sectors, such as ETMs and advanced services.
Such an approach will not bring the new firms and sectors that constitute effective
restructuring.
Fortunately, Labor did not always follow rationalist advice. Where they did
implement progressive policies, they often succeeded in fostering competence in
innovative capabilities. For example, in R&D, Labor's suite of progressive policies
assisted in producing an increase in BERD from 0.26 per cent of GDP in 1983 to 0.87
per cent of GDP in 1995."5u In export marketing, progressive policies assisted
ttto IMD, World Competitiueness Yearbook 1gg6,lMD, Lausanne, Switzerland, 1996, p.63,511,,51,5.
tttt ibid., p.386.
"tu Fig,rr", calculated at my request by the Science and Technology Policy Branch, Deparhnent of Industry,
Science and Tourism. August 1998. Note that the OECD average is only for the 19 countries for which
reliable data was available namely lreland, Australia, Swedery Denmark, Canada, Finland, Austria, Norway,
Flance, New Zealand, Japan, Spain, United States, Belgium, United I(ngdom, Netherlands, Italy, Gern'rany
and Switzerland.
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numerous firms to break into global markets and achieve sales, collectively, in the
billions.tttT
Flowever, while Labor did veer marginally from the rationalist market prescription
in some areas, it failed to create excellence in any elements of the innovation chain.
Inadequate investment in those areas it did address, and, more particularly, the
failure to adopt significant reforms in the remaining capabilities in the innovation
chain, was the key reason Labor failed to create an innovation-driven economy. This
meant that, where Australian firms sought to commercialise innovative ideas, too
often they could not gain patient finance, and where they did, too often their work
organisation, management, up-take of advanced technology and marketing were too
sub-standard to fully capitalise on the innovative research ideas.
The Federal Government should make innovation the key focus of their economic
strategy. By building national capability in each link in the innovation chain, the
Government could help to create an innovative economy, and thereby assist in
creating competitive advantage, restructuring and economic and employment
growth.
In this thesis, numerous government policies and programs that could help to create
excellence in each component of the innovation chain were outlined. While some will
disagree with some of the ideas, the aim of the exercise was to shift the debate into
the difficult areas beyond rationalism's 'no industry policy' prescription. The most
important economic questions lie beyond these simple prescriptions that dominate
mainstream Australian economic rationalism, in the areas where there is market
failure and where active government policies may be able to foster competitive
advantage. It is through research and policy creativity in these areas that an
innovative, competitive economy can be built.
With respect to the development of an innovation-driven economy, Australia has 'an
advantage of backwardness'.ttlt Given the extent of the weaknesses throughout the
innovation chain and the worldwide examples of successful solutions to many of the
problems, there is a considerable layer of clearly growth-inducing industry policy the
Federal Government could implement, before it got to areas in which it was
uncertain whether the benefits of goverrunent activity outweighed their cost. A
strategic industry policy directed to creating an innovation-driven economy could do
much to drive employment growth, foster restructuring and create national
competitive advantage.
11s7 Austrade, Australian Trade Commission Annual Report 1995-96, Australian Government Publishing Service,
Canberra, 1996,p.3"L
tttt Tl-,i, terrn was used in the United States context in Stephen S. Cohen & John Zysrnan, Mørrufacturing Mattcrs:
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